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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies the first Egyptian presidential election campaigns after the 25th 
January 2011 revolution. It aims to answer two questions: to what extent this election 
was professionalised and to what extent the levels of professionalism impacted the 
democratisation process of Egypt. To answer these questions, the study analyses the top 
five presidential candidates’ campaigns, applying the professionalisation index to them; 
this consists of two sub-indices that assess campaign structures and campaign strategies, 
offers insights into the organizational and tactical development of the campaigns and 
how they viewed the functions of campaigning in relation to this contest. The study 
does this through analytical qualitative research involving interviews with campaign 
staff and managers as well as analysis of secondary documents and contemporary media 
reports. 
 
The thesis demonstrates the crucial role campaign professionalism played in the 2012 
Egyptian presidential elections. The thesis infers that the professionalism of the 2012 
elections campaigns might have been the main factor that led to the success of both 
Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq in the first round of elections. The thesis also 
argues that the professionalisatism – as applied during this election through a “do 
anything to win” or a “win at all costs” approach - had negative implications on the 
democratization process of Egypt, as it hindered Egypt’s transition to functional if thin 
democracy. On the contrary, it led Egypt to remain trapped in its transitional period. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview  
 
The year 2012 can be considered a watershed in Egypt’s history as it came after a 
revolution that ended the rule of Hosni Mubarak, who had been in power for thirty 
years. For the first time in Egyptian history, not only in modern history, Egyptians were 
able to choose their ruler. There had been no form of presidential elections from the first 
ruler King Menes (3100 BC) taking power until the election of President Hosni 
Mubarak (2005) which did not follow the norms of democratic elections. Even after the 
1952 revolution, Egyptians were not able to choose their president through multi-
candidate elections. They were only able to do this through a referendum, where they 
had to say yes or no to one person, who was always the president. 
 
In 2005, and after huge pressure from different powers in the country, President 
Mubarak changed article 76 in the constitution which allowed for a multi-candidate 
presidential election for the first time in Egyptian history. However, this election was 
widely seen as a façade, as it was already previously known that Mubarak was the one 
who was going to win. In 2011, the Egyptian revolution took place and for the first time 
in the history of the country, Egypt witnessed a real multi-candidate presidential 
election in 2012; where no one – even pollsters – was able to predict the winner. 
 
The period prior to this election and the election result itself showed many surprises and 
unpredictable results. This indicates that this field still requires some attention by 
experts and scholars to know how elections work in a country in its transitional phase 
such as Egypt at that time.  For instance, all polls conducted before the elections showed 
that the competition was mainly between two candidates, the first being Abdel Moneim 
Aboul Fotouh, who had previously been dismissed from the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
second frontrunner candidate was Amr Moussa who portrayed himself as a defector 
from the Mubarak regime. However, the actual results of the first round of the elections 
showed completely the opposite as the two winners were Ahmed Shafiq, the last Prime 
Minister during the Mubarak era, and Mohamed Morsi, the head of the Freedom and 
Justice Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite the role of the 
people in demanding change, the revolution’s candidate, Hamdeen Sabahi came in third 
	 10	
place. Another feature of the campaigning process is that many candidates refused to 
use some forms of campaigning. For example, all candidates except Moussa and Aboul 
Fotouh refused to participate in any form of debates.  
 
Another controversial feature of this election was the winner: Mohamed Morsi, who 
entered the election by chance, became the president of Egypt. Was this the result 
Egyptians were looking for? What was the role of campaigning in this result? To what 
extent did the campaign conduct and its result impact upon the democratisation process 
in Egypt? These are some of the questions this thesis will answer. 
 
1.2 Rationale of the study 
 
This thesis presents the first analytical study of the levels of professionalism of 
campaigns in the 2012 Egyptian presidential elections. It provides the story of the five 
main campaigns by applying the professionalisation index to analyse their structures 
(hardware) and strategies (software). The thesis also provides an evaluation of the 
application of the professionalization index to nascent democracies, and the impact of 
campaign professionalism on such democracies.  
 
Due to the novelty of the whole topic, the results of this analysis add significantly to the 
understanding of campaigning and create an academic base for further studies within 
similar fragile democratic systems. Furthermore, it should offer campaigners practical 
guidance when approaching future elections. 
 
 
1.2 Research questions  
 
This thesis aims to explore campaign professionalism in the 2012 presidential elections 
and to what extent this affected the democratisation process in Egypt.  
 
The thesis will focus on analysing the Egyptian case by answering these main research 
questions:  
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1. Using professionalization theory, how was the 2012 presidential 
election campaigns organized and conducted? 
 
2. To what extent did campaign professionalism determine the outcome 
of the first and second rounds of this election?  
 
3.  What were the implications of the election campaigns for the 
process of democratisation in Egypt? 
 
To answer these questions, the research will explore the possible implications of 
professionalism using literature which examines the relationships between 
professionalization and democratization. After that, it will apply the professionalization 
index to the five studied campaigns by analyzing data from semi-structured interviews 
with the campaign managers using a critical realist paradigm, as appears in the 
following chapters. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure  
 
Chapter Two discusses the literature on both democracy and campaign professionalism. 
The chapter highlights the validity of using the professionalisation index in studying 
campaign professionalism. The chapter also discusses the relationship between 
professionalization and democracy.  
 
Chapter Three set the scene by describing the socio-political environment in which the 
2012 Egyptian presidential elections took place. The chapter highlights the extent 
Egyptians were polarised by the time of election, and argues that the confusion and 
mismanagement of the transitional period by all political forces led to flaws in the 
process of democratisation in Egypt making it difficult for first-time campaigners to 
work and mobilise voters.  
 
Chapter Four discusses the methodology for the research and paves the way for the 
following chapter, by highlighting the importance and validity of the critical realist 
research paradigm; and explaining the process of interviewing as the main data 
collection tool. 
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Based on the methodological chapter, Chapter Five applies the professionalisation index 
to each of the five main campaigns separately and analyses their structures and 
strategies drawing on data from the series of interviews with campaign staff. 
 
Based on the previous chapter, Chapter Six analyses the five studied election campaigns 
by comparing and analysing their structures and strategies. By analysing the campaigns’ 
professionalism, the chapter explores which campaigns were more professional and 
argues that professionalism played a crucial role in determining the results of the first 
round of elections. However, it did not play the same role in determining the result of 
the second round of elections, as there were other determinant factors such as voters 
resorting to punitive voting.  
 
The final chapter concludes the study by discussing the implications of the levels of 
professionalism on the democratization process in Egypt. The chapter concludes that the 
professionalism - as applied by Morsi’s campaign - had a negative impact on Egypt’s 
democratic transition in general as it led Egypt to being trapped in its transitional 
period, rather than moving to a functional emergent but thin democracy. The chapter 
also provides an evaluation of the application of the professionalisation index to nascent 
democracies. 
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Chapter Two: Democracy and Professionalisation: definitions and debate 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There are no studies to date on the 2012 Egyptian campaigns. This is the reason why 
this thesis will depend on literature about campaigns and its relation to democracy from 
a wider perspective, aiming to apply it to the Egyptian case. This chapter argues that 
studying campaigns is essential to understanding elections and democracy. The chapter 
further argues that campaigns play a vital role in elections as they can influence both the 
process and the outcome of elections, thus influencing the quality of democracy in 
general. This is due to the functions campaigns play in the election process such as their 
role in informing, persuading and mobilising voters (Norris 2002), making them a core 
feature of modern democracies. This chapter highlights campaign functions and 
relations to democracy and how campaigns can be studied academically by highlighting 
well-known frameworks used to examine the professionalism of campaigns. The 
chapter argues that literature on professionalism provides the most appropriate 
framework to study campaigns as it allows mapping how any specific campaign adheres 
to the core features of the post-modern era campaign. The chapter also argues that the 
professionalisation index is the most appropriate framework to study campaigns as it 
deconstructs the campaign into structures (hardware) and strategies (software) which 
give an overall understanding of how the campaigns were planned and implemented. 
The chapter also highlights the main arguments regarding the relationship between 
campaign professionalism and democracy in order to test them on the Egyptian case in 
Chapter Six. The chapter will do this by reviewing literature on: democracy, 
democratisation, elections, campaigns and campaigns’ professionalism. 
 
2.2 On Democracy  
 
There is agreement among scholars that democracy is the best type of governance tried 
so far. Despite having many flaws, no other system has ever been found to be better 
(Zihala, 2003). For example, democracy is believed to protect and respect human rights 
(Poe and Tate 1994), reduce poverty (Sen 1999), and protect the environment (Quan Li 
and Rafael Reuveny 2006). Robert Dahl (1998) argues that democracy produces eight 
main desirable consequences which are: avoiding tyranny, guaranteeing essential rights 
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for its citizens, general freedom, self-determination, moral autonomy, human 
development, protecting essential personal interests and political equality. He even 
argues that modern democracies produce more desirable consequences such as: peace 
seeking and prosperity (Ibid-P: 46-61). Despite the fact that some of these consequences 
have been criticised, no better alternative system of government has been provided 
rather than democracy.  
 
Jean Jacques Rousseau argued that 'citizens should be subordinate to the will of the 
whole', that's why Rousseau's social contract argument created 'a collective body of the 
people who act as a whole for the good of the whole', what Zihala (2003) calls 'the 
greatest good for the greatest number’. 
 
Wider definitions of democracy focus on elections, equality, individual rights, rule of 
law, accountability and participation. Joseph Schumpeter (1943:271) defines democracy 
as 'free competition for free vote', thus highlighting the centrality of elections for 
democracy. Aristotle and Plato mentioned equality as a central aspect to the idea of 
democracy (Catt, 1999). Juan Linz argued that without the rule of law, there is no 
democracy (Rose, 2009). A democratic government must also be accountable to its 
people (Przeworski ,1999). Citizens’ participation and engagement are also seen as 
crucial factors for democracy (eg: Buss 2006, Pateman 1970, Fishkin 1991, Gamson 
2001, Dahlgren 2001). Dahl (1998: 37-38) highlights five criteria for a democratic 
process: 1- effective participation: all members must have equal and effective 
opportunities for making their views known, 2- voting equality: each member should 
have equal opportunity to express his vote, 3- inclusion of all adults: all adults must 
have their full rights of citizenship, 4- enlightened understanding: each member must 
have equal and effective opportunities to learn about relevant policy alternatives and 
their consequences, and 5- control of the agenda: members must have exclusive 
opportunities to decide which subjects are placed on the agenda.  
 
2.3 Measuring democracy  
 
There is no consensus on how to measure democracy. It can be measured by various 
means, depending on which definition of democracy is adopted. For instance, if the 
definition adopted is 'free competition for free vote' then elections and participation 
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could be the main and only aspect in measuring democracy. On the other hand, wider 
definitions of democracy require wider means of measurement: what Bernhagen (2009) 
calls single and multi-dimensions of democracy, or what (Coppedge 2005) calls 'thin' 
and 'thick' concepts of democracy. 
 
Dahl’s (1971) measurement of democracy depends on two variables: public contestation 
and citizens’ participation, which he then highlights as the five criteria of democratic 
processes mentioned above.  Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang H. Reinicke (1990) 
developed another method of measuring democracy based on Dahl's measurement 
known as the Polyarchy Scale, which measures the 'degree to which national political 
systems meet the minimum requirements of political democracy' (1990:51). The 
Polyarchy scale depends on five variables: free and fair elections, freedom of 
organization, freedom of expression, media pluralism, availability of alternative sources 
of information, and finally the right to vote. Stressing the similarities between his 
variables and Dahl's variables, Tatu Vanhanen (2000; 2003) developed an index of 
democratisation that measures democracy according to two variables, which are 
competition and participation. According to Vanhanen, ‘Competition and participation 
represent the most crucial aspects of democracy and therefore their combination may 
constitute the most realistic measure of democratization’ (Vanhanen 2003:55). For 
Gasiorowski (1996), measuring democracy depends on three variables: extensive 
competition at regular intervals without the use of force, inclusive level of political 
participation, and civil and political liberties.  
 
Phillips Cutright (1963) developed an index of political development where he studied 
some socio-economic variables. Each country was given a score from zero to 63 points 
over the 21-year period of his study. Polity IV project, originally designed by Ted Gurr, 
depends on 'three principal characteristics: the recruitment of executive authority (i.e. 
how the chief executive gains office), executive constraints (i.e. checks and balances on 
executive action), and political competition (i.e. how public preferences are represented' 
(Marshall 2010). 
 
Another famous index for measuring democracy is the Freedom House index, which 
depends on two dimensions: political rights and civil liberties. The rating process is 
based on a checklist of 10 political rights questions - which are grouped in three 
	 16	
subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation - and 15 civil 
liberties questions, which are grouped in four subcategories: freedom of expression and 
belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy, and 
individual rights (Freedom House methodology, 2012). The Economist’s intelligence 
unit's index of democracy is based on the rating of 60 indicators grouped in five 
categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of 
government, political participation, and political culture (Kekic 2007). 
 
Whether a thick or thin view of democracy is adopted, and thus a thick or thin means of 
measuring it, variables like elections and participation appear to be key components of 
democracy, though not the only ones, and could serve as a starting point towards 
democratisation. 
 
2.4 Democratisation  
 
Democratisation is not an alternative to democracy. Democracy is a political system that 
involves the values and criteria discussed above; democratisation is the process of 
establishing that democratic system (Paul Carnegie, 2010:14). According to Geddis, our 
understanding of democracy will determine how a political system can be democratised 
(Ibid: p:16). In general, democratisation can be understood as the process of replacing 
an undemocratic political system with a democratic one, or the process of making a 
political system more democratic (Bernhagen, 2009). A more comprehensive definition 
is provided by Laurence Whitehead (2002: 27) where he defines democratisation as a 
'complex, long term, dynamic and open-ended process. It consists of progress towards a 
more rule based, more consensual and more participatory type of politics' 
 
Democratisation has been a dominant global trend, especially during the first half of 
1990 where the number of democracies increased from 76 to 117 (Ibid: 1). Francis 
Fukuyama (1992) described this triumph of democracy as the 'end of history'. Samuel 
Huntington (1991) also described it as 'one of the most important developments in the 
history of humankind’. 
 
Huntington (Ibid) also distinguishes three major waves of democratisation. The first 
waves started at 1828 and the latest wave started in 1974. Renske Doorenspleet adds 
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another fourth wave starting in 1989/90 with the fall of the Berlin wall and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union (Schlosser, P: 42). This continuing eagerness towards 
democracy may be further proof that democracy is the best model of governance so far, 
as explained previously.  
 
However, that does not mean that the way is always paved towards reaching a 
democratic political system. Huntington explained two other stages of ‘reverse' waves. 
 
The democratisation process does not necessarily mean achieving the aspired 
democracy. Diamond and Myers (2001) show four categories a democratisation process 
could achieve. The first is when the democratisation process fully succeeds and reaches 
a liberal democratic political system. The second is a non-liberal democracy, where the 
country holds free and fair elections but has some constraints on individual freedoms or 
any other constraints on the process such as military interference or high levels of 
executive domination or judicial inefficacy. The third category is what is known as 
pseudo- democracies or hybrid regimes; such regimes offer some of the democratic 
practices such as elections and institutions but have one dominant political ruling party 
that hinders the process of free and fair elections, as well as citizens’ participation and 
engagement. The fourth category is the authoritarian regime that does not allow formal 
political opposition, preventing the opposition from participating in the election process, 
as well as repressing individual rights.  
 
Guillermo O'Donnell (1994) also speaks about 'delegative' democracies, where regular 
elections are taking place, but with less political participation for citizens, where politics 
is 'delegated' to ineffective leaders. 
 
Arend Lijphart’s (1999) patterns of democracies list ten indicators according to which 
democracy can be classified. These include concentration versus sharing of executive 
power, the balance of power between the executive and legislature branch, the party 
system adopted, the type of government - whether it is unitary and centralised, or 
federal and decentralised, whether the legislative power is concentrated in a unicameral 
or bi-cameral legislature, the constitution flexibility or rigidity, judicial review and 
finally whether the central bank is independent or controlled by the executive power. 
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There is no single explanation of why democratisation fails in specific countries, as 
every case differs. However, in general, many countries fail due to political leaders' 
reluctance to 'devolve power from the political centre to local authorities and groups in 
societies' (Diamond and Myers, 2001:5); or due to the unawareness of elites with the 
necessary 'values and beliefs needed to represent the citizen's interest' (Ibid:5). Other 
reasons include fraud and corruption in any aspect of the democratisation process, lack 
of power to those elected (Ibid:6), or inability to deal with ethnic or religious 
differences (Schlosser, 2009). 
 
2.5 Elections 
 
Despite Aristotle's negative view of elections -as it allows rule of all the people and not 
by the best people - elections are believed to be the prerequisite for democracy. Richard 
Katz (1997:3) describes elections as the 'defining institutions of modern democracy' and 
'the device that makes democracy possible'. Powell, (2000) considers elections as the 
most crucial element of democracy, although not the only instrument of democracy. 
Rose and Mosssawir (1967) describe voting through elections as a 'single act of political 
participation’ (p:173), which is a core aspect of democracy. Dennis F. Thompson (2002) 
also highlights that 'elections can occur without democracy, but democracy cannot 
endure without elections' (p:1). 
 
Whether adopting a thin view of democracy or a thick view, building a democracy 
should start by a process of free and fair elections.  Democratisation via elections has 
been a common model of moving towards democracy, especially in the post-cold war 
era or what is known as the third wave of democratization, as it leads to peaceful 
transition towards democracy in many countries (Larry Diamond, 2009).   
 
Richard Katz (1997) highlighted five main functions of elections in the democratisation 
process. The first function is to confer or confirm the legitimacy of the regime; without 
elections that are held with the view of democracy being adopted in the society, citizens 
will not have a chance to vote ‘yes’ and thus give legitimacy to the regime, or decide to 
vote no, or boycott, or spoil their votes, or vote for another candidate, thus conferring 
legitimacy from one side, giving it to another side. A second function is the installation 
of officials, as elections 'fill offices with people'. A third function is selection and 
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choice, as without real selection and choice, the institutions of government could 
become authoritarian. A fourth function is to create representation, as elections are the 
institutions by which the represented authorise their representatives to act for them or in 
their place'. A fifth function of election is popular involvement, as elections drive 
citizens’ involvements in politics, and provide education about politics, mainly through 
election campaigns. Elections also ensure accountability, and give voters some 
influence on the direction of the adopted policy.  
 
Rose and Mosasawir (1967) highlight six main functions of elections. First, they solve 
the problem of leadership succession within a political system. Second, they control the 
policy decisions of government. Third, they influence the policy decisions of 
governments. Fourth, they legitimise the political regime. Fifth, elections may also lead 
to the repudiation of a regime, which can happen in extreme cases. Repudiation may 
take many forms, such as the refusal of a defeated candidate to leave office, or the 
revolt of losers. Elections can also play an important role in authoritarian regimes, such 
as splitting oppositions into factions (Linz, 1978), identifying and targeting opposition 
groups (Way, 2006), and buying time for a later exit (Hermet, 1978). Those points may 
be an explanation of why authoritarian regimes tend to hold frequent elections, without 
the intention of democratization i.e. elections without democracy.  
 
For elections to play their role, they have to be free, fair and regular.  
Robert Dahl described free elections as those where citizens can go to vote without fear, 
where coercion is not available. Dahl also defined fair 'when all votes are counted as 
equal'. Further international electoral guidelines added more specific criteria for free 
and fair elections. Such elections require a legislative framework, impartial practices by 
election administrations, media, legislative and executive power. Fair and free elections 
should also allow monitoring of the voting and vote counting processes, transparent and 
well known procedures for resolving election complaints and disputes, treating 
competing candidates as equal, guaranteeing freedom of speech and expression and 
campaigning, protecting the concept of a secret ballot, as well as administrating the 
whole process through an impartial committee, not controlled by the ruling party 
(Diamond and Myers, 2001). 
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Despite the significant role elections play in democratisation, there is an academic 
debate around the idea of democratisation by elections (e.g. Lindberg, 1969; 2009). The 
debate usually revolves around two issues: elections can lead to and enhance 
democracy, or they can lead to enhancing autocracy, as is the case with the elections in 
the Arab world (e.g. Sadiki, 2008 and Lustokar, 2009). This brings us to Diamond’s 
(2009) conclusion that democratic transitions via elections do not happen in isolation 
but are affected by many criteria such as the degree of pluralism in a society, the 
strength of opposition, the ability to mobilise and monitor elections, the role of the 
international community and the presence of international observers.  Pippa Norris 
(2009) also argues that the design of the electoral system can also affect the election 
process and thus the democratization process itself.  
 
Despite the fact that elections can be deficient due to flaws within the process itself or 
within the surrounding political environment, Lindberg argues that even deficient 
elections are worth holding as they could lead to democratic change later on, as 
elections ‘provide a set of institutions, rights, and processes stacking up incentives and 
costs in a way that tend to further democratization’ (2009:17). 
 
2.6 Campaigns and democracy 
 
Campaigns are seen as a core feature of democracy due to the important role they play 
in enhancing democracy and elections, as will be explained later. Campaigns are 
defined as organized communication efforts that seek to influence the process of 
elections. Political campaigns are periods of high-intensity information flows that reach 
broad cross-sections of the general public, including many individuals who are typically 
inattentive to politics (Cho, J et al, 2009). Thus campaigns are usually combined with 
elections as they aim to influence the process and outcome of elections (Schmitt & 
Farrell, 2002, P:3).  
 
The role of campaigns has risen dramatically in modern democracies due to three main 
reasons: (1) The decline in political parties as institutions along with party dealignment 
made ordinary citizens, especially those not affiliated to a specific party, rely more on 
campaigns in gathering information. (2) The growth of electronic media made it easier 
to communicate campaign activities and messages, besides creating new opportunities 
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for campaign influence. (3) Constant use of public opinion ensures that voters accept 
the final result.  
 
Academic debate on campaigns used to revolve around whether they matter or not 
(Farrell & Schmitt-beck, 2002). Traditional studies, depending on the amount of voter 
persuasion, and voter turnout to assess the importance of campaigns, used to claim that 
campaigns do not really matter (Iyengar & Simon, 1997). Other recent studies tend to 
prove that campaigns have an important role in elections as they help in priming, 
learning, education, political knowledge, civic engagement and political participation. 
Thus the debate has moved from whether campaigns matter or not, to what effects 
campaigns have, and what sections of citizens they affect: whether they have more 
influence on the politically aware citizens or the less aware ones (Claassen, 2011). This 
perspective thus supports the media mobilization theories’ perspective rather than media 
malaise theories, especially with campaigns being mediated. 
 
Campaigns are proven to be important in both established and new democracies. In a 
new democracy, there is a lack of resources in conveying the required messages. With 
the availability of public TV and social media for use by different candidates, besides 
the absence of established party loyalties, campaigns can play a role in shaping or 
influencing voters’ decisions, mainly because of the information they provide (Popsecu 
& Toka, 2002). This is true whether voters are actively looking for information, or 
whether the campaign itself is active and seeks to provide voters with information.  
 
Pippa Norris (2002) argues that the organised efforts of campaigns revolve around three 
issues: inform, persuade and mobilise, which can be understood as the main functions 
of campaigns. Campaigns play an important role in helping voters formulate their 
preferences, and helping them make their voting decision according to the information 
they gain, as campaigns raise the voters’ public awareness and knowledge about 
specific election-related issues or candidates. Campaigns also have a persuasion 
function in terms of reinforcing or changing public attitudes and decisions. They also 
have an effect upon mobilisation; one way of assessing this is by voters’ participation 
and turnout. In order to reach the level of mobilizing citizens to vote, campaigns serve 
other functions as well. Campaigns play an important role in the enlightenment process. 
They 'enlighten' voters about the interests and topics that are important to them. As a 
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forum of debate and discussion, voters are more likely to learn something about the 
candidates and their positions as they follow the campaign (Holbrook, 1996). The 
priming function of the campaign, along with enlightenment, helps citizens to be 
persuaded. Priming can make citizens change their minds by changing the relative 
weight of their opinions while taking their decisions (Gindengil et al: 2002).  Thus 
campaigns can reinforce opinions and decisions made by citizens, create more voters 
from the non-voter pool, and influence the non-decided voters to support a specific 
candidate (Gronbeck, 1978). Campaigns also promote citizens’ participation, which is a 
core value in democracy, by different means. Perhaps the most notable form of 
participation is voter turnout, when campaigns encourage citizens to vote. However, 
there are many other forms of citizens’ participation which a campaign can provide, 
such as financial support or volunteering support, besides participating in the wider 
topics and discussions within the campaign itself. Moreover, campaigns give all citizens 
- even outsiders - a platform to express their opinions and ideas, even if they are against 
the mainstream ideas. This gives the citizens the opportunity to control the agenda and 
express their views, a vital aspect in democracy (Medvic, 2010). Campaigns also give 
citizens a chance for social interaction and a chance to engage in the democratic process 
by their participation in the public sphere (Gamson, 2001); where citizens can use the 
topics and issues mentioned in campaigns in their informal talks, as well as giving the 
citizens a chance for self-reflection, where they have a chance to examine their 
opinions, preferences and priorities (Gronbeck, 1978).  Moreover, campaigns do play a 
role in legitimizing the regime or the political system, as they show that it is working 
and that the citizens accept its framework since they are still working within its rules.  
 
Geer and Lau argue that campaigns are vital to the practice of democracy, not only 
because they affect “the electoral choice that affects the course of government” but 
because they “leave an indelible imprint on the process of democracy” (Pfau et al, 
2005:49). This brings us back to Dahl’s criteria for democratic process. One can argue 
that campaigns do play an important role in the democratization process itself as 
campaigns can fulfil the three main criteria of Dahl’s. For instance, campaigns allow 
citizens to have equal and effective opportunities for making their own views and thus 
guaranteeing the effective participation condition. Campaigns also allow citizens to 
have equal and effective opportunities to learn about candidates and policies, along with 
the different consequences and alternatives, which is the enlightened understanding 
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condition. Moreover, they allow citizens to control the agenda as they allow them to 
decide and amend the issues placed on the campaigns and elections agenda through 
their interaction and participation.  
 
However, campaigns can be considered as a double-edged sword. Despite their 
significance in the process of elections, democracy and democratization, they can be a 
threat to them as well, depending on those who use them (Wojciech et al, 2011). People 
working on campaigns can make use of their important role and functions in providing 
false information and claims which may affect the whole process. However, with the 
availability of different sources of information and with the widespread use of media 
and communication mediums, especially the internet and social media, and with the 
awareness of citizens nowadays, false information and claims can be easily discovered, 
reported and challenged. 
 
2.7 Campaigns’ Functions 
 
(a) Persuasion 
 
One of the main functions of campaigns is to persuade the voter to vote for a specific 
candidate or party. Although this function is controversial among academics - as 
campaigns are not magic bullets that have an immediate, direct effect on voters, who are 
usually affected by many other things such as their backgrounds, internal differences, 
references groups, economic circumstances, level of knowledge, and their partisan 
resistance - campaigns can still play a role in persuasion, even if the voter’s choice is 
not changed. 
 
According to Bartels (1986), persuasion means ‘any systematic change in prospective 
voters’ electorally relevant attitudes and perceptions, over the course of the campaign’. 
According to this definition, campaigns can shift other sorts of voters’ attitudes, such as 
their positions regarding some issues or policies and their evaluation of candidates’ 
characteristics or the performance of the government, or by providing information that 
shows which candidate can move policies into their desired direction, or by providing 
information that can persuade voters to change their policy preferences (Erikson & 
Wlezien, 2012). All these could lead to a probability that the voter will support a 
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specific candidate, or change their support from one candidate, party or policy to 
another one, based on the new information given. Campaigns could also play a role in 
persuading undecided voters. They also account for pre-electoral vote swing between 
candidates.   
 
The degree of persuasion, however, is determined by other criteria. Zalers (1992, p. 
216) argues that ‘citizens vary in their susceptibility to influence according to their 
general levels of political awareness and their predispositions to accept campaign 
messages they receive’. This brings us to what Claassen (2010) describes as the 
reception and resistance phases, where people receive new information and then decide 
whether or not they are going to accept it, based on many criteria such as their previous 
knowledge and background. Based on this, more aware citizens are more likely to resist 
the campaign messages as the content contradicts their previous beliefs’ and positions. 
On the contrary, resistance is lower among the less aware individuals, who are less able 
to filter out messages and who do not have prejudged stances. 
 
Pippa Norris (2005) explained how campaigns can play a role in persuasion by giving 
the example of how labours supporters switched towards Liberal Democrats after some 
British media heavily criticised the Labour government because of Britain’s 
participation in the Iraq war. 
 
(b) Priming 
 
Unlike persuasion, priming is ‘any systematic change in the weights attached to 
prospective voters’ attitudes and perceptions in the formulation of vote intentions over 
the course of the campaign’ (Bartels 2006, p. 82) i.e. giving more weight to some 
factors that may determine the voter’s final decision, without changing their attitude. 
This process is strongly related to agenda setting effects where campaigns shift 
priorities among voters (Norris, 2005). This leads to a change in the voter’s final 
decision, by changing the standards people use to make their decisions, as the process 
assumes that people do not take into their consideration all they know for evaluating a 
complex political issue. On the contrary, people take into account those bits and pieces 
from their memories (Cwalina and al.) and this brings us to the role of campaigns which 
can make voters give weight to issues they did not think about. Iyengar and Kinder 
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(1987) give the example of the American 1980 presidential election, when the media 
reopened the issue of the Iranian hostages. This issue made voters consider the ability of 
candidates to counter terrorism when choosing between Jimmy Carter and Ronald 
Reagan, although terrorism was not on their agenda from the beginning of the 
campaigns.   
 
According to issue ownership theory (Petrocik, 1996), a campaign may be able to get 
the desired results if it is able to limit the debate to current issues facing the countries, 
which its candidate can tackle, and this can happen by giving these issues an extra 
weight in voters’ minds. Vavreck (2009) believes that the issues candidates choose to 
emphasise can determine the election’s outcome.  
 
Priming can be seen as ‘extension’ of agenda setting. Priming occurs when extensive 
media coverage leads voters to attach more importance to a given consideration in 
deciding their votes. Priming can lead people to change their minds, not because they 
have changed their opinions of the candidate, but because the relative weight of those 
opinions in their decisions has changed. 
 
(c) Participation 
 
By participation, I mean participating internally within the campaign and externally 
within the public sphere. A good campaign should allow voters to participate and 
engage with the campaign itself and politically with the bigger society.  
 
Participation is usually defined as the ‘activity that has the intent or effect of influencing 
government action – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public 
policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies’ 
(Verba et al., 1995: 38). The same definition could be applied to participation with in 
the campaign itself i.e. the activity that has the intent or effect of influencing 
campaigns’ actions and decisions. 
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(a) Political participation within the public sphere: 
 
With the excessive hypermedia (Howard,2006) use in elections campaigns, there is a 
controversial debate between academics about the effect of campaigns’ media 
(hypermedia) on voter’s participation and engagement with political life.  Some studies 
argue that campaigns’ use of mass media had negative effects on citizens’ participation 
and engagement within the political life or public sphere in general (Putnam (2000), Nie 
(2001), Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Others argued that it can motivate political 
participation and promote civic engagement (Hendricks & Denton, 2010; Norris, 2001 
&2002; Papacharissi, 2002; Holt et al, 2013, Boulianne, 2009).  According to the 
second school, mediated campaigns allow normal citizens to have access to the 
information provided and in some cases, create new public spheres such as the case with 
using the Internet, which may act as a virtual public sphere. Based on the 
communication mediation model, a third school argues that mediated campaigns do 
actually have a positive effect on citizens’ participation along with other factors such as 
interpersonal and background criteria, which can affect citizens, such as the message 
coming from the campaign (J. Cho et al, 2009). Moreover, the campaign can serve 
important functions in the public sphere, which can then be transmitted to the policy 
sphere by reaching decision makers and affecting them (Bennett and Entman, 2005). 
This study argues that participation can be considered as an indication of the 
campaign’s success as will be explained later. 
 
(b) Participation within the campaign: 
 
One of the main factors of a good campaign is to allow citizens to participate and 
engage with it. These engagements can alter the campaign’s policies and plans through 
feedback and suggestions given by citizens. Citizens (voters) can participate in the 
campaign by various means such as participating in the campaign activities or by 
volunteering or working in the election campaign by attending rallies, meetings, 
contacting other voters, signing petitions, or even using social media outlets to support a 
specific candidate and promoting his or her stances by sharing it. Campaigns can also 
allow greater grassroots engagement (Gibson, 2010). Volunteers can also fundraise on 
the candidate’s behalf, or send texts and emails to urge and remind voters to vote for 
their candidates. One of the famous examples that shows how campaigns can encourage 
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citizens’ participation is the Obama campaign in 2008 which established 
‘MyBarackObama.com’ or the MyBO website in 2007 which introduced new 
techniques at that time to promote citizens’ engagement and participation with the 
campaign. It allowed citizens to play an active role in the campaign. They were able to 
register and access the database, which allowed them to help the campaign in reaching 
other voters. Published figures showed how the campaign was able to engage citizens as 
over one million people signed up to the website, thousands of events were organized 
and held by volunteers, and around $35 million of donations were collected by 
supporters, which was around six percent of the final total raised (Gibson, 2010). Many 
scholars argue that online participation with the campaign is the strongest indication of 
offline participation of citizens / voters afterwards (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2010, 
Dimitrova, 2014) which is another form of participation known as citizens’ activism or 
citizens’ campaigns (Green 2016).  
 
2.8 Campaigns’ evolution (Norris, 2003) 
 
There is an agreement between scholars that the process of election campaigning has 
witnessed a series of transformations during the past years (Norris, 2004). These 
transformations created new terminologies in the political communications and 
campaigns literature, such as the terms ‘professionalization’ and ‘Americanization’ of 
political campaigns. Moreover, these terms, with all their techniques, were implemented 
in various countries. Swanson and Mancini (1996) argue that there are four main 
characteristics for these changes which are: the ‘personalization’ of politics, the 
‘scientification’ of the campaigning process, citizens’ ‘detachment’ from parties and the 
development of ‘more autonomous structures of communications’. Pippa Norris (2003) 
argues that these changes and transformations in election campaigning occurred due to 
the transformation and evolution of the ‘modernization’ process itself, which lead to 
transformations within the party as an organization, media and electorate (p: 137). 
Based on this, Norris (2003) divided campaigns’ evolution into three main stages: pre-
modern campaigns, modern campaigns and postmodern campaigns. These stages 
explain the changes and development of campaigns (Norris, 2003, pp: 137:161). 
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(a) Pre-modern campaigns 
 
They were developed in the nineteenth century and continued until at least the 1950s, 
with the emergence of televised campaigns and opinion polls which transformed the 
process. At that time, campaign organization was based upon direct interpersonal 
communication between candidates and citizens. Campaign organization depended on a 
party leader at the top, surrounded by close advisers, running a relatively short national 
campaign. They were mainly reaching the citizens through direct face-to-face 
communication. Media used by the campaigns were usually the partisan press, which 
acted as the main source of mediated information at that time. Further, the voters were 
characterized by their strong party loyalties, as if the main aim of the campaign and 
election was to reinforce party loyalties, rather than produce new alternatives 
(Lazarsfeld, 1944) 
 
(b) Modern campaigns 
 
Modern campaigns were developed from the early 1950s to mid-1980s, with the rise of 
television and the regular publications of opinion polling. The emergence of modern 
campaigns was a result of other main developments that occurred at that time such as: 
1- the shift from partisan newspapers to national television, where it became the main 
source of campaigns news, replacing other media outlets. Thus those working in the 
campaign were keen to have their message broadcast on TV for the amount of coverage 
they could gain. 2- Parties started depending on politicians and paid professional 
consultants specializing in communications, marketing, polling, and campaign 
management, who start preparing for their campaign a long time before the official 
campaign starts. 3- Voters themselves became less attached to their parties, social 
classes and religion. Moreover, they became more passive within the campaign as TV 
became their main source of information, and not the direct face-to-face communication 
which was one of the main characteristics of the pre-modern campaigns era. Thus they 
became more vulnerable to campaign messages. With many campaigns occurring 
during this period, parties and specialists started adopting the techniques and practices 
that were proven to be successful in other campaigns. This established the main themes 
and methods that were used in campaigns at that time, and created completely new 
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‘jobs’ with big markets, as those experts used to work on campaigns in different 
countries. This led to a dramatic change in the course of campaigns.  
 
(c) Postmodern campaigns  
 
Postmodern campaigns were developed mainly due to recent developments within 
communication outlets. The recent years have witnessed a revolutionary development in 
the field of media and communications. Unlike the pre-modern campaigns, which 
depended on face-to-face communications and newspapers, and unlike the modern 
campaigns, which depended mainly on Television and polls, postmodern campaigns 
witnessed great developments in communication outlets with the development of 
existing outlets such as TV or emergence of new outlets such as the Internet. In the era 
of modern campaigns, there were no more than two or three TV channels for voters or 
campaigners to depend on. Conversely, in the postmodern era, there are numerous TV 
channels, whether local or international. TV channels even became specialized: 24 hour 
rolling news channels and entertainment channels, besides many new programme 
formats that allowed interaction with audience such as talk shows. New technologies 
such as cable TV and Satellite helped in having these diversities. The emergence of new 
outlets such as the Internet introduced other new and complex outlets such as social 
media, YouTube, on demand TV, pod casts …etc. where there is a great space for 
engagement between campaigns and voters. Unlike the modern campaigns, where 
voters used to become more passive within the campaign, in postmodern campaigns, 
voters can engage more within the campaign and can, in many cases, have an impact on 
the campaigns’ strategies and policies through ideas and feedback they give, or by being 
active on social media and the Internet. Another aspect of postmodern campaigns is the 
role of professional consultants who became part and parcel of the campaigns and of 
equal importance with the politicians. Their role became essential in campaigning and 
their influence on the campaign is equally effective as the politicians’ influence. They 
also play a role as well in coordinating the campaigns’ activities at grassroots. For the 
electorate, postmodern campaigns could have things in common with the pre-modern 
stage as new media allowed new forms of engagement and interactivity between voters 
and campaigners almost similar to the face- to-face communication which was available 
at the pre-modern stage. All these changes lead to changes of the communication 
process itself to the extent that the core concept of political marketing began to change 
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from advertising or selling the political product and convincing voters with it, to another 
concept that depends on putting the customer ‘voters’ first. This is done by studying the 
voters’ needs and preferences and developing strategies that match these needs and 
preferences to get the maximum number of voters. In other words, trying to become 
adapted within the news environment rather than trying to be the main source that 
drives this environment. Having explained the main development in this stage, it is still 
unclear what other developments will appear in the future and to what extent they will 
have an impact on this stage, which remains under development. 
 
However, according to Norris (2003, p: 151), the pace and development of the 
modernization stages explained above are affected by four main mediating factors. 
These factors can determine to a great extent at which stage a specific country (specific 
elections) sits. These factors are: the regulatory environment, the party system, the 
media system and the electorate. 
 
(a) The regulatory environment: it includes the type of electoral system and its 
regulations, the type of the elections and their regulations and the laws 
organizing the campaigning process.  
(b) The party system: this includes the party system within the country, its structure, 
its organization, its membership and how it is funded. 
(c) The media system: this includes the structure of news media within the country, 
whether it is privately owned or owned by the state, the consultancy industry 
in the country, and areas it serves. 
(d) The electorate: this includes their voting behaviour, party loyalty, and access to 
media. 
 
 
2.9 The professionalization of election campaigns 
 
The term ‘professionalization’ and its derivatives were excessively used by academics 
starting from 1990s. They were usually coined within the postmodern campaigns. 
Professionalization became widely used to describe recent changes that happened to 
campaigns in the postmodern era i.e. one word to describe postmodern campaigns. It 
was used to reflect all changes and characteristics of postmodern campaigns from 
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employment of professional experts, to making the campaign message more effective, 
the smart use of hypermedia and the extent of citizens’ interaction and engagement it 
allows.  
 
There are several reasons behind the emergence of ‘professionalism’ as stated by some 
academics (Negrine et al 2007 ; Norris 2004 ; Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2002) such as: 
the influence of American campaigns and wide exposure of their consultants in other 
countries which is commonly known as the Americanization process; conducting many 
elections in post-industrial democracies with party dealignment and having a bigger 
chance to influence the voter choice, especially with the increase of swing voters; the 
globalisation era and new media and technologies which campaigns use methods of 
communicating its message to the voters.  
 
 Lilleker & Negrine (2002) concluded that the term is ‘multifaceted and subjective’ and 
cannot always describe the variation within political communications as it used by 
many scholars as a direct opposite to amateurism, or used to describe the degree of 
specialization. Strombäck (2007) highlights many other words that are used by 
academics as a synonym for professionalization, such as ‘Americanization’, 
‘postmodern’, ‘phase 3’ ‘post-Fordist’ and ‘high-tech’. Farrell (1996) argues that 
professionalized campaigns are characterized by the ‘3 Ts’: technology, technocrats and 
techniques. Scammell (1998) adds a fourth item to these elements which is ‘the 
increasing centralization of political campaigns’.  
 
Gibson and Romelle (2001:33; 2009:267) highlight four main areas for a campaign to 
be professionalized: (a) the adoption of new tools and tactics, (b) a change in the overall 
style of campaigning to be more capital-intensive, aggressive or attack-oriented and 
continuous, (c) to be more interactive and targeting citizens, (d) restructuring power 
relations within the party / campaign to be more centralized.  
 
Lilleker & Negrine (2002) highlight the main definitions used in different academic 
fields such as: Gibson and Rommele’s definition (2001) where they explain 
professionalism as giving campaigns’ tasks to outside agencies and not to party 
members; or Mancini (1999), who sees professionalization as in employing professional 
communicators; or political marketing literature, which combines specialized roles with 
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effective delivery; or marketing literature, which argues that when campaigns become 
professionalized, those working in them will be professionals in their assigned tasks. 
 
Strömbäck (2007) has a more comprehensive definition of a professional campaign 
where he mentions that it should be characterized by ‘being permanent, central 
campaign headquarters being able to coordinate the messages and the management of 
the campaign; and using expertise in analyzing and reaching out to members, target 
groups and stakeholders, in analyzing its own and the competitors’ weaknesses and 
strengths and making use of that knowledge, and in news management (p:54). This 
definition agrees with Lilleker & Negrine’s (2002) conclusion that the term 
professionalization is generally more used to ‘describe degrees of specialization related 
to the development of new knowledge or new skills, the increased use of experts and the 
management or centralization of the campaign’(P:100). This was developed later 
(Lilleker et al, 2015) where a professional campaign is described ‘as the ability to ‘mix 
strategic and structural components of different “phases” which is defined as ‘the 
degree of a party’s adaptations to modernization-related transformations in the 
campaign environment, which contains a number of structural and strategic 
components’ (p:750). Thus, Lilleker et al (2015) argues that the term ‘professionalism’ 
and its derivatives should not be limited to describing a specific period or era as was 
believed in the past i.e. being limited to the postmodern era, as explained above. 
 
2.10 Measuring professionalism 
 
Many efforts have been made to measure the degree of professionalization in 
campaigning. These efforts led to four main ways for measuring professionalism. From 
these measurements, we can identify two main approaches. The first is the approach that 
concentrates on measuring one dimension in the campaign such as the CAMPROF-
index, which was developed by Gibson and Römmele (2001), and adjusted later by 
Strömbäck (2009). The second approach is the Professionalization-index introduced by 
Tenscher (2007) and Tenscher, Mykkänen, and Moring (2012), which differentiates 
between two dimensions in the campaign: campaign structures (organizational 
adaptation or campaign hardware) and strategies (activities used by campaign known as 
campaign software). These two approaches can be summed up in these four methods of 
measurement: (1) Party-centred theory of professionalized campaigning developed by 
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Gibson and Römmele (2001). (2) CAMPROF index developed by Gibson and Römmele 
(2009). (3) Developed CAMPROF index by Strömbäck (2009).  (4) Professionalization-
index by Tenscher (2007 and 2012) 
 
1- Party-centred theory of professionalized campaigning developed by Gibson 
and Römmele (2001) 
 
The theory argues that explaining the move towards professionalized campaigns 
depended on ‘systemic-level factors’ such as: frequency of elections, rules of political 
advertising and donations and the level of party attachment to the voters. The theory 
argues that while these factors are very useful, they are not enough for explaining the 
process of professionalization. The theory considers parties as significant actors in 
campaigning processes and argues that major changes happen in a party’s campaigns 
when they realize that their goals are not achieved as a result of ‘an interaction between 
certain external events or shocks and internal party traits’ (Gibson and Römmele 2001: 
36). 
 
Based on this, the theory identifies indicators or variables for measuring 
professionalism. These variables are divided into independent variables and dependent 
variables and each of these variables are measured by giving it a score. The results of 
the final scores identify the extent of campaign professionalism. 
 
(a) For independent variables, the theory argues that seven criteria or variables 
should be taken into account while trying to understand the campaign’s shift 
towards professionalism. These variables are divided into two sections: 
internal factors and external factors. The internal factors can be summed into: 
(1) party goal: the theory argues that vote seeking should be regarded as the 
party’s primary goal as this function will force the party into using new 
techniques and seeking the help of professional advisers. (2) Party ideology: 
the theory argues that having a strong ideological stance, such as right-wing 
ideology, will lead to the use of outside consultancy and marketing techniques, 
unlike socialist parties who are reluctant to use these types of business 
communications. Thus, a right-wing party is more likely to go towards 
professionalism. (3) Internal structure: the theory argues that parties with 
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internal centralization, with a more ‘top-down’ hierarchical structure culture 
have also been regarded as more likely to professionalize, as they are able to 
engage with business media communications and using external expertise. (4) 
Party resources: the theory argues that parties with more resources can afford 
professionalized campaigning, since it is not cheap, thus only parties with large 
budget can go for it. The theory also adds another three external variables to be 
taken into account: (5) Electoral shock: after heavy electoral defeat, a party 
would resort to new marketing techniques in order to get voters back. (6) 
Leadership change / Internal event: when electoral shock leads to leadership 
change, the probability of changes within the party is greater, giving 
opportunities for changing the way the party campaigns, depending on more 
professionalization strategies and techniques. To sum up, the theory argues that 
professional campaigns will occur in “a well-funded, main stream, right-wing 
party with significant resources and a centralized internal power structure that 
has recently suffered a heavy electoral defeat and / or a loss of governing 
status” (Ibid 2001:37) 
 
(b) For dependent variables: it mainly depends on assessing ‘the tools and 
strategies used, and the nature of power associated’ (Ibid 2001:39). To assess 
this, Gibson and Römmele suggest a Professional Campaign Index that is 
designed to measure 12 items:(1) use of telemarketing for contacting (a) own 
members , (b) outside market groups , (2) use of direct mail, (3) use of outside 
public relations / media consultants, (4) use of computerized data bases, (5) use 
of opinion polls, (6) conducting opposition research, (7) presence of an 
internal/internet communication system, (8) email sign up, (9) outside 
campaign headquarters, (10) continuous campaigning.   
 
The results from measuring both dependent and independent variables should reflect the 
degree of campaign professionalism.  One of the main criticisms of this theory is 
offered by Tenscher et al. (2002), where they argue that some factors such as the 
‘business-oriented’, ‘right wing parties’ or ‘change of leadership’ do not necessarily 
lead to professional campaigns.   
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2- CAMPROF 
 
Gibson and Römmele (2009) developed the party-centered theory into the CAMPROF 
index, where they measured 10 activities instead of 12, by consolidating the direct 
mailing and telemarketing so that each covers voters and members. They also grouped 
items according to whether they relied primarily on objective data or subjective 
assessment by coders. Each item of the ten items was placed on a score from 0 to 3, 
which means that the maximum score of the index is 30. The score each campaign 
attains represents its degree of professionalism.  
 
The objectively measured variables are six: (1) use of telemarketing, (2) use of direct 
mail, (3) Internal/Intranet Communication System, (4) E-mail Subscription Newsletter: 
the more widely and frequently these four variables are used, the more likely the 
campaign will be professional. These variables are measured according to the 
proportion of voters reached by campaign by using these methods. (5) Outside 
Campaign Headquarters: this means having a separate management team that handles 
the campaign. (6) Continuous Campaigning: this variable is measured by both objective 
and subjective assessment to judge whether the party is engaged in an ongoing 
campaign, not depending only on ‘hot’ or high season campaign activities. 
 
The subjective measured variables are 4 variables: (7) PR/Media Consultants: the more 
the campaign depends on them, the more professional it is considered. (8) 
Computerized Databases: to what extent the party is on national and local data bases to 
identify swing voters and tries to reach them. (9) Opinion Polling: whether the party has 
its own professional survey unit and to what extent it depends on it. (10) Opposition 
Research: whether the party has its own professional opposition unit that conducts 
research before and during the campaign, and to what extent it depends on it. The more 
the party used and depended on these variables, the higher score it achieves and thus 
becomes more professional. 
 
3- The Amended CAMPROF by Strömbäck (2009) 
 
Strömbäck has some reservations about the CAMPROF index, mainly with regard to 
the dependent variables and the way CAMPROF measures its scores. Strömbäck argues 
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that the list of dependent variables suffers from ‘a lack of focus on the expertise 
required in the use of the various campaign techniques’ (p:98), and that it does not 
measure some other campaign practices such as focus groups, and research of own party 
or campaign, thus not covering all aspects of professionalized campaigning. Strömbäck 
also criticises the manner of measuring the dependent variables by giving them only two 
numbers. He argues that this method of measurement can be applied in a country that 
has few parties, and not in multiparty systems. Thus, he slightly modified the original 
CAMPROF index by changing the way it calculates the scores. Furthermore, Strömbäck 
highlighted some shortcomings in the index such as not measuring the number of 
employees, that the measurement of the priming variables was not standardised and that 
it fails to elaborate whether some variables are more powerful than others.  
 
Despite being widely applied and verified, the CAMPROF index, along with its new 
version, suffers from other limitations. First of all, it is a one approach system, as it 
concentrates on measuring the campaign structures (hardware) without paying attention 
to what is done during the campaign period (software). Thus, it is limited by focusing 
on a certain range of functions only. Second, it is biased by ‘new’ media technologies, 
making it ‘less applicable for longitudinal analyses’ (Mykkänen and Tenscher, 2014:7). 
Last but not least, it concentrates on parties as the main actor in campaigning, 
neglecting the fact that in many countries, especially new democracies, candidates who 
run for elections are – in many cases – independent candidates, with no party supporting 
them. Add to these, that they ‘restricted to single case studies and first-order national 
campaigns’ Tenscher et al. (2012) 
 
4- The professionalization index by Tenscher and al. (2007 and 2012) 
 
To overcome the main deficits with party-centered theory and CAMPROF, Tenscher et 
al. developed a new index which consists of two sub-indices that measure both 
campaign structures and campaign strategies - unlike previous indices that used to 
measure only campaign structures. Both indices consist of numbers of variables, each 
variable take a score, and the degree of campaign professionalism is based upon the 
result of the final score.  
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The first sub index which is ‘the campaign structure’ consists of eight items: the size of 
the election campaign budget, the size of the campaign staff, the degree of centralization 
of the campaign organization, the degree of externalization, the differentiation of 
internal communication structures, the nature and degree of feedback, the degree of 
opposition research, and the duration of the campaign. The second sub index, which is 
the “campaign strategy”, consists of seven items: the degree of audience targeting, the 
degree of narrowcasting activities, the relevance of paid media, the relevance of free 
media, the relevance of talk shows, the degree of event and news management, and the 
degree of personalization. The maximum score for the campaign structure index is 24 
and the maximum score for the campaign strategy index is 26. Thus, the maximum 
overall score of the whole Professionalization Index is 50. The higher the overall score 
is, the more professional the campaign. 
 
From this overview, it is clear that there are several attempts to try to find an efficient 
way of measuring professionalism. However, according to Tenscher et al (2016), these 
attempts are either based on literature reviews or observations and this does not take 
into account practitioners’ perspectives which are involved with the practical part of the 
campaign. Thus, Lilleker et al offer another dimension to add to the structure and 
strategies dimensions in assessing the degree of campaigns i.e. measuring practitioners’ 
perspectives – along with structural and strategies dimensions - due to the important 
role they play in the campaign and their influence on it. Their perspectives can be 
measured by a set of closed questions which practitioners reply on. Lilleker suggested 
32 items that can help in in identifying the practitioners’ perspectives, and thus the 
overall degree of campaigns’ professionalism. These items are: “ 1) choice of right 
strategy, 2) negative campaigning, 3) willingness to attack the political opponent even 
‘below the belt’, 4) clean (fair) campaigning, 5) choice of right issues, 6) the right top 
candidates, 7) willingness of the top candidates to reveal a little privacy, 8) good timing, 
9) information on expectations and motivations of relevant groups of voters, 10) use of 
polls, 11) use of focus groups, 12) systematic observation of political opponents, 13) 
systematic press reviews and media content analyses, 14) having an impact on media’s 
agenda 15) use of paid media such as TV spots, posters or advertisements, 16) TV spots 
on public channels, 17) TV spots on commercial channels, 18) radio spots on 
commercial channels, 19) radio spots on public channels, 20) advertisements in print 
media, 21) internet advertisements, 22) outdoor advertisements, 23) presence of party 
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and top candidates on TV, 24) presence of party and top candidates on the internet, 25) 
communication with voters via telephone, 26) email, 27) Facebook, 28) Twitter, 29) 
YouTube, 30) other online media, 31) face to face, 32) canvassing.”  
 
Although this method is still new and has been applied on a relatively limited sample, it 
can be a step toward a more comprehensive measurement of campaign professionalism 
as it combines both academic and practical perspectives. Nonetheless, perhaps a four-
dimension measurement is needed, which takes into account the voters’ perspective 
towards the campaign. However, this may be difficult because of voters’ different 
backgrounds and personal differences, financial costs and difficulty with getting a 
representative sample, but campaigns are a two-way process that contains several 
elements such as sender, medium used, and receiver. Each element should contribute 
towards better understanding of to what extent the campaign is professional. 
 
Several concerns were raised regarding implementing the professionalization index 
mainly for the following reasons: (a) it concentrates on communications practices 
without in depth analysis of other criteria such as political, economic, social and cultural 
content. (b) Variables are measured in a subjective way as it depends on researcher 
observation and assessment, rather than objective independent assessment. (c) It does 
not have a moral quality, as it fails to explain what is right or wrong, making the 
measurement itself ‘more administrative than critical’ (Herkman, 2010), as if it is more 
concerned with ticking boxes rather than actual analysis. (d) It does not add weight to 
variables by explaining which variables are more important than others (Mykkanen and 
Tenscher, 2014) (e) It tries to measure how practitioners from multiple countries have a 
general understanding of campaigns without trying to apply it to a single country with a 
more in-depth approach. 
 
Despite these shortcomings, the professionalisation index still offers a better approach 
to studying campaigns, especially as it is the only approach that divides campaigns into 
two components: structures and strategies, offering a better comprehensive way in 
understanding and analyzing how the campaigns are planned, managed and 
implemented.   
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This thesis will use the professionalization index as an interview guide while 
interviewing campaign managers in order to develop an in depth understanding of 
campaign strategy, design and execution. By using the professionalization index as a 
framework for interviews, the thesis will figure out the campaigns’ aims in in terms of 
reaching and engaging voters, gaining support and mobilizing them, and creating a 
vibrant political environment, reflecting on Dahl’s features of the democratic process. 
 
This thesis will overcome the professionalisation index’s shortcomings by conducting 
in-depth analysis, depending on the professionalisation index only as an interview 
guide, taking into consideration other political and cultural contexts and trying to get 
answers to the main question: to what extent were the campaigns professionalized? And 
more importantly, trying to answer the question: did campaigns’ professionalism 
positively impact Egypt? This question leads to the debate around the effect of 
campaigns’ professionalism on democracy: does it enhance or weaken democracy? 
 
2.11 Professionalism and democracy 
 
Despite the validity and recognition of professionalism, current literature on 
professionalism and democracy offers two conflicting trends (Rayner, 2014). These two 
trends indicate that professionalized campaigns have clearer functions in thin 
democracies, but their applicability is more questionable in strong or thick democracies.  
 
The first trend deals with professionalized campaigns in thin democracies. It believes 
that the professionalisation of election campaigns helps in enhancing democracy, as it 
helps candidates run effective, well-organized campaigns that are able to reach voters 
and convey information to them. It also helps candidates to communicate and engage 
with their audiences through interactive communication channels. It can also help in 
highlighting opponents’ weaknesses by conducting opposition research and elaborating 
these weaknesses to voters (Rayner, 2014: 342). The use of hypermedia in conveying 
messages by election campaigns acts as the main vehicle for mediating useful 
information to voters, helping them to be well informed citizens, to build their decisions 
upon this information, to interact with candidates or officials and in many cases helping 
in making candidates accountable in front of voters/ citizens. The use of communication 
channels, especially social media, can play an important role in in mobilizing voters and 
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urging them to participate. This mobilizing role of social media was clear in cases like 
the eruption of the Arab Spring; especially in the Egyptian revolution where Facebook 
was the main vehicle for mobilizing protesters and moving them to Tahrir square 
(Elsheikh, 2011), which can make it act as a new public sphere leading to a healthier 
democracy. The professionalisation of election campaigns led to other healthy 
consequences, which was clear in shifting voters’ loyalty from parties to causes and 
opinion led decisions that depend on several variables such as economic, political and 
social variables (Kosh, 2011); meaning that voters’ decisions can be changed and that 
they will vote for the better option for them, not what their party force them to vote for. 
Add to these that the use of marketing techniques in professionalized campaigns plays 
an important role in enhancing democracy (Kosh, 2011), as policies are adjusted 
according to voters’ needs, and not only top-down polices. 
 
The second trend raises more concerns about the role of professionalism in established 
democracies. It believes that professionalism does not help in enhancing democracy, but 
offers a ‘shallow campaign’ that maximizes and prioritizes the use of ‘dirty tricks and 
opponents’ attacks’ over content and political substances or real content which could 
lead to voters boycotting elections or at least withdrawing from the process (Rayner, 
2014: 342), which is the last thing a democracy wants. Advocates of this school argue 
that: (1) professionalization borrows some marketing techniques such as targeting 
voters into segments. These targeting processes make candidates concentrate more on 
voters and not on all citizens, forbidding all citizens from having equal access to 
information. According to this school, this can lead to segmentation of the public sphere 
and creating a knowledge and information gap between citizens in the same country, 
which leads to what Hamelink (2007: 182) calls ‘democracy without citizens’. (2) 
depending on mass communication media outlets in conveying the professionalized 
campaign messages, along with the rise of media logic, means that it could make 
candidates amend their stances or speeches to appeal to media coverage, which could 
lead to deceiving voters by using media to persuade them with polices against their will; 
thus it may manipulate and use citizens, instead of informing them. (3) Professionalized 
campaigns tend to maintain and improve the leadership’s image. This could lead to 
strengthening ‘totalitarian tendencies rather than contributing to development of open 
participatory and deliberative societies, since improving leadership image is usually 
related to authoritarian regimes’ (Hamelink, 2007: 183). (4) In many countries, people 
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working in this field, ‘the professionals’, conduct their work without any ethical rules or 
associations that provide guidelines to their work, thus taking them away from public 
accountability (Hamelink, 2007: 185), and perhaps providing them with an upper hand 
over the normal citizens away from rules and legislations in the country. (5) The use of 
negative campaigns and attacks may create a cycle of cynicism among citizens, making 
them lose trust in the whole process (Koch, 2011). (6) Professionalism strengthens the 
role of citizens, not as active participants but as passive followers of those who 
represent them, as it deals with them as consumers when adopting marketing techniques 
or as spectators when adopting media techniques, but not as citizens (Koch, 2011).  
 
 Although these two trends may appear contradictory, Rayner (2014) explains that they 
result from a different set of factors that are totally separate from the mechanism of 
campaigning itself, and that differentiate weak democracies from strong democracies, 
such as the nature of state, the legal framework, media organization and other cultural 
and institutional factors. This can take us to Cees Hamelink’s conclusion that 
Professionalized campaigns: 
 
“fulfill clear functions within thin democracies. If, however, Societies decide for a 
strong model of democracy, they will need all the professionalism they can muster 
to engage in the grand scale teaching of democratic minds (2007:187)” 
 
Bearing in mind the above debate, this thesis will discuss to what extent were the 2012 
Egyptian campaigns professionalized, and to what extent this professionalism affected 
the outcome of the 2012 election and more importantly the democratization of Egypt as 
a whole. 
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Chapter three: Introduction to the 2012 presidential election in Egypt 
 
The aim of this chapter is to set the scene for the environment wherein the presidential 
elections took place during the transitional period that lasted a little more than a year 
after the 25th January Revolution. The chapter further aims to highlight to what extent 
Egyptians were polarised by the time of the election. This could have been an early 
indication of the election results, which led to a second round involving the two most 
polarising candidates. It also gives an indication of the political situation the candidates 
were working in and the change in Egyptian behaviour during the course of the 
transitional period and the campaigns. 
 
3.1 A Polarised Public Sphere  
 
The idea of having a new president was ever-present since Mubarak left his post after 
the 25th January Revolution1. It became stronger during the transitional period, when the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) ruled the country. That is why 
Egyptians were very enthusiastic about this election: for the first time, they could 
choose their leader and the result was not known in advance. This enthusiasm was clear 
in the fact that the presidential election was the fourth and fifth times Egyptians went to 
vote in polling stations during the transitional period (Carter 2012) 2. Despite this 
enthusiasm, the presidential election on 23-24 May 2012, and the run-off on 16-17 June 
2012, were both characterised by uncertainty regarding the future, mainly because the 
powers of the president were not clearly defined as there was no constitution in place 
(Helal 2013, Carter 2012). 
 
This uncertainty was clear enough in the controversial debates and incidents that took 
place during the transitional period before the election and which precipitated, to some 
																																																						
1 The revolution was an unplanned one. It started with calls from youth online to protest in 
Tahrir square on the 25th January - Egypt's National Police Day. Protests were initially calling 
for ‘bread, freedom and social justice’. Demands then escalated asking former president 
Mubarak to step down. Mubarak was forced to resign on 11 February 2011. 
 
2 Egyptians voted in the constitution referendum and the elections of the Shura Council and 
People’s Assembly with their two rounds.	
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extent, the shifting of the debate away from setting the presidential election’s 
regulations and times.  
 
These debates played an important role in polarising the Egyptian public and, in many 
cases, created tension. These debates included, but were not limited to: whether to 
follow the rule of law or of the revolution, especially regarding the trials of old regime 
figures; and which should precede the other in electing a president or drafting the 
constitution first; and whether to allow figures affiliated with the old regime to 
participate in the elections or to ban them.  
 
The effect of these debates and incidents was not limited to the polarisation of the 
public sphere, but also affected campaign work. For the campaigns that started during 
these times were involved in all of these incidents and debates; either by having an 
opinion, which affected them through gaining or losing voters, or by trying to keep a 
distance from being involved, which again had similar effects regarding voters, or even 
by participating in protests over these issues. This is especially the case as, in the early 
stages after the revolution polarisation was issue-related, rather than group-related. 
These incidents, with all the debates and tensions taking place around them, used to 
lead, in many cases, to either protests or clashes between protestors or clashes between 
protestors and police forces. This affected the campaigns by delaying the election dates 
and the rules regulating it, causing the campaigns to work without any planned dates or 
laws. Moreover, most of the non-Islamic campaigns which started working at that time 
put their campaign work on hold to join these protests or clashes. For example, they 
would leave their campaign work and join a fight between police forces and football 
fans known as Ultras and similar incidents that took place at that time (Tadros 2012), 
entering into a continuous revolutionary mood, represented in the revolutionary forces’ 
slogan ‘the revolution continues’. 
 
During this transitional period, the spirit of Egyptians was highly affected as well. The 
spirit of people after the revolution was very high. This spirit was manifested in many 
actions, such as the cleaning of Tahrir Square before leaving it, or organising 
committees among the citizens in the streets to safeguard neighbourhoods and forming 
security check points when the police structure collapsed and disappeared from the 
streets after the revolution. It was also shown when Muslims praying in Tahrir square 
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were surrounded by Christians protecting them.  During this time, choosing a ruler for 
the country was one of the main issues. However, Egyptians, including candidates and 
politicians, were very much consumed by political battles that polarised the public 
sphere and ended the positive spirit Egyptians had after the revolution.  
 
These clashes and political debates postponed the starting of the process of elections as 
there was no clear roadmap. It also reflected heavily on the candidates. By the time of 
elections, candidates, like all Egyptians, were classified to a certain degree according to 
their positions regarding these incidents that occupied the political and policy sphere 
during the transitional period. 
 
Thus, the enthusiasm Egyptians had after the revolution was affected by political 
developments taking place at the time of the transitional period. In the end, this led to a 
polarised electorate, making the presidential election the result of a broader political 
transition taking place at that time. This section aims to describe and highlight some of 
these events and debates that took place during the transitional period in chronological 
order, to set the scene of the unclear and broader transition wherein the election took 
place, and in which the campaigns were working.  
 
3.2 Paving the Way towards the Election 
 
On 19th March 20113, Egyptians voted in a referendum to amend 9 articles of the 
suspended 1971 constitution in order to regulate and define the transitional period. The 
importance of this referendum was that it would act as a road map for the transitional 
																																																						
3	On 11 Feb 2011, Mubarak left power, assigning SCAF to manage the country. On the same 
day, SCAF issued a statement where it promised to guarantee holding necessary legislative 
amendments and hold accordingly free and fair presidential elections. On 13 Feb, SCAF issued 
the first Constitutional Declaration, setting the general framework for the transitional period. 
The declaration included suspending the 1971 constitution and gave SCAF temporary executive 
and legislative authority for six months or until the election of a new parliament and president. 
It also called for the formation of a committee to amend the suspended constitution and for 
these amendments to be put to a referendum. (Helal 2012 :118). On 15 Feb, SCAF appointed a 
committee to propose amendments to the suspended 1971 constitution headed by Judge Tarek 
El Bishry. The period from 15 Feb till 19 March was mainly about the committee and the 
referendum. For more details about this committee, the legal and constitutional framework of 
the transitional period, see: Helal (2013 p:111-204). 
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period. Among the proposed changes was an amendment to Article 189, suggesting that 
a newly elected parliament would have six months to choose a constituent assembly 
that, in turn, would have an additional six months to draft Egypt’s new constitution 
before it was put to a popular referendum. The amendments also suggested that the 
referendum on a new constitution would be held after a president was elected (Carter 
2012).  
  
At that time, most of the liberal, secular, leftist, and even the revolutionary forces 
campaigned strongly against the referendum. According to this group, the first element 
in this road map was to draft a new constitution before the elections, arguing that the 
elected officials could draft a constitution according to their own preferences. Thus, 
according to them, it was better to draft the new constitution before elections. For them, 
it would guarantee the inclusion and representation of all citizens if done beforehand. 
 
On the other hand, military figures, including SCAF supporters, and the Islamist groups, 
including the Muslim Brotherhood, campaigned heavily in support of the referendum. 
They argued that a constitution-first approach would extend the time SCAF would be in 
power. For SCAF, it wanted to legitimise its role, and for the Muslim Brotherhood, they 
wanted to continue with elections as they knew they could win. In order to mobilise 
voters and make them vote yes, Islamist groups used Islam as their main way of 
campaigning, where sheikhs (Muslim clerics) at mosques would tell Muslims that it was 
a Muslim conquest at the ballot boxes: urging Muslims to vote yes as if it was a vote for 
Islam and for God (Said 2016). Videos of sheikhs in mosques describing the 
referendum as a Muslim conquest4 were filmed by amateurs, who happened to be in 
mosques, and uploaded to social media and broadcast on television channels; mostly 
Islamist channels praising them and mobilising people through them, and other non-
Islamist channels using them to criticise such use of religion. 
 
In the end, the nine amendments were approved by a majority of 77.2% of the voters 
who participated, which was also high: voter turnout at 41.19%, was double the 
percentage in any previous referendum or election (Helal 2013). 
 
																																																						
4	Famous video for cleric Muhammad Hussein Yacoub. See: Said 2016.	
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This referendum acted as a small test for all the political forces and their ability to 
campaign and mobilise voters, as it showed their actual weight in society. They were 
unable to achieve a majority of ‘no’ votes in any of the governorates (Helal 2013). This 
illustrates the mobilising power of the Islamist forces compared with the revolutionary 
forces, and how they campaigned. It also acted as an indication for the presidential 
election result, but other campaigns did not pay close attention to it at this early stage. 
Even if they did pay attention, at such an early stage there was no Islamist presidential 
candidate to fear, given that the Muslim Brotherhood had announced that it would not 
nominate a presidential candidate.  
 
The importance of this referendum does not lay in framing the transitional period only, 
but in the way that it divided Egyptians into binaries such as: religious versus civilian, 
civilian versus military, Islamist versus secular, or socialist versus liberal (Mogeeb 
2013). These divisions increased the polarisation between each of these categories 
during the whole transitional period. 
 
Despite these controversies, the referendum was still considered an indication of 
progress to democracy as it was the first step in determining a roadmap for the 
transitional period. However, on 30th March 2011, SCAF unilaterally issued a 63-article 
provisional constitution that acted as the replacement for the 1971 constitution (Helal 
2013). Moreover, the wording of some of the amendments voted upon on the 19th 
March referendum was changed, which made it unclear whether a new president would 
be elected or a new constitution would be written first (Carter 2012).  
 
This wording created another controversial and polarised debate that caused a great deal 
of confusion in the Egyptian public sphere to the extent that those who wrote the 
wording were accused of favouring the Muslim Brotherhood and enabling them to hold 
parliamentary elections before forming the constitutional assembly; thus being able to 
control who participated in writing the new constitution (Al-Tahrir 26/6/2016; Sout Al-
Ouma 23/11/2016).  
 
Although the intention was to hold the presidential election before writing the 
constitution, the date for the election was not determined during this period (Carter 
2012). Only on 1st January 2012 did the government announce its intention to hold the 
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presidential election after drafting the constitution, stating that the official nominations 
for presidential candidacy would not begin until April 2012 (Ahram Online 1/01/2012). 
The announcement came amid activists’ calls to hold an early presidential election in 
order to shorten the transitional period and end SCAF rule5. 
 
After the conclusion of the parliamentary elections at the end of February, the political 
debate shifted towards electing the Constitutional Assembly to start drafting the 
constitution, paving the road towards the presidential elections. 
 
The parliamentary election6 in itself, for both the People’s Assembly (lower house) and 
Shura Council (upper house), further acted as an early indication of what the 
presidential election might look like, as the majority of seats went to Islamist forces7. 
This again showed who had the real ability to mobilise and campaign in elections: the 
Islamist forces in opposition to revolutionary and other more liberal forces in society. 
 
At the end of March 2012, the parliament met to elect the Constitutional Assembly. 
However, divisions emerged regarding whether to elect the Assembly from among the 
members of parliament or from outside. Parliament members wanted to elect all the 100 
seats in the assembly within themselves only. The debate ended in a majority decision 
of the Islamist- dominated parliament, deciding that 50 percent of the Assembly should 
be chosen from members of parliament. In other words, members of parliament decided 
																																																						
5 After demonstrations against military rule, SCAF said that they would hand over power by the 
end of June. Different initiatives and proposals were prepared by activists to shorten this period, 
such as SCAF handing over power to parliament or creating a presidential council or conducting 
early presidential elections.  
 
6 More than 50 political parties participated in these Parliamentary elections – which were the 
first after the revolution (Elsayyad and Hanafy 2014). Several explanations were given to 
Islamists dominating the results such as: voters’ illiteracy, conspiracy theory, money coming 
from Islamic gulf countries to support Islamic candidates, non-Islamic candidates unable to 
mobilise or reach voters and only using TV advertisements without reaching people, flaws 
within non-Islamic forces. See: (Elsayyad and Hanafy 2014; Tadros 2012). 
 
7 Although the Muslim Brotherhood initially raised the slogan ‘participation not domination’, 
they entered the race for almost all seats, not concentrating on their strongholds. For more 
details see: Brown 2012. What Holtmann described as their sudden decision to “have the whole 
cake and not sharing it with other parties” (Holtmann 2013: 198) 
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to elect themselves to write the constitution. This was opposed and criticised by all 
other non-Islamist political factions at the time, especially that many of the other 50 
seats dedicated to figures from outside the parliament were also given to Islamic 
figures. This led to the fact that more than 65% of the assembly seats were given to 
members of Islamic parties; among the 100 elected figures, there were only 6 Christians 
and 6 women. All the others were Muslim and men. (Helal 2013). Moreover, this 
Constitutional Assembly refused all ideas presented by other political factions, such as 
guaranteeing representation for women and Christians. For these reasons, and others, 
many non-Islamist forces, along with Al-Azhar and church representatives, withdrew 
from the assembly because it did not represent all Egyptians and was not concerned 
with consensus (Helal 2013).  
 
Amid all these events, some citizens filed court cases against the assembly, resulting in 
the 10th April 2012 suspension of the 100-member Assembly that was drafting Egypt’s 
new constitution (BBC 10/4/2012). While all this was happening in the Egyptian 
political sphere, the preparation for the elections had started, with no idea of how or 
when the constitution might be finalised. 
 
3.3 Preparing for Elections 
 
Planning for the presidential election started in March 2012 with preparations for voter 
registration and candidate nomination. During the first days of candidate nominations, 
more than 1,300 people went to the Presidential Elections Committee8 (PEC) and 
collected the nomination applications, all announcing their intention to run for the 
presidency (Gaafar 2012). The process was very chaotic, as many people collecting 
applications were just ordinary citizens who wanted to be president. Among these 
people were cleaners, taxi drivers, and an ex-thief (Al-Arabyia 16/3/2012; AlEmarat 
Alyoum 14/3/2012). This large number of people queuing was filmed by television 
channels. It represented events in a way that undermined the process, such as 
																																																						
8 The PEC is the body responsible for managing and administrating the elections. It is chaired 
by the head of SCC, and has other four judges. It has also a General Secretariat which is chaired 
by a secretary-general from the Judiciary and consists of 11 other judges. It issued a total of 21 
regulatory decisions. According to article 28 of the Constitutional Declaration, its decisions are 
immune and cannot be appealed against. For full details see: Rabeea 2012: 13-37. 
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interviewing a thief who would like to be president. This initiated a wave of anger from 
citizens who called in to condemn these incidents, denouncing the so-called democracy 
that would bring a thief and similar people to rule them; some even called for a return to 
Mubarak’s days (Al-Hayat TV 2012). 
 
However, they were not able to fulfil PEC requirements to apply for candidacy. In order 
to be a candidate, the person must meet the criteria in Article 26 of the Constitutional 
Declaration: that the candidate has to be born in Egypt to Egyptian parents and cannot 
have dual nationality or be married to a foreigner, and their age must not be less than 40 
years, and they must be able to practice their full civil and political rights (i.e. not be 
convicted of a crime and not be deemed insane). The candidate must be nominated 
through one of three ways: the applicant must gain the support of at least 30 members of 
the two houses of parliament, or gain the support of a minimum of 30,000 voters from a 
minimum of 15 Egyptian governorates where the number of supporters from each 
governorate is not less than 1,000, and where each voter could not support more than 
one candidate. A third way of entering the presidential race was through the support of a 
political party that held at least one seat from the previous elections of the People’s 
Assembly or Shura Council.  
 
The start of the nomination period witnessed a lot of other complicated circumstances 
that changed the calculations of many of the candidates who had already started their 
campaigns a year before the nominations opened. For example, the Muslim 
Brotherhood reversed its earlier decision not to nominate a candidate in the elections 
and nominated two candidates: Khairat El Shater, their deputy leader and mastermind, 
and Mohamed Morsi, the chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party. The decision to 
nominate two candidates was a clear indication of the Muslim Brotherhood’s intention 
to be present in the presidential race if Khairat El Shater was disqualified from running, 
which was the case. In response to this, as described by many experts, Omar Suleiman, 
the former intelligence chief, joined the process as well. However, both El Shater and 
Suleiman were disqualified by the PEC. El Shater was disqualified for being in prison 
during the Mubarak era, while Suleiman was disqualified due to a mistake in the 
signatures he collected, which gave him 31 fewer signatures than required in the Asyut 
governorate.  
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Ayman Nour, Mubarak’s rival in Egypt’s first multi-candidate presidential elections in 
2005, was also disqualified for being in prison during the Mubarak era. The Salafist 
leader, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, was disqualified as his mother was a U.S. citizen. The 
issue of disqualifying Abu Ismail contributed to further polarisation in Egypt. On the 4th 
April 2012, the New York Times published an article stating that Abu Ismail’s mother 
had U.S. citizenship (2012). Abu Ismail kept denying this until it was proven through 
citizenship documents. Amid these controversies, his supporters gathered in front of the 
PEC, protesting and occupying the streets in order to prevent any decision that would 
disqualify him (CNN Arabic 6/05/2012). Later on, Abu Ismail was charged with forging 
official documents during his application to run for president. He was also charged with 
inciting murder and defamation of police officers (Daily News Egypt 18/03/2013, 
18/04/2012, 11/12/2012; Ahram Online 21/01/2014; Egypt Independent 22/04/2012). It 
may also be worth mentioning that Abu Ismail was the only candidate to present to the 
PEC both citizen signatures and parliamentary support. He applied for candidacy by 
providing proof of the support of 47 members of parliament and 152,835 citizens’ 
signatures. The total number of his supporters exceeded what popular candidates such 
as Hamdeen Sabahi, Aboul Fotouh, or Amr Moussa received (Rabeea 2013).  
 
The main implication of these incidents was the last-minute total change of the election 
map, which influenced in one way or another the other campaigns that were working 
hitherto, believing that there would not be a candidate from the Muslim Brotherhood or 
a candidate from the old regime. It also relieved other candidates from the pressure of 
having Abu Ismail with all his mobilising power in the presidential race9. It further 
shows the great deal of uncertainty and polarisation that was occurring at the time, 
especially from candidates’ supporters who demonstrated, fought, and clashed in the 
streets. This diverted attention away from moving forward and continuing with the 
process, and on to concentrating on each of these incidents and the ways to handle them. 
																																																						
9 During my interviews with Moussa’s, Aboul Fotouh’s, Shafiq’s, Sabahy’s campaign staff, all 
considered Abu Ismail as the main popular candidate competing against them. This was mainly 
due to the mobilising power he had on his supporters and his campaign’s spending which was 
clear in the unlimited posters all over Egypt including governorates, which was known at that 
time as Abu Ismail’s posters phenomena. 
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In the end, the PEC announced only 13 presidential candidates out of 23 citizens who 
were actually registered as candidates10.  
 
Name Party Method of 
candidacy 
Job 
1- Abul Ezz 
Hassan Ali Al 
Hariri 
 
Socialist Popular 
Alliance Party 
 
Party in parliament Retired employee in 
textile company. 
Former member of 
parliament. 
2- Mohamed 
Fawzy Eissa 
 
Generation 
democratic party 
Party in parliament Retired policeman 
3- Ahmed 
Hossam 
Khairallah 
 
Peace democratic 
party 
Party in parliament Former deputy of the 
Intelligence Agency; 
retired lieutenant-
general in the Army 
 
4- Amr Moussa Independent 
 
Supported by 43,906 
signatures from 
voters 
 
Former secretary-
general of the League 
of Arab States, 
Former minister of 
Foreign affairs 
 
5- Abdel 
Moneim 
Aboul Fotouh 
Independent 
 
Supported by 43,066 
signatures from 
voters 
 
Former Muslim 
Brotherhood 
memeber 
6- Hisham Al-
Bastawisi 
Al Tagammu Party 
 
Party represented in 
the Parliament 
 
Former vice head of 
the Court of 
Cassation 
 
7- Mahmoud 
Hossam 
Independent 
 
Supported by 37,250 
signatures from 
voters 
 
Retired policeman 
8- Mohamed 
Saleem Al 
Awa 
 
Independent 
 
Supported by 30 
signatures from MPs 
 
Lawyer and Islamic 
scholar. 
9- Ahmed Shafiq 
 
Independent Supported by 62,192 
signatures from 
voters 
 
Last prime minister 
appointed by 
Mubarak and former 
minister of civil 
aviation 
 
10- Hamdeen 
Sabahy 
Independent Supported by 42,525 
signatures from 
voters 
 
Co-founder of 
Karama Party, 
Member of the 
parliament 
 
																																																						
10 For more info see: Rabeea 2012.	
	 52	
11- Abdallah Al 
Ashaal 
 
Al Assala Party 
 
Party represented in 
the Parliament 
 
former assistant 
minister to the 
minister of foreign 
affairs 
 
12- Khaled Ali 
 
Independent 
 
Supported by 30 
signatures from MPs 
 
Lawyer, human right 
activists 
13- Mohamed 
Morsi 
 
Freedom and Justice 
Party 
 
Party represented in 
the Parliament 
 
Chairman of the 
Freedom and Justice 
Party, the political 
arm of the Muslim 
Brotherhood group 
 
 
 
3.4 The First Round of Elections: 23rd to 24th May 2012 
 
Egypt in numbers  
Egypt’s population 82,813,95711 
Number of Governorates  27  
Number of Registered voters 50,996,74612 
Number of voters outside the 
country 
586,80313 
 
Number of candidates 13 
Turnout for the First Round 46.42%14 
 
 
 
Top Five candidates in the first 
round15  
Mohamed Morsi 5,764,952 
Ahmed Shafiq 5,505,327 
Hamdeen Sabbahi 4,820,273 
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh 4,065,239 
Amr Moussa 2,588,850  
 
																																																						
11 Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics website. 
 
12 PEC website. 
13 PEC website. 
14 PEC website. 
15 PEC website. 
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Second Round’s results16 
Mohamed Morsi 13,230,131 (51.73%)  
 
Ahmed Shafiq 12,347,380 (48.27%)  
 
 
 
The first round of elections led to unpredictable results, with the top two candidates, 
Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq, getting around 25 percent of the votes each and 
managing to make it to the second round. They were followed by the Nasserite 
revolutionary candidate Hamdeen Sabahi, who got 20 percent of the vote, then the 
former senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who 
got 17 percent, and next the former secretary general of the League of Arab States, Amr 
Moussa, with 11 percent of the votes. 
 
Despite the fact that these results meant that the top winners came from the old regime 
and the Muslim Brotherhood, they also showed that 50 percent of those who voted did 
not choose to vote for either Morsi or Shafiq and decided to vote for other candidates 
from the remaining 11, who were either revolutionary or reformist candidates. The 
results also showed that if we added up the number of votes given to the three 
candidates who were considered revolutionary, they collectively got more than 
Mohamed Morsi, the top candidate. In other words, if there was a coalition between the 
revolutionary candidates to nominate one candidate on their behalf, the result might 
have been in the favour of this chosen candidate. This means that the results of the first 
round did not meet the expectations of the majority of eligible voters who voted in the 
election17, creating another level of polarisation in the Egyptian public sphere.  
 
An example of this increased polarisation appeared after the three major revolutionary 
candidates, namely Hamdeen Sabahi, Aboul Fotouh, and Khalid Ali, protested with 
their supporters, holding hands in rejection of the results and asking to apply the 
Political Exclusion Law, which excluded those who worked in a senior official position 
																																																						
16 PEC press conference held on June 24, 2012.  
	
17	For detailed analysis of election’s results, see Chapter Six. 
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during the Mubarak Era for a period of ten years. In this case, they were aiming to 
exclude Shafiq from continuing to the second round. This would have resulted in a run-
off between Morsi and Sabahi. They also called for Egyptians to go into the streets and 
protest against the result of the election and called for the establishment of a civilian 
presidential council (Alyoum7 4/6/2012; Alyoum7 5/6/2012; Al Masry 4/6/2012)  
  
The implication of their gathering was not limited to fuelling and increasing the 
polarisation in society, but raised concerns about the possibility of not accepting the 
results of the election; the first step towards the democratisation of Egypt and hence 
hindering the democratisation process as a whole, which could have made Egypt enter 
into a period of uncertainty with unknown consequences, at least at this stage. Whether 
it would have meant continuing the transitional period under SCAF rule, or having a 
leader or presidential council to rule the country against the elections results and the 
official ‘people’s will’, is unclear. 
 
Their gathering and the demands they made also showed the lack of proper planning 
and the lack of experience between the three revolutionary candidates who refused to 
enter into a coalition or choose only one of them to be a presidential candidate that 
represented the revolution in the election, thus avoiding the fragmentation of votes that 
happened among those who supported the revolution18.  
 
3.5 Political Developments between the Two Electoral Rounds 
 
In addition to the three failed candidates gathering in Tahrir square, the period between 
the two rounds of the election witnessed two major political developments that 
increased dissatisfaction and uncertainty, and also increased polarisation among voters.  
 
The first development was SCAF initiating negotiations and mediating between Islamist 
and non-Islamist forces in order to reach an agreement on finalising the formation of a 
constitutional assembly. SCAF’s step came amid the prediction of a Supreme Court 
ruling on the constitutionality of the Political Exclusion Law, and the law under which 
the parliamentary elections were conducted. However, SCAF’s efforts failed despite 
																																																						
18 Chapter Six elaborates more on this point. 
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announcing that it might unilaterally amend the Constitutional Declaration in order to 
define the powers of the next president (Carter 2012). The main reason behind the 
failure of the mediation process was due to Islamist forces insisting on taking 50 seats, 
in addition to giving other seats, from the 50 seats that were supposed to be given to 
non-Islamists, to moderate Islamist parties and other religious institutions, rather than to 
liberal or other forces in society (Carter 2012; Helal 2013).  
 
The second development came on 14th June 2012, just two days before voting in the 
second round of the election, when the Supreme Court ruled that the Political Exclusion 
Law19, passed by parliament in May 2012 to exclude old regime officials from running 
in the presidential elections, was unconstitutional. This meant that Shafiq would 
continue in the presidential race in contrast to what the revolutionary candidates wanted, 
along with their supporters. The Supreme Court also ruled on the same day that the 
																																																						
19 The Law on the Exercise of Political Rights, also known as the Political Exclusion Law, 
aimed to exclude those who had worked in a senior official position during the Mubarak Era for 
a period of ten years (BBC News 2012 10/4/12). The debate surrounding this law started early 
after the revolution, creating a great deal of polarisation. However, real steps towards enforcing 
this rule were only taken when General Omar Suleiman, the country's former intelligence chief, 
along with Ahmed Shafiq, the last Prime Minister of the Mubarak era, announced their intention 
to run for the presidency. The new law was tailored especially for them, as it stated clearly that 
it would apply only to those who held the office of president, vice-president, or prime minister. 
Ahmed Shafiq appealed to the Presidential Elections Committee (PEC) regarding the validity of 
this law, and the PEC presented the law to the Supreme Constitutional Court and, after a very 
long debate and much polarisation amongst the public, the Supreme Constitutional Court 
declared the law unconstitutional, allowing them (i.e. Shafiq) to run for the presidency (BBC 
News 12/4/2012 & 17/04/12). This court ruling came only two days before the start of the 
second round of the election, which again increased the polarisation and confusion in the 
Egyptian public sphere.   
 
19 Before the Parliamentary elections, non-Islamic forces insisted on changing the electoral 
system to be based on party lists and not individuals to end the role of local big families and 
what they called the remnants (fulul) of the old regime. To please everyone, SCAF chose a 
mixed system whereby two thirds of seats were chosen through party lists and one-third in 
individual districts. This system led to many problems and affected the results as many families 
decided not to compete or competed against each other, leaving the place open for the Islamic 
forces (Tadros, 2012). 
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electoral law20 that was used to elect a third of the parliament was unconstitutional, 
which meant dissolving the parliament.  
 
These two incidents provoked anger and demonstrations in the streets that killed the last 
hopes for the revolutionary forces that Shafiq might be banned from continuing in the 
presidential race, and that the second round would be between Morsi and Sabahi, which 
would have meant that Sabahi would be the president.  
 
Another reason for frustration was that by dissolving the parliament, the next president 
would have unimpeded powers with no clear responsibilities, especially given that there 
was no constitution as well. The dissolution of parliament led to various speculations, 
explanations, and comprehensions at the time. Each political force interpreted it as a 
conspiracy against their candidate. From these explanations, it was believed that 
parliament was mainly dissolved in order to limit presidential authority and weaken 
Morsi if he won; as the parliament was dominated by Islamist forces that would fully 
support him, or that it was dissolved as a way to bring back the old regime in case 
Shafiq won. 
 
Fears of having the old regime back led to activists launching several campaigns, such 
as those calling for boycotting the second round of elections, or campaigns calling 
people to vote for Morsi in opposition to Shafiq, so as not to get the old regime again, 
by launching a campaign known as ‘squeezing the lime’. The name of the campaign 
came from a local expression that stems from the Egyptian practice of squeezing a lime 
or lemon onto food that does not taste good, is bitter, or is about to go bad: thus 
masking the bad taste and making it more palatable.  
 
This campaign claimed that the blood of the protestors killed during the revolution was 
an obstacle between them and voting for Shafiq, and that there was no such blood on the 
																																																						
20 Before the Parliamentary elections, non-Islamic forces insisted on changing the electoral 
system to be based on party lists and not individuals to end the role of local big families and 
what they called the remnants (fulul) of the old regime. To please everyone, SCAF chose a 
mixed system whereby two thirds of seats were chosen through party lists and one-third in 
individual districts. This system led to many problems and affected the results as many families 
decided not to compete or competed against each other, leaving the place open for the Islamic 
forces (Tadros, 2012)	
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Muslim Brotherhood’s hands at the time. They therefore urged Egyptians to ‘squeeze 
the lime’ and vote for Morsi, a bad candidate in the opinion of many. But just as 
squeezing a lime over bad food can make it sour, it is at least palatable, and thus so 
would Morsi be. There was mobilisation to vote for Morsi as a sort of punishment for 
the old regime that was represented by Shafiq. 
 
3.6 The Second Round of elections: 16-17 June 2012 
 
Despite all the uncertainty, polarisation, and protests in the streets, Egyptians went to 
the polling stations to choose a president who had no defined powers, and at the same 
time had unlimited powers due to the absence of a constitution and a parliament.  
 
But another incident erupted that increased the polarisation and tension, as shortly after 
the polling stations closed on 17th June, SCAF issued an addendum to the 30th March 
Constitutional Declaration (Ahram online 18/6/2012). This addendum gave more 
authority to SCAF, eliminating some of the president’s authority, such as not allowing 
the president to declare war without SCAF approval, giving SCAF leaders some 
immunities against removal until a new constitution was issued, and also giving SCAF 
the authority to appoint the new 100-member Constitutional Assembly if the new one 
failed to perform its duties. The addendum also stated that the president’s oath would be 
taken in front of High Constitutional Court's general assembly, which would create 
another problem that will be discussed later. 
 
The timing of the announcement of the new addendum was severely criticised. 
Egyptians were polarised once again around it. Opponents, mainly the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which was preparing itself for the presidency, described it as a 
“constitutional coup”, opposing the fact that their candidate might not have any powers, 
and saying that SCAF had no authority to issue such an addendum, and thus act like the 
real ruler of the country, especially with no real public transparency regarding its 
working mechanisms. 
 
Other political factions and presidential candidates were reluctant to announce their 
stance on it at the beginning, but opposed it in the end, as it decreased the power of the 
president. Supporters, who were mainly opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood, said that 
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this addendum was a practical solution to preserve Egypt until a new constitution was in 
place. Some felt secure that the new president, namely Morsi, would not have supreme 
powers. This addendum increased the polarisation of the Egyptian public sphere while 
Egyptians were waiting for the result of the election.  
 
Amid these controversies, the Muslim Brotherhood pre-empted the PEC and 
unilaterally announced that Morsi was the winner and thus the new president. His 
campaign even issued a book documenting his votes (Al-Masry 20/6/2012). Moreover, 
some members of the Muslim Brotherhood announced to their supporters who were 
demonstrating in various Egyptian squares and streets, and who were filmed by a 
journalist, that they would ‘burn Egypt’ if Shafiq won, and that Egypt ‘would not 
witness any other future presidential election’ if Shafiq was announced the winner.  
 
This led to Shafiq’s campaign refusing Morsi’s victory announcement and accusing the 
Morsi campaign of threatening the PEC. This polarisation was described in an Al-
Masry Al-Youm newspaper headline on 20th June 2012 as a psychological war in the 
presidential elections and an uprising against the addendum (Al-Masry 20/6/2012). 
 
This incident again increased the polarisation and fears among Egyptians, with rumours 
spreading that the Muslim Brotherhood was putting pressure on the PEC to announce 
Morsi as the winner even if he did not win. This led to opposing statements between 
Morsi’s campaign and Shafiq’s campaign, and to poisoning the public sphere with 
protests from both sides occupying the streets. This was accentuated by the delay of the 
PEC in announcing the result.  
 
During this time, on 21st June 2012, representatives of various political currents, 
including liberal and revolutionary forces, such as Wael Ghoneim, the administrator of 
the "We are all Khaled Said" Facebook page that called for the 25th January 2011 
protests that led to the revolution, held a meeting with Morsi in the luxurious Fairmont 
hotel. This meeting was known as the Fairmont Meeting, where the revolutionary forces 
went to ask the Muslim Brotherhood candidate to withdraw and not compete for the 
presidency. However, after Morsi’s refusal, these forces supported Morsi against Shafiq 
in order to end the transitional period and SCAF rule and what was described as a 
‘military plan to rig the election results’, and in return Morsi agreed to their demands 
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and promised to fulfil them during his term as president. Among these demands was 
that he be a president for all Egyptians and to not exclude others (Shukrallah 2013).   
 
After revolutionary forces failed to cancel the election results by forming the 
Presidential Council, or by convincing Morsi to withdraw, and amid protests from 
Morsi’s supporters in Tahrir Square insisting he won, and other protests in Nasr City by 
Shafiq’s supporters insisting he was the winner, the PEC finally announced the results 
on 24th June, one week after the end of voting, announcing that Morsi was the new 
president of Egypt, winning with 51.73 percent of the votes, and Shafiq gaining 48.27 
percent of votes. 
 
3.7 After the Election 
 
The controversies and polarisation continued as soon as Morsi was announced 
president. The first controversy was regarding where he would take the presidential 
oath. According to the 17th June addendum to the 30th March Constitutional 
Declaration, he should make it in front of the High Constitutional Court's General 
Assembly. However, since the Muslim Brotherhood and revolutionaries saw this as a 
constitutional coup, they wanted him to make the oath in Tahrir Square. To end this 
issue, Morsi made the oath three times in three different places (Al-Masry 30/6/2012 & 
1/07/2012): in front of his supporters in Tahrir Square, in front of the High 
Constitutional Court's General Assembly, and at his inauguration party at Cairo 
University. Morsi’s controversies were contained later on with his annulment of the 17th 
June addendum to the 30th March Constitutional Declaration, and by installing members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, or those affiliated with them, to public and official posts. 
This raised concerns about the future of democratisation in Egypt as well as the role of 
the rule of law in the coming period. 
 
Another controversy was Shafiq’s allegation that the election was fraudulent. An 
investigation was opened into this, especially after discovering ballot papers coming in 
from the governmental printer that were already signed. Furthermore, some Israeli 
reports talked about Shafiq winning (Israel Hayoum 18/06/2013), but Morsi claiming 
victory out of fear of unrest. However, the media was banned from publishing the story 
(Daily News 19/01/2016) until the ban was removed in January 2016 (Al-Watan 
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20/01/2016). Until now, the court has not ruled on this case. Shafiq’s campaign still 
believes that Shafiq was the winner and SCAF interfered to announce Morsi’s victory 
amid fears of turmoil and unrest in Egypt.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
Although SCAF originally stated that it would hand over power to a civilian elected 
president within 6 months, it stayed in power for more than a year. However, from the 
above overview, it appears that there was no clear plan for managing the prolonged 
transitional period which was characterised by confusion and a lack of clarity, both 
from the political forces present at the time and from SCAF itself. 
 
This interim period was characterised by many matters that hardened the transition, 
such as the control of conflicts and divisions among political forces. These conflicts 
became more violent in many cases and were not solved through political competition 
or through legal institutions, but rather through mobilising people to protest to force 
those responsible to implement their demands. This way of achieving demands by 
protest was not limited to political matters only, but extended to include any non-
political, sectarian demands or work-related demands.  
 
The transitional period also witnessed the emergence of new political forces that were 
not known before the revolution. Many of these forces were Islamist ones, such as the 
Salafist forces, with whom no one was familiar regarding their real position and 
intentions at such early stages. The main three powers present at that time also lacked 
full legitimacy (Mogeeb 2013). Firstly, SCAF derived its legitimacy from supporting 
the revolution but it did not have popular support for its rule, which made the support it 
had change several times over the course of the transitional period. This appeared in the 
chants and slogans that were heard in the streets at that time, which changed from: ‘the 
people and the army hand-in-hand’ to ‘down with the rule of the military’. Secondly, 
the revolutionary youth forces had the streets and the sympathy of the people, but they 
were split and without any legal or elected legitimacy and without a single leader to 
represent them. Thirdly, were the Islamist forces that had mobilisation capacity but 
were trying to exclude all other non-Islamist forces (Mogeeb 2013).  
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The relation between the three forces showed a distinct lack of trust between them, 
which was clear in failing to reach a deal or agreement in many incidents during the 
transitional period, one of which was the formation of the Constitutional Assembly. The 
result of all these factors led to a prolonged transitional period full of controversies that 
extended until after electing the president.  
 
The same applied for presidential candidates as non-Islamist presidential candidates, 
along with their campaigns, – especially those who belonged to the revolution – 
immersed themselves in the permanent continuous revolutionary status. They assumed 
people would be active enough and would support them as they did in the 25th January 
revolution.  Apparently, however, people were fed up with the instability, deteriorated 
economic situation, jobs closure and non-stop protests that used to block the roads 
making it difficult for many to commute. Liberals were ready to bear the price of this 
state of continuous instability and continuous revolution, aiming for a better future.  Not 
all those who sympathised with them and supported them during the revolution were 
ready to sustain the same cost, especially with 19 % of Egyptians living under 2 dollars 
a day during that time (Hellyer 2011).  
 
On the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood was the most organised political force present 
at that time, although it was more concerned with its own interest rather than Egypt’s 
national interest (Hellyer 2011). It was able to concentrate on achieving its goals 
whatever they were, to the extent that it distanced itself from participating in numerous 
protests and events that other political forces, especially revolutionary ones, were 
participating in; such as protests asking for retribution for those killed by security forces 
amid the revolution or protests against SCAF, or protests calling to end military trials of 
civilians (Selim 2015): the actions that were described by some as a deal or alliance 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF (Selim 2015). 
 
The accumulation of all the political controversies explained in this chapter, along with 
the main themes that characterised the transitional period, led to a polarised society and 
polarised voters. It also participated in undermining the political transitional period and 
undermined the process of democratisation in Egypt in general.  
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According to Dahl, (1998: 37-38) a democratic process should have five criteria. First: 
effective participation where all members must have equal and effective opportunities 
for making their views known. Second: voter equality, where each member should have 
equal opportunity to express their vote. Third: the inclusion of all adults, as all adults 
must have their full rights of citizenship. Fourth: an enlightened understanding where 
each member must have equal and effective opportunities to learn about relevant policy 
alternatives and their consequences. And fifth: control of the agenda where members 
must have exclusive opportunities to decide which subjects are placed on the agenda.  
 
Although the five criteria mentioned above were fulfilled during the presidential 
election, not all of them were fulfilled during the transitional period that preceded the 
election, especially when viewing the controversial political incidents mentioned in this 
chapter from a wider perspective. 
 
Despite the fact that the effective participation criterion was present in the election 
process itself, as all voters had an equal opportunity to vote in the elections, this 
criterion was not present in many of the events during the transitional period. This was 
clear, for example, in the controversies that surrounded forming the constitution, and in 
not having a parliament that clearly reflected the different forces in society and that 
could make its views known. There was also no clear process or bodies to ensure the 
participation and transmission of public views in forms other than protest, which was 
the main form of expressing views at that time. 
 
The inclusion criterion was also not present in many incidents during this transitional 
period. The main example to prove this case was Islamists trying to exclude or limit 
non-Islamist political forces from participating in drafting the constitution and deciding 
on the future of their country. 
  
Instead of encouraging a healthier debate and enlightening voters, each of these 
incidents provoked protests and in many cases protests that led to clashes, either 
between different protestors, or between protesters and the army or police. The way 
Islamist forces used Islam to mobilise voters and direct them to vote in favour of the 
19th March referendum, which framed the transitional period, also meant that not all 
citizens had equal and real opportunities to learn about the reasons why they should or 
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should not support the referendum along with the alternatives and their consequences, 
meaning that the enlightened understanding criterion was not present either.  
  
Further, Dahl’s fifth criterion was not present in many cases during the transitional 
period, as most Egyptians’ actions were reactions to sudden actions made by other 
political forces, mainly SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood, meaning that they did not 
have exclusive opportunities to decide and control the political agenda. This was also 
clear in not having the chance to shorten SCAF ruling period or to set the election dates 
earlier. 
 
Despite being an essential part of democracy, the rule of law (Rose 2009; Ferdinandeo 
2010; Tamanha 2007) was not an agreed-upon element of democracy during this 
transitional period. It provoked several protests and demonstrations when applied during 
the transitional period. Examples of this vary from immediately after the revolution and 
the beginning of the trials of old regime figures, where some revolutionary forces did 
not want to prosecute them according to the existing law, but rather by creating new 
revolutionary laws, specially-made for the transitional period, or to punish them directly 
since it was the ‘age of revolution’, leading to another level of polarisation. This 
polarisation surrounding the rule of law was clear as well when the parliament was 
elected, with some people still wanting to protest in Tahrir Square to communicate their 
demands. The polarisation was also clear in not accepting the Supreme Court ruling to 
dissolve the parliament or allow Shafiq to continue in the elections because the law was 
proven to be unconstitutional. It was also present immediately after the revolution by 
allowing SCAF to rule and manage the transitional period as this was against the law as 
well. According to the Egyptian constitution of 1971 and all its amendments which was 
the one applicable during Mubark’s era, in case the Presidential post became vacant, the 
post should go to the Prime Minister. If his post was vacant, it should go to the Head of 
Parliament and if his post was vacant, it should go to the head of the supreme 
constitutional court. The debate around the rule of law extended till after Morsi was 
elected as president and was clear in the controversial debate which took place around 
where to swear the presidential oath, which he ended by saying three times to make 
everyone happy. 
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The confusion and mismanagement of the transitional period from all sides led to flaws 
in the process of democratisation in Egypt as explained above. This might have made it 
difficult for the election campaigns to work and mobilise voters. The following chapters 
will discuss how the first five main campaigns worked in this political environment by 
analysing their structures and strategies through a series of interviews with campaign 
staff. 
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Chapter four: Methodology 
 
 
The research relies solely on qualitative research, mainly applying critical realism21 as 
the main research paradigm. 
 
Critical realism (Bhaskar 1978, 1986, 1989, and Collier 1994) involves a switch from 
epistemology to ontology, and within ontology a switch from the events to the 
mechanisms that produce it (Danermark 2002). According to critical realism, reality is 
differentiated, structured, stratified, and changing (Bhaskar 1978, 1986, 1989, and 
Collier 1994). Critical realists believe that there is an external reality that exists 
independently of human consciousness, and at the same time another level of reality 
that includes ‘our social determined knowledge about reality’ (Danermark et al. 2002 
p.6). According to the paradigm, there are three strata of reality: the domains of the 
empirical, actual, and real. (Bhaskar 1978, 1986). The empirical domain includes 
observable experiences. The actual domain includes actual events which have been 
generated by mechanisms. The real domain includes the mechanisms that have 
generated the actual events (Elder-Vass 2004). This is why critical realists mainly 
require a profound understanding of any social situation, not only studying events, but 
studying the mechanisms that interact to produce the events. 
 
Based on the critical realist paradigm, this research explains the 2012 presidential 
election campaigns in Egypt by revealing the causal mechanisms that produced the 
campaigns, which is revealed by conducting semi-structured interviews with campaign 
staff.  
 
The reason for choosing interviews is that it gives the required data from the perspective 
of those who participated in them. It also helps in revealing the mechanisms that took 
place inside the campaigns that led to particular events. It gives information and insights 
as to what was happening behind closed doors in the campaigns (Winstanley 2009, 
																																																						
21 Critical realism is a philosophical approach developed by Roy Bhaskar, where he combines 
a general philosophy of science (transcendental realism) with a philosophy of social science 
(critical naturalism) to describe the relation between natural and social reality. The two terms 
were combined by other authors to become ‘critical realism’. 
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Harvey 2011, Lilleker 2003). Due to the novelty of this topic, there are no previous 
academic studies and it is not known how campaign staff saw the whole process and 
how they managed to plan, manage, and execute the campaign. This is why semi-
structured interviews were chosen as the main method of collecting data, as they will 
give an insight into how the campaigns used to work and interact with the whole 
system. Moreover, semi-structured interviews give more flexibility in terms of changing 
the direction of the discussion and gaining more information on ideas and topics that 
come up during the discussion (Winstanley 2009).  
 
The same interviewing method was used by Tenscher in studying campaign 
professionalism; for example, in studying the electoral campaign professionalism in a 
comparative design between Finnish and German elections between 2004 and 2011 
(Mykkänen and Tenscher 2014), and also in studying campaign professionalism in a 
four country (Austria, Finland, Germany, and Sweden) comparison in the 2009 
European Parliamentary elections (Tenscher et al, 2012). This proves the validity of 
using interviews in studying campaign professionalism. 
 
Through these interviews, the research explores how the campaigns were designed to 
raise voter awareness and participation, besides identifying what strategies were used to 
achieve the campaigns’ aims. The interview questions depended on the 
professionalisation index, which measures both the strategies and structures of the 
campaigns. There were two sets of questions: the first set of questions measured ‘the 
campaign structure’. It consisted of questions covering these areas: size of campaign 
staff, management style, campaign premises, degrees of externalisation, the 
differentiation of internal communication structures, the nature and degree of feedback, 
the degree of opposition research, campaign budget and the duration of the campaign. 
The second set of questions measured the ‘campaign strategy’, and consisted of 
questions focusing on: the degree of audience targeting, the degree of narrowcasting 
activities, the relevance of paid media, the relevance of free media, the relevance of talk 
shows, the relevance of the internet and social media, the relevance of debates, the 
degree of event and news management, and the degree of personalisation. The research 
also used descriptive, analytical, as well as comparative approaches when it came to 
comparing campaign strategies and structures and understanding campaign 
professionalism.   
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The interviews took place in two stages. The first was an initial contact through visiting 
some campaign headquarters and meeting campaign staff in Egypt during the election 
times in the period of May/June 2012. There were also visits to polling stations in the 
second round of elections and visits to some governorates to see the campaigns’ work 
there. The visits also included meetings with experts, researchers, and journalists who 
were monitoring the election’s progress. These visits helped in better understanding the 
campaigns’ work, the political atmosphere in Egypt, and granted access to local media 
channels which did not broadcast in the UK. These visits also helped in assessing and 
challenging the information gathered in the second stage while interviewing the 
campaigns’ staff, due to the awareness and information gathered through this stage in 
2012. 
 
The second stage of interviews (where the actual full semi-structured interviews were 
conducted) took place between April 2016 and July 2016. Interviews ranged from 3 
hours to 6 hours in length and were all voice recorded. Some of the interviewees asked 
to have a copy of the recording. The original main interviews were conducted either 
face-to-face with those in Cairo in May 2016, or by telephone with those living abroad. 
Follow-up questions were asked by various means such as Skype, phone, or WhatsApp 
messages. All interviewees were based in Egypt, except one in Turkey, and another in 
Turkey who later moved to Canada. Other sources used to verify information were from 
Qatar. These were all personally conducted interviews and transcribed thereafter.  
 
Conducting the interviews in 2016 (four years after the election) helped in many cases 
for the following reason: the long time-span gave the interviewees a better opportunity 
to assess what they did, their strong and weak points, and what led, according to their 
understanding, to the results they achieved. However, during the initial interviews in 
2012, the losers were in a state of shock and did not have clear answers regarding their 
weak points and they often exaggerated the role they performed. Moreover, not all of 
them were happy to give more details about the way they worked or about their 
campaign details. They were afraid of breaching the confidentiality of their work and 
thus not being hired again by other candidates in future elections. They also did not 
want the secrets of their work to be leaked to Egyptian media which was paying close 
attention to the issue at that time.  Nonetheless, with all the political developments 
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taking place in Egypt during this time and not having other competitive campaigns, for 
some campaigns, providing details about their work was a way of documenting it. 
 
On the other hand, the longer time-span had its disadvantages, mainly regarding two 
issues: the first was locating the interviewees. After the campaigns ended, most of them 
changed their phone numbers, and due to political changes taking place at that time in 
Egypt, along with the ousting of President Morsi, locating Islamic candidates’ campaign 
staff for interviews became very difficult; especially those working in Morsi’s 
campaign, as most of those still in Egypt were in prison. Those who managed to travel 
and leave the country did not want to speak about their work in the campaign. Some 
simply denied their involvement in the campaign, although they had worked in it. This 
same difficulty was met with Aboul Fotouh’s campaign, as his campaign manager, who 
was initially contacted in 2012, travelled to Turkey, then to Canada. The second 
disadvantage regarding this long time-span had to do with the memory of the 
interviewees. Luckily, some of them had kept notes, but there were many details and 
examples that they were not able to remember. 
 
The other main obstacle that faced the interviewing process was how to verify the 
information given by the interviewees, especially given that each of the interviewees 
was giving their own perspective of the story, and due to the absence of other primary 
resources and data that dealt with the same topic. To overcome these limitations, the 
following measures were taken to ensure both internal and external consistency 
(Neuman 2011): (a) challenging the interviewees with notes and data collected during 
the initial visits in 2012, along with stories published in the media; (b) using reliable 
sources as much as possible, whose credibility was known to the author before during 
previous work as a journalist covering Egypt’s stories; (c) verifying information 
gathered from another source inside the campaign; (d) contacting the original source a 
second time after the interview if information needed verification or was missing; and, 
(d) asking redundant questions to the main interviewee and secondary interviewees to 
check consistency (Rubin and Rubin 2005). 
 
The author’s job as a journalist who covered the Arab spring, Egyptian Revolution, and 
Egyptian politics in general for the BBC also helped in verifying facts and information 
as the research topic was not approached from the point of view of a complete novice or 
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outsider reliant upon the interviewees. The author was already studying Egyptian 
politics prior to conducting this research, mainly since 2006, had worked in various 
Egyptians local newspapers, and wrote an MA thesis about how social movements in 
Egypt led to the 25th January Revolution.  
 
During the 25th January Egyptian Revolution, the author was the coordinator of the 
coverage of the Egyptian Revolution across the whole of the BBC (2011-2012). This 
included responsibility for the hub created at that time to verify news coming from 
Egypt and the Arab world and distributing it to all BBC outlets for broadcast. After the 
revolution, this extended to conducting day-to-day televised news stories on Egypt’s 
transitional period, campaigning period, and the first round of elections. This provided a 
familiarity with the relevant sources in Egypt on a day-to-day basis. The author’s 
expertise was also helpful in commenting on and simplifying terms and topics for the 
BBC English audience who might not be aware of the political developments in various 
BBC outlets. All these experiences helped in assessing and verifying data collected 
from various sources. Being Egyptian further helped in understanding the social 
context, proverbs, jokes and other statements that might not be familiar to non-Egyptian 
academics.  
 
In Morsi’s campaign, the main interviewee was Yehia Hamid, the spokesperson of 
Mohamed Morsi’s presidential campaign. He is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and was appointed later as the Minister of Investment when Morsi won the election and 
became the President of Egypt. Three main obstacles faced the research when 
attempting to conduct the interview. The first was convincing Yehia Hamid to conduct 
the interview amid all the refusals from others in Morsi’s campaign. This was done by 
resorting to the mediation of a presenter at the Al Jazeera channel, which was giving the 
Muslim Brotherhood a platform to express their views. The second was that he was not 
aware of some of the details. The third obstacle was that he was not willing to reveal a 
lot about the manner in which they used to work due to the secretive way the Muslim 
Brotherhood prefers to operate.  
 
One of the examples he gave inaccurate information about was denying that the Muslim 
Brotherhood had information about what were known as the ‘electronic committees’. 
This was understandable because if any member of the Muslim Brotherhood spoke 
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about it, it would have affected their current campaigns against President Sisi’s regime 
in Egypt.  In order to overcome this limitation, Abd Elgalil El-Sharnopy was contacted. 
He is an ex-member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was responsible for various media 
committees in the organisation, and who gave more details about topics Hamid was 
denying. For some of the remaining missing information, the office manager of a high-
profile Muslim Brotherhood figure delivered it, provided he could do so anonymously. 
Although he did not have all the information needed, he was asked and he checked 
details with whoever was responsible (if not in prison) and came back with answers to 
my questions. Other direct contact attempts by the author with Muslim Brotherhood 
members outside Egypt failed as they refused to participate, and some of them even 
denied their involvement in the campaign. 
 
For Shafiq’s campaign, the main interviewee was the campaign’s social media manager, 
Mahmoud Ibrahim. Ibrahim’s credibility was tested several times in the author’s daily 
work as a journalist over the past 10 years. Ibrahim was also precise in the information 
he was giving in cases where he did not remember or was not present in the situation. In 
order to avoid the possibility of not having a wider version, Mahmoud Baraka was also 
contacted, responsible for the campaign’s media. However, personal judgment from a 
2012 visit to Cairo led to the dismissal of some of Baraka’s views, especially those 
related to the importance of media in the campaign. This was due to two main incidents: 
the first was the confiscation interview tapes of the candidate’s interview with the BBC. 
Baraka said it was due to technical issues with the tapes and the filming of the BBC. 
However, it was confirmed to the author, through colleagues at the BBC who conducted 
the interview, and by the campaign’s social media manager, that Baraka confiscated the 
tapes as the candidate commented on the military. The second incident on which 
judgment was based was that during the 2012 visits to Egypt, the author contacted the 
media office (Baraka’s wife) to meet and made three appointments, all of which his 
wife forgot. The result was a long stay at the campaign office and being left with a 16-
year-old to ask about the campaign, as all others were busy.  
 
In Moussa’s campaign, the main interviewees were Yara Khalaf from the media office 
and Ahmed Kamel, the campaign’s spokesperson. The experience with Moussa’s 
campaign was a little bit different. In a 2012 visit, the author had a meeting and 
interview with Lamia Kamel, the campaign’s media office manager. Lamia Kamel 
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informed the candidate about the research project. The candidate then asked to meet the 
author after which the whole team was introduced and told to help in whatever way 
possible. The candidate’s instruction for his campaign to help with the research aided 
greatly. Thus, based on this, there were several meetings with Moussa’s campaign staff. 
The first was with Lamia Kamel in 2012. The second was with the candidate himself in 
2012. The third was a collective meeting with 6 members of his campaign staff on the 
same day after meeting the candidate in 2012. However, all these meetings did not 
represent the main interview that was used in this study. The main interview was 
conducted in the same time frame in 2016 in one meeting that was attended by Yara 
Khalaf and Ahmed Kamel.  Later on, some questions about I.T. and social media in the 
campaign were directed to Moataz Kotb, the I.T. coordinator for the campaign. Data 
gathered in 2012 was only used to verify the information from the 2016 interviews.  
 
For Aboul Fotouh’s campaign, the main interview was conducted with Mohamed El 
Shahawy, the campaign manager. The author met Mohamed El Shahawy during the 
2012 visit to Cairo. However, the main interview was conducted during the same time 
frame as the other interviews in 2016.  During the time of the interview, El Shahawy 
left Egypt to live in Turkey, and then moved to Canada. The interview was conducted 
with him on two stages. The first was when he was in Turkey. The second was 
conducted when he was in Canada. El Shahawy had already written notes where he 
documented incidents he saw as important, which helped a lot in memorising answers to 
questions. To double check his answers and to get a wider perspective of understanding 
the campaign, another interview was conducted with Mohamed Abuelgeit, coordinator 
for the campaign in Asyut governorate. Abuelgeit had never met El Shahawy before as 
there was middle management in-between. Thus, he was a good source to verify what 
El Shahawy said and whether it was really implemented in reality or not. The 
campaign’s social media manager could not be reached as he had left the country and 
changed his contact details.  
 
For Sabahi’s campaign, the main interview was with Hossam Moeness, the campaign 
manager. The interview was conducted in 2016. Data gathered in the interview was 
verified through comparing it with data gathered in 2012 while meeting some 
volunteers who used to work in the campaign. There were attempts to reach other 
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members of the campaigns such as the campaign’s social media manager and the 
external social media company they resorted to but these attempts were not successful.   
 
From the above, it is clear that this research accepts that the campaigns had a real 
existence that is independent of the researcher’s and the interviewees’ experiences of 
them. The author also uses the interviewees’ account to build a picture of the reality but 
also employs various ways to critically reflect on the accounts the interviewees gave 
while interviewing them. 
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Chapter five: Campaigns’ structures and strategies 
 
This chapter gives an overall understanding of how each of the five studied campaigns 
were planned and implemented. The chapter does this by deconstructing the campaigns 
into structures (hardware) and strategies (software) applying the professionalisation 
index as the main framework. By structures, the chapter gives an insight to campaigns’ 
staff, management style, campaign’s premises, and degree of externalization, internal 
communication, feedback, opposition research, campaign duration and budget. By 
strategies, the chapter gives an insight to each campaign’s strategies regarding voters’ 
targeting, narrowcasting activities, free media, paid media, debates, internet and social 
media, campaigns’ activities, and degree of personalization inside each campaign. The 
chapter will start by discussing the two top campaigns, those of Morsi and Shafiq; then 
Aboul Fotouh’s and Moussa’s campaigns which were expected from the public opinion 
polls to be the top two candidates, yet who were the last of the winners; and finally 
discussing Sabahi’s campaign which was considered as the election surprise or the 
election’s dark horse since he got the third rank although he was seen – especially at the 
beginning of his campaign – to have almost no chance. 
 
Candidates Number of votes22  
Morsi 5,764,952 
Shafiq 5,505,327 
Sabahi 4,820,273 
Aboul Fotouh 4,065,239 
Moussa 2,588,850 
 
Candidates Number of votes in the turn off23  
Morsi 13,230,131 
Shafiq 12,347,380 
 
 
 
																																																						
22 Number of votes in the first round of elections as appears on PEC website 2012. 
23 Number of votes in the second round of elections as appears on PEC website 2012.	
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5.1 Mohamed Morsi 
 
5.1.1 Mohamed Morsi: A short biography 
 
Dr Mohamed Morsi was the chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party and a former 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau. He was the leader of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc at the People's Assembly between 2000 and 
2005. He was also a professor and Head of Materials Engineering in the Faculty of 
Engineering at Zagazig University (IkhwanWeb 7/5/2012). 
 
During the presidential campaign, he was presented as an academic who studied in the 
USA and a former NASA engineer24 (Black 2012). He was also positioned as a 
prominent opposition activist during Hosni Mubarak’s presidency and was imprisoned 
several times as a result. Morsi’s campaign gave examples of how he and his family 
suffered under Mubarak by highlighting the so-called ‘injustice’ that his family 
suffered, as his son was arrested several times due to his father’s political activities 
(IkhwanWeb 7/5/2012).  
 
At the time of the 25th January Revolution Morsi was in prison, later leaving along with 
129 other prisoners who escaped during the events of the revolution. He gave a 
telephone interview to the Al-Jazeera TV channel at the time, with his campaign 
pointing to this phone conversation as proof that he was an imprisoned political 
opponent; and as further proof that he did not break out, but left the prison only when 
others entered and set him and his fellow inmates free (Ahram Online 23/6/2013). 
 
Being the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Morsi made religious appeals to calm the 
Christians who feared his rule, as well as many Muslims who feared his Islamist 
policies, by making statements like, ‘there is no conflict between Islam and 
Christianity’ (Al-Mehwar TV, May 2012), or ‘Copts should have the right to build 
places of worship anywhere they want, just as Muslims do." (CBC TV, 10 May 2012). 
He also tried to allay fears regarding a strict application of Islamic Sharia (Al Jazeera 
2012) and concerns over people changing their faith (Al-Nahar TV, May 2012). 
																																																						
24 This was proven later –after Morsi’s winning- incorrect. See chapter six. 
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During his campaign, he further relied on appeals of both a statistical and logical nature 
wherever possible during the election, mainly when talking about the election 
programme – Al-Nahda project. According to Hamed25, Morsi’s campaign did not need 
to attack opponents during the first round of elections as they “were too busy securing 
votes, especially due to the tight timeframe”. In the second round, however, the 
situation was different as they had to oppose Ahmed Shafiq. As Hamed describes the 
situation, in the second round of elections their opponent “was well-known and the 
campaign did not waste time searching for any ‘scandals’, as they were already known 
to us”. The campaign concentrated on emphasising that Shafiq represented Mubarak’s 
regime and in contrast, Morsi represented the revolution; portraying the second round as 
an election between Mubarak’s old regime and the revolution. 
 
5.1.2 A candidate by accident 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood had originally pledged not to seek presidency. On 10th 
February 2011, before Mubarak’s abandoning power within one day, the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s General Shura Committee voted not to run for presidential elections and 
not to approve any Brotherhood’s members request to run for presidency (Habib 2013). 
This was an action that was described as a message of reassurance for both the 
international community and Egyptians that Mubarak’s outset would not be replaced by 
Islamist domination (Trager 2016; Habib 2013). However, the Brotherhood reversed its 
decision as the election approached and decided to nominate the movement's deputy 
supreme guide, millionaire businessman Khairat Al-Shater for presidency.  
 
Several explanations were given to explain this change in the Brotherhood’s position, 
one of which was Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh’s decision – the well-known 
Brotherhood’s member- to run for presidency, an action that led the Brotherhood to 
dismiss him for opposing its decision in June 2011. According to ex brotherhood leader 
Mohamed Habib (2013), Aboul Fotouh’s decision was the main trigger for the 
Brotherhood leaders to reverse its decision since his winning would prove that the 
																																																						
25 Interview with Yehia Hamed, Morsi’s campaign spokesperson and former investment 
minister during Morsi’s term in presidency. 
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Brotherhood’s initial decision was a wrong decision and would cause splits within the 
Brotherhood members (Habib 2013: 35). Other explanations revolve around: (a) the 
strong appearance of other Islamist forces that would threaten the Muslim Brotherhood 
if they succeeded, (b) failed efforts from the Brotherhood to convince some characters 
to run for presidency with the Muslim Brotherhood’s endorsement (Trager 2016). 
According to Hamid , the Brotherhood had already tried to convince three independent 
candidates from outside the Brotherhood to run for the presidency, but they refused 
(Hamed 2016), (c) tactical maneuver for dividing the Islamic votes to get other benefits 
from SCAF in return (El-Sherif 2012), (d) or a deal between SCAF and the Brotherhood 
as explained by Brotherhood member Kamal El-Helbawy who resigned from the 
Brotherhood because of this decision (CNN 1/5/2012), (e) or just an example of their 
inconsistent messages (El-Sherif 2012). I would add as well that all the political 
developments taking place before the election period, as explained in chapter two, made 
the Brotherhood aware of its presence and mobilizing ability especially in the March 
referendum and in the parliamentary elections, which would make it difficult for them 
to abandon and not to enter the presidential elections.  
 
However, Al-Shater was later disqualified by the PEC due to a previous criminal 
conviction, making one of ten candidates who were dismissed as a result of their failure 
to meet candidacy requirements26. After being prevented from nominating its first 
candidate, the Brotherhood called on Mohamed Morsi, the head of its Freedom and 
Justice Party, to submit his nomination papers for the presidency in the last minute 
before the nomination door closed27. 
 
Submitting his nomination papers in the last minute to be Al-Shater’s replacement 
meant that the campaign which was originally established to work for Al-Shater had to 
convert its work and campaign for Morsi instead. It further meant that he was the last 
																																																						
26 PEC refused and excluded 10 candidates who did not meet the criteria. Among them, four 
famous characters: Khairat Al-Shater, Omar Soliman, Hazem Salah Abu-Ismail and Ayman 
Nour. 
 
27 Morsi submitted his nominations papers on 8/4/2012 in the morning. The PEC closed the 
door for submitting nominations papers on 8 April 2012 at 14:00 PM. For more information see 
Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper edition on 9/4/2012. 
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candidate to begin campaigning, as all other candidates started campaigning prior to the 
formal nominations. 
 
5.1.3 Morsi’s campaign   
 
Morsi’s campaign – previously Al-Shater’s campaign- had a major task in introducing 
Morsi to the public in a narrow time-frame, as he was less well-known and less 
charismatic than Al-Shater. This switch in the campaign’s main candidate led to many 
jokes among Egyptians about Morsi, ridiculing him as a candidate by chance or giving 
him the nickname of ‘spare tyre’ (‘estebn’ in Arabic). Morsi was also rather boring to 
journalists as his speeches were too long and with few short quotable sentences for 
news clips.  
 
Nonetheless, according to his campaign, not being as well-known as Al-Shatter was not 
an obstacle due to “the secured votes the Muslim Brotherhood could rely upon” (Hamed 
2016)28 which should be well-known for an organisation that had campaigned in 
elections before: a secured vote that would vote for the Brotherhood, no matter who the 
candidate was. 
 
In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, after the 25th January Revolution, they would 
refer to votes they were able to mobilise in the 19th March constitutional referendum 
and their votes in the parliamentary elections which were conducted six months before 
the presidential elections, and dissolved two days before the presidential elections. 
Added to this is a history of elections recorded for more than 80 years, as the 
Brotherhood had participated in numerous elections previously, whether parliamentary, 
trade union, or even student union elections. All this information helped them to 
visualise what needed to be done and where. 
 
Morsi’s campaign was not different from other campaigns because of the starting time 
or the secured voters only, but due to the availability of several bodies campaigning for 
him. As explained by Hamed, there were three bodies campaigning for Morsi: “the 
																																																						
28 Interview with Yehia Hamed, Morsi’s campaign spokesperson and former investment 
minister during Morsi’s term in presidency.  
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official campaign, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Freedom and Justice Party”. As 
Hamed elaborated, “in reality, the whole party was converted into a campaigning 
organisation for its leader” (Hamed 2016). 
 
El-Sharnoby29 - ex Muslim Brotherhood-  elaborated more on the role of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a group in campaigning for Morsi by referring to its organisational 
weapon30 that is embedded in their numbers: total obedience31 to their superiors through 
a top-down chain of commands, where each member campaigns for the candidate and 
their offices in both Egypt and outside Egypt. El-Sharnoby specifically refers to the 
Muslim Brotherhood London office by saying “the headquarters of their international 
organisation in London32 which acted as a main operation room during the presidential 
elections, and acted as a mini campaign for Morsi”. This does not deny that the three 
bodies – the group, the party and the official campaign- were already organising with 
each other as they would all take general lines, if not orders, from the guidance office.  
 
A main difference between the campaign and both the group and the party as Hamed 
explained was that “the campaign was responsible only for the candidate, whereas the 
party was responsible for other issues including securing more votes”. Morsi would 
visit a governorate for one day, but he was not present for the rest of his campaign’s 
																																																						
29 Interview conducted with Abdel-Galil El-Sharnoby in October 2016. El-Sharnoby held 
several official positions in the Muslim Brotherhood such as: head of media unit which was 
responsible for all the governorates, deputy head of the Brotherhood’s media unit, member of 
the weekly newsletter committee, ex editor in chief of Ikhwan online website. 
 
30 For more information about the Brotherhood’s internal structure, methods of recruiting 
members, how to become a Brotherhood, different ranks and authorities inside the organization 
see: Trager 2011. 
 
31 The extent of total obedience of Muslim Brotherhood members led non-Muslim Brotherhood 
members to describe Brotherhood members as ‘Sheep’ (‘khirfan’ in Arabic) obeying their 
Shepherd. For more info about obedience in the Brotherhood see: Masoud (2014 p:155-169) 
and Trager (2011). 
 
32 The Muslim Brotherhood denies having an office in London. However, I managed to visit the 
office which is based in Cricklewood Road in North West London in May/June 2013 while 
covering a TV package for BBC Arabic TV. The office was exposed later by other British 
media (see: Both 2014; Loveluck 2014; Wynne-Jones 2014) 
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work at that location. He was not available every day and thus he needed the party and 
the group to continue organising events and securing more votes, providing the 
promotion and campaigning necessary even in his absence.  
 
For the sake of this study, the next section will apply the professionalisation index to 
Morsi’s official campaign, deconstructing it into structures and strategies in order to 
understand how it was planned and implemented.  
 
5.1.4 Campaign’s structure 
 
5.1.4.1 Campaign staff 
 
As explained by Hamed, the campaign staff came from the Muslim Brotherhood, with 
the majority possessing previous experience in working on elections. The campaign 
staff was divided into ten committees or teams; each has main responsibilities that can 
be summarised in the following tasks. 
 
5.1.4.1.1 Events and on-the-ground campaigning: This team was responsible for the 
candidate’s agenda and for organising the campaign and the candidate’s events in 
various governorates. Due to the short timeframe of the campaign, “Morsi would visit 
two or three governorates in a single day” (Hamed, 2016). The team managed and 
decided on where the candidate would go and what he would say in each of these places 
by providing him with the main issues and problems each of these places suffered from. 
Their large numbers and numerical advantage helped the team in achieving its goals. 
 
5.1.4.1.2 Setting the programme and promises: This team was responsible for setting 
the programme and the election promises the candidate would make i.e. what he will do 
in his first 100 days in office and what his plans would be regarding all the various 
aspects and sectors in the country, whether they be agriculture, industry, healthcare, or 
otherwise. This team was already working during the original campaign of Al-Shater 
and the promises were already set. However, “there were some alterations that were 
made when it converted to work for Morsi” (Hamed 2016). The efforts of this team led 
to the final election programme for Mohamed Morsi, which was known as the Al-
Nahda (renaissance) project. According to Hamed, the programme was not presented as 
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a separate Nahda project as media presented it33 , but it was mainly the promises and 
projects from the FJP programme. This team was crucial to the campaign, as it provided 
materials and data for Morsi to talk about. According to Trager (2016:134), Morsi did 
not depend on talking about himself or his vision but “that he was the Brotherhood’s 
candidate and as president would implement the Brotherhood Renaissance project, 
whatever that meant”; which explains the importance of this team in developing the 
content that Morsi depended on in his speeches and media interviews.  
 
5.1.4.1.3 Advertisement and branding team: This team was responsible for the 
branding and the advertisements for the candidate, whether on traditional media like 
television or on social media. The campaign worked with a ‘big company’ in Egypt. 
However, campaign staff refused to disclose its name as it is still working in the 
country. They do not want the Egyptian security to be aware about it. Thus, it appears 
that they were working with a professional entity from day one. There was also a media 
office to deal with journalists. 
 
5.1.4.1.4 Monitoring team: This team was responsible for monitoring and observing 
everything taking place in the media about the elections. This included what the other 
candidates were saying and promising; how Morsi was framed in the media; and the 
reactions to what he said or did. In other words, it was responsible for getting feedback 
about their candidate’s message and the campaign itself. They consulted professional 
advisors every time the candidate appeared and advised him regarding what was done 
wrong and what was done right. 
 
5.1.4.1.5 Statistics team: This team played a significant role in the campaign. It 
determined the areas and places where their candidate would win or get more votes 
based on public opinion polls conducted by a poll centre affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Unlike other opinion polls carried out at that time by private polling 
bodies, which were proven to be inaccurate, Morsi’s campaign trusted their polling 
centre as they had relied upon it many times before in previous elections. As Hamed 
explained, the campaign staff would sometimes challenge this team based on the 
campaign staff’s judgements or observations, but the statistics team was proven to be 
																																																						
33	Chapter Seven proves that this claim is not true.	
	 81	
accurate at the end. Hamed explained as well that the polls conducted by the 
Brotherhood’s affiliated centre – through their statistics team - predicted that Morsi 
would win the final round with 52 per cent of the vote, and the actual results came very 
close to their predictions.  
 
5.1.4.1.6 Public relations team: This team was responsible for talking to specific 
different sectors in the community, such as the ‘Arab Matrouh’ and ‘Arab Giza’: large 
local tribes or communities of mixed origin somewhat similar to Bedouins, yet distinct 
from them, that show up to take part in elections. The public relations team differed 
from the other teams as it communicated with marginalised sectors and others deemed 
important in society, such as businessmen, industry, athletes, and artists who were 
active during the revolution. The real challenge for this team was during the second 
round of the elections where there were only two candidates and voter polarisation was 
very high. In addition to their role in securing the secured votes, they had to reach out 
and convince swing voters in each of these sectors to vote for Morsi. 
 
5.1.4.1.7 Egyptians abroad team: This team was responsible for securing the votes of 
Egyptians abroad. They helped Morsi to communicate with Egyptians abroad in various 
countries via Skype and video conferences. The team even managed to arrange that one 
or two of their representatives were present on the day of elections at the various 
Egyptian embassies abroad where the voting took place. The campaign believed that 
Egyptians abroad played an important role, not just because of their numbers, but 
because of their “psychological effect on the rest of voters, since their results used to 
appear earlier than the domestic votes” (Hamed 2016). This would be used as an 
indication to domestic voters regarding the overall result of the election. 
 
5.1.4.1.8 Foreign affairs team: This team was tasked with communicating with any 
foreign state or any think-tank centre interested in understanding the candidate and his 
policies. The team used to deal with important high-profile bodies and people, whether 
state officials, embassies, non-governmental organisations, or think-tanks interested in 
studying the Arab Spring, elections, or the Middle East in general. It was thus different 
from the media and public relations team as it was only concerned with foreign affairs 
and foreign institutions and bodies. Most of the staff working there were from the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Freedom and Justice Party. 
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5.1.4.1.9 Spokespersons: The campaign had three spokespersons who were the 
officials assigned and authorised to speak on its behalf. 
 
5.1.4.1.10 Executive board: The executive board had one representative from each of 
the above teams in addition to the campaign’s manager, who was Essam Hadad, a 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau, which proves that the 
campaign was not working in isolation, but coordinating with the Guidance Office 
(Maktab al-Irshad) which is the highest body in the Muslim Brotherhood group34. 
 
5.1.4.2 Management style  
Despite the top down hierarchical chain of commands inside the Muslim Brotherhood35, 
this hierarchy was simplified in the campaign “to enable swifter actions” (Trager 
2011:136). As Hamed explained “the campaign had a very flat organisational structure”. 
This was mainly due to the time restrictions, which made it difficult to create a strict or 
intricate structure. Hamed elaborated that the main tasks and responsibilities were 
agreed upon and there was cooperation between teams in the various fields to enhance 
each other’s work. The executive board met daily to decide upon its agenda for the day 
and to make strategic decisions, necessitated by the rapid changes in the political 
sphere, such as political developments or even attacks by the media and others. The 
campaign was flexible enough to the extent “that each team within the campaign, or a 
member of the party, could go and fill any vacant space they found” (Hamed 2016). 
This could be understood because of the rushed establishment of the campaign. It also 
shows the campaign was not working in isolation of the Brotherhood group and FJP, 
which indicated that there were two levels of hierarchy; a top down chain of command 
between the Brotherhood Guidance Office – since the campaign manager was a member 
of it – and the campaign, and another level of horizontal hierarchy inside the campaign. 
 
 
 
																																																						
34 The guidance office is the highest body in the Brotherhood. It consists of approximately 15 
members, headed by the Supreme Guide. For more information see: Trager 2011 
35 For more details about Muslim Brotherhood internal organisational structure see: Trager 2011 
and Trager 2016. 
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5.1.4.3 Campaign premises  
The campaign was using all the premises of the FJP in all the governorates, as well as 
any other offices of the Muslim Brotherhood group. There was no need to open more 
offices, as “the party converted all its offices for the sake of campaigning for Morsi, the 
party leader” (Hamed, 2016). The campaign was managed centrally through two 
offices: the first one was the main office for the party in Al-Kasr El-Ainy, and the 
second was the previous headquarters of the FJP in Al-Maniel.  
 
5.1.4.4 Degree of Externalisation 
The campaign referred to “specialists from almost every field” (Hamed 2016). Most of 
the necessary specialisation was already available within the party or centres affiliated 
with it, such as its media production company or public opinion poll centre. 
Consequently, “very little expertise” (Ibid) needed to be brought in from outside the 
campaign.  
 
5.1.4.5 Internal Campaign Communication structures 
As Hamed explained, the campaign utilised many types of communication “depending 
on each situation”. There was no preferred method, although the most common method 
was the use of phone calls. In general, the communication means included: mailing lists, 
face to face meetings, video conferences, and Skype calls. Although El-Sharnoby was 
not part of the campaign, he stressed the importance of the Brotherhood’s IT department 
in securing the process of internal communication, mainly between Brotherhood 
members. This securing process would include making sure emails and phone calls 
could not be hacked from the government or other entities.  
 
5.1.4.6 Feedback 
The campaign was able to receive detailed feedback mainly from: (a) the monitoring 
team which was responsible for monitoring everything mentioned in the media about 
the elections, the candidate and his opponents, (b) the statistics team which was 
conducting public opinion polls through the poll centre affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, (c) the party branches in various governorates which were in direct 
contact with the voters in various cities and villages.  
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5.1.4.7 Opposition research 
This was done mainly through the monitoring team, which would monitor opponents as 
they appeared in the media. Hamed explained that “there was also room for immediate 
interaction and responses”. The continual flow of information provided by the 
monitoring team meant that someone from the campaign or the party could go and 
provide immediate live participation or commentary in the media depending on the 
situation.  
 
5.1.4.8 Campaign duration 
As explained, Morsi’s campaign was the shortest campaign. The campaign initially 
started working for Khairat Al-Shater, but the subsequent one for Morsi began when he 
submitted his papers for the presidency shortly before the deadline, meaning that his 
campaign duration was around 6 weeks only. 
 
Apparently, however, the relatively short time of Morsi’s campaign was in his favour, 
as there was not enough time for others to investigate it and highlight the weakness of 
Morsi as a candidate, other than a few examples such as describing Morsi as ‘the spare 
tyre’. There were some other rumours about his health which caused the campaign to 
publish his medical examination report.   
 
However, after the campaign ended and Morsi was elected president, media and 
activists started revisiting what he did and what he promised during the campaign to 
find contradictions and deceptions in his messages, such as claiming to be a consultant 
to NASA which was proven to be false after a journalist contacted NASA to ask about 
this claim; and after Morsi himself appeared on television confirming that he had 
worked for NASA for a long time, but then appeared on another Islamist programme 
denying that he had ever said so (Issa 2013). 
 
Another incident, which was also noted and highlighted after the campaign, relates to 
footage of Morsi talking to the public with the Supreme Guide of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Mohammed Badie, standing nearby and who can be heard audibly 
instructing Morsi to use the word ‘Al-Qassas’ (Arabic for ‘retribution’) when referring 
to the deaths of those in Tahrir Square (Bassem Youssef 2013). The video had great 
impact as it portrayed him as a candidate that takes orders from the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, and as a candidate that used the deaths of protestors for propaganda. Also, 
after Morsi became president, more details appeared on the electronic committees36 
which continued their work.  
 
5.1.4.9 Campaign budget 
Officially, all campaigns including Morsi’s campaign did not exceed the maximum 
amount of campaign spending which was set by the election as low as 10 million 
Egyptian pounds (approximately around one million GDP37) for each candidate in the 
first round, and 2 million Egyptian pounds (around 200 thousand GDP) for the second 
round. Each campaign had to submit financial documents to the PEC showing their 
campaign spending. In reality, all campaigns only included the liquid cash they spent. 
They did not include money that entered the campaign as ‘in kind contribution’, which 
makes it difficult to assess the actual amount each campaign actually spent. 
 
For Morsi’s campaign, the budget in terms of liquid cash was mainly spent on media 
and advertisements. The campaign did not need to spend on infrastructure as the 
necessary offices and equipment were already provided by the party.  Other tasks, such 
as transport used for advertisements in villages and printing brochures with subsequent 
distribution, were not calculated into the budget as they were usually paid for from the 
outside (i.e. by a volunteer or supporter) without any liquid cash entering the 
campaign’s accounts. 
 
However, after the election and Morsi’s inauguration, Egyptian media reports revealed 
that the U.S. Congress under the Obama administration had paid 50 million U.S. dollars 
to support the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate (Abdelghany 2012). These reports 
claimed that Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia had provided the U.S. Congress with 
a legal document proving that the Obama administration had provided the Muslim 
Brotherhood with 50 million U.S. dollars during the second round of Egypt’s 
presidential elections (Abdelghany 2012). Although these allegations were 
																																																						
36 Electronic committees are equivalent to astroturfing. For more details see section 6.2.6 and 
chapter Six. 
37 In 2012, one GDP was equal to approximately 10 LE. 
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widespread38, I found no basis for them. I contacted Congressman Frank Wolf of 
Virginia office to verify the story, who described it as a “false claim”39. There are other 
widespread journalistic leaks about a secret agreement between the Obama 
administration and the Muslim Brotherhood (not the Egyptian government) to give 40% 
of the Sinai to allow Palestinians to settle there. The objective is to facilitate the 
conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. 
(Zane,2013).  Other reports also revealed the role of the state of Qatar in funding the 
campaign (Ashour 2013).  
 
It was difficult for me to verify these allegations, especially as after the ouster of 
President Morsi, the case was referred to the court to investigate the campaign finance 
and its sources of funding, and whether these sources included foreign governments 
(Al-Hagag 2014). The court hasn’t ruled yet in this case. However, according to Emad 
ElSayed40- current editor of the Daily News Egypt and former reporter on the judiciary 
and court cases during that time - these types of cases are usually put in “the drawer” 
and “will not be ruled at” for several reasons: there were many cases like this where an 
individual or lawyer raised it but do not follow it up, or who just file this type of case to 
get media attention; and more importantly, because the campaign had already ended by 
the time the case was filed, Morsi was no longer in office and was accused in more 
serious cases, thus nothing would change even if the court investigated it. 
 
5.1.5 Campaign’s strategies 
 
5.1.5.1 Voters’ targeting  
According to Hamed, “the campaign considered all voters important but there were 
priorities”. The first priority as explained by Hamed was to secure the Islamists’ vote 
especially in the first round of elections, where not all the Islamist votes were 
guaranteed for their candidate due to the presence of other Islamist candidates in the 
election. Other important voters that the campaign targeted were the revolutionary 
youth, the “sofa party”, workers, and trade unions. There were other general priorities 
																																																						
38 These allegations were widespread and were also mentioned to me by other campaigns who 
believed it was true.  
39 Email from Abby Berg –Frank wolf’s office- on 27 October 2016. 
40 Personal interview on 28 February 2017	
	 87	
such as the larger governorates, which were more important than the smaller ones in 
terms of having a larger number of registered voters. 
 
5.1.5.2 Narrowcasting activities 
The campaign conducted several face to face activities that mainly targeted the Islamist 
voters. These activities included door-to-door campaigning, which was especially 
successful in rural villages; cars equipped with speakers in village streets; SMS 
campaigns; face-to-face meetings; and Skype and video conference campaigns with 
Egyptians abroad. There was also a variety of meetings and electoral conferences in 
various governorates where Islamist supporters were invited to talk to the public in 
attendance and endorse the candidate. These conferences included some narrowcasted 
messages especially designed for the Islamist voters, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
5.1.5.3 Free media 
The campaign divided free media outlets into three categories. The first was Egyptian 
media outlets. The second was those in the Arab world, and the third was media outlets 
in Western countries.  
 
In Egypt, the campaign mainly depended on TV as the main communication medium. 
As Hamed explained, “in Egypt, the campaign targeted all the television channels, as 
television remained the most popular medium”. This was done by the candidate’s 
appearance, mainly in many talk show programmes. The campaign also used to secure a 
media environment for the candidate to express his point of view and opinions. The 
second medium that the campaign depended on in Egypt was the “internet” which will 
be discussed in a separate section. For media outside Egypt, it was mainly done through 
interviews with foreign newspapers and foreign television programmes. These types of 
interviews were secured both by the media team and by the foreign affairs team. 
 
5.1.5.4 Paid media 
In Morsi’s campaign, the role of paid media was limited to advertisements. This 
included TV advertisements, billboard and posters. His official TV advertisement 
mainly depended on showing ordinary citizens’ endorsement for Morsi. The 
advertisement had the title of ‘we need a president’, then each of the citizens appearing 
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would say a sentence describing what they need in their president. The advertisement 
was keen to show diversity in those endorsing Morsi. However, both the Christian 
religious man and unveiled girl did not appear talking like the rest of those who 
appeared in the advertisement. They only appeared in a collective scene at the end of 
the advertisement. The posters and billboards had the slogan “renaissance is the will of 
the people” and did not use the normal colours that were generally used in the 
Brotherhood printed brochures or advertisement which were green and yellow, but 
employed a red background in an indication to the revolution.  
 
5.1.5.5 Debates 
As Hamed explained, the campaign “made a strategic decision not to participate in 
debates”, for the simple reason that they did not believe that debates would help their 
candidate in securing more votes. For them, the only presidential debate in that election, 
which was between Amr Moussa and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, was a clear 
example of how debates can affect both candidates badly.  
 
The campaign goal was clear: it needed its candidate to win. Thus, it would only allow 
him to participate in activities that would bring him more votes. They would not 
participate in anything that might allow him to lose votes, whether it was common 
practice in democratic countries, or even if it should have been introduced into Egypt 
regardless. For them, securing the vote was more important that putting on a show; or, 
in Hamed’s own words:  
 
“At the end, I have a candidate and I want him to win. This is my target and my 
criteria. Anything in the election process that would bring more votes will be done. 
Anything in the election process that would deduct from my votes will be left, even if 
it was applied in the United States as part of the political process, or even if it is new 
in Egypt”  
 
5.1.5.6 Internet and social media 
           As explained by Morsi’s campaign, the main aim of the online campaign was to 
influence the undecided voters, especially the younger ones. The social media team 
used to broadcast all his interviews and many other materials online. The candidate also 
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used to dedicate specific special messages for YouTube and the online audience in 
general.  
             
Regarding the so-called ‘electronic committees’41, the campaign denied usage of an 
army of fake social media accounts attacking supporters of other candidates and 
attempting to control the direction of what was said on social media. They responded by 
saying that their supporters were already large in number and that Muslim Brotherhood 
members may defend their candidate online as they wish. Thus, there was no need to 
resort to fake accounts to do this. However, the campaign’s claim of not having these 
electronic committees was denied by ex-Muslim Brotherhood members, other 
campaigns, and by Egyptian social media experts.  
 
Among those are El-Sharnouby who confirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood indeed 
operated these so-called ‘electronic committees’, by recruiting a group of people whose 
responsibility was to spread certain ideas and information in favour of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and making it appear as if public opinion supports these ideas or as if the 
public opinion is heading in a specific direction. In that way, they can affect the public 
as they often follow what they see as the majority point of view. The role of these 
committees also included insulting and destroying opposition figures through fake 
social media accounts. El-Sharnouby also confirmed that these electronic committees 
used to work under the direct supervision of Al-Shater, and that they were working 
under an open budget. Accordingly, not all of those working on the campaign or the 
party were aware of the details. El Sharnouby adds that the committee used to access 
Facebook pages and websites via fake accounts, denying any link or responsibility 
thereto, and would attack and distort the opposition by spreading rumours, and also 
attacking journalists critical of the Muslim Brotherhood or its candidate.  
 
In another project, as revealed by a report for Al-Watan newspaper,42 the Brotherhood 
worked on establishing a news agency that was not known to be affiliated to them. The 
aim of this project was to feed newspapers and media all over the world with stories 
																																																						
41 The term and practice will be explained in detail in the next chapter. 
42 For more info, see Al-Watan newspaper special file on the topic on 31/3/2013. 
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from the Brotherhood’s perspective. The Muslim Brotherhood had already trained 140 
youths among its members to work as journalists in this field (Hamed 2013). 
 
From the above, the role of social media was not limited to positive or direct 
campaigning, but extended to what is known as astroturfing, which will be explained in 
detail in the following chapter. 
 
5.1.5.7 Campaign activities  
The campaign used a wide range of activities to reach voters and to urge the media to 
cover them. The main three distinguished activities for Morsi’s campaign were the 
human-chains which were mainly aimed at media coverage. The campaign also 
depended on face to face communication which was mainly used in the form of door 
knocking or electoral conferences attended by both voters and media representative. 
The campaign also depended on the Muslim Brotherhood’s female members for face-to-
face campaigning with other women in areas the Muslim Brotherhood are not popular 
in, or areas in which they do not have a base (Shoman and Saleh 2012). 
 
5.1.5.8 Degree of personalisation 
According to Hamed, there were different types of news that the campaign needed to 
pass on to the media, or that they tried to focus media attention upon. This mainly 
depended on the timing: at the start of the campaign, there was a need for personal 
information-related news to introduce Morsi as a candidate to the public. He was not 
famous like Al-Shater, and he also lacked Al-Shater’s charisma. Therefore, the 
campaign highlighted his education and other qualifications to the public, mainly 
through the media. At a later stage, when the candidate was better-known, the campaign 
started highlighting his political career. They needed the voters to know that he was not 
new to politics and that he had parliamentary experience when he was head of the 
Muslim Brotherhood bloc during the rule of Mubarak. After that, they reiterated his 
political views and stances by highlighting what he said in the campaign and the 
election promises he was giving.  According to the campaign, Morsi himself did not 
mind being asked about either personal or general issues. 
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5.1.6 Did the campaign matter? 
Morsi’s campaign had advantages over other campaigns which helped their candidate to 
win around 5.7 million votes in the first round of elections and enter the run-off against 
Ahmed Shafiq. One of these advantages was the secured votes comprised mainly of the 
Muslim Brotherhood membership and its supporters; a support base built up over 80 
years of political activity in Egypt.  
 
Another advantage was access to professional and mostly accurate opinion polls, as the 
campaign described them. This luxury was not available to other candidates. As 
explained by Morsi’s campaign, there are few public opinion polls centres in Egypt and 
very few entities can carry out polls in a narrow time-frame. The available centres in 
Egypt capable of carrying out polling can mostly only do so on other issues that are not 
politically sensitive – i.e. not the elections – and even then, it will take them a long time. 
They have small teams and can only work and move between 5 or 6 governorates. As 
Hamed described, to move between all the governorates, to take large samples and to do 
so in two stages of an election that were very close to each other, required significant 
presence on the national level, adequate resources, and experience. These resources 
were available to both the state and the Muslim Brotherhood, but not to the relatively 
new private centres.  
 
A third advantage of the campaign was the presence of the FJP with all its logistical 
expertise and resources, such as head offices and computers. Thus, the campaign did not 
have to consume time or money in building up the necessary infrastructure, unlike other 
campaigns which were managed centrally and used to go and open branches in various 
governorates.  
 
A fourth asset to Morsi’s campaign was its foreign affairs committee, which helped in 
enhancing and improving his image both abroad and domestically, as Egyptian media 
would often translate and present what was said and written in western media about 
Egypt, its elections, and candidates. Most western newspapers, for example, did not 
realise that, during the time of the campaign, Morsi was not working for NASA, and 
even wrote it as one of his jobs in their biography of him in such reputable papers as the 
Guardian, which described him as ‘the former Nasa engineer’ (Black 2012). This was 
echoed in Egypt and taken as a matter of fact not doubted by Egyptians.  
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The Muslim Brotherhood’s electronic committees helped their candidate, especially in 
the short term and more so in the run-off by framing and convincing public opinion and 
voters that they were essentially choosing between Mubarak’s National Democratic 
Party and the Revolution. However, the role of the aptly-named ‘squeezing the lime’ 
campaign was perhaps the main reason behind Morsi winning the second round of 
elections. The name of the campaign came from a local expression that stems from the 
Egyptian practice of squeezing a lime or lemon onto food that does not taste good, is 
bitter, or is about to go bad; thus, masking the bad taste and making it more palatable. 
This campaign was run by some activists, one of whom was Alaa Al-Aswany, the writer 
who was the reason behind Ahmed Shafiq’s resignation from his post as prime minister 
after appearing with him on the ONTV television channel.  
 
The ‘squeezing the lime’ campaign claimed that the blood of the protestors killed during 
the revolution was an obstacle between them and voting for Shafiq, and that there was 
no such blood on the Muslim Brotherhood’s hands at the time. They therefore urged 
Egyptians to ‘squeeze the lime’ and vote for Morsi, a bad candidate in the opinion of 
many, but just as squeezing a lime over bad food can make it sour, it is at least 
palatable. Thus the ‘lime squeezers’ in Egypt refers to all those who voted for Morsi 
only because his opponent, Shafiq, had been a prominent figure in the Mubarak regime, 
even though they did not want Morsi either. All these assets and factors will be 
explained in detail in the following chapter while discussing campaigns’ impact on 
elections results. The next section in this chapter will discuss Ahmed Shafiq’s 
campaign, Morsi’s main rival. 
 
But did the campaign really matter for Morsi in this election? This question was asked 
of Hamed to get a practitioner’s evaluation of the campaign after it had already ended. 
Morsi’s winning was usually reported as only due to the Brotherhood’s organisational 
strength, as if he would not do the same without having a campaign. So according to 
those who worked in his campaign, did his campaign really matter? In other words, did 
it help Morsi to win? 
 
According to Hamed, “campaigns do matter. They form part and parcel of the election 
process, and are the main method of securing votes”. However, Hamed clarified that 
	 93	
“the candidate’s situation before the election cannot be separated from the situation 
during and after”. This means that a campaign could carry out its duties to the 
maximum and still not succeed. This would happen if it failed to address its candidate’s 
political presence before the campaign, during the revolution, or during the run-up to 
elections. Hamed continues: 
 
“If the candidate does not have a secured and loyal voter-base built up over years, or 
if rural and poor voters do not know of the candidate, the campaign cannot help him 
win. If the candidate has never visited remote places like Nubia or Sinai, does not 
know their problems, and has no actual presence there, the campaign will not be able 
to secure him these votes. The candidate can be methodical and hire the best 
professionals, but if he does not have a presence in society, he cannot win however 
competent his campaign staff are.”   
 
Although Hamed believes that the campaign succeeded in securing enough votes for 
Morsi, allowing him to win, he also believes that the campaign’s biggest mistake was 
“raising people’s expectation”. He continues that if the election was to be repeated, they 
would have reduced expectations and not given as many promises. According to 
Hamed, the promises they gave were based on their expectations and vision of how to 
run the state, but when they entered government they found that their expectations and 
the reality of governing were very different43. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
43 For details about Morsi’s governing, see Chapter Seven. 
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5.2 Ahmed Shafiq 
 
5.2.1 Ahmed Shafiq: Short biography 
 
Ahmed Shafiq was the last prime minister in Mubarak’s era. Amid the 25th January 
Revolution and during the last days of Mubarak’s presidency, Mubarak implemented 
some changes to calm protestors, one of which was Shafiq’s appointment as the Prime 
Minister on 29 January 2011. 
 
Despite speculation years before the revolution that Shafiq could be a possible 
successor to Mubarak, before being overshadowed by the inheritance scenario44, 
Shafiq’s relationship with the protesters had soured quickly after being appointed as 
Prime Minister: he was believed to have ignored some of the protestors’ demands, 
offering to send them sweets (“Bonbon” in particular), and suggesting removing the 
protesters’ campsite in Tahrir Square to Hyde Park’s Speakers’ Corner. Shafiq was also 
in charge when armed thugs on camels attacked protesters in Tahrir on 2 February 2011, 
which was known as the Battle of the Camel. 
 
Shafiq resigned on 3 March, a day after appearing in a talk-show on ONTV private 
channel where he was accused and critically undermined by the famous author and 
opposition figure, Alaa al-Aswany. The talk show represented one of the rare examples 
– if not the first – of televised criticism of a high-ranking government official in 
Egyptian history.  
 
During his time as a prime minister, many jokes erupted about him such as: “Shafiq 
bonbon,” referring to his sweets offer to the protesters, and “Shafiq pullover” referring 
to his trademark blue jumper, to the extent that there were Facebook pages called by 
these nicknames. 
 
After keeping a low profile for several months, Shafiq re-entered the public arena when 
he announced in December 2011 his intention to run for the presidency. 
																																																						
44 Speculations that Mubarak’s own son Gamal Mubarak would inherit his father Mubarak and 
be the president of Egypt after him. 
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5.2.1.1 Early career 
 
Shafiq was born in 1941 in Cairo. He graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1961 
and has a master’s degree in military sciences and a PhD in military strategy. He fought 
in three wars including the 1973 Arab-Israeli war as a senior fighter pilot under the 
command of Mubarak, the commander of the air force at the time, and is said to have 
downed two Israeli warplanes. He served as the military attaché in the Egyptian 
embassy in Rome between 1984 and 1986, then as Air Force Chief of Staff between 
1991 and 1996, and later became commander of the Egyptian Air Force between 1996 
and 2002 (Fathi 2012). Prior to the revolution, the public had started to become more 
familiar with Shafiq during his years of tenure as civil aviation minister from 2002 to 
2011. 
 
His role as an aviation minister raised speculation that he could be a possible successor 
to Mubarak, but this was soon overshadowed by the inheritance scenario. Shafiq’s name 
was mentioned along with other possibilities such as Amr Moussa, the former Foreign 
Minister and the General Secretary of the League of Arab states, and Omar Suleiman, 
the former head of intelligence45.  
 
As aviation minister, he aimed to transform Egypt Air, the government-owned main 
airline, into a more competitive, international carrier (Knell, 2012). He successfully 
lobbied the World Bank to finance air transport projects in Egypt for the first time, and 
thus gained the funding for a new terminal at Cairo International Airport and renovated 
the other terminals, giving a boost to tourism. He also secured the membership of Egypt 
Air in the elite Star Alliance international courier constellation in 2008. He was 
positioned as a hard-working and efficient minister (Fathi 2012). 
 
However, after the revolution, a number of lawsuits had been filed against him, mainly 
around corruption allegations. Shafiq repeatedly denied these allegations, insisting that 
																																																						
45 These names were overshadowed by the inheritance scenario and the name of Mubarak’s own 
son Gamal Mubarak. 
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he did not participate in any wrongdoing, and expressing that his records were free from 
any violations. 
 
New legislation called the Political Exclusion Law was passed by the parliament in 
order to hinder Ahmed Shafiq from running for presidency. According to this law, 
senior officials from former President Hosni Mubarak's regime were banned from 
standing for office. After the law was passed by the parliament, the elections 
commission announced Shafiq was barred from continuing in the presidential race. 
Then the Supreme Court decided that he could continue to run for president by rejecting 
the unconstitutional exclusion law that would have barred him from standing only two 
days before the election date. 
 
5.2.1.2 Political positioning 
 
During his presidential campaign, Shafiq portrayed himself as the strong state person 
who could lead and implement projects, referring to his era as an aviation minister. He 
promised to bring safety and security back to the street, to stop chaos and to sustain 
productivity, especially after job losses and closures following the revolution. He 
portrayed himself as the only presidential candidate who had both the civilian and 
military expertise needed for Egypt’s gradual shift to purely civilian rule (Knell, 2012). 
In an interview with Reuters (Awad 16/2/12), he warned of the consequences of 
assigning the presidency, who is also tasked with being the supreme commander of the 
armed forces, to someone who has no knowledge of Egyptian military life, as any 
Egyptian president would have to deal with the army. He was promising a “smooth 
handover” to civilian rule, and changing the way the army works in Egypt which was 
described by some activists as a state inside the state, promising to make it pay taxes on 
its businesses. He also promised to reform the presidential institution. He tried to reflect 
his position as a statesman on his campaign’s colours as well, as he chose navy and dark 
blue which are the official formal colours.  
 
During his campaign, Shafiq and his staff concentrated on some main messages and 
appeals to preserve his picture as a strong statesman, which was the main brand 
associated with him, aiming to maintain his secured votes and influence swing voters. 
This was clear in the usage of the following appeals: 
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(a) Fear: One of the main messages the campaign played on was fear. The fear of 
Egypt’s situation at that time, the fear of the future of Egypt and the future of the 
revolution as well if the president who was elected was inexperienced and 
unable to adapt; as Ibrahim46 explained, the fear from the uncalculated risk if 
Egyptians voted for a candidate who did not know how to run the country. Fear 
was also used when Shafiq mentioned that the “Abassyia is just a rehearsal” 
when he commented on violence in the streets and the possibility of using force 
in the future to stop violent demonstrations. This was one of the times where his 
“positioning” appeared clear to his supporters, who needed a strong man. As 
Ibrahim commented, “a strong man who can use force to protect his citizens and 
restore order”. 
 
(b)  Emotions: The campaign wanted Shafiq to appear as a strong man, not 
emotional. Thus, according to Ibrahim, “emotions were used with limit in some 
circumstances as when his photos with disabled people in one of the conferences 
were published”. Emotions also appeared when his wife died at the middle of his 
campaign, although this was not planned. 
 
(c) Logic: Logic and numbers were used in addressing topics such as education, 
health and other issues addressed in his programme/vision. Unlike other 
candidates, he did not write a full programme. They were “sure that Egyptians 
would not vote according to it” (Ibrahim 201647). He wrote a vision that was 
published to the public three days before the election, as he did not want other 
candidates to steal his ideas. The campaign claimed that many of his ideas were 
stolen by other candidates such as the exemption for farmers’ loans.  
 
(d) Religion:  Shafiq was presenting himself as a conservative Sufi Muslim. He was 
also presenting himself as the prophet’s descendant (known as Al-Ashraf in 
Arabic). However, he did not volunteer and enter discussions about religion 
unless he was asked, or when he tried to get the support of Sufi groups in Egypt 
																																																						
46	Interview with Mahmoud Ibrahim, Internet and Social Media Manager in Shafiq’s campaign. 
47 Interview with Mahmoud Ibrahim. 
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who were against both Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood. His point of view 
on Shari'ah Law was that "The application of Shari'ah [Islamic] law is 
complicated... Civil law is the best choice for Egypt." (CBC TV, 1 May 2012). 
 
(e) Attack and negativity: The campaign attacked other candidates using fake 
social media accounts48. For example, the campaign was the first to highlight the 
fact that Hazem Abu Ismail’s mother was American. As Ibrahim explained: they 
saw the news at the beginning and it was not highlighted. They passed it on to 
social media without verifying it, creating a controversial debate that was passed 
to traditional media, then to the authorities, leading to the prevention of Abu 
Ismail from entering the presidential race.  The campaign used to attack its main 
opponent Amr Moussa through fake accounts as well. They were the ones who 
highlighted the issue of Moussa’s daughter helping him in the campaign and 
compared it to Gamal Mubarak’s son helping his father along with the 
inheritance scenario. They also used to publish photos of him smoking cigars 
with Zakaryia Azmi, the former chief of presidential staff during Mubarak’s era. 
The aim of publishing this photo was to show him as a friend of the old regime, 
and living a luxury live by smoking expensive cigars. The campaign additionally 
highlighted that Shafiq has physical achievements in Egypt and that his name is 
written on several buildings that perpetuated his name, unlike Moussa. They 
also used to discuss other issues about candidates such as disclosing articles 
about Aboul Foutouh as a part of the Muslim Brotherhood and previously Al-
Jamaa Al-Islamyia, a fact he did not want the media to concentrate on. 
 
(f) Attacking Shafiq’s campaign: As a result, Shafiq’s campaign was highly 
attacked as well, from opening Facebook pages mocking him and describing 
him as the “pullover” or “Mubarak’s man” or the “Bonbon man”, to the setting 
of his campaign headquarters on fire49. He was especially attacked about 
wasting public money and the camel field, but the campaign was utilising these 
allegations on the website with his own replies.  At the time of the isolation law, 
they published his photo with his lawyers to reassure his supporters. When his 
																																																						
48 See social media section in this section and social media analysis in Chapter Six. 
49 Protests in front of Shafiq’s headquarter ended with setting it on fire. 
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wife was in a hospital in Paris before her death, he used to travel to see her at 
weekends. Every time he travelled, the media said he had escaped and had left 
the country. During his interview with a Christian channel, he spoke about 
substituting religious subjects with ethics subjects. The Muslim Brotherhood 
interpreted this, claiming that he wanted to cancel religion from schools. Media 
and opponents were also claiming that the Egyptian intelligence service along 
with the army and state were helping Shafiq to win. 
 
5.2.2 Campaign structure 
 
5.2.2.1 Campaigns staff 
A main feature of Shafiq’s campaign was that staff working on it were divided into two 
categories: staff acting as the mastermind of the campaign who were working secretly 
with the candidate, and staff known to the public who were responsible for specific 
tasks such as media and advertisements.  
 
As Ibrahim explained50, the campaign did not concentrate on giving official job titles to 
those working on it. Many of its staff were working secretly. “There were no contracts, 
only word of mouth”. Most of the staff were working as volunteers; thus, there was no 
structural organisation as such, but “it was understood between people working there of 
the duties of each other” 
 
Influential people who worked on the campaign were working secretly as the campaign 
depended mainly on staff who worked in previous elections with the National 
Democratic Party, the ruling party in Mubarak’s era. The main reason for resorting to 
these people was “their experience in elections and the data they had”, which they were 
willing to give to Shafiq due to previous ties and as they were not approached by others.  
 
The campaign had some people who were working in front of the public, such as its 
manager, General Ibrahim Manaa, a former aviation minister and Shafiq’s friend. He 
was dealing mainly with the budget and managerial administrative issues. The media 
office was led by Shafiq’s media officer when he was aviation minister, Yousryia 
																																																						
50 Quotations in this section are from Mahmoud Ibrahim, unless otherwise stated. 
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Ragab. There were two spokespersons for the campaign. The media interviews and 
appearance team was led by one of the well-known producers, Mahmoud Baraka, who 
had his own production company. The advertisement team was led by Tarek Nour, one 
of Egypt’s tycoons in the field of advertising and a TV channel owner. These were 
almost the only people known to the public. 
 
However, the cornerstone of this campaign and its actual manager who was involved in 
the day to day work was the journalist Abdallah Kamal, who was well known for his 
strong support of Mubarak’s regime when he was an editor-in-chief to a newspaper 
owned by the government. Abdallah Kamal was also a friend of Shafiq. Abdallah 
Kamal, as stated by Ibrahim, “acted as the real manager and the real engineer for this 
campaign”. Abadallah’s position remained secret from the public until a mistake 
revealed his role to journalists. This mistake was that the media officer forwarded one 
of the press releases Abdallah had written for the campaigns to the journalists’ mailing 
lists, which showed his email address and signatures instead of copying and pasting it. 
In a previous TV interview before the election, Shafiq was asked if Abdallah Kamal 
was part of the campaign and Shafiq said no. This was a clear indication to the public 
that people affiliated to Mubarak’s regime were working on the campaign; something 
the campaign was trying to hide. 
 
Another key figure in the campaign who acted as an advisor was Mohamed Kamal, 
senior figure in the NDP and close friend to Gamal, Mubarak’s son. As Ibrahim 
explained, “he helped in the strategic political thinking of the campaign”. 
 
The governorates team, known as the ‘organisation’, was the team responsible for 
dealing with the governorates. It had around 5000 representatives covering all Egypt’s 
governorates of which there are 28. This team was led by staff who used to work closely 
with Ahmed Ezz, the national organizer of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party 
(NDP) before its disbandment following the 25 January 2011 uprising. They were 
highly trained abroad on elections and campaigning, and participated in both 
parliamentary and presidential elections. Their work in the NDP allowed them to have 
access to a lot of data such as the voter registration database (an old version as it was 
renewed after the revolution), and key figures in different villages and cities who had 
the ability to mobilize people to vote, known in the Egyptian culture as elections’ 
	 101	
brokers, such as influential families, reference groups, ex-MPs, ex-council members, 
and the like. 
 
A major event that took place at the beginning of the campaign was Shafiq meeting with 
5000 people from different governorates. As Ibrahim explained, no one then noticed the 
importance of this meeting to the campaign; the media at that time wrote the news “as if 
Shafiq was meeting with his supporters, but they were his representatives in the 
governorates”. Those 5000 played a very important part in the campaign in general and 
the elections specifically. 
 
The reason for keeping these people working in the shadows, as explained by Ibrahim, 
was that “it would divert the discussion and could be another door for attacking the 
campaign”. This attack could make the campaign lose the undecided voters. It was part 
of the political harmonization process the campaign had to play especially after rumours 
spread that the intelligence service and Ahmed Ezz himself – who was in prison at that 
time – were funding and participating in the campaign. For those working in the 
campaign, they knew that Egyptians outside the capital, especially in villages, would 
not go to vote unless mobilised. They sought the help of few professionals who were 
working in elections in the NDP and were not owned by Ahmed Ezz, even if they were 
helping him because of his title at the NDP. They needed that data to help them to gain 
votes.  
 
Staff working under these teams comprised around 150-200 staff members in the 
campaign’s head office in Cairo alone.  There was also a social media team, which will 
be highlighted in detail in the social media section. It was also led by Mahmoud 
Ibrahim, former member of the NDP. There was no role for Shafiq’s family in this 
campaign. 
 
5.2.2.2 Management style 
The campaign had two levels of management style. There was a horizontal management 
style at the management level beneath the candidate and campaign manager, but a 
centralised vertical management style at the top level. This can be explained as follows: 
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There was a daily meeting each morning with key figures in the campaign to decide on 
campaign developments and daily issues. They would pass what is necessary to lower 
level teams who were working horizontally. Daily decisions with regard to daily work 
in various departments had to be taken by each department. Strategic decisions or 
formal decisions had to be approved by the Abdallah Kamal. 
 
For the organisation team dealing with the governorates, there was an internal call 
centre. Its phone numbers were not published to the public but were provided to the 
5000 representatives. Each day there was a so-called “communication wave” to follow 
up on current statuses. The 5000 representatives did not have direct access to the 
campaign manager, Abdallah Kamal, nor Ibrahim Manaa. The team leader was 
responsible in managing the 5000 representatives via direct communication through the 
call centre. 
 
One of the main aims of this hybrid way of management – as explained by Ibrahim - 
was that the campaign “did not want crowds around the candidate and others speaking 
on his behalf”. Sometimes, a list of the 5000 representatives was given to the candidate 
using which, he phoned them personally just to give support or thanks. 
 
5.2.2.3 Campaign premises 
The headquarters was located in Dokki and was rented to Mahmoud Baraka, the 
campaign’s media producer. It was intended to be a headquarters for his production 
company, but he gave it to the campaign. In the governorates, campaign offices and 
premises were mainly managed and paid for by the 5000 representatives.  
 
After the headquarters was burned and damaged by protestors who threw Molotovs on it 
when the results of the first round were announced, it was left as a place for volunteers 
and journalists but actual work was not done from there.  The daily morning meeting 
used to take place in hotels or in Shafiq’s house. In other words, the main work was 
done away from the campaign’s main official premises.  
 
5.2.2.4 Degree of externalization 
According to Ibrahim, choosing the staff depended on “their specialization and political 
position”. The campaign hired outside agencies such as the Tarek Nour communication 
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and advertisement company to manage the campaign’s advertisements, Baraka Media 
Production for managing the candidate and campaign media, Mahmoud Ibrahim for 
social media, and Abdallah Kamal and Mohamed Kamal for political advice. Some 
youths who were working previously in the NDP were directed to manage and deal with 
elections in the governorates and the representatives there. The campaign also resorted 
to around 20 specialised experts in various fields in dealing with what was known as the 
candidate’s vision for the country which was his equivalent to his election programme. 
 
5.2.2.5 Internal communication 
Communication inside the campaign was mainly by face to face meetings between key 
figures in daily meetings. There was also a What’s App group exchange between small 
teams and texts and calls between Abdallah Kamal and various team leaders. In addition 
there were phone calls known as the ‘communication wave’ between the headquarters 
and the 5000 representatives in the governorates.  
 
5.2.2.6 Feedback and opposition research51 
There was not a specific department for feedback or opposition research, but feedback 
was mainly gathered through three departments. The first was the “organization” 
department responsible for getting feedback from various governorates. As Ibrahim 
explained, “this determined voters’ needs that were not addressed by the media or by 
other candidates”. The campaign used to amend its messages depending on this 
feedback which represented public opinion direction in these governorates. Some 
messages were added depending on this feedback, such as exempting farmers from their 
agricultural loans. Such a problem would not appear in the city. A second way of 
getting feedback was via the social media team who used to monitor everything 
mentioned about Shafiq using the “Tweet deck” programme. This was free software that 
allowed them to keep updated with everything written on Shafiq on Twitter. The third 
source for monitoring and getting feedback was Abdallah Kamal himself, through his 
monitoring and analysis of the media and of opponents’ various activities. The 
campaign did not depend on public opinion polls or media as a form of accurate 
feedback, but maintained an awareness of them without relying upon them as it was 
																																																						
51 Added in one title due to similarity in Shafiq’s campaign.  
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known from experience that they lacked the resources to represent the real situations in 
Egypt.  
 
5.2.2.7 Campaign duration  
The campaign started working with the candidate from February / March 2012 till the 
election date in June 2012. Before that time the candidate was preparing to take the 
decision to enter the presidential race, not preparing for his campaign. This means that 
Shafiq’s campaign was the second shortest campaign in terms of its duration52. 
 
5.2.2.8 Campaign Budget 
As explained previously, the official maximum limit allowed by law for the campaign 
to spend was 10 million Egyptian pounds in the first round of elections. Such as in any 
other campaign, the money was spent mainly on logistics and production. However, 
there were a lot of items that were not included in the budget – again like other 
campaigns – such as offices, computers, cars, etc. Volunteers used to bring and provide 
these for the campaign, without involving the campaign budget, as it was not paid for 
by this. Some of the campaign staff who were not volunteers were paid by an 
accountant from one of the small businessmen who wanted to help in the campaign53. 
The day-to-day budget was managed by Abdallah Kamal, while the overall budget was 
managed by General Manaa and the candidate himself. There were allegations that the 
campaign received funds from outside countries such as the United Arab Emirates, but, 
apparently, it was not proven and the campaign denied it several times54. There were 
also allegations that specific businessmen related to Mubarak and the NDP were 
funding the campaign secretly. However, these allegations were apparently unfounded 
as most of them were in prison and their assets were frozen. The campaign denied 
taking money from these parties but clarified that it had used manpower utilised by the 
NDP in previous elections. 
 
 
																																																						
52 Morsi’s campaign was the shortest campaign. 
53 I was not able to verify his name or relation to the candidate, as the campaign refused to 
reveal his identity upon his request. 
54 Allegations were based on UAE hostile tensed relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
Shafiq’s staying there after losing the election. However, I was not able to verify these 
allegations. 
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5.2.3 Campaign strategies 
 
5.2.3.1 Voters’ targeting  
The campaign was aware that it would not be able to get votes from those against 
Shafiq, either from the revolutionist sectors, or the Islamists. It was aware that it would 
not be able to change attitudes and behaviours. Thus it targeted and segmented its 
potential voters which Ibrahim summarised in the following ten categories:  
 
1. The traditional conservative power in the community. This included those with 
conservative ideas and resistance to change or those who did not participate in 
the revolution on either side. 
2. The sofa party, which is a term widely used in Egyptian politics referring to 
millions of Egyptians who avoid participating in protests and have no political 
affiliation. They are inclined to participate in anything in favour of sitting 
comfortably at home. 
3. Senior families and references groups outside Cairo and Alexandria, mainly in 
villages, urban and semi-urban governorates.  
4. Christians, who were afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood ruling Egypt in the 
future. 
5. Women who saw Shafiq as elegant and polite. (As Ibrahim explained, they knew 
this from the comments they received after a photo session for Shafiq). 
6. Any sectors in the Egyptian society who were upset about the standstill situation 
Egypt was suffering from after the revolution. 
7. Any sector who wanted safety and security.  
8. Undecided voters who were choosing between him and his opponent, Amr 
Moussa. 
9. Sufism groups and Sufism Muslims. They were not politicised and against the 
Muslim Brotherhood55.  
10. Those against the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
The campaign’s general message and the candidate’s political positioning was able to 
steer in this direction. According to Ibrahim:  
																																																						
55 For more info about Sufism in Egypt see: Daily News Egypt on 21/10/2012 and Harvard 
Religious Literacy project. 
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“the campaign was not against the revolution publicly but it was focusing on a 
position that the past was past and Egypt needed to move forward, and that the next 
stage had to be led and managed by an experienced statesman without removing 
gains people got from the revolution by giving Egypt to people who didn’t understand 
the Egyptian state or how to run it”. 
 
In addition to this general message that the campaign was keen to highlight, it also 
developed specific messages for each group on the potential voter list mentioned above. 
 
5.2.3.2 Narrowcasting activities 
Various activities were conducted depending on each sector of the targeted voters. The 
main method used for narrowcasting was face to face communication. This included 
various forms like visits to certain sectors such as visiting churches in villages to 
support Christians, or visiting families and senior figures in their homes in villages. As 
Ibrahim explained, visiting families and senior figures gave these influential figures 
prestige, re-assurance that they were close to the candidate, and that they would not be 
forgotten in the future. 
 
The 5000 representatives in the governorates played an important role in conducting 
narrowcasting face to face activities in various governorates as well as amending the 
campaign’s messages. In their narrowcasting activities, they would be alerted to the 
main problems that their potential voters suffered from or asked about, so they advised 
the campaign to add specific messages for them. For example, they alerted the 
campaign that the farmers took loans for seeds and other supplies and because of the 
economic problems, they were not able to sell their crops and were thus unable to pay 
their loans back therefore prompting the need for exemptions. This was adopted by the 
campaign, as the candidate promised to exempt farmers from paying the debts if he 
became president. Another message that was amended was the white taxi drivers’ loans. 
They were affected by the security after the revolution and the protests everywhere. 
Thus, they were not able to pay their taxi’s instalments / loans, and the campaign 
suggested a flexible plan for them to re-pay their debts if Shafiq was elected. As 
Ibrahim explained, the taxi message was a complex message, as it highlighted the 
importance of a having a strong man who can restore security: “Shafiq would return the 
security for them, so they would be able to work again and he restructured their debts”. 
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5.2.3.3 Free Media 
Shafiq’s relationship with the media was not good, especially after his experience with 
the ONTV talk show where he resigned from his job as Prime Minister a day after 
appearing in it. He continued to have some problems with media after that. Opponents 
used to take clips from what he said and mock him about it. Amid the campaign, his 
media producer, Mahmoud Baraka, confiscated tapes from a BBC Arabic interview 
after he was questioned about the future of the head of the military council, Field 
Marshal Hussein Tantawi (BBC 22/1/12). At the time, Baraka claimed that the 
technique used in filming was not satisfactory for him and that it would affect his 
candidate’s professional appearance. After interviewing his campaign staff, it became 
clear that this was because Shafiq had attacked Tantawi and the campaign did not want 
problems with SCAF. Ibrahim said that in contrast to the popular assumption, SCAF 
was not supporting Shafiq. Shafiq continued to appear in TV interviews and talk shows 
conducted for the elections by various channels except Islamic channels, and of course, 
ONTV, where he had his bad experience. He also appeared on Christian channels.  
 
After starting the campaign, Shafiq’s appearance on media was managed by Baraka 
Media Production with 300 people dedicated to the campaign. As Baraka explained, 
they made 150 short films for the campaign including songs. Some of them were used 
as advertisements. They had channels’ and programmes ratings, beside distribution 
numbers of newspapers. Due to their connection with the media, they were able to 
decide when they should appear on each channel and at what time, to deliver particular 
messages. 
 
5.2.3.4 Paid Media 
Just like the rest of the campaigns, the role of paid media was limited to advertising. 
This included TV advertisements, billboard and posters. However, the most important 
feature of Shafiq’s campaign advertising was a series of mysterious blue billboards 
around Cairo reading “The President” in both Arabic and English. For months, no one 
knew what they were for until Ahmed Shafiq’s name was revealed on them on the first 
day of the official election campaigning, after months of speculation over who was 
behind this mysterious campaign.  
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The main colour used in Shafiq’s advertisement was navy blue. As Ibrahim explained, it 
was chosen as it was an official colour used in official documents; thus, again stressing 
the idea of the “statesman”. He was also wearing his trade-mark pullover in all the 
photos. This was an action that was interpreted by many as a way of challenging his 
opponents who used to mock him for wearing pullovers and not a full suit (Shoman and 
Saleh 2012). However, as Ibrahim explained, Shafiq was a practical man. His previous 
work was not an office job, but a practical job that required his presence in working 
locations and sites. He was keen to appear as himself: a practical man who would not 
stay in an office isolated from his people’s problems. This was the main theme of the 
animated song that urged people they should vote for Shafiq.  
 
Shafiq had several TV advertisements that were re-broadcast on other outlets such as 
online and radio. In the first one he appeared talking to the Egyptian people on the 
importance of taking correct decisions. He explained why any decision should be taken 
seriously, why it is important and highlighted all the important decisions he took, 
including his decision to run for the presidency. He then talked to each sector in Egypt 
such as Muslims, Christians, church, Al-Azhar, media, parliament, judge, police …etc. 
Another advertisement showing the importance of the future and not being immersed in 
the past, asked Egyptians critical questions such as whether they would like to protect 
Al-Azhar or follow what he called the general guide’s state, in clear reference to the 
Muslim Brotherhood candidate. He also had other advertisements highlighting his past 
achievements as a statesperson and his future plans for Egypt. All the campaign’s 
advertising carried its main logo “deeds not words”, again to reflect that he was a 
practical man, implementing his words into actions and deeds as he did before, and not 
a man who would give promises and not fulfill them. 
 
5.2.3.5 Debates 
Shafiq did not participate in any debates. There was only one debate between two 
presidential candidates and it badly affected both candidates who participated in it. 
Shafiq’s campaign believed that the idea of debates does not suit Egypt and that it 
would make a candidate more likely to lose. As Ibrahim elaborated:  
 
“Egyptians would prefer to see their president as a strong man, not attacked or 
questioned by another candidate or presenter. No president in Egypt’s history – 
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including Mubarak - has participated in any debates. Thus, there was no reason for 
him to participate in such activity. It will not bring more votes. And at the end, I need 
my candidate to win” 
 
5.2.3.6 Internet and social media 
The online platform was a different arena. As Ibrahim explained, the campaign knew 
that they would not get votes from it but they were trying “to neutralise it”. Ibrahim 
explained four main roles for social media in Shafiq’s campaign; (1) to discredit other 
campaigns. This role was clear, especially in dealing with their opponent Amr Moussa. 
The campaign highlighted the role of Moussa’s daughter in his campaign and described 
it as inheritance in Moussa’s campaign. They used to do this away from their official 
page or account, through other people’s accounts who were working on the campaign 
unknown to the public or social media users. A second role of the team was (2) to stop 
rumours about Shafiq by replying quickly to prevent further repetition. A third 
campaign role was (3) to consume the time of opponents’ campaign staff, knowing that 
other campaigns had a shortage of staff. They would discuss with the administration of 
another campaign a single point for more than 3 hours as if they were members of the 
public in order to consume their time, thus not allowing them to do other important 
tasks in their campaigns. (4) A fourth role was to strengthen and support Shafiq’s 
supporters online. During that time, Shafiq supporters were attacked when they 
supported him online. Therefore, the social media team used to encourage anyone who 
supported Shafiq online through accounts of unknown members of the campaigns or 
through fake social media accounts.   
 
As Ibrahim elaborated, the social media team consisted of a team leader and 24 staff 
members. They worked 3 eight hour shifts in a 24-hour period with 8 people on each 
shift. Each staff member on the team had 20 fake accounts on Twitter to manage and 
administrate, in addition to other fake accounts on Facebook. These 480 fake Twitter 
accounts played an important role in passing campaign messages covertly. The 
campaign used to concentrate more on Twitter as it demonstrated a greater potential for 
dissemination of ideas to a larger sharing population.  
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News websites were also applied to this social media strategy. Staff members had to 
enter comments on any news published about Shafiq and attack other opponents in 
news stories that were published as well.  
 
The team used to give indirect messages through commenting on social media and 
created debate that would support their candidate. For example, when Shafiq spoke on 
TV, someone from the campaign would comment on social media about being bored 
with long commercial breaks. A reply that commercials are long because the man is 
strong and people were watching him so the channel would make profits would be 
added by another staff member. 
 
The social media team’s role extended to cover voting in online surveys. Two people 
from the team were dedicated to this task. With the help of IT, they were able to remove 
cookies and vote again every 25 seconds, filling the survey box and manipulating the 
survey. 
 
Despite the team activity in other outlets, they did not concentrate on their own 
campaign website. They made a simple official campaign website for their candidate 
that contained basic information. It only cost them 10 thousand Egyptian pounds and 
was hacked twice. Once, the campaign was able to restore the news bar and wrote a 
sentence to the hackers saying that they would catch them. As Ibrahim explained, this 
was to avoid media coverage claiming that the candidate who had promised security had 
his own website stolen without them noticing. The campaign was not keen on 
developing the website or having strong security for it due to a shortage of funds. They 
always wanted the money for manpower and did not want to work with non-trusted 
companies. 
 
On the contrary, the campaign created another website known as ‘presidential elections’ 
website, where it used to appear as if it was collecting all candidates’ news from all 
newspapers and from their own websites. At the time, the website appeared to be a good 
source of information about all other candidates. However, as explained by Ibrahim, 
they were highlighting controversial news about candidates; for example, if two 
candidates were attacking each other or show a torn candidate poster on the floor with a 
title referring to a collapse in this candidate’s campaign. They would highlight news 
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that could create an image and help in getting the hesitant voters to support Shafiq. The 
website appeared to have been managed by a group of journalists, but no one – at the 
time of the campaign – doubted that it was managed by senior figures in Shafiq’s 
campaign.  
 
5.2.3.7 Campaigns activities  
Various activities were conducted depending on each sector of the targeted voters. 
Occasionally, one activity would include messages to all these sectors such as TV 
programmes or conferences. Other activities would include narrowcasting as explained 
before. Sometimes Shafiq used to enter villages with what is known in the Egyptian 
culture as zaffa baladi where he entered on a horse with drums; a tradition associated 
with welcoming heroes; an action that would attract the attention of both those living in 
the area and the media. 
 
A big part of the campaign’s activities was conducted in the governorates which was 
mainly the responsibility of the 5000 representatives. They kept the head office updated 
about various campaign activities such as conferences, advertisement cars with 
microphones running in the villages, or door knocking in villages and handing out 
brochures. They were campaigning for the candidate and convincing people locally in 
the governorates to vote for him.  
 
Each of the 5000 representatives was responsible to the central campaign for bringing a 
variable number of voters in on the day of the election. The number of voters estimated 
to be mobilised and transported by each of the 5000 was one thousand each. Thus, in 
total, the 5000 representatives were expected to bring 5 million voters. They used to 
provide cars or buses to collect and return voters back on the day of the elections. Either 
they did this with cars from their own money or they asked the head office to provide 
them. 
 
5.2.3.7 Degree of personalization 
Due to the semi-secret nature of the campaign’s staff, the campaign was only keen on 
covering news about its own candidate. They were not interested in media coverage 
about the team working on the campaign. Most influential figures were working in 
secret without contracts or official titles. As explained by Ibrahim, the real manager 
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himself, Abdallah Kamal, would not enter the campaign headquarters from the main 
door. In a talk show, Shafiq even denied that Abdallah Kamal was part of his campaign, 
until the previously mentioned email revelation. 
 
Personal stories were also not a priority for the campaign. A lot of personal events 
happened during the campaign that they did not use or highlight, including the death of 
Shafiq’s wife. The campaign did not use or publish the incident on their own resources 
and this was only done by other media.  
 
Shafiq refused to publish or announce to the public his tax return documents. He 
believed that it was confidential information and that it should not have to be shared 
with the public, but only be given to the correct authority. According to Ibrahim, 
“publishing it would imply that he was accused and was trying to defend himself. This 
would destroy the image of the strong statesman” 
 
5.2.4 Did the campaign matter? 
 
Shafiq’s campaign was characterized by three main assets that distinguished it from the 
majority of other campaigns. These assets are its 5000 representatives in the 
governorates; experienced staff who had previous experience with campaigns and 
election employment in Egypt; and finally, the social media team. But did the campaign 
really matter in this election? This question was addressed to Ibrahim in order to get a 
sense of the staff evaluation of the campaign, especially amid accusations from other 
campaigns that Shafiq won because of state support. 
 
According to Ibrahim, “campaigns are essential to the Egyptian elections”. Ibrahim 
believes that, “without the campaign, Shafiq wouldn’t have won against his main 
opponent Amr Moussa and be able to continue to round two”. He also believes that 
those who say that campaigns are not important “are those who failed in it”. He 
elaborated that some campaigns concentrated on the media, on the offices, and creating 
shows around the candidates, but neglected to consider “how will they mobilise voters 
who rarely access TV or who can’t read a newspaper?” 
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That is why the campaign emphasised the role of the 5000 representatives. As Ibrahim 
explained, from day one, the campaign was aiming to get five million votes in the first 
round which is why they were concentrating on the five thousand representatives and 
their roles in securing the five million votes. Their main internal slogan was “5 thousand 
equals 5 million”. As Ibrahim elaborates, “people outside the capital don’t feel the 
momentum of general elections, unlike Cairo”. That is why too many efforts needed to 
be concentrated on mobilising them as no one would leave his home easily and vote 
without being urged and mobilised to do so. Ibrahim denied the accusations of using 
money or the state infra structure to secure Shafiq’s votes by saying:  
 
“People / senior families prefer prestige over money. They want to enter council or 
parliamentary elections, or have a relationship with those who are in power, and it 
was the role of the campaign to understand and make use of these people to help their 
candidates get votes.” 
 
Ibrahim explained that in the first round of elections, the 5000 representatives and the 
social media were perhaps the two pillars that helped Shafiq secure the votes that he 
did. The campaign resorted to using staff that had experience in previous elections – 
even if they have it from the NDP – and gave them privileges on other campaigns as 
they were capable of reaching people who could mobilise voters. It helped them as well 
in not believing media and public opinion poll estimations, or even social media 
predictions. Their social media team helped in supporting Shafiq’s supporters and not 
making them feel alone or attacked 
 
However, as Ibrahim continues, the situation was different in the second round of 
elections. According to Ibrahim, “they were mistaken”. They were not able to manage 
the campaign to the extent they would have loved to during the second-round due  
 
“to the severity of the attacks, especially from the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
headquarters was burned and damaged. Candidates who lost in the first round, went 
to Tahrir Square, united in solidarity to lead more attacks on Shafiq. He was not able 
to do visits or conferences freely lest opponents should send someone to attack him, 
which would be highlighted and over-analysed in the media. In round two, he did two 
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conferences in hotels that were to be secured and people who attended were chosen 
carefully.”  
 
Another dimension the campaign regretted ignoring – according to Ibrahim- was that 
they did not pay attention to foreign media. For example, famous writers from famous 
foreign newspapers came to Egypt and wanted to meet Shafiq; but they were very busy 
campaigning and trying to secure votes, thus foreign media was not on their agenda as a 
priority, and they did not meet these journalists. Thus, these writers returned to their 
country and either wrote about Morsi instead or wrote negatively on Shafiq. 
 
Another mistake the campaign made - that Ibrahim highlighted - was that many of the 
staff – including himself- left the office and went on holiday after the voting in round 
two had ended. They did not predict that a problem would erupt with regards to the 
results, such as Morsi’s campaign and the Muslim Brotherhood announcing the election 
result before it was announced officially. Ibrahim believed that this was their biggest 
mistake, especially as the campaign believed until then that Shafiq was the winner, 
which is why they should have waited until the results were announced officially. 
 
In contrast to what was believed in respect that the state was not with Shafiq in 
supporting him, Ibrahim said that “the state was afraid to deal with Shafiq so as not to 
be criticised at this sensitive time”. And regarding allegations that the intelligence 
service was creating fake social media accounts or “electronic committees” to help 
Shafiq, Ibrahim replied that they “find it unfair that all their work would be credited to 
the state or the security services that did not help them”.  
 
For Shafiq’s campaign, campaigns in Egypt are no different from any other campaigns 
in the world. The only difference is the cultural one. Or using Ibrahim own words: 
 
 “In other countries, the campaigns will send emails, but in Egypt they have to knock 
on doors in villages and explain their candidate’s positions and even bring them 
buses to go to the polls and vote on Election Day” 
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5.3 Amr Moussa 
 
5.3.1 Amr Moussa: Short biography 
 
Amr Moussa is a former Egyptian foreign minister and was the head of the League of 
Arab States until he stepped down in mid-2011 to run as for the presidency. 
 
When he left his job as Egyptian Foreign Minister it was believed at the time that 
President Mubarak had removed him from his post and sent him to the Arab League to 
place some distance between him and the public due to his popularity amid the 
inheritance scenario. The latter refers to speculation that Gamal Mubarak was going to 
succeed his father as president, and Moussa was seen by many during that time as a 
viable successor to Mubarak.  
 
His popularity even led a popular singer called Shaaban Abdel Rahim to sing a song for 
him: ‘I hate Israel but I love Amr Moussa’. During his time as Foreign Minister and 
Secretary-General of the Arab League, he made several statements supporting the 
Palestinian cause and attacking Israel, and spoke strongly against the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq. All of these statements added to his popularity.  
 
5.3.2 Political positioning 
 
Moussa positioned himself as a reconciliatory presidential candidate with a 
reconciliatory message for Egyptian society, and as a secular presidential candidate with 
an international profile. His advantage, as he presented it, was that since he had served 
Egypt on the international stage and as head of the Arab League, that he would like to 
serve it once again as president. He also positioned himself as a supporter of the 
revolution, and had joined the crowds in Tahrir Square on 4th February 2011: a week 
before Mubarak stepped down.  
 
He also mentioned that he if succeeded, he would be in office for just one term because 
of his old age. He stressed that his economic reforms policy as president would deal 
with the poor before the rich, given that more than 50% of Egypt’s population is near or 
under the poverty line (BBC news 10/3/12). This also addressed one of the demands of 
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the 25th January Revolution, which called for ‘bread’, in addition to the other two 
demands for freedom and social justice, by promising to rebuild Egypt “on the 
principles of democracy, reform and development" (BBC news 10/3/12). Moussa 
further believed that Egypt had a significant role in promoting democracy in the Arab 
world and in the Middle East, and that he would be able to perform this role given his 
diplomatic experience and relations with world leaders. 
 
In order to maintain this political positioning, Moussa’s campaign restored some 
appeals and abandoned others as follows: 
 
(a) Emotions and logical appeals: the general theme of the campaign revolved 
around a solid thoughtful speech, “preferring to rely on logical and practical 
appeals” (Khalaf 2016)56. However, the campaign did resort to emotional 
appeals or commented on some emotional events. It was therefore “more of a 
reaction than a deliberate or pre-planned act” (Khalaf 2016). Such events 
necessitating an emotional response included violent events leading to deaths 
and injuries, such as the Port Said stadium incident where 72 people were killed 
during a match at the stadium, and other similarly unfortunate incidents. The 
candidate held a press conference to comment on the issue amid widespread 
mourning over the incident.  
 
(b) Attacks: According to both Shafiq’s and Moussa’s campaigns, Moussa was 
attacked a lot mainly by Shafiq’s campaign. For Shafiq’s campaign, Moussa was 
their main rival in the first round of elections. Shafiq’s campaign knew that it 
would not get votes from potential voters of other candidates apart from 
Moussa’s potential voters as they targeted almost the same voters. Khalaf 
highlighted some examples where they were affected badly by attacks. 
According to Khalaf, Shafiq sent an SMS message on the second day of voting 
saying that there were indications that Shafiq was about to win and Moussa was 
failing. Other such tactics included the publishing of a torn photo of Moussa, 
saying it was the collapse of his campaign, or spreading rumours that Moussa 
was against SCAF. According to Khalaf, the Muslim Brotherhood used to attack 
																																																						
56	Interview with Yara Khalaf, campaign’s media team.  
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him by pointing out that he drank wine and portraying him as a heavy drinker. 
Despite being harmed by the attacks, the campaign used to rise above it and not 
counterattack. Kotb57 explained that they received photos of Shafiq’s daughter 
that could harm Shafiq’s campaign if published, but Moussa refused to use 
them. According to Kotb, both the campaign and the candidate believed in 
democratic values, ethics, and the need to maintain good values among 
Egyptians. 
 
(c) Religion: the campaign did not employ or play on religious appeals, but they 
were speaking to those who saw them as an important aspect of the election. 
Sometimes they would quote Quranic verses or poetry when it was relevant to 
the topic at hand, which is a practice common among Egyptians58. 
 
5.3.3 Moussa’s campaign 
 
Those working on Moussa’s campaign believed that their campaign was more advanced 
and professional than other campaigns. Khalaf stressed their adoption of what she called 
the “Obama campaign model”. As both Khalaf and Kamel59 explained, there was a 
separation between the role of the candidate and the management of the campaign itself. 
There were some strategic decisions that were agreed upon with the candidate but in 
general there were no separate individual decisions from Moussa, except in special 
circumstances such as the decision to participate in the debate. The next section will 
address the campaign’s structures and strategies as follows. 
 
5.3.3.1 Campaign’s structures 
 
5.3.3.1.1 Campaign’s staff 
The campaign was divided into ten teams, including a campaign manager who acted as 
a co-ordinator, as follows: 
 
																																																						
57 Interview with Moataz Kotb, the campaign’s IT and social media manager. 
58 Ordinary Egyptian uses Quranic verses and poetry in their ordinary talks as a way of showing 
emphasis, eloquent, or Rhetoric.  
59 Interview with Ahmed Kamel, Moussa’s campaign. 
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1- Campaign manager and political liaison: Former ambassador Hesham Youssef, 
who was the director of Moussa’s office when he was the Secretary-General of 
the League of Arab states. He worked closely with the candidate and co-
coordinated various campaign departments. As Khalaf and Kamel explained, he 
acted as the link between the candidate and others, as the campaign did not want 
their candidate to be overwhelmed by details from many people which could 
lead to his time being unnecessarily consumed. He was also tasked with co-
ordinating political meetings with various political and societal forces and 
community leaders at the time, such as those among the Bedouin tribes, and in 
the areas of Nubia, Halayib, and Shalateen.  
 
2- Governorates co-ordinator and field manager: General Said Zaatar. Khalaf 
described him as the campaign’s “executive arm”. He was supposed to manage 
the campaign in the field in the various governorates. He was responsible for the 
local headquarters, conferences, events, the candidate’s visits to these 
governorates and other such events. He was also responsible for the 
governorates on the days of elections. He was responsible for getting 
endorsements and lobbying the big families in the governorates, as well as the 
sectors affecting voters in each governorate or city, such as traders, fishermen, 
peasants, and other such categories. He also chose representatives for the 
campaign in each governorate.  
 
3- Programme co-ordinator: the main role of the programme co-ordinator was to 
develop and compile the candidate’s programme for the election. The team dealt 
with many advisors from different fields to develop Moussa’s final election 
programme. The programme was also translated and published into English, 
which shows that the campaign was keen on its image abroad. 
 
4- Finance department: this team was responsible for the budget, fundraising, and 
donations. 
 
5- I.T. team: this team was responsible for all the I.T. needed for the campaign. The 
team was also responsible for social media, wherein it used to campaign for the 
candidate, and for managing the campaign’s official pages.  
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6- Secretarial team: this team was responsible for managing and amending the 
candidate’s schedule. Hanyaa Moussa, the candidate’s daughter, oversaw this 
team. As Khalf explained, if there was a conflict in the candidate’s schedule 
between high profile figures, she would call and amend it. If the campaign 
needed money, she would make calls and bring in donations as she was well-
connected with her father’s contacts. All of these things are responsibilities 
Moussa would not have had time to attend to himself.  
 
7- Marketing and advertisement team: this team was responsible for the campaign 
and candidate’s photos, colours, slogans, and their testing on focus groups 
before adoption. 
 
8- Egyptians abroad and communities’ team: this team was responsible for 
campaigning outside of Egypt and for reaching Egyptians abroad. The team’s 
role was facilitated by Moussa’s connections with Egyptian diplomats abroad, 
whom he came to know during his work as Egyptian Foreign Minister or later as 
the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. 
 
9- Media and PR team: responsible for content development, Egyptian media, and 
international and Arab media. This team previously worked and managed the 
campaign of Amr Hamzawy in the parliamentary elections. This was why they 
were contacted by candidates to work during the presidential elections, due to 
their previous experience in the parliamentary elections60.  
 
10- Advisory board: this consisted of public figures who were not working on the 
campaign on a daily basis but who endorsed the candidate and acted as an 
advisory board for him. 
 
 
 
																																																						
60 These were the parliamentary elections that were conducted around six months before the 
presidential elections. Hamzawy was elected as an MP in Heliopolis in Cairo.  
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5.3.3.1.2 Management style 
Khalaf and Kamel explained the management style as a horizontal one that did not 
require the approval of the candidate on all decisions. According to them, “the 
campaign was managing the candidate rather than the reverse”, but there were “some 
strategic decisions taken by the candidate, and his input was clear”. 
 
However, as they elaborated, almost all decisions were based on discussions, except 
decisions related to politics and dealing with political entities such as the Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) or other political parties or foreign countries that the 
candidate would deal with using his experience and personal evaluation of the situation. 
Additionally, there were a few decisions taken by the candidate despite the campaign’s 
refusal, such as the decision to participate in a debate, or the decision to reply to 
nonsensical and provocative questions in social media events, as will be explained later 
in this chapter. 
 
This indicates that there were two levels of management style in the campaign: a 
vertical one in political decisions and a horizontal one between different departments 
and with regard to daily work. 
 
5.3.3.1.3 Campaign’s premises 
The main headquarters of the campaign was in Dokki, Cairo, where they rented a villa 
for this purpose. The campaign paid a lot of attention to media and the image of their 
candidate. There was a photo booth with the campaign logo in the background so that 
anyone who visited the campaign office could take a photo with the candidate shown as 
a backdrop.  
 
There was also a special office dedicated to and equipped for journalists. The campaign 
was keen that journalists had an appropriate place lest they go wandering about the 
building and hear conversations or arguments that the campaign wished to keep private. 
This reflected their understanding of journalists and the media environment in Egypt, 
and reflected the sorts of places the candidate worked in before. Both the Egyptian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the League of Arab States had such dedicated places for 
journalists. 
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The campaign’s other offices in the various governorates were either places given to the 
campaign by volunteers or strategic locations rented by the campaign for the duration of 
the elections. In every office in these governorates there was usually a journalist who 
supported the candidate and volunteered as a local media officer, and who knew and 
had connections with other local journalists, to whom they could distribute press 
releases and other news from the campaign. As explained by Khalaf, this journalist 
would also write about internal campaign events in the governorate and send them to 
the central media office in the campaign headquarters.  
 
The relations between the campaign headquarters and the other premises in the 
governorates were managed through the governorates co-coordinator and field manager. 
There was a central email sent every day containing daily reports, in addition to 
communications throughout the day via various means to deal with any updates or 
questions that arose. The central media team updated the governorates with the content 
and media information they needed through the governorates co-ordinator and field 
manager. There was also daily communication between journalists in the governorates 
and the campaign’s central media office, which was keen on feeding journalists in the 
governorates with news about the candidate and the campaign in order to discourage 
them from inventing any fictional stories in the absence of real material, Khalaf 
explained. 
 
5.3.3.1.4 Degree of externalization 
The campaign relied upon several specialisations, such as media and public relations, 
marketing, and advertising companies. They also acquired relevant information from 
research centres, in addition to the experts and specialists who helped in writing the 
campaign’s election programme. The campaign staff also turned to their friends 
working abroad, either as diplomats or journalists, to reach Egyptians in other countries.  
 
5.3.3.1.5 Internal communication 
Almost all types of communication were used by the campaign, including but not 
limited to: phone calls, emails, WhatsApp, BBM, SMS, video messages, messages on 
Twitter and Facebook, uploading videos on YouTube for others to see, uploading 
downloadable files elsewhere online, and video streaming.  
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The campaign also used Walkie Talkies after an incident when the campaign travelled 
to an isolated area called Wadi Feran (Feran Valley). As Kamel explained, that place 
had not been entered before except by President Sadat and Amr Moussa. They were 
escorted by Bedouins as police do not enter the area. On the bus, some journalists who 
were accompanying the campaign fell asleep and nobody noticed them; they were not 
able to use their mobile phones as there was no coverage in the area. After the bus doors 
were closed they went unnoticed until they were about to be die of suffocation, when, 
luckily, they were seen by one of the bus drivers who happened to pass by at the time. 
After that, the campaign staff used to travel with Walkie Talkies and three phones with 
three SIM cards from the three mobile companies in Egypt in case of a network 
coverage problem in the areas they visited. 
 
5.3.3.1.6 Feedback 
The campaign did not have a specific department for feedback. As Kamel and Khalaf 
explained, they received feedback from social media, traditional media, and reports 
from the governorates and public figures that used to call the candidate. The campaign 
also assigned an expert in media and public opinions who used to get feedback from 
focus groups in addition to feedback the campaign received from journalists and the 
public. 
 
Khalaf gave an example of a journalist who told Moussa about an old lady in one of the 
villages who admired him. The campaign asked for her contact and invited her to come 
and meet the candidate. Later on, this lady acted as a campaigner for Moussa in her 
village and used to call them to provide feedback from her observations as well. 
 
5.3.3.1.7 Opposition research 
The campaign did not have a separate department for opposition research. As Khalaf 
explained, the role was embedded with other departments such as the media unit which 
analysed all opponents with their strengths and points of weakness. There was a daily 
analysis of the media outlets that also covered everything related to the other 
candidates.  
 
 
 
	 123	
5.3.3.1.8 Campaign’s duration 
The campaign staff explained that they started in two phases. The first phase was from 
April 2011 to December 2011, when Moussa took the decision to run for the presidency 
and began visiting the governorates and meeting people. This was the phase where the 
programme was researched and started to be written.  
 
The second phase lasted from January 2012 to May 2012, when the campaign was 
working intensively on all aspects, with special attention on the media, both local and 
foreign. However, the campaign believes – as explained by Khalaf- that this was “a 
strategic mistake as this extended their candidate’s exposure time”, unlike other 
candidates who entered the presidential race at almost the last minute. The campaign 
believes that it was a mistake that he worked on the ground in the first six months, “as 
raising his exposure increased the attacks against him” and was generally not a good 
move in Egypt’s political climate at the time, with its many political developments 
taking place daily and because of other candidates resorting to attacking their 
opponents. As Khalaf explained; 
 
“Public Figure candidates generally have already built up their support among the 
public, and cannot go much higher than that. On the contrary, the candidate may 
lose votes if he starts his campaign too early. This contrasts with those who announce 
their intention to run for president later and start their campaign later, thus 
minimising the chances of losing votes” 
 
 
5.3.3.1.9 Campaign’s budget 
Unlike information acquired from other campaigns, Moussa’s campaign says that the 
money spent on media and advertisements was less than the money they spent at the 
time of the election itself.  
 
As Khalaf explained, the campaign was divided into two parts: the campaigning period, 
and voting week. During the voting week, the campaign spent two thirds of its budget 
on what they called ‘expenses prior to election’. This money was spent on hiring buses 
to bring people to voting stations, and living and accommodation expenses for the 
campaign’s representatives in the polling stations all over Egypt, including meals served 
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twice daily, as these people were working from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. There were also 
lawyers hired to pass by the polling stations to make sure there were no violations. As 
Khalaf explained, as a campaign, they could not depend on volunteers to do these jobs, 
as a volunteer can easily call in sick on the day. 
 
Khalaf elaborated further that the campaign faced shortages of money during the voting 
period. They had to call fundraisers and businessmen asking for donations. This was the 
role played by Hanya Moussa, as she was well-connected to people known to her father 
who could donate and who might become embarrassed when she called, compared with 
any other member of the campaign calling. 
 
The campaign also explained that before the official start of campaigning for the 2012 
elections, which only took place after the candidates submitted their papers to the PEC, 
the candidate used to work through what was known as ‘the popular campaign61’. This 
meant that money spent during this period was not calculated in the official budget as it 
was either for the popular campaign, or was in the form of goods, products or logistics 
that were needed and paid for by volunteers for the formal campaign.  
 
Another problem that they faced in their budget towards the end of the elections was 
billboards. There were some people who acquired permission from councils for 
strategic places to put up posters and then sold them to others at higher prices, making a 
business out of it and becoming known as a result as the ‘brokers of elections and 
billboards’.  
 
5.3.3.2 Campaign’s strategies 
 
5.3.3.2.1 Voters’ targeting 
The campaign was aware that it was not going to be able to convince the already-
polarised or decided voters and thus aimed at all the undecided voters. According to 
Khalaf, they mainly targeted: 
 
																																																						
61 Campaigns by volunteers and candidates’ supporters without the official involvement of the 
candidate and their team. 
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1- The ‘sofa party, that was looking for stability and someone they could trust to 
lead the country. 
2- Those who dreamt in the past, when Moussa was foreign minister, that he would 
succeed Mubarak and who believed he was moved to the Arab League to be 
away from the Egyptian political arena. 
 
These two categories would come to include many other groups such as housewives, 
those who are settled and have stable jobs, old people on pensions, and the football fans 
known as ‘Ultras’. 
 
As Khalaf explained, in order for them to reach the undecided voters, the campaign, 
with the help of experts, created “something like a map”, based on the parliamentary 
election results which took place around 6 months before the presidential elections, 
showing the political inclinations of the various areas as well as the more prominent 
families.  
 
They received endorsements from the big families in the governorates who were not 
affiliated with political groups or already decided. However, they later discovered, 
when the votes were counted, that these people are ineffective as not all of them would 
vote, and they also would not mobilise others in their areas to go and vote on Election 
Day. As Khalaf explained, 
 
“They would come to campaign rallies in large numbers, sometimes more than 
22,000 of them, to attend an event for the candidate, but they would not vote, 
attending the events largely out of curiosity.” 
 
According to Khalaf, the campaign also received the endorsement of Egypt's Coptic 
Christian Pope Shenouda III just prior to his death in March 201262. Khalaf said that 
during a phone conversation between Moussa and Shenouda, “the latter told Moussa 
that he would get the Christian votes”. It was believed that the pope would mobilise and 
direct the vote of Christians and it was agreed – according to Khalaf - that the votes 
																																																						
62 For more info about Pope Shenouda III see: BBC News 17/3/2012. 
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would go for Moussa63.  But as Khalaf explained, during other campaigns’ attacks 
against Moussa, a message was circulated with the content that Moussa would reconcile 
with the Islamists and that he was opposed to SCAF. Khalaf elaborated that this 
message raised fears among Christians – who were afraid of Islamist rule and wanted 
the protection of SCAF-. That is why the campaign believes that the Christian vote did 
not go to Moussa and instead went to his opponent, Ahmed Shafiq, who was seen as a 
clear opponent to the Islamist forces and part of the military.  
 
5.3.3.2.2 Narrowcasting activities 
These activities varied depending on the audience. For example, the campaign depended 
on door to door campaigning, especially in villages. They also organised several 
electoral conferences. The campaign considered its official launch as one of its most 
important activities. The campaign was launched from Ezzbet El Nakhl, a poor slum 
area, in contrast to the more affluent locations of other campaigns, which gave a clear 
message that, as a president, Moussa would deal with the poor before the rich and that 
he would protect those below the poverty line. The campaign had also targeted SMS 
campaigns through mobile phone companies whereby they sent messages to specific 
areas at a specific time (the place could be a church address and the time could be a 
time of a prayer when Christians would be there and receive the message); face-to-face 
meetings; visits to governorates and to Egyptians abroad; in addition to media 
campaigns on television, radio, the internet, and social media, along with another 
campaign in the international and Arab media. 
 
5.3.3.2.3 Free Media 
The campaign’s media team was the team responsible for content development for the 
campaign and would provide media outlets with stories. The campaign divided media 
intro three categories: Egyptian media, Arab media, and international (Western) media. 
There was a person dedicated to each of the three categories. Moussa had an advantage 
over the other candidates as he already had access to Arab and Western media due to his 
previous positions. 
 
																																																						
63 For role of the Coptic Church in Egyptian politics see: Fahmi 2014. 
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For the campaign, media was a vehicle to address public opinion across the world. As 
Khalaf explained, Moussa realised that Egypt cannot be without friends, or survive on 
its own. Thus he tried to address public opinion across the world for support so that 
when he won and took office, he would find international support. According to Khalaf, 
“he was thinking of his post-electoral position”. 
 
In the international media, foreign journalists asking to visit the campaign or to 
interview Moussa were offered the chance to accompany him on his campaign visits 
and rallies in the villages in various governorates, instead of undertaking the interviews 
at the campaign office.  He would hold press conferences and sessions with foreign 
journalists. His language and previous experience in dealing with the media helped him 
in this regard, as he did not need any training on how to deal with them. As Kamel 
explained, he was also well aware of the informal rule of the Egyptian media: “get 
published outside of Egypt, and all the Egyptian media outlets will re-publish it”. For 
the Arab media, he already had a team of journalists working therein that covered the 
news of the League of Arab States. The campaign used to pass on topics related to the 
Arab world and feed them to journalists. The campaign also used to organise round-
table sessions with high profile journalists, writers, and editors-in-chief, where they 
could come together and ask the candidate all the questions they wanted, which was 
reflected in their writings later on. 
 
Due to the reconciliatory nature of Moussa’s political positioning, he used to appear on 
most television channels. As Khalaf explained, “the campaign believed that every 
programme, even if unpopular, has its audience”. At the start of the campaign, new 
channels opened whose ideologies or bias were not yet clear. Thus, the campaign used 
to appear on almost everything, so as not to run the risk of overlooking one sector of 
society in favour of another. The campaign also provided Egyptian media with stories 
about the candidate and the campaign. This included giving them the contacts of his 
hairdresser, old friends, and so on. 
 
Khalaf explained, from their experience working with the media in Egypt, the campaign 
divided each outlet and staff according to their ideology and political inclinations, in 
addition to dividing them according to their target audiences; whether they be the elite, 
businessmen, youth, housewives, retirees, or otherwise.  The campaign also used to 
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develop a specific message for each of these categories. They did not ignore any voters, 
but concentrated on their target audience and expected voters. This is why the candidate 
appeared on Muslim channels to re-assure them that he was not secular and was not a 
heavy drinker or smoker. 
 
They also appeared on other media such as sports channels on television to reach the 
‘Ultras’ youth, which was a group of militant Egyptian football fans, and one of the 
country’s largest civilian groups (Dorsey 2012)64. According to Khalaf, the campaign 
believed that the revolution had divided people within the family. This is why it chose 
to appear on several outlets to reach different people with the aim of reassuring all 
voters, even if they were not all going to vote for Moussa. The campaign wanted to 
“reassure them so that when Moussa became president, they would not be afraid or go 
out and protest”. 
 
The campaign appeared on the 25th of January Channel (which was loosely, but 
unofficially, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood), Al-Jazeera, and Al-Anadool 
Turkish news agency, which were all supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. According to 
Khalaf, “the campaign did not want to give them the chance to say that Moussa refused 
to appear or speak with them.” 
 
However, he did not appear on entertainment programmes as they do not suit his 
character, such as cooking programmes for example, but he did, nonetheless, show his 
sense of humour on other programmes. The campaign also helped him to reach this type 
of voter by producing short films or personal interviews where he highlighted the 
personal aspects of his life. 
 
5.3.3.2.4 Paid media 
This mainly involved advertisements on radio, television, and newspapers, along with 
the targeted SMS campaigns and billboards and posters in the streets.  
 
For posters and billboards, the campaign had three main designs (Shoman and Saleh 
2012). One was used in street advisements and the other two for social media. The 
																																																						
64 For more info about Ultras and role in politics, see: Dorsey 2012; Elgohari 2013. 
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poster was in grey with the background showing Cairo, and had either the campaign 
slogan “we are able to challenge” (Ad Al-Tahady in Arabic) or the wording “Amr 
Moussa, president for Egypt”. As Khalaf explained, the posters were not good, “he 
appeared much older and it used the grey colour” which the campaign was doing its best 
not be associated with: opponents used to describe him as going to grey areas, an idiom 
meaning that he does not take clear – black or white - decisions, but goes to the grey 
area.  
 
The TV advertisement had the same colour and slogan themes, with Moussa appearing 
stating his promises along with ordinary citizens endorsing him.  It had the same 
problems as his posters and billboard advertising. According to Khalaf, the reason was 
mainly that the campaign started these advertisements too early and resorted to a 
marketing company that had “some problems”. They did not have the time or resources 
to repeat them.  
 
For televised advertisements, they paid only for the production costs. They would strike 
a deal with channels whereby Moussa would appear on their programmes and waive his 
fee and in return the channel would play his campaign advertisement for free. 
 
5.3.3.2.5 Debates 
The debate between Moussa and Aboul Fotouh was the first ever presidential debate in 
Egypt and in the Arab world. However, the campaign believed that it should not have 
agreed to a debate, as it harmed both of the candidates who participated. The campaign 
explains that the debate should have been between all the initial top candidates, 
according to public opinion polls published at the time. The campaign agreed to 
participate based on the participation of other candidates.  
 
As Kamel explained, when the campaign discovered that the other candidates refused to 
attend, Moussa’s campaign refused as well. However, Naguib Saweris, the businessman 
who owned the channel, then called the candidate directly and agreed with him to 
appear. Moussa agreed, reasoning that it would be good for the democratic process. As 
Kamel quoted Moussa: 
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“Moussa further argued that Egyptians had never seen such debates before, and that 
it was their right to see one after the revolution, and that Egypt had to be an example 
of democracy in front of the Arab world.” 
 
The campaign explained that their political communications team was afraid that the 
popularity of Aboul Fotouh could increase because of his appearance in the debate. 
However, as Kamel explained, this did not happen in the end, as “Moussa managed to 
highlight his opponent’s relation to the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as other things 
Aboul Fotouh tried to conceal”. According to Kamel, “the debate may have harmed 
Moussa, but it ruined Aboul Fotouh”. 
 
Khalaf elaborates that as far as the campaign was concerned, the debate mainly harmed 
Moussa as it cost him the undecided and non-aligned voters due to successful attacks 
made by Aboul Fotouh. He also lost the supporters of the former NDP, “as the party 
was attacked by his opponent and Moussa did not defend it”. 
 
5.3.3.2.6 Internet and social media 
Both the internet and social media were managed by one team within the campaign 
which was the I.T. team. It was managed by Moataz Kotb who was specialised in digital 
marketing. 
 
For the internet - as Khalaf and Kamel explained - the campaign website was delayed 
because one of Moussa’s fans had acquired the domain with his name and would not 
give it to the campaign unless she could manage his campaign website. The campaign 
explains that this was one of the things they suffered from. Everyone was sure that 
Moussa would win, thus they started making a business out of it. This fan made a 
website with his name (www.amrmoussa.com), expecting that he would become 
president and that she would be able to sell the domain name for a large amount of 
money. This incident delayed the launch of the campaign website as they were 
consumed in negotiations with this volunteer until they resorted to another domain 
name: AmrMoussaForEgypt.com. The campaign added that this volunteer gave Moussa 
the domain name as a gift after he lost the election. 
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According to the I.T. manager, Moataz Kotb, in a phone interview in September 2016, 
the website they made had international technical standards. It was plain and simple, 
artistic and white. However, they found that the traffic was not as expected. They went 
to a local company that makes website designs in Egypt. The company told them that 
Egyptians like crowded websites where everything is on the front page. The company 
changed the website as advised. As a result, the website was down for three hours due 
to traffic. They exceeded its traffic limit at 1.5 million visits per hour. Unlike Shafiq, 
Moussa’s campaign ensured security and a firewall for their website, so as not to be 
hacked.  
 
The campaign also developed an iPhone application for the candidate with basic 
information about him. They also used to do Search Engine Optimisation (SEO) to 
counter attacks from other campaigns that would cut and edit his speeches, and publish 
them out of context.  
 
During the last two months, they paid money for ‘boosting posts’ on Facebook, in 
addition to some advertisements on newspaper websites. On social media, there were 
many fake accounts in his name. The campaign had to report all of these which was 
very time-consuming as Khalaf explained. Thus, they were often on the defensive. 
There were also many fan pages that had no relation to the campaign. The campaign 
used to feed these with news and content to publish about Moussa. 
 
The candidate himself did not appear a lot on social media unless there was a major 
event that he had to comment on, or a specific message he wanted to send. The social 
media team used to take the content from the media department and publish it on 
Facebook and Twitter. 
 
Kotb explained the role of social media by saying, “it was an ethically-run campaign; 
we did not aim to attack or create fake accounts”. Kotb demonstrated this by referring to 
an incident that happened after Shafiq’s campaign attacked Moussa’s daughter, as some 
of Moussa’s fans sent the campaign inappropriate photos of Shafiq’s daughter. 
However, the candidate and the campaign refused to use these images. 
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According to Kotb, their real victory on the social media front was the fact that “their 
fans were increasing on Moussa’s page even after the campaign had ended”. 
Nonetheless, the campaign did speak of problems regarding their candidate’s attitude 
towards social media. Although he was aware of all such technological developments, 
he had some problems dealing with a social media audience. Khalaf gave the example 
of a live Twitter event they held, where Moussa proved to be keen on answering every 
single question, even mocking impolite ones, rather than ignoring them. One such 
question referred to the wife of famous person, and Moussa insisted on replying that 
this was rude.  According to Khalaf, the social media audience did not take kindly to 
this as he appeared to be reprimanding them. 
 
5.3.3.2.7 Campaign’s activities 
The campaign used a variety of activities depending on the audience targeted. In 
addition to the narrowcasting activities – which were often covered by the media- the 
campaign had some other activities such as : a branded bus moving in the streets; a call 
centre with general numbers for voters to call the campaign and ask questions; planned 
events, including the campaign official launch and face-to-face meetings; visits to 
governorates and to Egyptians abroad; in addition to media campaigns on television, 
radio, the internet, and social media, along with another campaign in the international 
and Arab media65. 
 
5.3.3.2.8 Degree of personalization 
As Khalaf explained, the campaign divided the content it provided to the media into the 
following categories:  
 
a) Popular topics: Because of his work as a diplomat, Moussa would hitherto 
usually appear in a suit and holding a cigar. However, the campaign needed to 
highlight the other more popular side of his character. Thus the campaign used 
to feed the media with photos of his visits to the villages, eating food with his 
hands among the peasants, or with the people they visited. They also highlighted 
his visits to urban slums and other such poverty-stricken areas. 
																																																						
65 Some of these activities were meant to be narrowcasting activities for their targeted groups 
but at the same time can be considered as general campaign activities as it was enhanced by 
media coverage to a wider audience. 
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b) Political topics and political speeches designed for officials, the interim 
government, and SCAF.  
 
c) Topics for general voters: the campaign was also keen on passing certain types 
of stories to the media which included: 
i. News about the daily activities of the campaign and candidate, whether 
in Cairo or the other governorates. 
ii. They also made announcements regarding his upcoming media 
appearances, including which programme and at what time. 
iii. Reports about the Arab League or issues related to the Arab world, 
where he could express his views. 
iv. Highlighting the campaign team itself as well, allowing the team to 
speak about themselves to show that Moussa employed professionals. 
Thus he could be expected to do the same when he became president. 
v. The campaign would remind Moussa about personal stories in his life to 
mention to the media, as he generally only remembered to tell stories 
about negotiations and disputes from his previous work. 
vi. The campaign created a list of all his friends, former neighbours, 
schoolmates, and his old porter in order to ask them about personal 
stories related to the candidate. Then they would then pass these on to 
the media without the media noticing that they were being dictated the 
news topics. 
 
However, as Khalaf explained, “the candidate did not like involving his family and 
personal life in the campaign”. She gave an example of when a television crew wanted 
to go to his house in a gated compound and film there, the campaign refused. For the 
campaign and the candidate, they wanted to “present Moussa’s professional experience 
more than his personal life”. Khalaf gave another example: when his son got married 
during the campaign, they had a small wedding ceremony and did not tell the media. 
This was “to avoid the event being used in the election,” especially given that the media 
might have assumed that all those attending were endorsing or voting for Moussa. “He 
also did not want to embarrass his guests, some of whom may not be voting for him”, 
Khalaf added. 
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5.3.3.3 Did the campaign matter? 
 
Moussa resorted to those who campaigned for Amr Hamzawy in the parliamentary 
elections. This act demonstrated a need for those with election experience in Egypt, of 
whom there were not many. However, in a country with weak and divided political 
parties, experience in elections and how they are managed, as well as the ability to 
secure votes (especially outside Cairo), were competencies only found in the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the former NDP because of their experience in parliamentary 
elections, student unions, trade unions, and so on. 
 
Moussa’s campaign was working for the period after the election as well, as if their 
candidate had already won. This is why they attended to many details that other 
campaigns overlooked, such as the location, photo booth, and separate rooms in the 
campaign headquarters for journalists equipped with computers, fax, and internet; or the 
targeting of world leaders and global public opinion for the sake of international 
connections after the election.  
 
The campaign had advantages over the other campaigns on the media front, but it was 
not that active in the field and in the governorates, mainly due to a lack of experience in 
elections, particularly those outside of Cairo. They also did not resort to those who 
possess the necessary field experience for political reasons, as those people who had the 
experience were either from the former NDP or the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
The role of the media team was to help the governorates’ co-ordinator and field 
manager in building up the image of the candidate, creating his branding and the visual 
work; but both the field manager, and communication with various political forces, had 
to bring in the actual votes. 
 
The campaign only started working with representatives and the so-called ‘brokers of 
elections and billboards’ after other candidates had done so already: in other words, at a 
later stage in comparison with other campaigns. This meant that they were not aware of 
the real business of campaigning on the ground. In most cases, they were not able to 
monitor those representatives or brokers they had agreed with, unlike Shafiq’s 
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campaign. This led to some of these ‘brokers’ taking money from Moussa’s campaign 
and not doing the job required of them.  
 
Furthermore, choosing an ethical campaigning approach and reconciliatory message, in 
contrast to the polarising speeches that were common at the time - such as old regime 
speeches, revolutionary speeches, or Islamist speeches - caused the campaign to lose the 
polarised voters. Added to this is the fact that it was negatively affected by the attacks 
from other campaigns, notably Shafiq’s campaign. Its reconciliatory message was 
understood or advertised by opponents as insubstantial and aimed at pleasing everyone, 
whether supporters of the old regime, revolutionaries, or Islamists, just to get more 
votes.  
 
The campaign also mentioned that one of its security team, who loved and supported 
Moussa, did not vote for him on the day of the election66. He apparently believed that 
the candidate was good enough to win without needing his vote, especially given that 
the media and public opinion polls in the country had him as the favourite to win.  He 
therefore voted for Shafiq, for which he was greatly criticised. This is an example that 
shows the difficulty in predicting voters’ behaviour.  
 
All these combined factors contributed to the final result, with Moussa losing the 
election in the first round, despite speculation during the campaigning period that he 
was the favourite to win. But how did his campaign’s staff evaluate the role of their 
campaign in the 2012 elections? 
 
Moussa’s campaign was divided on the question of whether campaigns were important 
or not. Khalaf (2016) believed that campaigns were important as they made everyone 
aware of the candidate. For her, elections are like football matches: “it is not important 
to manoeuver with the ball during the match, but to score goals, even if only through 
penalties”.  
 
																																																						
66 Interview with Lamia Kamel in May 2012. 
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In other words, although the campaign kept its integrity and its values by not 
participating in attacks and negativity, or resorted to people from the former NDP, it 
lost. Thus, according to Khalaf:  
 
“It might have been wiser to resort to the help of those who were aware of the rules of 
the game to win the election, and to play on polarisation at least behind closed doors, 
or to attack instead of consuming time replying to rumours, especially given that 
traditional Egyptian media presents what is written on social media as if it is the truth 
or what the public wants. This caused ordinary people to follow or believe these 
things as truth”. 
 
Khalaf added, “once elected, the candidate can adhere to his own rules and values once 
again, instead of losing at everything”. However- as Khalaf explained- it is because the 
candidate played according to his own values and kept his integrity during the campaign 
that he is still respected in Egyptian society now. He still had a role in the political arena 
after the election, such as his role as the head of the ‘Committee of 50’ which was 
assigned to set up the new Egyptian Constitution after the ouster of Morsi. For her, at 
least, these values and ethical rules made Egyptians regret not voting for him after 
Morsi’s winning. 
 
However, according to Kotb (who decided to quit campaigning work after participating 
in another two parliamentary elections) campaigns were not a decisive factor in the 
2012 presidential elections. Kotb explained, 
 
“Votes in the villages were in the hands of a relatively small number of people. A 
senior family leader can bring a candidate 30,000 votes if he has an agreement with 
the candidate or was promised a future position. However, if he did not have such an 
agreement, he could be the person behind these 30,000 people protesting against the 
candidate, or even ruin an event organised for the candidate in front of the media”. 
 
Kotb disagreed with Khalaf’s arguments that they should have played the game as it is –
without ethics- and later on adhered to the candidate’s own rules if he became president. 
According to Khalaf, a candidate who played by these rules would not be able to 
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withdraw his promises afterwards and attempt to apply the demands of the revolution, 
or even just democratic values. As he further explains:  
 
“The candidate would have to pay back his debt, finding himself in a situation similar 
to that of a policeman who wants to catch a prostitution ring, and instead finds 
himself involved in it not only as a pimp but as a prostitute”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 138	
5.4 Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh 
 
5.4.1 Aboul Fotouh: short biography 
 
Aboul Fotouh was a prominent figure in the Muslim Brotherhood group. He was 
dismissed from the group after announcing his intention to run for president in May 
2011, contrary to the group’s decision not to nominate any of its members (Al-Jazeera 
19/6/11). He was one of the 16-member Guidance Bureau of the Brotherhood from 
1987 to 2009. He was, however, from the reformist wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
During his campaign, he attracted the support of many Muslim Brotherhood youths who 
were in support of change within the organisation. Some of them were also dismissed 
from the group and worked with him on his campaign. 
 
He had a long career in doctors’ unions and relief organisations and as the head of the 
Arab Medical Union, as well as his role on the emergency and relief committee of the 
union, which played an important part in relief efforts during the Second Palestinian 
Intifada in 2000 and anti-war efforts against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (El-Gundi 
2012). Aboul Fotouh’s opinions changed significantly over the previous years. He was a 
co-founder of the first cell of the Islamic Group (al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya) and he 
believed that violence was allowed to spread the message of Islam and establish an 
Islamic state. However, he later came to condemn all these views (Knell 13/4/11). 
 
He was imprisoned three times due to his political activities (El-Gundi 2012). In 1977, 
when he was the leader of Cairo University's Student Union and he confronted 
President Anwar Sadat in a public debate where he told Sadat to his face that he was 
surrounded by hypocrites and raised issues around the restrictions Sadat placed on 
political Islamic activities. He was jailed along with hundreds of other opponents just a 
month before Sadat was assassinated in 1981.He was imprisoned again by President 
Hosni Mubarak from 1996 to 2001 after being sentenced by a military court for 
belonging to a banned group seeking to overthrow the regime in 1996-2001, and again 
for five months in 2009 (El-Menshawy 2011). While serving a prison term under 
Mubarak between 1996 and 2001, Aboul Fotouh obtained a bachelor’s degree in law 
from Cairo University (El-Gundi 2012). Aboul Fotouh supported the 25th January 
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Revolution. He helped in establishing field hospitals in Tahrir Square to provide first 
aid to injured protestors.   
 
5.4.2 Political positioning 
 
Aboul Fotouh positioned himself as a consensual politician who could gain the popular 
support of people who come from different backgrounds. As El-Shahawy, his campaign 
manager, describes it, he “opposed the use of religion for the sake of appearances”, and 
positioned himself as a moderate and civilised reformist Islamist. He also highlighted 
his role in relief work and his opposition to both Mubarak and Sadat. However, he was 
keen to distance himself from the Muslim Brotherhood, and his campaign did not like 
media interviews highlighting or questioning his relations with the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
 
In his promises, he highlighted that Egypt was an impoverished country rather than a 
poor one. He argued that with the use of the available resources at the time, he could 
fight corruption and make Egypt a stronger country. This was reflected in the 
campaign’s main slogan: ‘Egypt stronger’. His plans for a stronger Egypt included 
establishing a minimum standard income or a minumim wage, restoring security within 
100 days of taking office, re-equipping the Egyptian military from sources not funded 
by the United States, and appointing a young vice-president, aged below 45. He also 
promised citizens’ engagement through a “participatory democracy” (Ayad 2012). In 
order to deliver his campaign messages, the candidate used some appeals and 
abandoned others such as: 
 
Negativity and attacks: The campaign adopted a positive ethical approach which is 
why they did not attack or pursue negative campaigning tactics especially at the start of 
the campaign. However, according to El-Shahawy,67 when Shafiq announced that he 
would run for the presidency, the campaign started attacking him by highlighting his 
negative points. In a press conference, the candidate was asked by a journalist about 
reports that Shafiq might run for president and Aboul Fotouh replied that it would be a 
disaster, adding that Shafiq was not fit to even run a district. 
																																																						
67 Interview with Mohamed El-Shahawy, Aboul Fotouh’s campaign manager. 
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Amr Moussa was considered to be Aboul Fotouh’s main opponent. As El-Shahawy 
explained, the campaign used to address issues like his age and the need for change, 
claiming that Egypt did not undergo a revolution just to have someone from the 
Mubarak regime again. However, the candidate was attacked by Islamists for not being 
Islamic enough while also being attacked by liberals for being an extremist. 
 
Emotions: The candidate appeared to be very emotional as El-Shahawy recalled - he 
cried two or three times during televised appearances. During the violent events that 
took place at the time of the campaign, such as clashes between police and protestors, 
the campaign used to send doctors to help with first aid, and sometimes Aboul Fotouh 
himself used to go. Two members of the campaign died in the various political clashes 
that took place and these were emotional times for the campaign that led to some 
sympathy.  
 
Religious: both the candidate and the campaign were trying to distance him from his 
former affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. He was against the use of religion for 
the sake of appearances. He used to talk about what he described as a civilised and 
moderate Islam. Moreover, according to El-Shahawy, the campaign used to suffer from 
Islamist groups endorsing its candidate publicly, and this led to the loss of support 
among voters opposed to the Islamists. 
 
Logic and numbers were also used by the campaign, especially when talking about his 
electoral programme and plans for making “Egypt stronger”. 
 
5.4.3 The campaign 
 
Aboul Fotouh’s campaign was formed after several brain-storming sessions, discussing 
whether the candidate would run for the presidency or support another candidate if he 
found a suitable one.  Aboul Fotouh’s decision to run for the presidency was taken after 
several stages, which was reflected in his statements: he initially said he ‘might think’ 
about running, then that he ‘was thinking’ of running, and the final stage when he 
confirmed that he ‘would’ indeed run.  
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According to El-Shahawy, during these stages the candidate tested the support he had 
by asking his supporters to collect 3,000 signatures for him supporting his bid for the 
presidency; then asking for another 5,000 and so on in order to gauge how much 
popular support he had. During the early period when he had not taken the formal 
decision to run, he used to have meetings with his supporters in places like his villa’s 
basement or, later on, in a sporting club where he had supporters from the governorates. 
When they started formulating the campaign, it began with only four people, namely the 
campaign manager, operations manager, spokesperson, and governorates co-ordinator. 
As El-Shahawy explained, these four people represented the campaign nucleus, and 
when the number of people working on the campaign increased and the campaign 
became bigger, the teams started realising what was missing bit by bit, such as the need 
for a dedicated media professional to deal with the media. 
 
Unlike other campaigns, Aboul Fotouh’s campaign did not start with structures or goals. 
They started with certain principles that they were keen to implement. El-Shahawy 
listed these principles as follows: “to assign tasks only to professionals, to be ethical 
and conduct an ethical campaign, to be positive and conduct positive campaigning, and 
de-centralisation”. These principles also lengthened the process of new staff joining the 
campaign, as they wanted to make sure that anyone who would join them “would share 
their same values”.  
 
5.4.3.1 Campaign’s structures 
 
5.4.3.1.1 Campaign’s staff 
The campaign staff varied from one phase to another in its duration, which was more 
than a year. As El-Shahawy explained, “it was flexible enough to change and to add the 
tasks needed over the campaigning period”. The campaign started with only four 
people, who were the campaign manager, operations manager, spokesperson, and 
governorates co-ordinator. After a period of time, the organisational structure evolved to 
include a range of operational committees that operated centrally, as follows: 
 
a- Strategic thinking committee: responsible for converting “the general theme of 
the election campaign into practicable do-able strategies”. This included setting 
the criteria for choosing the presidential team who would work with the 
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candidate later on when he was elected. This comprised several specialisations 
including agriculture, energy, education, economics, and the like.  
 
b- Political communication committee: responsible for following up and 
monitoring political developments and communicating with political forces, and 
monitoring and following up other candidates’ news. They would also help the 
candidate in setting his political agenda.  
 
c- Popular works committee: this team was responsible for the campaign in the 
governorates. It was accountable for mobilising voters through various 
campaign events. 
 
d- Volunteer committee: this was a simple committee responsible for counting 
new volunteers and registering their details on the database; besides providing 
them with the necessary training to understand more about the campaign and the 
candidate, how to use campaign materials, and what was expected from them.  
 
e- Marketing committee: this committee was responsible for setting up the 
marketing strategy for the campaign, outsourcing companies to implement it, 
and organising events for the campaign and other related tasks. 
 
f- Media committee: the media committee was responsible for both traditional 
and social media. 
 
g- Finance committee: responsible for fundraising. Its role was limited at the start 
of the campaign as there was no law then to organise donations and fundraising. 
It probably only really started working after the law was passed. In the 
beginning, it used to bring in non-monetary and kind in contributions, rather 
than cash, for the campaign; and it used to train those working in the campaign 
on how to bring in contributions for events, such as projectors, lights, and 
campaign office space even if it was just a balcony in a flat. 
 
h- Egyptians abroad committee: this consisted of volunteers living abroad who 
campaigned for the candidate in their respective countries. They were managed 
	 143	
by the co-ordinator of the Egyptians abroad committee. The committee managed 
the candidate’s visits abroad where he met Egyptians living in several other 
countries. 
 
i- The candidate committee: this was his personal secretary and assistants. They 
were responsible for his appointments, clothes, flight tickets, and other such 
details. 
 
These committees were working under the campaign’s general manager, while the role 
of the operations manager was to follow its daily work and co-ordinate between the 
committees. At this stage, the role of the spokesperson was also replaced by the role of 
the media committee, which became responsible for media communications, candidate 
news, and candidate appearances in various media outlets. The candidate’s meetings 
with foreign officials, academics and journalists were organised with the candidate 
himself, his secretary, and the campaign’s general manager.  
 
In parallel with those committees was an advisory board that consisted of several 
advisors to the campaign. They were all public figures, experts, and academics from 
various backgrounds including Marxists, liberals, Islamists, and others. This advisory 
board was responsible for the candidate’s programme under the supervision of the 
campaign’s general manager and for co-ordinating between the political 
communications committee and the candidate. With the increased number of volunteers, 
which exceeded 40,000 to 50,000 as El-Shahawy stated, and with the increase of the 
campaign’s branches in several governorates, the campaign encouraged the idea of 
having several independent popular campaigns68 that worked independently of the 
central campaign.  
    
5.4.3.1.2 Management style 
As El-Shahawy explained, the campaign’s structure was a matrix one, in which two or 
more duties may run through the same department or individual in both the central 
campaign and its branches in the governorates. The head office was responsible for the 
																																																						
68 A group of volunteers who support and admire the candidate can run a campaign to support 
him on their own. They don’t have to necessarily know him in person. 
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main duties such as PR, media, strategies, and political communications. The 
governorates’ committees were mainly responsible for mobilisation, getting supporters, 
and conveying the message and ideas of campaign, but there was overlapping between 
some of the tasks. 
 
Decentralisation was one of the core values and features of this campaign. As El-
Shahawy explained, various teams were responsible for taking their decisions without 
referring back to the head office every time. This did not include strategic decisions like 
the political agenda and coalitions, as these were managed through the central 
campaign. For this reason, the campaign developed the internal slogan: ‘you are the 
campaign’. Thus, according to El-Shahawy, when a team member called asking for 
money, they would reply “you are the campaign”, meaning that they should try to find 
the resources themselves. El-Shahawy further added that decentralisation worked well 
for the campaign as it allowed the central campaign to focus more on accomplishing 
high level objectives away from local day-to-day work. 
 
5.4.3.1.3 Campaign’s premises 
During the early stages of the campaign, meetings with the candidate were held at his 
residence and other places such as sporting clubs. Later on, the campaign rented a place 
from one of the candidate’s supporters for a symbolic rent, besides opening around 60 
branches in the governorates according to El-Shahawy. These branches were either 
donated by volunteers and supporters or rented by the campaign.  
 
5.4.3.1.4 Degree of externalization 
The campaign resorted to outsourcing and hiring people from outside the campaign 
rather than the advisory board who acted as volunteers. This included a technical 
company that helped them establish a call centre with a number for the general public to 
call and ask about the campaign or the candidate, companies to organise big campaign 
events, and a marketing company for determining the campaign themes and designs. 
They also resorted to experts in the fields of marketing research, measurement of public 
opinion, and public speaking skills: the majority of whom were experts who were also 
friends and supporters of the candidate.  
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5.4.3.1.5 Internal communication 
The campaign staff used several methods to communicate with each other on a daily 
basis, including weekly face-to-face meetings at the start of the campaign, then daily 
meetings, and eventually “sleeping in campaign headquarters near election times” as El-
Shahawy explained. There were also mailing lists and phone calls, especially when 
dealing with the governorates. 
 
5.4.3.1.6 Feedback 
El-Shahawy described feedback in the campaign as “one of the most painful things”. 
According to him, in Egypt, there were no bodies capable of conducting public opinion 
polls professionally except the government and the Muslim Brotherhood. Another 
option was the business sector, which was not used to conducting political public 
opinion polls. Thus, for the campaign “there were no reliable sources to refer to”. They 
tried to develop a method of measuring public opinion by resorting to those who 
conduct it in the business sector, in order to develop a small public opinion polling 
centre as part of the campaign, but they did not succeed. Therefore, to get feedback they 
depended on the marketing team that mainly collected feedback from the call centres, 
the youth on Facebook, and events in the media: all of which “proved to be 
unrepresentative and inaccurate” as El-Shahawy concluded.  
 
5.4.3.1.7 Opposition research 
The campaign did not have a special committee for opposition research and this 
responsibility fell to the political communications committee, along with the help of 
other committees such as the popular works committee, media committee, and 
marketing committee. According to El-Shahawy, this was handled in a periodical 
manner with the campaign general manager. 
 
5.4.3.1.8 Campaign’s duration 
The campaign lasted for almost a year. It was divided into three stages as explained 
before: the “might think to run” stage, the “thinking to run” stage, and the actual 
running for president. During all of these three stages, the campaign was working for 
the candidate, although in different capacities. As with Moussa’s campaign, El-
Shahawy also believed that the long duration of the campaign was not in their favour, 
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especially with rapid changes happening on the political arena that affected the 
campaign’s work in general.  
 
5.4.3.1.9 Campaign’s budget 
According to El-Shahawy, the absence of rules regulating campaign finance at the time 
the campaign started (almost a year before the elections) did not help the campaign to 
plan ahead for their budget, nor allow it to collect donations from the start. Like other 
campaigns, Aboul Fotouh’s campaign depended on volunteers buying the items they 
needed. The contributions were given in kind rather than in cash. All the in kind 
contributions were not included in the campaign’s financial report submitted to the 
Presidential High Elections Committee. At the beginning of the campaign, the 
candidate’s family helped him a lot in funding his campaign. His brother had a printing 
house and he would print there for free. 
 
5.4.3.2 Campaign’s strategies 
 
5.4.3.2.1 Voters’ targeting 
The campaign divided voters into segments. According to El-Shahawy, the campaign 
was concentrating on: 
 
“the undecided voters, the ‘sofa party’, and the mainstream who would not read the 
election programme and who just wanted to trust that the new  
president would not be an extension of the old regime, and those who wanted Egypt to 
be stronger in general in various fields” 
 
However, because there was no real accurate data, they had to depend on their own 
estimations. As El-Shahawy explained, the campaign used all previous election and 
referendum results from after the revolution to get an estimate of the segments that 
could vote for their candidate. This led the campaign to concentrate on 19 governorates 
in Egypt, which El-Shahawy described as “19 falcons”, to focus their campaigning 
work on. El-Shahawy explained how they surmised that if they concentrated on these 19 
governorates, they would get more votes overall as they were not totally polarised. 
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The campaign also divided political forces on the street according to their presence and 
their numbers. At the start of the campaign, it concentrated on the Islamist vote as 
Aboul Fotouh was the only Islamist candidate at that time; other Islamist candidates 
joined the presidential race later on. 
 
However, one of the main challenges that made it difficult for them to reach the voters – 
as stated by El-Shahawy- was the gap that appeared and later widened between 
Islamists and secular non-Islamists that occurred after the 19th March constitution, 
which led to a high degree of polarisation in society. This was one of the reasons that 
made the campaign concentrate on the mainstream, non-ideological, undecided voters. 
From the campaign’s point of view, there was no point in spending time on people who 
have already decided who to vote for. In the targeted governorates, the campaign would 
mainly concentrate on, but not limit itself to, doctors, revolutionary youth, academics, 
and universities. 
 
5.4.3.2.2 Narrowcasting activities 
As El-Shahawy explained, they did not carry out narrowcasting but rather targeted the 
middle class, youth, and conservative voters throughout the campaign’s messages and 
wide range of activities. These activities were mainly direct face-to-face activities, 
including candidate visits to various governorates, mainly the 19 falcons, other 
governorates, and candidate visits abroad and to universities.  They also arranged face-
to-face visits to senior families that the campaign saw as “not polarised”. There were 
also special visits for specific groups like the disabled, demanding for and promising 
their rights, women’s groups, trade unions, and chambers of commerce. Through the 
marketing department, the campaign sent out SMS campaigns as well, but this was on a 
small scale. 
 
5.4.3.2.3 Free media 
The candidate used to appear extensively in all media outlets and talk-show 
programmes, except those that El-Shahawy described as “having a polarised presenter 
or a presenter with an agenda.” The main criterion for appearing on a specific 
programme was “a desired target audience”. This is why the candidate appeared on an 
entertainment talk-show for women where he talked about the women in his life, such 
as his mother and his wife, besides of course appearing on other political talk-shows. 
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The campaign would not take payments for Aboul Fotouh’s appearances, but rather 
organised a deal where these channels would broadcast his campaign advertisements in 
exchange. They also used to ask the television programme the candidate would appear 
on to place a full page or half-page advertisement in a newspaper before the programme 
was broadcasted.   
 
The campaign did not like to be asked by presenters about their candidate’s relationship 
with the Muslim Brotherhood. According to El-Shahawy, they used to threaten to leave 
the programme if asked these types of questions, as it was believed by El-Shahawy and 
the campaign that: 
 
“it used to put the candidate into a corner, and made him lose votes from among 
those who did not want the country to be run by Islamists or people affiliated with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. It would also consume the time of the programme and would 
not allow the candidate to set out his opinion or programme messages regarding the 
rest of the issues”. 
 
The campaign used to prepare content and train the candidate in its use, so that he 
would be able to concentrate on the main ideas and messages that he would like to send 
to his targeted voters during such televised appearances. The campaign would also 
make sure to receive the questions from the channel before the candidate’s appearance. 
In the first stages of campaigning, they would take the themes of the questions. Towards 
the end, they used to organise the questions and programme details with the channel, as 
they saw it as a joint event between the channel and the campaign. 
 
The campaign was also keen on international media. Foreign journalists and foreign 
officials visiting Egypt used to contact the campaign to meet the candidate. These 
meetings were organised through the candidate himself, the candidate’s secretary, and 
the campaign general manger. 
 
5.4.3.2.4 Paid media 
This was mainly during the marketing events, such as the campaign launching event in 
the AL-Azhar Park, where he was accompanied by his advisory board. Besides 
billboards on the streets, it also included the campaign’s advertisements on television 
	 149	
and online. Billboards and posters had the campaigns main colour which was orange. 
El-Shahawy explained that they chose this colour as it was good in personal 
communication, and it does not have the disadvantages of a strong colour like the red of 
Morsi’s campaign. These printed advertisements had the candidate’s photo and name 
followed by the words ‘President of Egypt’ and the campaign slogan. 
 
For TV, the campaign had official advertisements such as the one where the candidate 
appears introducing himself to the voters and setting his promises. There were also 
some advertisements made by volunteers and supporters outside the campaign, 
including animated songs. The campaign used them later on its social media accounts 
and website as they were created professionally. The campaign did not pay for 
broadcasting TV advertisements; they only paid for the production costs if the 
advertisement was not produced by volunteers. Newspaper advertisements were mainly 
done by the television channel the candidate would also appear on. 
 
5.4.3.2.5 Debates 
As explained before, the debate was supposed to be between several candidates, but all 
withdrew, leaving only Moussa and Aboul Fotouh to take part. According to El-
Shahawy, 
 
“Aboul Fotouh saw that the debate would be something new for Egyptians, and 
assumed that he would be able to get votes from it as it would be a chance to express 
his ideas.” 
 
El-Shahawy described the debate as a “miserable night”. The campaign had some 
concerns and was not happy with the questions or the format the questions were asked 
in. For them, the debate started with questions about Aboul Fotouh’s Islamist history, 
something the campaign did not want. For them, their candidate was forced to discuss 
issues he did not want to talk about. They were also unhappy with the format and the 
amount of time allocated to each candidate. From the campaign’s standpoint, as El-
Shahawy revealed, “the debate merely led to character assassinations”. He further added 
that, “it also gave advantages to those who did not participate, such as Hamdeen 
Sabahi”. According to El-Shahawy, the debate might have been successful in only two 
cases: 
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“since Aboul Fotouh and Moussa were the top two candidates in all public opinion 
polls, they should have been left to debate after all others had debated. Either that or 
that all the candidate should enter the debate at the same time” 
 
5.4.3.2.6 Internet and social media 
The internet and social media team was part of the media team. The campaign had its 
own official website and there was another personal official website for the candidate. 
The campaign had an official Facebook page and their official Facebook page for the 
campaign in each governorate. There was also an official Twitter account along with the 
candidate’s accounts on Facebook, Twitter, and staff accounts. All of these were used to 
campaign for and support the candidate. As explained by El-Shahawy and Abou El-
Gheit69, the campaign saw social media as an important outlet, especially in influencing 
the youth. The campaign had statistics saying that there were 6 million active Facebook 
accounts in Egypt at that time. Thus, for the campaign, those who were active could 
influence or help in spreading the candidate’s message to others.  
 
For the campaign, this type of media was important as it helped in dealing with the 
youth. However, the positive approach the campaign was adopting did not help them 
face the attacks coming from other campaigns, and they were only defensive in 
response. They also did not have the money for arranging an online response. As El-
Shahawy explained, “if they had had additional funds, they would have spent them on 
other departments in the campaign”.  Further, the campaign did not imagine – as El-
Shahawy explained - “that rival campaigns would spend large amounts of money to lie 
and spread rumours and conduct character assassinations”.  
 
Nevertheless, due to the attacks they received towards the end of the campaign, they 
were able to develop defensive tools to reply to these allegations. For example, if a fake 
video appeared of the candidate, they would send it to a director or a picture editor who 
would give them a report proving why it was a fake and they would then publish these 
details. 
 
																																																						
69 Responsible for the campaign in Asyout governorate. 
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The campaign remains convinced to this day that Shafiq’s campaign was helped by 
Egypt’s intelligence services in creating electronic committees, and that whatever Aboul 
Fotouh’s campaign did at that time, they would not have been able to counter the attack 
coming from both the Muslim Brotherhood and the state. 
 
5.4.3.2.7 Campaign’s activities 
The campaign used a diverse set of activities, such as direct face-to-face activities, 
including general candidate visits and narrowcasting activities to various governorates, 
mainly the 19 falcons, other governorates, and candidate visits abroad and to 
universities.  They also arranged face-to-face visits to senior families that were not 
polarised. The campaign also established a call centre for the public to call and get 
information about the candidate or the campaign. The campaign also developed the idea 
of a double-decker open bus that would move between cities and campaign for the 
candidate. There were also special visits for specific groups like the disabled, 
demanding for and promising their rights, women’s groups, trade unions, and chambers 
of commerce, besides the use of various media outlets as well. Through the marketing 
department, they advertised through billboards, and posters. There were also some 
organised events like human chains, distributing brochures, and shows with projectors 
showing parts of his speeches in the streets, and marketing events like the campaign’s 
official launch in Al-Azhar park. 
 
5.4.3.2.8 Degree of personalisation 
As El-Shahwy explained, the campaign was keen on passing on news about the 
candidate’s ideas and the main issues regarding his election promises from the 
beginning. This was done by the candidate himself when he appeared on media outlets. 
News about the campaign’s activities was mentioned or passed to the media by the 
campaign staff. Campaign staff also appeared in the media to talk about themselves and 
their structure.  
 
The campaign used to pass on news about the candidate and his activities. They found 
this easy due to their connections with journalists and those working in the media on the 
one hand and on the other hand, public opinion polls published at that time put their 
candidate in second place, and thus the media was keen on following up his news. 
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The candidate also spoke about personal issues such as his family and their middle-class 
life and how they sacrificed for him, as well as the women who influenced him like his 
mother, and how his wife took care of the children when he was in prison. However, 
when his son was injured during one of the protests, the candidate refused to use it or to 
tell the media. One of the journalists once asked him why his house was in the name of 
his wife and not his and he answered, even though these types of questions about wives 
and mothers are not generally acceptable in Egypt. 
 
5.4.3.3 Did the campaign matter? 
 
Despite efforts to conduct a professional campaign, Aboul Fotouh’s campaign had 
shortcomings on the structural side, especially when comparing it to Morsi’s and 
Shafiq’s campaign. This shortage was clear in their work in the governorates. As El-
Shahawy explained, they did not contact the senior families who were approached by 
Shafiq. On the one hand they did not have access to them, and on the other they knew 
that they would not support Aboul Fotouh anyway. Instead, the campaign used to 
approach the youth, like pharmacists or youth lawyers, as they were the educated people 
in their villages.  They also did not have an accurate way of getting feedback. These 
structural factors affected their ability to mobilise voters. According to Abu El-Gheit, 
who was responsible for the campaign in Asyut in Upper Egypt, 
 
“the campaign was mistaken in not recruiting someone in each place they visited (no 
matter how small the place) to continue campaigning for the candidate, after the 
campaign left”. 
 
This shows the importance of having efficient experienced field co-ordinators on the 
ground, feedback and vote inducing activities, as will be explained in the next chapter. 
Moreover, the shortcomings were not only structural, as the candidate positioning made 
the campaign lose some of their targeted voters. For example, the candidate appearing 
to be a consensual politician who can get the support of various groups, no matter their 
background, led to several problems, as in some cases where the candidate’s stance was 
seen to be insubstantial. For instance, for some Islamist groups he was not Islamic 
enough, as he did not say that he would implement strict sharia law, and because of his 
famous visit to the Nobel Prize-winning novelist Naguib Mahfouz in the past. On the 
	 153	
other hand, some liberals and non-Islamists accused him of being an extremist due to 
his previous affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood and the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. 
He was sometimes described as a murderer due to his old opinions when he joined the 
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. The picture of him as an Islamist was highlighted once again 
after the Salafists decided on their own that they would vote for Aboul Fotouh and not 
for any other candidate.  
 
El-Shahawy elaborated more regarding the Salafist issue, by describing an incident that 
might have caused them to lose votes, where some Salafists volunteered without 
contacting the campaign and made a song in support of the candidate. The song was 
made in the ‘nasheed’ style popular among Salafists, which does not use musical 
instruments. It differed from the campaign’s songs which included music and women. 
This alternative type of un-organised and unofficial campaigning for the candidate, 
especially by Salafists, made Christians and other liberals afraid to support Aboul 
Fotouh.  And, according to the campaign, in the end they did not even receive the votes 
of the Salafists. For them Aboul Fotouh was not Islamic enough and the Salafist leaders 
did not have control over their popular bases.  
 
But did their campaign matter? El-Shahawy believed that campaigns were important but 
that “they were not the decisive factor”. As he explained: 
 
“the result of the election was a clear reflection of the political situation at the time 
and of how the election was engineered and managed, as well as the degree of 
polarisation the society suffered from, with its division into Islamist and secular blocs. 
The delay of the elections and the late announcement of the dates, in addition to 
candidates entering at the last minute, changed the calculations of other candidates 
and led to the final results”. 
 
However, he believed it had an important role because it resulted in Aboul Fotouh 
becoming “known to the public”. He was not well-known beforehand to the ordinary 
public, especially in the governorates as both Abu El-Gheit and El-Shahawy explained. 
However, since the campaign made him well-known, the candidate was able to establish 
a student movement and political party called ‘Strong Egypt’. For the campaign staff, 
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“the campaign was important as it created a third way separate from the National 
Democratic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood” as stated by El-Shahawy. 
 
For them, the campaign cannot be compared with other campaigns abroad as there will 
be a significant gap; mainly because of what El-Shahawy called “the way that 
democracy is practiced in Egypt, and how the election process was engineered, along 
with the high degree of polarisation in the society”. The campaign started before the 
PEC was formed and before any dates were known. Thus, according to El-Shahaway, it 
cannot be compared with a country where the dates are known beforehand and the laws 
are already set, especially those laws that manage donations. For Aboul Fotouh’s 
campaign, it was very difficult to work without dates or laws. 
 
El-Shahawy summarised the campaign’s perspective by saying, 
 
“operational excellency was not the reason for the final result and Morsi’s victory, 
but rather the engineering of the election itself by SCAF and the division of the 
people into Islamists and non- Islamists, as well as the increased polarisation that 
proved to be the decisive factors in the final result” 
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5.5 Hamdeen Sabahi 
 
5.5.1 Sabahi: short biography 
 
Hamdeen Sabahi is a Nasserist socialist politician and former Member of Parliament. 
He was born in 1954 in the Delta governorate of Kafr El-Sheikh. He was raised in a 
peasant family in the coastal city of Balteem, being the youngest of 11 children. Sabahi 
spent his childhood among other peasants and fishermen, and he worked as a fisherman 
in his younger years (Ibrahim 2012). 
 
Sabahi was elected head of the Cairo University Student Union in 1975 and served as 
deputy chair of the General Federation of Students from 1975 to 1977. He also 
established the political Nasserist Thought Club to mobilise students on campus to 
defend the principles of Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1952 revolution (BBC news 16/5/2014). 
 
In 1977, following the January popular uprising against President Sadat over the high 
prices of food, Sabahi publicly confronted the president in a televised meeting in which 
he spoke on behalf of the Cairo University Student Union. As a result, Sabahi was 
prevented from working as a journalist in the state media sector for several years 
(Ibrahim 2012). 
 
Sabahi was a member of the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party, but his membership was 
suspended in 1994 due to internal conflicts between the party's youth, which included 
Sabahi, and the party's old guard of personalities who had been close to the late 
president Nasser. In 1996 Sabahi founded the Al-Karama party and was elected to the 
People's Assembly in 2000 and 2005 (Al-Arabyia 15/5/12). 
 
During the Mubarak era, he was arrested again in 1997 on charges of inciting 
agricultural workers to protest, due to some new legislation that strengthened the hand 
of landowners against poor tenant farmers. In 2003, as a sitting MP, his parliamentary 
immunity was lifted and he was subsequently jailed for his involvement in organising 
demonstrations against the U.S.- led war on Iraq that year. During the Mubarak era, 
Sabahi was one of the co-founders of the Kefaya (‘Enough’) movement, which emerged 
in 2004, and which opposed the inheritance scenario. In 2010, he was one of the co-
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founders of the National Assembly for Change (NAC), which called for constitutional 
reform and social justice. These two movements paved the road towards the 25th 
January Revolution. Sabahi participated in the 25th January Revolution and was slightly 
injured during anti-regime demonstrations in his home governorate of Kafr El-Sheikh 
(Ibrahim 2012). 
 
5.5.2 Early campaign: A candidate from among us 
 
As explained by Hossam Moeness – Sabahi’s campaign manager70- a number of staff 
working in the campaign, including the campaign manager, already knew and had 
worked with Sabahi when they were students through the political Nasserist Thought 
Club, and later on after they finished university through Al-Karama party. Some of 
them already had experience or knowledge of elections in the governorates, as they had 
followed the parliamentary elections which Sabahi entered in his constituency, which 
was in one of the governorates. 
 
At the beginning of 2010, there were calls from activists and opposition personalities 
for constitutional amendments to change article 76 in order to allow the option of multi-
candidate presidential elections. There was an idea to collect signatures from the public 
to nominate public figures to run for election in protest to article 76. At that time, 
people working on Sabahi’s presidential election campaign were collecting signatures 
from the public to nominate public figures such as Sabahi and Mohamed El Baradei to 
run for office. However, at that time their campaign was a political campaign rather 
than an election campaign. Their aim was to give Egyptians the option to witness and 
participate in real multi-candidate presidential elections, regardless of the candidate. As 
Moeness explained: 
 
“We would collect signatures from the public and register them at the relevant 
registry office. Although we were working with Hamdeen Sabahi at that time, we 
were collecting signatures to nominate other candidates besides him, as we wanted to 
prove that there are other people in Egypt who can run for president other than just 
Mubarak and his son”. 
																																																						
70 Interview with Hossam Moeness, Sabahi’s campaign manager. 
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Their efforts were developed later into other formats, such as establishing the National 
Association for Change (NAC), which was formed by Mohammed El Baradei, the 
former head of the UN's atomic watchdog. These efforts continued until the 25th 
January Revolution. After the revolution, both Sabahi and the staff that used to work 
with him were aware that there would be an election. They wanted to continue what 
they had started before the revolution and nominated Sabahi to run for the presidency. 
Sabahi announced by the end of March 2011 that he would officially run for president 
and started forming his election campaign. 
 
The slogan of his campaign was ‘one from among us’. As Moeness explained, the 
slogan was suggested during the 2010 campaign by one of the youths who was 
supporting Sabahi, but changed his mind in the 2012 elections. The campaign continued 
with the slogan, which they saw as a clear reflection of Sabahi’s character.  
 
The campaign also resorted to a mixture of appeals to mobilise and influence their 
targeted voters, such as:  
 
Logic and numbers:  These were used mainly in the campaign’s electoral programme. 
However, as Moeness explained, their programme was too ambitious, as they were not 
aware of the real situation nor did they have the relevant dates or schedule for the 
election.  They did not have access to the data available to the state. Nonetheless, 
according to Moeness, “this was an advantage as well, as it made them think outside of 
the box”. Regarding the campaign, they believed that the voters in Egypt would not vote 
for a candidate for his programme, but rather that experts in the various fields from 
among the elites would read the part they specialised in, and may then campaign for the 
candidate through their own circles if they were convinced by the candidate’s policies 
and plans. 
 
Emotions: As Moeness explained, Sabahi used emotional appeals “unintentionally”. 
For example, he cried on-air during a television programme. For the campaign, this 
gave him credibility as he appeared to be sincere. The candidate was also keen on 
following Egyptian customs and traditions. For example, when Shafiq’s wife died, 
Sabahi insisted on keeping with tradition and attending the customary Egyptian 
condolences service, despite disagreement from his campaign.  
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Religion: Moeness explained that there was no pre-planned intention to use religion: 
“he did not play on religion, but merely employed it in the manner that is the norm 
among Egyptians”. Sabahi quoted verses from the Qur’an, and if he was visiting a 
governorate during the time of Friday prayers, he would go with the local people and 
pray. However, he would not feign increased piety and pray each prayer at the mosque, 
preferring to do so when he got back home. 
 
Negativity and attacks: As Moeness explained, the official campaign did not plan to 
conduct attacks or employ negativity. “However, some unplanned attacks did use to 
happen from time to time”. In the beginning, this involved youths and volunteers on 
social media arguing over which candidate represented the revolution. The official 
campaign had to intervene to stop supporters of the revolution from damaging each 
other’s candidates. Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, there were general attacks from 
the campaign stating that they neither wanted the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate nor 
any candidate even close to that ideology. For Moussa, they used to attack his politics, 
not his character.  
 
According to a member of the campaign, the main attacks which the campaign was 
unable to control were those against Shafiq. During Shafiq’s first public conference, 
some of those working on Sabahi’s campaign started throwing objects at him as a way 
to protest against him running for election. At that time, no one knew that they were 
from Sabahi’s campaign, although the campaign came to know later. However, the 
campaign did use this later in front of the media to demonstrate that Egyptians were 
against Shafiq running for president. 
 
Sabahi was attacked by other campaigns, including allegations that he was splitting the 
revolutionary bloc as he was running against other revolutionary candidates; but his 
campaign responded likewise regarding the other revolutionary candidates. There were 
other attacks and rumours regarding how he financed his campaign, given that he was 
not rich. As Moeness explained, “because his profile was only raised during the last 
month, there was no time to attack him significantly”. He was mostly affected by these 
attacks after the campaign ended. 
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5.5.3 The campaign 
 
5.5.3.1 Campaign’s structures  
 
5.5.3.1.1 Campaign’s staff 
As Moeness explained, Sabahi’s campaign was “an extension of his previous political 
campaign”, staff from which had started working with him before the revolution to ask 
for change; although it was not working solely for him. 
 
When Sabahi announced his intention to run for the presidency, his campaign was 
mainly formed from those who used to work with him on the political campaigns of 
signature collecting, those who worked with him on his parliamentary election 
campaigns, as well as youth from the Al-Karama party and some activists from the 
Revolution. He did not go to a company or other bodies to help him except for technical 
issues. 
 
The campaign started with these committees: 
 
a- Media committee: this was responsible for traditional media and social media. 
 
b- Governorates committee: responsible for finding people who could join the 
campaigns in the governorates, and campaign for the candidate there and 
mobilise them to vote on election day. Due to the candidate’s family’s large 
presence in one of the constituencies, they would also help him in the field. The 
governorates team used to mobilise people to go and vote in the election, even if 
they would not vote for Sabahi. The governorates team used to concentrate on 
the youth and students in big families, as they believed that modern-day family 
leaders could no longer force youths to vote for someone specific.  
 
c- Popular works committee: responsible for planning and organising various 
campaign events such as conferences, open buses, door-to-door campaigning, 
and organising the candidate’s visits to the governorates. 
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d- Fundraising committee: responsible for fundraising and securing funding for 
the campaign. At the beginning its role was limited due to the absence of laws 
regulating the issue of fundraising. Thus it used to depend on volunteers for their 
campaign to get the things it needed, mostly in the form of in-kind contributions. 
After the law was issued, the role of this committee became more active as it 
opened a bank account for donations and ran a campaign encouraging Egyptians 
to donate one Egyptian pound through SMS messages that were linked to the 
campaign’s bank account. Alternatively, they could donate directly through the 
same account. 
 
          At a later stage, the campaign added two other committees: 
 
e- Egyptians abroad committee: this committee mainly depended on volunteers. 
The campaign depended on the governorates committee to reach Egyptians 
abroad. There were many Egyptians from specific areas, for example 
governorates such as Dakahlia, and especially in Kafr El-Sheikh, from which 
people went to work in Italy. Thus the governorate committee in Dakahlia used 
to connect them with Egyptians in Italy, and so on. This committee also helped 
Sabahi to travel abroad and meet Egyptians in other countries. 
 
f- Programme committee: this committee referred to experts who had the same 
political stance and who volunteered and wrote the programme. 
 
There was also a campaign co-ordinator who acted as the campaign manager, and three 
assistant co-ordinators.  Each of the three assistant co-ordinators was responsible for 
some of the committees above, as well as reporting to the campaign’s main co-ordinator 
and manager. 
 
The candidate’s son and daughter worked with the campaign as volunteers. His son, for 
example, was a cinema director, and would help them create videos for the campaign. 
The situation was similar in Balteem, Kafr El-Sheikh, as his family was there helping 
the campaign and volunteering for him. 
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Despite the agreed roles, campaign staff would sometimes leave their roles to join 
political events taking place in the country which would delay campaign pre-planned 
events and activities. As Moeness explained,  
 
“Due to the political developments taking place, the campaign found itself more like a 
political movement, participating in events and voicing opinions, rather than an 
election campaign. If the campaign planned something like brochure distribution, or 
any other such campaigning event, and then a political event took place or clashes 
erupted, they would leave the pre-arranged campaign event and head to the events 
taking place to participate”. 
 
5.5.3.1.2 Management style 
According to Moeness; the campaign used to differentiate between two levels, namely 
the political sphere and the campaign or electoral sphere. 
 
In the political sphere, there was differentiation between the candidate’s political stance 
and the political stance of those working on the campaign. If they did not agree, 
everyone could participate as they wished. For example, the candidate could make a 
speech or voice an opinion and the campaign would say something else. Moeness 
explained that this was part of the “Revolutionary spirit”. Everyone was different and it 
was not necessary to have the same political opinion or position, especially given that 
the majority of those working on the campaign came from the revolutionary youth and 
it was not easy to convince them of a specific stance, particularly regarding the army or 
SCAF. As Moeness explained,  
 
“Many of the youths were not raised politically or had experience in a political 
movement to be able to know the importance of rules and organisation, and they used 
to revolt against anything. The campaign was aware of this and tried to absorb them”. 
 
Regarding the campaigning or electoral decisions, this too was divided into two parts. 
Decisions that dealt with the candidate himself, such as his visits or media appearances, 
would be discussed with him first, and if they did not agree, the final word lay with the 
candidate. For campaign decisions that did not involve the presence of the candidate 
himself, such as day-to-day activities and operations, the campaign used to manage 
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these without referring to or informing the candidate. Thus, tasks related to the 
candidate were managed vertically, whereas tasks related to the campaign were 
managed horizontally. 
 
5.5.3.1.3 Campaign premises 
The campaign’s central office was in Lebanon Square in Mohandessin, Cairo. The 
campaign supporters used to pay its rent. For the governorates, the campaign used the 
Al-Karama party local offices, although the candidate was running as an independent. 
Some other small parties used to give them their branches in the governorates to 
campaign in such as the Nasserist party. In areas where the campaign had supporters, 
they used to rent places. Mostly, people would give them places in the governorates 
without the campaign asking. In Alexandria, for example, they had four places in 
addition to the local Al-Karama party branch.  
 
On the issue of receiving places from volunteers, Moeness explained that some people 
used to donate flats or offices without the campaign even asking, to the extent that 
someone decided to close his work premises, which was a tyre workshop, and gave it to 
the campaign to use. However, the campaign explained that it did not use to manage all 
these places. In the beginning, they tried to do so, but after a while and towards the end 
of the campaign, the degree of volunteer activities and places became unmanageable.  
 
Moeness gave an example of two incidents that showed the degree of unmanageable aid 
from volunteers, and that also reflected the lack of cohesion with the campaign. The 
first incident involved news, later known to the campaign, that some campaign staff 
were going to protest in front of the High Election Committee (HEC). As Moeness 
explained, the campaign was not aware of this at the time and was not able to determine 
whether they were really from the campaign, or from among the candidate’s supporters 
or just some people who were pretending to be from the campaign and who wanted to 
create problems between the candidate and the HEC. The campaign had to publish a 
statement denying involvement and Sabahi had to speak publicly telling them not to go 
if they were really his supporters. The second incident was towards the end of the 
elections. During this time, the central campaign premises was full of volunteers whom 
they did not know. The campaign officials had a meeting with the candidate and they 
said no one was allowed to go into the area they were meeting in. After finishing, as the 
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campaign manager was leaving, he found that the volunteers were acting as if they were 
security and not even allowing those in the meeting to leave, some of whom they had 
never met. In this case, the volunteers were acting from excessive enthusiasm. 
 
However, the campaign explained that volunteers were an essential part of their work, 
as they did not have access to some areas and yet they found the campaign’s posters 
there, placed by volunteers without the knowledge of the central campaign. Even during 
election days, the campaign did not have enough people to act as its representatives in 
the polling stations. However, during those days, the campaign found many people who 
went to vote and did not find a representative from the campaign there, and who then 
asked the campaign if they could act as representatives. The campaign took a risk and 
allowed them to represent the campaign officially. Moeness explained that this was a 
risky decision as they did not know these people. If someone untrustworthy went there, 
they might not give them the correct count or even fight with the judge, or they might 
be working for an opponent’s campaign. Nonetheless, their decision to allow them to be 
representatives was right at this stage, except where some of those representatives were 
very tired at the end of the day and went home to sleep after the counting ended without 
giving the final counting numbers to the central campaign until the next morning; thus 
leaving room for rumours that they were infiltrated by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
5.5.3.1.4 Degree of externalisation 
The campaign hired only two companies: the first was an accounting company for the 
accounting and financial reports, especially those that would be submitted to the EHC. 
The second company was a social media company to help them with technical issues. 
All other specialists needed in other departments, such as advertising or programme 
writing, were volunteers from the campaign who were professionals in their fields. 
 
Moeness explained that they were working more as a political movement, rather than an 
election campaign. They therefore resorted only to people who had “the same political 
thoughts and ideas, and not professionals with different political opinions”. 
 
5.5.3.1.5 Internal Campaign Communication  
The campaign mainly depended on face-to-face meetings. There were daily face-to-face 
meetings between those working on the central campaign, and the governorates’ co-
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ordinators use to come to Cairo every month to meet the central campaign as well. The 
second means of communication was daily mobile phone communications. As Moeness 
explained, emails were only used within the central campaign; in the governorates, this 
was not applicable as older people managing the work there did not have smart-phones, 
or did not know how to use them, or had problems with internet connectivity. 
 
For the campaign, it was not keen on using technological or expensive methods that 
would harden the communication process inside the campaign. It was keen to maximise 
the use of available affordable resources that their staff would be able to use without 
causing extra technological or financial burdens. 
 
5.5.3.1.6 Feedback 
There was no specific department for feedback. As explained by Moeness, the 
campaign received feedback mainly by sending people to public coffee shops to sit 
when Sabahi was on television and open the channel there without saying that they were 
from the campaign. They would then listen to people talking and commenting and get 
feedback this way. This was done in the both the governorates and in Cairo.  
 
The campaign used to get feedback from social media as well, but they did not take the 
public opinion polls carried out in Egypt at that time seriously. As Moeness clarified, 
they believed these polls “would not be professional, and they had no guarantee that the 
sample would not be biased and would be representative”. 
 
Although the campaign did not have the infrastructure or resources for conducting 
scientific opinion polls, they were innovative in the way they gathered feedback. They 
did not depend on media reports or public polls conducted at that time, as other 
campaigns did. On the contrary, they innovated their own ways in to achieve their goal. 
 
5.5.3.1.7 Opposition research  
As Moeness explained, the campaign did not have a specific department or committee 
for opposition research, but it used to get this information from other committees, such 
as:   
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a- Governorates committee: that used to write reports for the central campaign 
about opposing campaigns in the governorates. 
 
b- Media committee: that used to follow up on opponents’ news in both traditional 
media and on social media. 
 
Moeness explained that they did not need any background research or any extra 
research on their opponents, as they already knew them from their previous work in 
politics. Thus, the opposing stances and opinions were clear from the start. 
 
5.5.3.1.8 Campaign’s duration 
The campaign duration can be divided into three stages. The first stage dates back to 
2010 when youth activists were collecting signatures for some candidates, among them 
Sabahi, to run for the presidency. However, this campaign was not only for Sabahi, but 
it paved the way towards gaining him supporters and getting him known. This stage 
continued until the 25th January Revolution. 
 
The second stage was after Mubarak’s resignation, when they decided to activate their 
political movement and convert it into an election campaign. The third stage was when 
the election date became known and formal nominations were declared by the PEC. 
 
Thus, the duration of the second and third stages of the campaign was more than a year. 
During this period, Sabahi’s campaign was working as both a political movement and 
an election campaign, as Moeness explained. 
 
Moeness commented that this long period caused them a lot of hassle as there were no 
regulations to follow, and they also did not know the election dates, leaving them 
unable to decide upon many things, such as how long to extend the rent contracts for 
their premises; or if one of them wanted to take a career break from his job, when he 
could do it, and so on. On the other hand, - as Moeness explained- the long period 
helped them to develop a relationship between the team members working on the 
campaign, as most of them had not worked closely with each other before. It also helped 
in making the candidate well-known to the public. 
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5.5.3.1.8 Campaign’s budget 
In the beginning, the campaign did not have any money and did not manage to acquire 
cash. They used to depend on volunteers in providing the campaign with necessities 
such as paying rent, providing equipment, or providing the campaign with branches or 
office space. As Moeness explained, “during this stage, there was no actual budget: 
whenever the campaign needed money, they started thinking about how they could get 
it”. 
 
Towards the end of the campaign, when the law allowed them to collect money, they 
started a fundraising campaign urging supporters to donate one pound through SMS or 
through the campaign’s bank account. For Moeness, the SMS campaign demonstrated 
that “those who donated small amounts of money contributed two thirds of the money 
collected”. It was an indication of the type of people supporting them. They were not 
businessmen or millionaires, but either students or lower-income people. 
 
Moeness explained that they were not affected by the maximum spending limit, as they 
did not have enough money and thus did not reach it. However, they were affected by 
the limit of donations per person. The campaign saw this as impractical because if a 
donor wanted to donate more that the allowed amount, they could give it to a member of 
the family to donate on their behalf. The campaign also explained that there was no real 
means of providing accountability for those who exceeded the limit. The campaign was 
also affected by the short timespan for collecting and spending the money for 
campaigning. 
 
5.5.3.2 Campaign’s strategies 
 
5.5.3.2.1 Voter’s targeting 
There was an assumption among the public that since the candidate was a socialist and a 
Nasserist, he would target the poor and lower classes, including peasants and workers. 
However, Moeness explained that “due to changes in the society over the past years, 
those who agreed with his speeches and ideas were often from the middle and upper 
classes as well”.  
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This is why the campaign concentrated on the cities that witnessed the revolution, and 
mainly on middle and educated classes and youths living therein. The campaign was 
also keen on sending reassuring messages to different segments in society, such as 
businessmen, clarifying the candidate’s stances on issues like development and 
capitalism. 
 
However, Moeness pointed out that the main problem in reaching the target audience 
was that candidates were not allowed to access the voter database during the 
presidential elections. The campaign explained that this was not the case with the 
parliamentary elections, where a candidate could access the database for his 
constituency. As Moeness explained, 
 
“In the same year, there were parliamentary elections and candidates in each 
constituency were allowed to access the databases for their constituency. A group like 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which had candidates in every constituency, therefore had 
access to voter databases for almost the entire country, which was a privilege 
Sabahi’s campaign did not have”. 
 
5.5.3.2.2 Narrowcasting activities 
In addition to general campaigning activities, the campaign in each governorate used to 
invent its own unique narrowcasting events to their targeted voters. These were mainly 
initiatives from each governorate to be organised individually. Moeness gave an 
example of narrowcasting events in the canal area, as the campaign organised a day for 
fishermen, where they heard their problems and passed the information to the central 
campaign to work on. 
 
5.5.3.2.3 Free media  
For the campaign, television was an important outlet to convey their own and their 
candidate’s messages. According to Moeness, “there was freedom of expression at that 
time and people still used to watch television”. This is why Sabahi appeared on all 
channels, including Islamic and Christian ones, and he appeared in various formats, one 
of which was with his family. 
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With the local media, the campaign had two issues as Moeness said. The first was that 
the candidate himself was a journalist and had personal relations with most of the other 
journalists. Thus, he used to appear with some of them as he was unable to refuse due to 
these personal relations: “if he had said no, they might get upset”. The second issue was 
that “media used to put Sabahi in a separate category from the frontrunners”, and thus 
they had to accept the timing that was given to the candidate. They were also unable to 
control when they could appear during the first stages of the campaign. Later on, they 
were able to control this, as all channels wanted Sabahi to appear with them. 
 
With the international media, the campaign had the same problem, namely that “the 
international media also did not consider him a frontrunner”. They were not paying 
attention to the candidate, and he did not have access to them; and when the 
international media started noticing the candidate towards the end of the elections, the 
candidate and the campaign were busy with other priorities like reaching voters and 
mobilising them. According to Moeness, despite the importance of free media outlets to 
the campaign, the campaign did not have much luck with the free media, both local and 
international, especially at the start of their campaign. 
 
5.5.3.2.4 Paid media 
The campaign did two official advertisements, which involved a short documentary 
about the candidate and endorsements from public figures including Khaled Said’s 
mother, whose death sparked the 25th of January Revolution71. There were other 
advertisements and songs done by Sabahi’s supporters without the involvement of the 
campaign. The campaign also had posters, brochures and billboards advertising for 
Sarahi. It had the campaign’s slogan ‘a candidate from among us’ along with a verse 
from Quraan which meant ‘there is no victory except from God’; an action that was 
explained by some as a way to influence traditional Muslims (Shoman and Saleh 2012). 
The colours of his posters were white and black, which gave an impression of his clarity 
and decisiveness and tendency to implement clear solutions (Ibid 2012). 
																																																						
71 Said was beaten and tortured while in police custody in 2010. This lead to the creation of a 
Facebook page called “we are all Khaled Said” through which the revolution was organized. 
The page which had hundreds of thousands of followers urged Egyptians to participate in anti-
government demonstrations on 25 January 2011 - Egypt's National Police Day. Eighteen days 
later, Mubarak was forced to resign. 
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According to Moeness, the campaign did not actually pay for the production or for the 
broadcast of the advertisement in case of TV and radio. Director and prominent 
filmmaker Khaled Youssef – who supported Sabahi - provided the advertisement for 
free. The campaign also agreed with some channels to broadcast them for free. They 
also ran one advertisement on the radio which was narrated by famous people who had 
volunteered in the campaign. For printed advertisements, when fundraising was allowed 
by the new law, the campaign started putting up billboards and posters. 
 
5.5.3.2.5 Debates 
Unlike other campaigns, Sabahi wanted to participate in a presidential debate with the 
frontrunners. However- as Moeness explained - the media did not pay attention to him 
and only offered him a chance to appear with low-profile candidates “who did not 
represent significant political trends or political thoughts in society”. According to 
Moeness, the candidate saw debates as a “right of society and a chance for Egyptians to 
know the real differences between the candidates”. 
 
As explained, the only debate that took place was between Moussa and Aboul Fotouh. 
According to Moeness, Sabahi’s campaign saw it as technically good from the format 
side of things, but content-wise, the candidates were fighting rather than debating. 
Accordingly, the campaign saw that what happened between the other two candidates in 
the debate was in Sabahi’s favour, as undecided voters went to him and not to the other 
candidates, due to perceived faults revealed during the debate. 
 
5.5.3.2.6 Internet and social media 
Internet and social media were part of the overall media team. They were an extension 
of the media team but with a different audience, mainly the youth.  For social media, the 
team used to formulate the general strategies and left it to a company to help them in 
implementing these strategies, as well as helping them in organising live events on 
social media.  
 
For the website, the campaign created this with the help of volunteers. It was used as a 
source of information for the general voters, and it was also used to upload the 
campaign’s materials for those working in the governorates to print and use. 
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According to Moeness, the campaign did not have any ‘electronic committees’ such as 
Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaign. Their social media team was mainly concerned with 
redistributing content from the candidate’s and the campaign’s activities, besides 
launching some live events for social media audiences. 
 
5.5.3.2.8 Campaign’s activities 
The campaign organised a variety of events, such as a touring bus, conferences, visits to 
governorates, human chains, and meeting people in coffee shops. In addition to normal 
campaigning events, each governorate used to invent its own unique events; some of 
which were narrowcasting events, others were general events. The campaign also used 
social media, traditional media, and advertisements to reach its target voters.  
 
5.5.3.2.9 Degree of personalisation 
The campaign was keen on passing news about the candidate himself and his opinions. 
During the candidate’s appearances in the media, he used to add a personal touch. He 
once appeared with his family on a television programme, and on another programme 
he recited some poetry he wrote when he was in prison.  
 
According to Moeness, “the act of reciting poetry that he wrote gave him credibility as 
he did not appear fake”.  It also made some youths, who loved poetry, support him. The 
candidate was fine with introducing his family, who were already known, such as his 
daughter, who was a presenter, and his son, who was a cinema director, until attacks and 
comments criticised his family’s appearances for reminding people of Mubarak and his 
ever-present son.  
 
The campaign was also keen on passing news about the campaign itself such as events 
that it organised, its statements and stances and any endorsement they took from public 
figures. 
 
 
5.5.3.3 Did the campaign matter? 
 
Sabahi’s campaign was different from the other studied campaigns in terms of the way 
it was managed. As explained, its candidate’s positions and those of his staff could be 
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completely different, unlike other campaigns which were keen on abiding by their 
candidates’ positions and stances. The campaign was only different as it managed to 
invent innovative ways to reach its goals despite a lack of resources. The main success 
of the campaign was that Sabahy became the third winner and the election dark horse, 
which was one of the main election’s surprises. But did the campaign help in this 
success, or Was the rank Sabahi’s achieved a result of other factors? This question was 
asked to Moeness, Sabahy’s campaign manager.  
 
Moeness replied that “the campaign was very important but not the decisive factor”. 
According to Moeness, the campaign staff were the ones working with the people, not 
the candidate. Some voters may support a candidate or participate because those 
working on the campaign were nice to them. Others may hate a candidate because 
someone in the campaign treated them badly. Thus, the campaign played a massive role 
in reaching out and communicating with voters. The campaign was also important 
because even if the candidate did not win, he could organise his supporters into a 
political party or for any other political activity.  
 
However, as Moeness explained,  
 
“Even the best campaign cannot guarantee victory, as the political equation in 
Egypt at that time involved overlapping factors that played a role in determining 
the results of the election”. 
 
Among these factors- as Moeness elaborated - were “what the regional and western 
powers wanted”. The campaign believed that Morsi came to power because the regional 
powers did not want Shafiq, and because they wanted to control the country: “This was 
why, for example, the electoral forgery case was not concluded”.  Another important 
factor for the campaign was the issue of the law and its tailoring, such as “the immunity 
given to the PEC’s decisions”. There was no separate committee to consider appeals 
against PEC decisions. A third factor was the manipulation of people’s awareness 
through the media, or through what Moeness described as “planting people in villages 
and companies to influence voters”, in addition to the involvement of SCAF in 
determining all the political details. For Sabahi’s campaign, All of these factors 
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combined “proved to be more important in determining the final result than the 
campaign itself”. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter offers a detailed overall understanding of how each campaign was planned 
and implemented by giving a detailed account of the campaigns’ structures and 
strategies. In addition to this, the chapter gave a practitioner account of how the 
campaigns were managed and whether the campaign staff see campaigns as an 
important factor in influencing elections results. The next chapter will build upon the 
data presented here and offer an analytical comparison in terms of the professionalism 
of the five studied campaigns, and the impact on election results. 
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Chapter Six: Analysing the campaigns in light of their Professionalisation 
 
This chapter aims to analyse the five studied election campaigns by comparing and 
analysing their structure (hardware) and strategies (software) based on the 
Professionalisation index which was applied separately to each campaign in the 
previous chapter. By analysing the campaigns’ Professionalism, the chapter explores 
which campaigns were more professional and tries to answer the question: did 
Professionalisation play a role in determining the election results. In other words, was 
there a direct relationship between campaigns’ professionalism and the election results? 
The chapter argues that Professionalisation played a significant role in the first round of 
elections which left both Morsi and Shafiq as the top two front runners, giving them the 
chance to compete again in the second round of elections. However, Professionalisation 
did not play the same role in determining the result of the second round of elections, as 
there were other determinant factors such as voters resorting to punitive voting.  
 
6.1 Campaign structure: 
 
A good campaign structure is vital to any election campaign as it represents the 
‘organisational preconditions’ for campaigning, which acts like the campaign hardware 
(Tenscher et al, 2012). This good structure (hardware) facilitates the ‘communication 
flows’ between the candidate, various political actors, media, and voters (Esser and 
Strömbäck, 2012).  
 
A well-designed infrastructure and the employment of necessary qualified staff also 
help the campaign to fulfil its daily tasks which are usually many in number and require 
more than one person to carry out. These tasks vary from traditional campaigning 
activities to administration within the campaign. The variety of tasks and relatively 
large number of people working in the campaign require a solid internal infrastructure 
similar to that of companies. This infrastructure should be flexible enough to deal with 
the candidate and his advisors on the one hand, and volunteers and activists in the field 
on the other (Maarek 2011). 
 
However, like any company, good infrastructure alone does not necessarily guarantee 
success, as this is affected by other things such as the staff chosen, relationships 
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between staff, poor or good communication behaviour within the teams, decisions 
taken, energy, and the enthusiasm of those working in the campaign (Maarek 2011).  
This is why the role of campaign manager is of great importance as he is the one to 
ensure a smoother workflow and working relations in the campaign. However, there are 
other obstacles that may affect the campaign structure on which both the campaign 
manager and the candidate may not have the upper hand.  
 
Philippe J. Maarek highlights what he describes as ‘psycho-sociological handicaps’ 
(Maarek 2011: 180) that differentiate a campaign from a company, and can also 
differentiate one campaign from another.  Among these handicaps is the lack of ‘past 
history’, which played a significant role in the 2012 Egyptian presidential elections. 
This lack of past history and previous experience can delay or prevent the campaign 
from taking decisions that would have otherwise been based on previous experience, 
knowledge, or previous work habits. The lack of experience could cause a campaign to 
make naïve decisions, or take a longer time to finalise a decision regarding a trivial 
issue. The ‘past history’ also plays a role in knowing how the candidate can obtain 
funding from contacting previous donors, or those the candidate or campaign are aware 
of whose previous history and experience informs them that they could donate. In the 
2012 Egyptian elections, the first top three candidates in the first round of elections 
already had a long history of electoral campaigning in Egypt through parliamentary 
elections and through other forms of political activism in the Egyptian political and 
public spheres.  
 
For instance, Mohamed Morsi had the Muslim Brotherhood group behind him, making 
use of all its ‘past history’, and previous electoral data. The same applies to Ahmed 
Shafiq; although officially he did not have a political party behind him, he recruited 
those who had a ‘past history’ in performing that role in elections within the dissolved 
National Democratic Party (NDP). The same applies to a greater extent to Hamdeen 
Sabahi, who has previous experience in parliamentary elections or in other forms of 
political mobilisation and campaigning such as the campaign to collect signatures to 
change Article 76 of the constitution. The luxury of ‘past history’ was not one enjoyed 
by the other two campaigns: Aboul Fotouh and Moussa. This is why, for example, 
Moussa’s campaign did not know earlier on about those ‘brokers of elections and 
billboards’ who acquired permission from councils for strategic places to put up posters, 
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and then sold them to others at higher prices, making a business out of it. Likewise, 
Aboul Fotouh’s campaign complained of not having access to adequate previous 
electoral data to build upon, saying that, ‘past experience could provide us with more 
historical data about voters’ trends, managing electoral debates, and fund raising 
techniques’ (Al-Shahawy 2016). 
 
The next section will analyse the campaigns’ structure depending on the 
Professionalisation index which reflects the main indicators according to which the 
structure can be considered ‘professional’. The more the structure has from these 
indicators, the more professional it is. These indicators are summarised by Tenscher 
(2013: 245-246) as follows: (a) ‘a growing structural, financial and personal capability 
for cost-intensive campaigning which includes the centralisation of campaigns 
organisation’, (b) ‘Professionalisation of campaigns activities and actors, which 
includes the process of consulting, externalisation and commercialisation of campaigns 
tasks’ and (c) ‘the change from ‘selling’ to ‘marketing’ the political product, which 
includes the use of marketing techniques, opposition research, opinion polls …etc.’  
These indicators are reflected in the following nine criteria that will be discussed in 
detail in the following section: campaign staff, management style, campaign premises, 
degree of externalisation, internal campaign communication, feedback, opposition 
research, campaign duration, and campaign budget. 
 
The first step toward building the campaign structure, which would then determine the 
campaign’s strategies, was choosing the campaign staff as the harmony of the campaign 
team would depend on it (Maarek 2011: 181). 
 
6.1.1 Campaign staff: 
 
Campaign staff refers to ‘the institutionalized permanent and temporary staff members 
involved in the planning, organisation and implementation of the election campaign at 
the national level’ (Tenscher, 2012: 161). This is a wide definition that involves a 
variety of positions and roles within the campaign which all play a vital role.  Due to 
budget and time constraints, it is not expected that a campaign will fill all positions with 
professionals who have previous experience in campaign work. However, there are two 
key positions that require professionals to ensure a campaign’s internal efficiency, 
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which reflects later on the campaign strategy. These two roles are the position of the 
campaign manager and the position of the field co-ordinator (Maarek 2011). This part 
discusses both roles as an indication of how staff were chosen in the campaigns and the 
level of their Professionalisation.  
 
a- Campaign manager 
 
The campaign manager is always chosen by the candidate himself as the candidate 
needs someone they can trust on a personal level and who can stand in for him in some 
of his duties, or make decisions on his behalf. The campaign manager is vital to the 
campaign as an organisation as he then hires other members of the campaign and 
manages them, besides co-ordinating and supervising with outside agencies and 
organisations exterior to the campaign. Maarek concludes that dismissing the campaign 
manager during the course of the campaign has a negative effect on the campaign, even 
if the campaign manager did not do his job as planned, as previous experience from 
various campaigns shows that this was a ‘bad omen’ for the campaign (Maarek 2011: 
183). This emphasises the importance of choosing a professional campaign manager in 
order to maintain the stability and efficiency of the overall campaign. In Egypt’s 2012 
campaigns all campaigns had a manager, although the role and efficiency varied from 
one campaign to another.  
 
In Morsi’s campaign, the campaign was already formed before the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s decision to nominate Morsi instead of Khairat Al-Shater. Thus, the 
candidate did not play a role in choosing the campaign manager or most of the 
campaign staff that were already chosen by the Muslim Brotherhood and who were 
already members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Freedom and Justice Party were already campaigning for the candidate.  
 
Essam Hadad, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau, was chosen as 
the campaign’s manager. After Morsi was elected as president, Hadad was appointed as 
the president’s advisor for foreign affairs and international cooperation, which again 
shows the amount of trust he had in him. 
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In Shafiq’s campaign, the candidate himself chose a trusted person, General Ibrahim 
Manaa, as his campaign manager. General Ibrahim Manaa was an ex-army officer, who 
was known in Egyptian local media as Shafiq’s secret keeper. Even though he was the 
official campaign manager who dealt with the public and managed campaign staff, the 
actual campaign manager who was working secretly was, as explained before, the 
journalist Abdallh Kamal, who acted as the campaign’s mastermind. However, he was 
only known to a small circle within the campaign. 
 
Amr Moussa also had a favoured trustee. He chose his previous office manager, the 
veteran diplomat Hesham Youssef, as his campaign manager.  Sabahi chose Hossam 
Moeness, who has the same political inclinations and who managed his political 
signatures campaign previously. Hossam came from a banking background. For Aboul 
Fotouh, although there was no previous experience between him and his campaign 
manager, he chose Mohamed Al Shahawy, from the marketing sector, as he was among 
the first people to contact Aboul Fotouh after the revolution asking him to nominate 
himself for the presidency. He was also from the same political school of thought as 
both were dismissed from the Muslim Brotherhood.   
 
From the above, it is clear that trust, political stances, and previous knowledge were the 
main criteria for candidates to choose their campaign managers, and not necessarily 
previous experience on electoral campaigns. This shows that personal trust preceded 
professionalism in all the five campaigns when choosing a campaign manager. This 
gives an indication that other positions also might have been filled by loyal staff rather 
than professional staff. This was clear in the way some campaigns appointed their field 
co-ordinator.  
 
b- Field Co-ordinator 
 
The second key position was the field co-ordinator. Unlike the campaign manager, the 
field co-ordinator may not have direct access to the candidate; instead he has to work 
directly with the central campaign. The field co-ordinator is mainly responsible for 
organising the ground campaign as in deciding which neighbourhoods to visit, which 
houses, and sending volunteers out knocking on doors.  
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Maarek (2011: 183) explains that the position of the field co-coordinator intersects three 
categories of players from contradictory backgrounds. These categories are: (a) 
Activists and party members; (b) Sympathisers and volunteers who are not necessarily 
professional; (c) The central campaign, which may convey unclear messages, especially 
if it has a poor structure. Staff in these categories may be working according to different 
methods and may have some tensions between them due to their professionalism or 
closiness to the candidate. The role od the field coordinator is equivlant to the 
governorates committee or governorates co-ordinators in the Egyptian campaigns. This 
role was significant in the first round of the elections as it aimed at mobilising and 
securing voters in various governorates72 to vote for their candidate. It was a 
determinant factor in securing enough votes for both Morsi and Shafiq to pass the first 
round and compete in the second round of elections.  
 
For Shafiq’s campaign, one of its main strategies was what was known within the 
campaign as ‘five thousand is equal to five million’, where the campaign resorted to 
those from the former NDP who had past experience in dealing with governorates, 
especially the villages. Each of these had the responsibility of mobilising a thousand 
voters to vote for Shafiq, meaning that in total the five thousand representatives could 
secure five million votes, and this helped Shafiq enter the second round of elections. In 
Shafiq’s campaign, the role of the field co-ordinator was to provide the campaign with 
trusted representatives, contact them on a daily basis, and develop methods to monitor 
their performance. The field co-ordinator was also responsible, along with his team (the 
five thousand representatives), in organising the candidate’s visits to the governorates - 
including villages and cities - and meeting with senior families there. The field co-
ordinator also had NDP data from previous elections, which mainly helped the 
governorates teams and the campaign in general in developing strategies to secure 
votes. 
 
Although Morsi’s campaign did not have a title called ‘field co-ordinator’ or 
‘governorates committee’ within the campaign’s structure, these roles were part of the 
events and on-the-ground committees which were responsible for organising the 
																																																						
72 Egypt is divided, for administrative purposes, into 27 governorates. These governorates are 
either fully "urban" or else a mixture of "urban" and "rural", depending on its second tier 
division whether it’s divided to Markaz and Qesm , or Qesm and districts.  
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campaign’s and candidate’s events in the various governorates. The role was also 
embedded in the way the Muslim Brotherhood as a group, or the Freedom and Justice 
Party, used to campaign for the candidate, where each member – i.e. each Brother- of 
the Muslim Brotherhood group and party used to campaign and mobilise voters, 
especially in the governorates, to vote for their candidate. In other words, and although 
there were no accurate figures for members of the Muslim Brotherhood, if there were 
five thousand active members that would campaign and mobilise a thousand voters to 
vote for their candidate, taking into consideration the Muslim Brotherhood members 
themselves, the campaign would easily secure the 5 million votes (exactly 5,764,952) 
votes Morsi gained in the first round that secured him a place in the second round. This 
could resemble Shafiq’s main strategy in securing votes which was summarised in (five 
thousand equal five millions). 
 
The field co-ordinator position was also present in Moussa and Aboul Fotouh’s 
campaigns, although they were not as effective as they had planned. This can be 
explained by the fact that neither of the two campaigns employed professionals who had 
worked as a field co-ordinator before; thus not having a data base of voters to mobilise, 
nor did they have links to the key figures that can mobilise voters, especially in 
governorates, unlike Shafiq’s and Morsi’s campaign who had this privilege.  
 
For Moussa’s campaign, the field co-ordinator’s job was equivalent to the governorates 
co-ordinator and field manager. The campaign describes this role as the ‘executive arm’ 
(Khalaf 2016). However, due to the lack of previous experience, the role was not as 
effective as previously thought. The campaign realised that it did not meet the effective 
people in the governorates; those who can mobilise voters in the governorates, or those 
who can go and vote on election days. As the campaign explained, those who endorsed 
the candidate in villages, ‘would come to campaign rallies in large numbers, sometimes 
more than 22,000 of them, to attend an event for the candidate, but they would not vote, 
attending the events largely out of curiosity’ (Khalaf 2016). The ineptitude of the field 
co-ordinator’s role was also clear with some examples the campaign gave while 
interviewing them, such as: not being fully aware of the election brokers’ game, not 
contacting representatives in various governorates early enough, and more importantly 
not having a strong method of monitoring the families or representatives they had 
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agreed to work with. This explains the state of shock they were in after the results 
appeared, as it was against their expectations and calculations. 
 
For Aboul Fotouh’s campaign, the field co-ordinator’s post was equivalent to the 
popular works committee, which was the team responsible for working in the 
governorates and mobilising voters therein. The committee’s role was also weak in 
comparison to Shafiq and Morsi’s campaigns. Aboul Fotouh’s campaign did not contact 
senior influential families in villages, and as explained in an interview with Mohamed 
Abu El Gheit, who was responsible for the campaign in Asyut in Upper Egypt (Personal 
interview, May 2016), ‘The campaign was mistaken in not recruiting someone in each 
place they visited (no matter how small the place) to continue campaigning for the 
candidate, after the campaign left’. Again, the campaign did not have a solid mechanism 
to monitor the performance of their representatives in the governorates, nor did it have 
access to influential people therein who could mobilise voters, or a fixed group of 
campaigners who could continue to campaign for the candidate in each place he visits. 
According to Abu El Gheit, they would visit some small places and convince voters 
there of their candidate, but another candidate would go to the same village and 
convince the same people of another candidate.  
 
For Hamdeen Sabahi’s campaign, the field co-ordinator post was equivalent to the work 
of the governorates committee, which used to campaign for the candidate in 
governorates and mobilise voters there to vote and campaign for the candidate as well. 
In Sabahi’s campaign, the governorates committee took a different approach which 
concentrated on reaching and mobilising young voters. The campaign believed that after 
the revolution, and due to changes in society where the youth in families became more 
educated than their family seniors, they would no longer go and vote as was dictated to 
them, even if they appeared to be obeying (Moeness 2016).  
 
The campaign had advantages over Moussa and Aboul Fotouh’s campaigns, namely 
their past experience working on the ground, whether in the parliamentary elections in 
the governorates, and had the privilege of having Sabahi’s big family living in one of 
the governorates and already campaigning for him. It appears that the campaign’s bet on 
the youths in the governorates rather than senior families was a sound decision as it 
positively affected the results of the first round of elections, allowing Sabahi to beat 
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other candidates, mainly Moussa and Aboul Fotouh. The bond Sabahi’s campaign was 
able to make with youth in the governorates became evident during a visit to one of the 
villages immediately after the results of the first round of elections until the end of the 
second round of elections. During this period, visits to one of the villages involved a 
meeting with a group of youths (who were not affiliated to the campaign), and some of 
them less than 18 years old, thus they could not vote. Nonetheless, they explained how 
they supported Sabahi by standing in front of polling stations urging those who had the 
right to vote to go and vote for Sabahi. This observation confirms what Sabahi’s 
campaign manager said (Moeness 2016), which is that they found people they did not 
know contacting the campaign and asking to be the campaign’s representatives in 
polling stations where the campaign had no representatives. These examples show 
unplanned support from the youth in governorates which stresses the importance of the 
role of the governorates committee (i.e. field coordinator). 
 
From the above, it appears that only Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaigns had professionals 
in the field co-ordinator position. After them comes Sabahi’s campaign who already had 
some experience in mobilizing voters in governorates. At the bottom of the list comes 
Moussa’s and Aboul Fotouh’s campaign. The reason for this could be understandable, 
as the only two forces who had this experience were the NDP and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood had its own candidate to work for and the NDP 
people were approached by Shafiq. Although there were other NDP people who used to 
work in elections, they were not approached by any of Moussa’s, Aboul Fotouh’s or 
Sabahi’s campaigns who wanted to keep their image and avoid resorting to staff of the 
NDP. At the same time, there was no guarantee for them that ex NDP staff would be 
happy to work for them even if they were well paid. This explains why the rest of 
campaigns did not approach professionals who already had experience of field co-
ordinator work. 
 
c- Other positions  
 
Other positions in the campaign, including the campaign treasurer and cabinet, were 
present in all campaigns as explained in the previous chapter. Their roles were roughly 
the same and their performance was determined by other factors such as the candidate 
himself, the candidates’ personal relations, and laws organising the campaigning 
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process, as explained in previous chapters. The only clear difference in role would be 
for the media department in Moussa’s campaign which was given to a media and PR 
company. The same can also be said of Aboul Fotouh campaign’s which gave the media 
a priority. This priority given by both campaigns to the media helped a lot – along with 
other factors- in framing their two candidates as the front runners. However, this did not 
have any effect on voting as was demonstrated by the elections result where Morsi and 
Shafiq emerged as the two front runners.  
 
The similarity in the rest of roles in the five campaigns made the field co-ordinator role 
(whatever its name was in each campaign) the most influential position; the position 
which played a significant role in determining the results of the election as it was the 
one securing the votes from the villages in the governorates. The professionalism of the 
field co-ordinator posts, mainly in Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaigns, suggests that their 
role might have impacted the election results and helped Morsi and Shafiq to be the top 
candidates in the first round of elections, allowing them to compete again in the second 
round of elections. Unlike the rest of candidates, both Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaign 
resorted in general to professional staff who had previous experience mainly in 
parliamentary elections, which made them precede other campaigns in terms of 
professionalised staff with past experience in elections. 
 
6.1.2 Management style: 
 
The management style reflects ‘the degree of centralisation of the campaign 
management in the hands of the leaders at the national level’ (Tenscher et al 2012; 
Tenscher 2013). It is argued that ‘a more top-down internal structure and hierarchical 
culture’ would make it easier for implementing the changes required for 
Professionalisation (Gibson and Rommele 2001:37; Norris 2000). Those responsible for 
decision making can urge the rest of the staff to adhere to their will and decisions in 
implementing professional techniques and strategies.  
 
The importance of having a coherent internal structure – usually presented in an 
organisational chart- lies in its ability to improve operational efficiency by defining the 
roles and responsibilities of team members (Sullivan 2010) and in determining the 
workflow, decision making and final responsibility. It also makes it easier to add new 
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positions when needed (Ingram 2011). A good internal structure should ensure the 
adaptation of communications to guarantee efficient flows of information between 
various teams (Hill 2011). 
 
The most common management styles are vertical and horizontal task divisions. In the 
vertical structure style - known as ‘tall’ companies- there is a manager at the top making 
decisions, delegating jobs and authority to lower- level managers (Huebsch 2010). As 
you move down the chain, at each level authority and responsibility decreases (Joseph 
2011). According to this structure, information flow is either downwards or upward 
(Ostroff, 1999).  Its main advantage is that it is better in assigning tasks, and generally 
easier to manage (Huebsch, 2010).  The vertical tasks’ management, however, has 
major disadvantages such as the slow process of making decisions due to its 
bureaucratic shape (Ostroff, 1999).  
 
Alternatively, the horizontal –flat- management style is usually preferred, especially in 
new or small businesses due to its efficiency in the short term. Horizontal structures 
usually have fewer management levels, with each level responsible for a particular field 
(Griffin 2010). It usually ensures better employee morale and synergy as they are 
involved in decision making (Bass, 2011). Decisions are taken within teams according 
to their specialisations or targets, and tasks are often completed more quickly and 
effectively. However, the main disadvantages tend to be that different teams tend to 
make decisions without paying attention to the probability of conflicting with other 
teams’ goals ... i.e. without taking into consideration other aspects of the campaign. 
Further, specialised teams sometimes overestimate their roles in relation to other teams 
which may lead to serious mistakes. It could also lead to increased costs as each team 
may try to increase its budget at the cost of others, viewing its role as more important 
than other roles. This is why the horizontal management style is usually advisable only 
if the campaign has a strong campaign manager and a strong field co-ordinator (Maarek 
2011), although it is most appealing due to its fast process of decision making (Ostroff, 
1999). 
 
Despite the importance and necessity of deciding a management style, it would appear 
that the five studied campaigns did not pay much attention to which management style 
they needed to adopt. It looks like none of the campaigns decided beforehand which 
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management style to follow. They only became developed through practice and within 
situations as they occurred and required decisions.  
 
The campaign structure itself was not finalised until toward the end of the campaigning 
period. At the beginning of most of the campaigns, only the candidate with the 
campaign manager and a few members were involved in planning and decision-making 
for the campaign. During the campaigning period, campaigns were adding teams and 
expanding their structures depending on the situation at the time. It would appear that 
most of the campaigns started with a vertical style but the managerial tiers under the 
candidate or the campaign manager were not structured till towards the middle or the 
end of the campaign when all the teams were formed. 
 
When asked about their organisational structure, most of the interviewees from the 
various campaigns could provide no clear answer. The question had to be simplified for 
most of them as to whether they had to get approval for decisions, or whether they 
decided on their own and the relationship between different teams, and with the 
campaign manager and candidate.  
 
It appeared that most campaigns had two levels of internal management style. The first 
was a vertical management style between the campaign manager / candidate and heads 
of various departments /teams. The second was a horizontal management style, beneath 
the candidate, i.e. between various departments / teams and inside each of the teams. 
However, this horizontal style lacked coordination in some points as will be explained. 
 
For Moussa’s campaign, the main management style was horizontal as each team was 
working and taking decisions separately without the need to get approval from the 
candidate or campaign manager, except for strategic political decisions which had to 
have the input of the candidate himself and thus the importance of the second style of 
vertical management applied. The vertical management style was also applied between 
some of the teams in the governorates and their relative department in the head office. 
For example, the media team in the governorates would report vertically with the main 
media team in the head office.  
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However, this horizontal style led to some problems in Moussa’s campaign, mainly 
with their marketing team. The marketing job was assigned to a professional marketing 
company very early on, earlier than the formation of all other teams inside the 
campaign. Neither the candidate, nor the campaign manager interfered with their job. 
However, the output of their work was not up to standard and did not come into line 
with what other departments such as the PR and media departments were trying to do. 
For example, they printed the poster with a grey background, and Moussa was described 
by his opponents as a ‘grey’ person due to his job as a diplomat, and other teams in the 
campaign such as the PR and media teams had to work to counteract this. 
 
For Aboul Fotouh’s campaign, the campaign was a matrix where tasks between 
governorates and the central campaign used to intersect, with some overlapping 
between tasks. On the other hand, the main theme of the campaign was decentralisation, 
especially when it came to the relationship between the central campaign and the other 
branches in various governorates. For the campaign, decentralisation allowed the central 
campaign to focus more on accomplishing high level objectives away from local day-to-
day work. 
 
For Sabahi’s campaign, it differentiated between two levels: tasks related to the 
campaign itself, which were managed horizontally, and tasks and decisions related to 
the candidate were managed vertically, where they had to refer ideas to the candidate to 
be approved before being implemented. For example, a decision needed for campaign 
staff to go and campaign in a particular area – without the candidate present - would be 
taken horizontally. Whereas a decision needed to involve the candidate in the activity – 
i.e. going with the campaign staff to particular area – would be taken vertically.   
 
Morsi’s campaign did not develop a specific management style which was due to the 
‘tight timeframe’, as explained by Yehia Hamed in a personal interview, although each 
team was specialised in its role and had certain tasks to manage horizontally. Each team 
within the campaign, or a member of the party, could go and fill any gap they found 
over the course of the campaign, which was probably done through the vertical style of 
management as someone would probably have had to decide who would go and fill 
which gap. The Muslim Brotherhood itself is a hierarchical organisation founded in 
1928. It has an embedded centralised vertical management style, depending on a top - 
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down chain of command and obedient members, which was clearly reflected in the way 
the campaign was working; taking into consideration that the campaign was formed 
almost at the last minute, which indicates that members of the campaign would still 
follow management in the way they were used to. This would suggest that at least major 
strategic decisions would be concentrated in the hand of its ‘war room’ (Scammell, 
1998) whether it was the campaign managers, or the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance 
Office, or the Freedom and Justice party, or a ‘war room’ that included members from 
all the three bodies. 
 
Shafiq’s campaign did not differ a lot from Morsi’s campaign. Although there was a 
horizontal management style at the management level beneath the candidate and 
campaign managers, the campaign had its own secret ‘war room’ that used to meet daily 
in various places and decide on the candidate and the campaign. There was a direct 
relationship between the war room and some team leaders to highlight what needed to 
be done. This was clear in the way Abdullah Kamal – secret campaign manager- would 
highlight items for the social media manager, or meet and start commenting on 
candidates’ performances on social media outlets for example. There was also a direct 
relationship between the ‘war room’ and the governorates team (i.e. the field co-
ordinator). 
 
Despite general agreement within each campaign on the way they worked, the 
management style adopted was not strict as changes could happen and the candidate or 
the campaign manager could intervene and change or oppose decisions taken by the 
campaign, such as the previously explained example of the debate: both Moussa and 
Aboul Fotouh’s campaigns refused the candidate’s participation in the debate, but both 
candidates took the decision and participated. Apart from Morsi’s and Shafiq’s 
campaign, it looks like the management style did not play an important role in the 2012 
campaigns’ structures. Disagreement or any conflicts that arose were dealt with 
collectively by discussion with the campaign manager and the candidate himself, if 
required. However, the involvement of Morsi’s and Shafiq’s ‘war room’ at various 
stages, with decisions taken in their campaigns, demonstrates the centralisation of 
power in the hands of this war room through a vertical, hierarchical top down 
management style – despite the presence of the horizontal style as well - which suggests 
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that they were able to push for the changes required for professionalization without staff 
resisting, as at the end the candidates and their ‘war rooms’ had the upper hand. 
 
The Professionalization Index assesses the degree of centralization of campaign 
Organization based on the degree of the centralization of the campaign management in 
the hands of party leaders. The more centralized, the more professional it is. By 
applying the index, it appears that both the Morsi and Shafiq campaigns were the two 
most centralized campaigns, thus the more professionalized. On the contrary, Aboul 
Fotouh’s campaign was the least professional as it was totally decentralized. 
 
6.1.3 Campaign premises: 
 
The campaigns’ separate premises became an important feature of professionalised 
campaigns, which indicates the presence of a separate team to manage the campaign 
apart from the main parties’ premises (Strömbäck, 2009), usually known as the ‘war 
room’ (Scammell, 1998) where the concentration of power (Lisi, 2013) and decision 
making rests. This is why choosing campaign premises is a very important step toward 
building the campaign’s infrastructure. They would have to accommodate individual 
staff members from varied backgrounds, with differing skills and roles, who had never 
worked together before (Maarek 2011). A lot of attention should be paid to the 
headquarters as it has to ensure the coordination of messages and management of the 
campaign (Strömbäck 2007:54), and it has to have responsibility for the whole overall 
strategy of the campaign (Gibson and Römmele 2001:33). Therefore, it has to be 
designed to ensure maximum internal communication from one side, and from the other 
side it has to be open to the outside word to avoid rumours (Maarek 2011), false 
speculations or general gossip by the media or the public. This is why the premises -
mainly the headquarters- should be located in a central location for easy access and a 
relatively short distance from TV channels and other political parties, along with being 
easy to access for volunteers and the public as well. 
 
The campaign premises give credibility to the campaign and give proof to the public 
that the campaign cares about them. For example, if the campaign opened a branch in a 
village or governorate, it would give an indication to those living there that the 
campaign cares about them, in comparison to a campaign that did not open places there. 
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It also gives a privilege to the campaign as it allows it to know its actual presence in this 
area; are voters aware of their presence and of their candidate, do they visit the premise, 
and how they interact with the campaigns’ activities in the area? The local premises also 
help the campaign to know the problems facing the people living in this place and what 
issues will make them support the candidate. All this information could be 
communicated back to the central campaign and help in amending or designing a more 
targeted message to these voters. 
 
A well-designed headquarters helps in creating the image of the candidate. Does it look 
like a presidential office or is it a chaotic place that doesn’t reflect the image of a 
president? 
 
The premises make the campaign more accessible to the public as well. It could 
encourage citizen participation or engagement with the campaign. People may be 
reluctant to visit and engage in a campaign, even if they support the candidate, if, for 
example, they had to travel or pay extra for transportation to get to the campaign 
premises. 
 
For the headquarters of the central campaigns, all five campaigns managed to have a 
central office near the city centre, which is almost equidistant from the locations of 
Egyptian TV, media TV centres, local newspapers, parliament, and Tahrir square. The 
locations of the premises were well served by public transportation as well. The main 
difference perhaps was in internal design. Moussa’s campaign was very keen on making 
the premises appear as a presidential office. As explained before, they were keen to 
have separate and well-equipped offices for journalists, and a photo booth for any 
photos that would be taken for the campaign. This is in contrast to other campaigns who 
were not interested in these details.  
 
For campaign branches in other governorates, it varied from one campaign to another. 
Opening campaign branches was an easy task for Morsi’s campaign as it had all the 
offices of the Freedom and Justice Party, alongside any other offices the Muslim 
Brotherhood owned that were opened to campaign for the candidate. The rest of the 
campaigns had to start from scratch and choose strategic places in the governorates and 
rent them, or take the places that volunteers or supporters gave them. Sabahi’s campaign 
	 189	
was helped by some parties such as the Nasserist Party with some of its offices in the 
governorates. Other than this, it was mainly volunteers giving them places that could be 
a whole flat, shop, balcony, or a room in a flat. 
 
Thus in terms of the campaign premises, there was no difference between campaigns 
with regard to the presence of a main central headquarters. The differences only 
appeared in the relative importance of the headquarters. Shafiq campaign for example 
had its main headquarters which was thought to be their war room, but they left it for 
volunteers and media and they used to have their meetings in other places, especially 
towards the end of the campaign. The same would apply for Morsi’s campaign as the 
concentration of power and decision making was not limited only to the campaign 
headquarters, as there were additional ‘war rooms’ in the Freedom and Justice party, 
known as the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood group, and in the Muslim 
Brotherhood guidance office as well.  Another difference would be the internal design 
of the headquarters which Moussa’s campaign was keen on, unlike other campaigns.  
 
In terms of the campaigns’ premises in the governorates, it appears that Morsi’s 
campaign excelled other campaigns in this aspect. This is due to the organisational back 
up it had from both the party and the Muslim Brotherhood group. Other campaigns tried 
to overcome Morsi’s advantage by accepting places offered by volunteers, which 
showed public support and engagement, but at the same time showed the lack of 
resources they had. 
 
6.1.4 Degree of Externalisation  
 
The degree of externalisation refers to the ‘number of temporary dedicated agencies and 
political consultants and experts occupied with election campaign jobs’ (Tenscher et al 
2012:17).  In the age of Professionalisation, election campaigns became more dependent 
on professional experts and consultants (Strömbäck 2008), making ‘no room for 
amateurs’ (Johnson, 2001). Whether they are paid or not, they add credibility to the 
campaign, and add to the morale of the staff as it gives the impression that everything is 
under control (Maarek 2011). The reliance on professional experts led the campaign to 
enter the postmodern phase (Norris, 2000). Many campaigns not only hire external 
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professionals but also increase the Professionalisation of its own staff (Esser and 
Strömbäck 2012).  
 
The need for professional consultancies was one of the main themes of the 2012 
Egyptian presidential campaigns. It only differed over whether these professional 
consultancies were already part of the campaign staff or part of the volunteers working 
in it, or whether the campaign had to resort to additional consultancies from outside the 
campaign, and whether they had previous experience in campaigning. 
 
For Morsi’s campaign, the party and the campaign already had their consultancies and 
professionals in almost every field. The campaign also had an affiliated public opinion 
polling centre and an affiliated media company. It also had its own experts who helped 
in writing the election programme. Thus, the need for full-time additional external 
experts was limited. 
 
For Shafiq’s campaign, which did not have an official party behind it, it resorted to 
experts and professionals on two levels. The first level was hiring them as a part of the 
campaign staff. The second was resorting to experts who were not members of the 
campaign. On the campaign staff level, the campaign resorted to field co-ordinators 
from the dissolved NDP to become part of the campaign and help them with the 
governorates. It resorted to professional journalists, a professional social media team, 
and a professional media company who were all part of the campaign. From outside the 
campaign’s full-time staff, the campaign resorted to around 20 experts to help in writing 
the candidate’s vision. 
 
For Aboul Fotouh’s campaign, the campaign resorted to experts from outside the 
campaign mainly to help with technical issues in establishing the call centre, an events 
and marketing company, public opinion polls, and public speaking skills. Other 
specialisations were provided from within the campaign’s staff such as the advisory 
board which helped in writing the programme, the media, and the marketing committee 
which all involved professionals. 
 
For Amr Moussa’s campaign, the majority of the expertise needed was hired as part of 
the campaign as well as the media and PR company which was responsible for the 
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media committee in the campaign, or the advertisement team which was another 
company, or the I.T. team which mainly specialised in technical and I.T. issues. This, 
along with the advisory board, acted as the candidate cabinet and helped in writing the 
programmes. The campaign resorted to external experts mainly in getting some research 
undertaken and analysing data, besides resorting to volunteers, mainly friends in the 
media or diplomats, to help them reach the voters abroad. 
 
For Sabahi’s campaign, the campaign managed to have all the necessary experts as 
volunteers in the campaign, to the extent that they did not have to pay for 
advertisements, for example, as explained in previous chapter. They only resorted to a 
social media company to help them with technical issues and an accounting company to 
help them with the financial issues. 
 
From the above, the two campaigns that proved keenest to hire external full-time 
professionals were Shafiq and Moussa’s campaigns. They were keen on having full-
time experts as part of their campaign staff. Each was responsible for their team or task. 
This action proved to be important as the campaign was guaranteed full loyalty by those 
they employed. Freelance or part-time consultancies can work with various campaigns 
at the same time, which was shown to have happened in this election. During the 
author’s interviews with campaign staff for the sake of this study, it became evident that 
some experts, mainly academics and researchers, worked for more than one campaign at 
the same time, for example in providing them with research or data. The campaigns 
were not aware of this during the time of elections. This is why hiring experts as part of 
the official campaign staff might have been a better option in the Egyptian case, as even 
if the expert tried to work in another campaign at the same time, both campaigns would 
know about it which would ruin his reputation. 
 
 For Morsi’s campaign, although the campaign sourced all its experts and professionals 
from the party and the Muslim Brotherhood, it may well be that the campaign was self-
contained enough and did not need outsiders to be involved. It also prevented outsiders 
knowing its secrets, which could perhaps be published later in the media. Trust and 
confidentially were among the main themes controlling the way Morsi’s campaign 
worked. This was made clear to the author in the reluctance in answering some of the 
questions asked during the interviews, which other campaigns replied to openly. 
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Although all campaigns resorted to professional experts- whether they acted as 
volunteers, or they had full time jobs or part time jobs- the main difference was those 
professionals’ past experience in the campaign and elections field. In terms of this 
political experience, both Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaigns were ahead of the rest of the 
campaigns, which had professionals but, on the whole, it was the first time for them 
working in a nationwide election campaign. Based on this, the degree of externalisation 
of Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaign was better than the rest of the campaigns. 
 
6.1.5 Internal Campaign Communication structures 
 
Effective communication inside a campaign is vital to ensure the campaign’s targets are 
met and decisions are well understood and implemented. Effective communication 
ensures synergy and good relations between the campaign’s teams. However, the term 
‘internal communication structures’ does not refer to the reliance on traditional means 
of communication that prevailed in almost all the five studied campaigns. According to 
Tenscher (2013:254), the term refers to ‘the existence and the use of “new” 
communication media for internal campaign communication and the mobilisation of 
party members’  
 
Although all the campaigns were keen on maintaining effective communication, or in 
other words avoiding miscommunication between staff internally, this was done mainly 
through traditional means of communication such as daily face-to-face meetings in all 
central campaigns, along with mobile phone calls throughout the day. The use of emails 
was limited to sharing big files, data, or brochures.  
 
In each of the governorates, there were also daily meetings or phone calls between staff. 
The communication between the central campaigns and governorates differed from one 
campaign to another.  
 
Shafiq’s campaign established daily communication waves between the central 
campaign and the governorates.  Morsi’s campaign did not have a fixed system for 
communication between the central campaign and the branches in the governorates. It 
used to depend upon the situation. Moussa’s campaign had daily phone calls betw
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their field co-ordinator and the governorates, and emails from the central media team 
and equivalent media teams in governorates.  
 
Aboul Fotouh’s campaign used phone calls as well and emails to send brochures and 
campaign materials for governorate offices to print. For Sabahi’s campaign, the main 
methods of communication with the governorates were daily phone calls and bringing 
in those working in the governorates each month for a face-to-face meeting at the 
central campaign. 
 
Thus, internal communication was almost the same within the different campaigns, as 
they all depended on traditional mediums as the main means of communication. The 
only differences would be for Moussa’s campaign, which managed to use a bigger 
variety of methods than other campaigns, such as Walkie Talkies, or WhatsApp, or 
three different sim cards with the three different telecommunication companies. A 
second difference would be for Shafiq and the communication waves with the 
governorates. This would make Moussa’s campaign the most professionalised campaign 
in terms of the internal communication structure implemented. After it, comes Shafiq’s 
campaign due to establishing the daily ‘communication wave’. There was not a 
noticeable difference between Aboul Fotouh’s and Morsi’s campaign in this regard. 
Although Sabahi’s campaign did not use techniques that were consistent with the 
Professionalisation index, it employed other ways and techniques to maximize its 
chances. The campaign did not use ‘new’ communication mediums. On the contrary, it 
used to bring in the staff in governorates for a monthly face-to-face meeting at the 
central campaign headquarters. This was very understandable as it was suitable for its 
targeted audience. However, due to the resource gap, Sabahi’s campaign was not able to 
challenge his rivals. In other words, in the case of Sabahi, following the Tenscher index 
by using new communication means, might have led to miscommunication inside the 
campaign. This highlights another aspect of Professionalism which is trying to perform 
better depending on the resources available. This might not be the most professional, 
but in a way, it is still professional especially if they are unable to achieve the same as 
those with more resources. 
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6.1.6 Feedback 
 
Feedback is essential for any campaign and any message it delivers. Feedback allows 
the campaign to alter or change its message, tactics, or strategies. It also allows the 
campaign to know about its actual presence on the street, i.e. what the public -mainly 
voters- thinks about the candidate, whether they support him or not, and whether they 
are likely to vote for the candidate. Feedback can be assessed by several means such as 
from public opinion polls and focus groups that allows the campaign to learn about 
“voters’ sentiments” and feedback from media monitoring that allows the campaign to 
learn about the “journalists’ sentiments” (Esser and Strömbäck 2012: 299). 
 
In the case of Egypt, due to a lack of data and lack of efficient accurate public opinion 
polls73, there was a lack of accurate data which the campaigns could have built upon. 
																																																						
73 Public opinion polls were another main feature of this election. Several centres were keen to 
conduct public opinion polls. Some were conducted by governmental centres such as the 
information and decision support centre, others were conducted by research centres affiliated 
with state owned newspapers such as Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic studies ACPSS, 
others were conducted by partnership between independent newspapers and independent 
research centres such as those conducted by Baseera centre and Almasry al youm newspapers. 
 
Most of these polls put Amr Moussa and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh as the front running 
candidates. It also reported accelerated progress in the popularity of other candidates such as 
Morsi and Shafiq over time. However, these polls were not proven to be accurate in comparison 
to the elections results. For example, Moussa who was reported as the top candidate, came fifth 
in the elections results. And Morsi, who was not a top candidate in these polls came as a top 
candidate in the results. 
 
These inaccurate results led some to accuse the polls of bias or being pseudo polls, to the extent 
that some presidential candidates such as Abdul Ezz Al-Hariri, Hamdeen Sabahi and Hisham 
Bastawisy filed lawsuit against the head of the Shura council, head of press supreme council 
and chairman of newspapers and polls centres that conducted polls accusing polls of directing 
the voters to vote for specific candidates (Ahram gate, 27/5/2012). 
 
Serval reasons were given to explain the polls’ inaccuracy such as ignoring some segments in 
the Egyptian societies such as housewives, illiterate citizens and some border governorates. 
Majed Othman, head of Baseera, argued that this inaccuracy was mainly because of undecided 
voters, as 33% of the sample had not decided yet at the time of polls (Aswat Masryia, 
24/5/2014), In addition was the difficulty of getting the governmental permissions required to 
conduct face to face polls, which make some centres conduct telephone interviews, which lead 
to inaccuracy as it depends on mobile phones, making verifying identities and details very 
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This was mainly the case for Moussa and Aboul Fotouh’s campaigns. Other campaigns 
tried to find a way of getting feedback from other sources.  
 
Morsi’s campaign did not have the same problem that faced other campaigns in getting 
feedback as the Muslim Brotherhood already had its own affiliated centre that 
conducted public opinion polls, which was, according to Yehia Hamed, an accurate way 
of getting the feedback the campaign needed. 
 
For Shafiq’s campaign, it depended mainly on its five thousand representatives in the 
governorates to get them the required feedback. There are no details on how those 
representatives used to get the feedback, but it was mainly through their observations, 
not properly conducted public opinion polls. It also depended on its social media team 
who used a ‘Tweet deck’ programme in following everything said about Shafiq on 
Twitter.  
 
The main problem facing Moussa and Aboul Fotouh’s campaigns was that they were 
depending heavily on the data available in the media and on public opinions polls that 
were proven not to be accurate. Aboul Fotouh’s campaign tried to develop a way to get 
its own feedback by resorting to the business sector but the project failed. 
 
For Sabahi’s campaign, they did not depend on public opinion polls. Their past 
experience in the political field made them aware that polls would not necessarily be 
accurate. According to Hossam Moeness, there was no guarantee that they would not be 
biased, or that the sample would be representative, or that those working on it would be 
too lazy to get a representative sample. Instead Sabahai’s campaign used to depend on 
observation by participation, where the campaign staff would go into a coffee shop and 
open a discussion with those sitting there about the presidential candidates without 
saying that they were from Sabahi’s campaign; or go to coffee shops and open places 
when Sabahi was on the television and listen to what the public was saying. Again, 
while Sabahi’s campaign did not stick to the index on how to get its feedback, it was 
more innovative than other campaigns such as Moussa’s and Aboul Fotouh. The latter 
																																																																																																																																																														
difficult. But others argued that this inaccuracy was mainly due to a lack of experience, lack of 
access to lower classes and lack of access to remote locations (Al-Fagr, 22/5/2012). 
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depended on media and public opinions polls, but Sabahi was better in finding new 
ways – not covered by the index- amid a shortage of resources, in order to maximise his 
chances.  
 
In the professionalization index applied as a framework to this study, Tenscher (2013: 
254) assesses feedback mainly through two methods which are ‘(a) commissioned or 
independently conducted opinion polls and (b) focus group analysis’. By applying these 
two methods to the five-studied campaigns, it became clear that only Morsi’s campaign 
had a professional way of measuring feedback as it had its own affiliated centre to 
measure feedback scientifically. Other campaigns had their own methods which did not 
include commissioning opinion polls or conducting focus group analysis. 
 
6.1.7 Opposition Research 
 
Opposition research is considered to be fulfilled if the campaign has a dedicated unit to 
conduct regular and frequent research into the opposing campaigns, both before and 
during the election campaign. The result of this research should be distributed and 
integrated later to the rest of the campaign by giving it back to relevant departments 
which will help in amending their strategies (Gibson and Rommele 2009; Tenscher et al 
2012) 
 
In the 2012 Egyptian campaigns, each campaign developed its own internal way of 
conducting research on their opponents’ candidates. In the interviewing process, all 
campaigns – except Morsi’s campaign – highlighted that they did not need to conduct 
background research or research on the candidates’ previous positions. This was 
because, for all of the candidates and their campaigns, these positions were already clear 
in the minds of the campaign’s staff and the candidate. The campaigns were more 
interested in monitoring other campaigns, and what other campaigns and candidates 
were doing during the campaigning period.   
 
Again, Morsi’s campaign surpassed other campaigns in this regard as well as they had a 
unit dedicated to monitoring other campaigns.  
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For Shafiq’s campaign, they did not have a separate unit for opposition research. They 
depended on their five thousand representatives in the governorates, their secret 
campaign manager himself, what was written on social media, along with what was 
given to them by other departments.  
 
For Moussa, Aboul Fotouh, and Sabahi, they did not have a separate unit to monitor 
other campaigns. They mainly depended on media reports conducted by their media 
units, along with other information that would come by now and then from the teams in 
the governorates, or other departments in the campaign. 
  
However, it looks like there were weaknesses in the opposition research in Shafiq, 
Moussa, Aboul Fotouh, and Sabahi’s campaigns, as none of them were able to discover 
and exploit the contradictions in Morsi’s speech during the time of elections, such as the 
‘Qassas’ (retribution), and NASA examples elaborated on in previous chapters.  
 
In terms of the Professionalisation index, the degree of opposition research should 
assess if the campaign developed an independent structure to monitor its political 
opponents (Tensher et al 2012; Tescher 2013). By applying the index, it appears that 
only Morsi’s campaign was professionalised in terms of having a separate body to 
monitor its political opponents. i.e. Morsi’s campaign exceeded other campaigns in 
terms of the opposition research.  
 
6.1.8 Campaign Duration 
 
The presidential election law determined the campaigning period to be from only three 
weeks before the actual date of the election, until two days before the election’s first 
round. In the second round, it would start a day after announcing the result of the first 
round and end a day before voting starts for the second round. This was implemented by 
the High Elections Committee ruling Number 10, deciding the dates for the first round 
to be from 30th April to 21st May. The second round would be from the second day of 
announcing the results until midday on 15th June. 
 
Many political forces saw the three-week period as insufficient. This led the People’s 
Assembly (the lower parliamentary house) to amend the law on 7th May, making the 
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campaigning period start from the first day of opening the door for nominations till the 
date of the elections, even cancelling the period of silence prior to voting. This was 
dismissed by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which insisting on starting the actual 
campaigning period after nominations were accepted formally, and further insisted on 
the period of silence as it was a right for voters to have time to think over their preferred 
candidates and to compare them without being subject to influence or pressure from the 
candidates (Hashem 2012: 38). 
 
For all the campaigns, except Morsi and Shafiq, the campaign duration lasted for more 
than a year, as they had announced their decisions earlier than both Morsi and Shafiq, 
whose announcements of their decisions to run came at the last minute. 
 
According to the Professionalisation Index, the longer the overall duration of the 
campaign is, the more professionalised it is. The overall campaign duration includes 
preparation, planning and implementation of the campaign until the Election Day 
(Tenscher et al 2012; Tenscher 2013). This would mean that Moussa’s, Aboul Fotouh’s 
and Sabahi’s campaign were more professionalised in terms of the relatively long 
period of campaigning they enjoyed.  
 
However, this long campaigning period highlighted contradicting views from the 
campaign staff interviewed. The dilemma for both Moussa and Aboul Fotouh was that 
the longer campaign time gave an opportunity for opponents, media, and even the 
public to have enough time to research the candidates’ weak points and attack them. 
This is unlike short campaigning periods, as no one has enough time to research and 
attack the candidates. On the other hand, the short period of campaigning would not 
allow the candidate to be well known enough to the public.  
 
The long period of campaigning led the candidates’ campaigns to be impacted by the 
political polarisation that took place during the campaign year, such as the rule of law 
versus the rule of the Revolution, constitution first or election firsts, the Law on the 
Exercise of Political Rights, and other issues explained in previous chapters, which led 
to an increase in the polarisation of society and affected the candidates as well. Any 
stance the candidate took, even if this stance was not to have a stance, would be used 
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against them, or gaining supporters for one side would mean a loss of supporters for the 
other side. Thus the long campaign created greater challenges for the campaigns. 
 
The debate around the duration of campaigning highlights concerns about whether it is 
applicable in the Egyptian case – mainly in the 2012 presidential elections campaign -  
to say that the longer duration the campaign, the more professional it is, as it appeared 
that the shorter duration was better for both Morsi and Shafiq. On the contrary, the 
longer duration was detrimental to both Moussa and Aboul Fotouh. Yet it is too early to 
generalise, as the duration is not the only factor that indicates whether the campaign is 
professional or not or if the model applies fully; other factors highlighted in the 
Professionalisation Index should be taken into consideration as well. 
 
6.1.9 Campaign budget 
 
The election law regulated the amount of spending and donations for each campaign. 
The spending limit was 10 million Egyptian pounds (approximately around one million 
GDP74) for each candidate in the first round, and 2 million Egyptian pounds (around 
200 thousands GDP) in the second round. There were also some restrictions, such as 
that every candidate should open a bank account for cash donations in one of the banks 
agreed upon by the committee. Donations were to only be from Egyptians, and 
donations could not exceed 200 thousand Egyptian pounds (around 20 thousands GDP) 
from one individual. Despite these regulations, there was no actual way of monitoring 
or punishing those who exceeded these limits. 
 
There was also no accurate way in this research to verify the budget or money spent by 
each candidate. Media reports estimated that 100 million Egyptian pounds were spent 
during the elections. Other estimations suggested that some candidates spent more than 
four times the amount before the start of the official campaigning period, such as 
Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, who was dismissed from the presidential race as his mother 
was proven to be American, and who had printed 10 million posters at a printing house. 
This estimation is based on the fact that the cost of one poster was four Egyptian pounds 
																																																						
74 In 2012, one GDP was equal to approximately 10 LE. 
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at that time. Thus, the total cost of the printed posters was 40 million, in addition to his 
other forms of campaigning which meant even more spending (Azzabawy 2012). 
 
For the five studied campaigns, especially those campaigns that started early, such as 
Aboul Fotouh, Moussa, and Sabahi, the delay in issuing rules for budget and spending 
regulations till towards the start of the campaign period led to a state of confusion and 
uncertainty and issues with regards to planning. The campaigns were not able to start 
fundraising or to plan ahead with regards to spending. To overcome this situation, all 
campaigns resorted to in-kind contributions rather than cash, especially at the 
beginning. Cash was used on advertisements and other forms of campaigning, which the 
High Elections Committee could easily know about and verify from other governmental 
sources and reports. 
 
The issue of the budgets witnessed many rumours and uncertainties, with media reports 
suggesting that Shafiq was taking money from the United Arab Emirates, since it is 
against the Muslim Brotherhood. Other reports were about Morsi taking money from 
both Qatar and the United States as explained in previous chapters.  
 
Rumours also faced some of the candidates who refused to publish their financial 
disclosure reports to the public, although they were submitted to the HEC. For example, 
both Moussa and Shafiq refused to publish them to the public, saying that issues like 
their salaries and financial situations should remain confidential. This led to a large 
amount of rumours against them.  
 
Despite all this, the financial documents submitted to the HEC did not exceed the limit. 
However, at the same time, during the interviews with campaign staff, members from 
all campaigns stated that if the in-kind contributions had been calculated into the 
budget, this would mean that the total amount spent on campaigning would have 
exceeded the maximum limit permitted by the HEC. Thus, only the bills paid by the 
campaign itself, and not its supporters, were documented in the financial reports, and 
not the actual costs. 
 
The Professionalisation Index evaluates the professionalisation of the election budget 
based on the election campaign expenditures of each candidate’s campaign per eligible 
	 201	
voter (Tenscher et al 2012, Tenscher 2013). By applying the limit set by the election 
law on the number of eligible voters which was 50,996,74675 voters, would mean that 
the campaign expenditures are 20 piasters (around 2 Pence) per eligible voter, which is 
very low. However, it is very difficult to assess or know the actual expenditure of each 
campaign due to the complexity and sensitivity of the issue. Officially, all campaigns 
adhered to the official limits, as reported in the figures they submitted to the HEC. Only 
Sabahi’s campaign says that it did not reach the 10 million maximum limits decided by 
the law – without calculating the in-kind contributions. All campaigns expressed – 
informally – that if they calculated the in-kind contributions, they would have exceeded 
the maximum limit. This research was not able to verify the actual budget for each 
campaign.  
 
6.1.10 Which structure was more professionalised? 
 
From the above overview, it appears that the structure of Morsi’s campaign was the 
most professionalised structure. This was due to their past history in campaigning in 
Egypt, the expertise of its staff, mainly their expertise in the governorates (field co-
ordinator position), their centralised management style, the widespread nature of their 
premises due to the use of their already available party premises and finally the 
presence of separate units for feedback and opposition research. The second most 
professionalised structure was implemented by Shafiq’s campaign. This was also due to 
their past history of campaigning in Egypt, the expertise of its staff mainly their 
expertise in the governorates (field co-ordinator position), their centralised management 
style, their externalisation in terms of hiring external professionals and their ways of 
getting feedback and opposition research, although not having separate units set up for 
these functions.  
 
The result that Morsi’s structure was the most professionalised is almost the same result 
that Tenscher et al (2012: 155) reached while studying the professionalization of 
elections campaigns in four EU countries. Tenscher et al (2012:155) concluded that the 
campaign structures of big parties were more professionalised. This result can explain 
why Morsi’s campaign structure was more professional than other campaigns, as it 
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already had the required funds, resources and people who are available to big 
established parties in most developed democracies, which was not the case with other 
campaigns. Moreover, Tenscher (2013: 249) concludes that smaller political parties will 
try their best to compensate for the structural disadvantages they have by being more 
innovative in strategic development. But was this applicable in the Egyptian case? The 
next section will try to answer this question by analysing the strategies (software) of the 
five studied campaigns according to the Professionalization Index. 
 
6.2 Campaigns strategies 
 
Determining an effective strategy is essential for any campaign (Lees-Marshment 2001; 
Burton and Shea 2015; Sides et al 2012). A good strategy should help determine what 
the campaign will look like: What is the main theme of the campaign? What methods 
and tactics will the campaign utilise in order to achieve its goals? And how will the 
campaigns make full use of the limited resources they have while maximising the 
return. The strategy should also guide the campaign staff on what to do at each stage of 
the campaign, especially when situations change. A good campaign strategy should also 
be coherent, meaning that any decision taken should be correlated with the campaign’s 
other decisions (Maarek 2011). It should also be suitable to and understandable by the 
candidate and their staff who put it into practice (Burton and Shea 2015) 
 
This section will analyse campaigns’ strategies based on the Professionalization Index 
which reflects the main indicators according to which the campaign’s strategy can be 
considered ‘professional’. The more the strategy demonstrates the presence of these 
indicators, the more professional it is. These indicators are summarised by Tenscher 
(2013: 246) as follows: (a) efforts to influence the media’s agenda and shaping public 
opinion. (b) focusing on free media channels, mainly TV including talk shows. (c) use 
of paid media such as paid advertisement. (d) segmentation of voters into targets groups 
to be contacted by narrowcasting and micro-targeting and (e) focusing on the candidate 
through personalisation. In studying the five Egyptian campaigns, these indicators are 
reflected in the following eight criteria, which will be discussed in details in the 
following section: targeting, narrowcasting activities, free media, paid media, debates, 
internet and social media, campaigns activities and the degree of personalisation.  
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A first step in determining a good strategy is to know who your target audience is. This 
would help in determining the campaigns’ tactics and means of communication in 
reaching and influencing this targeted audience or type of voter, as follows: 
 
6.2.1 Targeting 
 
Voter targeting reflects the number of segmented targeted groups that the campaign 
identify in order to contact and mobilise (Tescher 2013: 255). The idea behind the 
segmentation of voters, as Burton and Shea (2015: 106) explain, is to divide the voters 
according to other common characteristics rather than the traditional ones such as: age, 
sex or demographical locations; thus concentrating campaigns efforts by GOTV 
activities (Gerber and Green 2008) on them, more than the rest of voters, in order to 
maximise the votes that the campaign requires to win the election. 
 
In general, both the candidates and the campaigns are faced by two major challenges. 
The first is to admit that they will not appeal to every voter and that all voters will not 
be flexible enough to give the campaign a chance to convince them of their candidate. 
This is especially the case if the voters have already pre-decided who they will vote for 
due, for example, to party loyalty. Thus there is a need to divide voters into segments. 
The second challenge is to be able to locate and find those voters who may vote for the 
candidate or at least could be influenced by the campaign’s activities and who may 
become convinced and vote for the candidate. From this comes the need for the 
segmentation of voters, whose main goal was to comprehend each voter’s needs in 
order to communicate with them successfully (Cwalina et al. 2011: 81).   
 
A campaign can divide voters according to four ways. Cwalina, Falkowski, and 
Newman (2011) differentiate between two levels of voter segmentation: primary and 
secondary. Primary segmentation divides voters according to two main criteria which 
are party identification and voter strength, which assesses the voters’ level of 
attachment to a party. The second level of segmentation divides voters according to 
geographic, demographic, behavioural, and psychographic segments.  
 
A third way of segmenting voters is to divide them into decided and undecided voters, 
who can be divided into campaigning-period deciders or last minute deciders (Chaffe 
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and Rimal 1996). However, with the difficulty of reaching voters and thus dividing 
them, a fourth way of segmentation could be via primary and secondary targets. Primary 
targets could be to identify people to act as ‘opinion relays’ and convince them of the 
candidate so that they can convince other voters in turn. Secondary targets include 
targeting the voters through one of the criteria mentioned above (Maarek 2011).  
 
In order to be able to divide voters into segments, there is a need for information about 
the voters. In most countries, there are many sources that gather information about 
voters, such as: voter databases, general census records, results of previous elections, 
and lists of union members or other associations (Maarek 2011).  
 
The level of available data, however, differs from one country to another. In some 
countries, such as Egypt, personal data on a nation-wide level is not published or given 
to candidates, as it is considered a matter of national security, or for the sake of 
protecting individual privacy. 
 
The main problem that faced all the campaigns, except Morsi and Shafiq’s, was that the 
voter databases were not available to their campaigns. According to Hossam Moeness, 
Sabahi’s campaign manager, the voter databases were only allowed for candidates in the 
parliamentary elections, as each candidate can ask for the voter database for his or her 
constituency. However, this was not allowed in the presidential elections, so as not to 
give out personal data about all the voters in the country to one person or candidate 
(Moeness 2016). Nonetheless, although all the candidates should not have access 
(theoretically) to voter databases, Morsi’s campaign had the database of each separate 
constituency, as they had candidates in the parliamentary elections that took place that 
same year. The same applied to Shafiq’s campaign, as it had the voter databases from 
previous elections prior to the revolution from their field co-ordinator (Moeness 2016). 
 
Amid this absence of data, and the unequal access thereto, each campaign tried its best 
to identify and divide their targeted voters through a mixture of the four ways 
mentioned above. The most commonly targeted audience among all of them was what is 
known as the ‘sofa party’, despite small differences in the groupings that come under 
the definition of ‘sofa party’, which were explained in previous chapters. This indicates 
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the undecided voters that are not affiliated to a specific party, in this case one that was 
not affiliated to Islamists, the old regime, or the revolutionaries.  
 
For Morsi’s campaign, in the first round of elections, the campaign’s main targeted 
voters were the Islamists. In the second round, the campaign extended its targeted voters 
to include revolutionaries and the ‘sofa party’. 
 
Regarding Shafiq’s campaign, the targeted voters did not differ from the first to second 
round of elections. The campaign mainly concentrated on targeting conservative voters 
in society, those who were against the Muslim Brotherhood, and the ‘sofa party’, which 
the campaign divided into the sub-categories mentioned in previous chapters. 
 
Moussa’s campaign mainly targeted the ‘sofa party’, and divided it into sub-categories. 
They did not target other segments, although they sent them some campaign messages. 
This proved to be the wrong choice, as they did not try to secure a solid base in the 
same way as other candidates, especially given that the sofa party is a very loose term 
that involves too many people with different backgrounds whose main common interest 
is that they are not interested in politics or do not take actions. 
 
Aboul Fotouh’s campaign used the parliamentary elections results to decide upon 19 
governorates, thus targeting voters according to geographical and behavioural 
categories. In the beginning, this segmentation included the Islamist voters, 
revolutionary voters, and the ‘sofa party’. However, after the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
announcement to nominate Al-Shater and then Morsi, the campaign only concentrated 
on revolutionary voters and the ‘sofa party’ in the 19 governorates it chose. 
 
Sabahi’s campaign targeted youths in the cities that witnessed the revolution, using the 
geographical and demographical criteria available.  
 
A common comment made by all campaigns, except Morsi and Shafiq’s, was that the 
undecided voters, or the ‘sofa party’, were not necessarily active or paid much attention 
to politics, nor were they ready to take political decisions. This was clear in what Khalaf 
(2016) told the author: that targeted voters were attending events largely ‘out of 
curiosity’, but would not actually go out and vote. This was confirmed by Aboul Gheit 
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(2016), who mentioned that when they went to a village and convinced voters to vote 
for them, after a couple of weeks another candidate would go and the same voters 
would tell the second candidate the same thing: that they would vote for him instead.  
 
Perhaps this may be explained by the timing of exposure to the candidate’s message and 
the time the voters would take to make their final decision (Chaffee and Choe 1980). 
This means that the candidate should have visited those undecided voters, or presented 
his message to them at a time nearer to the election when they would be most likely 
make their decisions or by returning to reinforce their message, as well as employing 
‘get out the vote’ tactics. The power of GOTV is not about reminding voters of election 
dates by pre-recorded messages and leaflets, but by personalising the importance of 
their vote; going back to voters who initially showed interest, or by just being around as 
many non-voters will vote if they think that they are being watched since the decision to 
vote is shaped to a great extent by one’s social environment (Gerber and Green 2008). 
 
From the above, it appears that the most professionalized campaigns in terms of 
targeting their voters were Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaign. This was mainly due to the 
fact that they had voter registration lists from previous elections, in addition to a base of 
loyal supporters. Add to this a professional field co-ordinator who knows how to reach 
these targeted segments and all these factors helped them to identify and segment their 
voters; and more importantly to be able to reach them. This was not the case with other 
campaigns that chose a vague, widely targeted group which other campaigns were 
competing for as well, besides not being able to reach them effectively. 
 
6.2.2 Narrowcasting activities 
 
Narrowcasting became an essential feature of postmodern campaigns. In pre-modern 
campaigns, campaign managers were described as ‘mobilizers’, as ‘broadcasters’ in 
modern campaigns, then as ‘narrowcasters’ in postmodern campaigns (Esser and 
Strömbäck 2012). Unlike broadcasting, which means delivering messages to the 
masses, narrowcasting means delivering information or messages to a narrow group 
within the public. Essentially, in an election campaign, narrowcasting means delivering 
a campaign message to a segment of targeted voters, and not all the voters. A campaign 
may need to send specific messages to a certain segment of voters who have different 
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interests and fears. The reason a campaign may resort to narrowcasting could be to gain 
the support of a certain segment of voters by making them some promises or that the 
candidate would appeal most specifically to one target group. The campaign may also 
resort to narrowcasting to send messages to some segments among the voters who are 
not the campaign’s targeted voters, just to reassure them or perhaps even to frighten 
them. Narrowcasting can be done through various means of communication, such as 
face-to-face communication or through mass media outlets, such as specialist mass 
media outlets that target specific audiences or specialised programmes in general 
outlets. In Egypt for example, there are television channels and programmes that target 
women, youths, Muslims, or Christians.  
 
Aboul Fotouh’s campaign did not carry out narrowcasting but rather targeted the middle 
class, youth, and conservative voters throughout the campaign’s messages. Both Sabahi 
and Moussa carried out narrowcasting toward certain groups, either by face-to-face 
meetings whose content was published in media outlets and included no targeted 
promises, or in special television programmes or on channels that target certain 
audiences. Most of the promises given to them were from the candidates’ programmes. 
Sabahi held some closed meetings with workers whose factories were closed because of 
the revolution, or farmers, or university students. Moussa’s campaign did the same with 
groups such as those working in the communication sectors, union members, or 
disabled people. However, the content of such meetings was all published in the media 
after the event. 
 
For both Morsi and Shafiq’s campaigns, they did the same but there was also some 
face-to-face narrowcasting that was not published in the media and that involved secret 
promises or secret reassurances to certain groups. As explained in the previous chapter, 
Shafiq’s campaign, for example, gave some indirect promises to certain groups. For 
Morsi, the campaign did not speak about secret promises, but it is believed that Islamist 
groups were promised special posts in the event of Morsi winning. This is due to his 
choosing more than half of the committee that was responsible for drafting the Egyptian 
Constitution in 2012 from among Islamist groups (Al Arabiya 29/11/2012), besides 
appointing many members of the Freedom and Justice Party in governmental posts after 
being elected. 
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The Professionalisation Index assesses the degree of narrowcasting according to the 
number of activities aimed at the target group through various direct communications 
(Tenscher el al, 2012). By applying the index, it appears that all campaigns – except 
Aboul Fotouh- resorted to narrowcasting. However, messages that were narrowcasted in 
both Moussa’s and Sabahi’s campaign were usually reinforced by being broadcast later 
to wider voters, either by the campaign itself, or by the media. This was unlike Morsi’s 
and Shafiq’s campaigns where narrowcasting was not transformed to broadcasting later; 
apparently so as not to lose votes from one section of the electorate while securing the 
votes of another due to the controversies of their narrowcasted messages. In terms of 
which campaign was more professionalised in resorting to narrowcasting activities, it 
was difficult to assess objectively because of the unavailability of all the messages that 
were narrowcasted and its importance. This was due to either the memory or the 
reluctance of the interviewees when asked about more details. 
 
6.2.3 Free media 
 
Media play an important role in the campaign period, as they act as a vehicle for both 
the candidates and the campaigns to deliver their messages to the voters. Voters are 
unlikely to receive the information they need directly from the candidate, but from mass 
media (Gibson and Rommele 2001). Candidate participation in the media stabilises the 
agenda-setting media effects, as important or controversial news from the candidates or 
campaigns will always find its way into the media in most cases. In the 2012 Egyptian 
elections, campaign relations with the media were affected by three main factors: access 
to the media, media bias towards candidates, and the degree of a campaign’s 
dependency on the media as a reflection of the final results. 
 
(a) Access to the Media 
 
Towards the start of the official campaigning period, the main theme for election 
coverage was in the form of dedicated programmes designed to interview various 
candidates. Some of these programmes had a panel of experts to ask and discuss issues 
that they specialised in with the candidates. For example, an economics expert would 
ask the candidate about his economic policies, and so on. Other programmes had an 
audience within them. These types of programmes depended on interviewing each of 
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the candidates in a separate episode. This meant that candidates had equal access to 
these programmes and the channels themselves did not want to appear biased. The 
problem of media access, however, was before the start of the official campaigning 
period, as most candidates started campaigning a year before the official starting date.  
 
Both Moussa and Aboul Fotouh did not have a problem accessing the media. This was 
mainly due to their contact with those working in the media, and at a later stage because 
of opinion polls that showed both Moussa and Aboul Fotouh as the top candidates. 
Hiring professionals to lead the campaigns’ relations with the media was a successful 
decision as well. They managed to frame their candidates as front runners and create a 
mainstream belief – with the help of the polls - that their candidates were the two front 
runners, as explained in previous chapters. Moreover, there was a common belief 
among many journalists and intellectuals that Moussa’s campaign was the most 
professionalised campaign. This was due to the professional way that his media 
department was dealing with them, being keen to frame his campaign in a professional 
way. 
 
In contrast, Sabahi had a problem accessing the media. Although he was a journalist and 
had personal relationships with many journalists and presenters working in the field, he 
was seen by them as having no chance. Thus, he was not able to get the same attention 
from the media. Moreover, he sometimes had to appear in the media either at times he 
did not want, or in an outlet he did not want, as he could not refuse due to his personal 
relations with those working in these outlets and risk upsetting them. 
 
For Shafiq’s campaign, his history with the media was not good, but he still had access 
to them. The media was interested in following up his stories, as for them he was a 
controversial character. On the other hand, there was a belief among the campaign’s 
higher echelons that the media would not be the decisive factor in the result of the 
election, and that what is said in the media does not necessarily reflect reality. For 
Morsi’s campaign, he did not have a problem accessing the media early on due to 
joining the presidential race late. 
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(b) Media Bias 
 
Campaign messages can be subject to three types of media intervention: heavy 
intervention, medium intervention, or no intervention at all (Paletz 2002). In the 2012 
elections, there was heavy journalistic intervention that exceeded the normal news 
coverage. The media played an important role in creating a common public perception 
that Moussa and Aboul Fotouh were the two frontrunners. The implication was that if 
there was going to be a second round of elections between two candidates, they would 
be Moussa and Aboul Fotouh. This explains why there was a state of shock when the 
actual results appeared showing that the second round would be between the two most 
polarising candidates: Shafiq and Morsi. 
 
There is no clear evidence to suggest a reason for this bias. However, it might have been 
due to several combined factors, such as: active media departments in both Moussa and 
Aboul Fotouh’s campaigns, personal relationships between both candidates or their 
campaigns’ media departments with media personnel, the media depending heavily on 
opinion polls available at that time showing both candidates as the front runners, or the 
media trying to perform a gatekeeper role and support the two most moderate 
candidates: Moussa’s with his reconciliatory speech and Aboul Fotouh with his 
consensual speech. This was in stark contrast to Shafiq and Morsi’s polarising speeches.  
 
(c) Dependency on the Media as a Reflection of Voter Behaviour and Future 
Decisions. 
 
Both Aboul Fotouh and Moussa’s campaigns relied heavily on the media as an 
instrument to change voter behaviour and as a real reflection of their preferences and 
future voting patterns: the belief in a strong media effect and that media was a 
representation of what the public thought was an essential part of their campaign logic.  
This could be due to their lack of experience in elections and campaigning, the active 
media departments in both campaigns in contrast to their field co-ordinators, and 
finally, the lack of resources that made them depend on media as the primary method of 
communication, and a main source of feedback as well.  
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Academic studies on the role and effect of mass media during the 2012 Egyptian 
Presidential Elections are limited. They also depended on a limited sized sample, thus 
their findings cannot be generalized76. Phillips (2013) concluded that mass media have a 
significant effect on voters’ final decisions during the elections, arguing that the 
sample’s respondents who followed mass media during the elections were highly 
affected by them in shaping their voting decisions, unlike those who did not follow it 
and who disagree that it had a role. However, El-Khoreiby (2013) concluded that mass 
media had a limited effect on influencing a voter’s decision to elect a specific candidate 
in the 2012 elections. Despite this, they were able to change some voters’ attitudes 
towards candidates, as voters did not like the candidates’ media performances. 
However, those who changed their electoral decision did not admit resorting to the 
media in taking information about the new candidate they voted for, and it did not affect 
their new decision either (El-Khoreiby 2013: 196-197). The difference in the findings 
between the two studies could be because of the limited samples they used. It could also 
be interpreted that respondents in favour of a media effect could have used media for 
reinforcement only, getting the required information and not necessarily changing their 
vote to correspond to media reports. However, for the sake of this study, the election’s 
result supports the argument of this study that media did not have an effect on the 
election outcome as was expected by the campaigns of Moussa or Aboul Fotouh. They 
were not the two front runners despite media predictions. 
 
The Professionalisation Index assesses the relevance of free media though the subjective 
opinion of the campaign manager regarding the importance of their candidate’s 
presence on various free media outlets (Tenscher et al 2012). The question was asked to 
campaign managers at the time of campaigns. Both Moussa’s and Aboul Fotouh’s 
campaign invested heavily in gaining media coverage. Their investing in the media 
represented a clear theme of their campaign tactics and logic. Sabahi’s campaign tried 
but he did not have the same access at the beginning of the campaigning period. Both 
Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaigns did not see the media to be significant, especially when 
compared to their investment in the governorates. Thus in terms of professionalisation 
and the use of free media, Moussa’s campaign was the most professional campaign in 
																																																						
76 El-Khoreiby’s study was conducted a sample of 228 respondents. Only 126 of them 
responded to the second phase of questions. Philips’s study was conducted on a sample of 393 
respondents. Thus, both were very limited to represent the 50,403,717 registered voters.  
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this regard. It hired a professional media and PR company to assure its media presence 
through several tactics as discussed in the previous chapter. The second most 
professionalized campaign was Aboul Fotouh’s who hired a professional journalist to 
assure a media presence.  
 
6.2.4 Paid Media  
 
Paid media allows the campaigns to communicate their messages while guaranteeing 
that there will not be any sort of journalistic intervention (Esser and Strömbäck 2012). 
Paid media – usually known as advertisements - can be made through mass media 
channels such as TV, radio, the internet, newspapers, or in the form of campaign 
literature such as flyers, leaflets, brochures, billboard, posters and similar means 
(Cwalina et al 2011). Some studies argue that television advertising is the main method 
by which political campaigns communicate with their targeted voters (Wisconsin 
Advertising project). Despite the importance of advertising, there is no academic 
consensus on its influence on the final voting decision according to Cwalina, Falkowski, 
and Kaid (2000) who compared the effects of candidates’ advertisements in three 
countries. Their research differentiated between three types of influences of 
advertisements: (a) Advertisements can reinforce already existing voting preferences. 
(b) Advertisements can weaken or change already existing voting preferences. (c) 
Advertisements neither weaken nor reinforce existing voting preferences. This is mainly 
due to other factors such as the candidates themselves, or their advisors, or differences 
in the countries (Cwalina et al 2011).  
 
In Egypt, at this point, there is no scientific research to measure the influence of the 
2012 campaigns’ advertisements on voters’ behaviour. During the campaigning period, 
the most used advertising methods were TV advertisements, billboards and posters. All 
the five campaigns were keen on advertisements as a way for reaching the voters. 
Advertisements were mainly used to give more information about the candidate, or to 
reinforce the candidate’s position and messages, or just to simplify the candidates’ 
promises to the general public, or to make the slogan and name easy to remember. 
However, it did not seem that those working on the campaigns had a sincere belief that 
advertising can affect the voters’ final decision. For them, it was one of the factors but 
not the main factor. As explained by most of the interviewees, advertising would play a 
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role in voters’ final decisions in areas where people do not access the internet, such as 
the governorates or in areas with high percentages of illiteracy. In other areas, such as 
the capital or among more educated classes, it was understood that advertising was 
bought by the campaign so could say what it wants to say without intervention, even if 
there was exaggeration. Conversely, the campaigns were keen on advertising as it gives 
impression of having money and resources. It also showed respect to the voters in terms 
of doing its homework and duty to reach them and not taking them for granted. It shows 
that they can deliver professional content, that they care about the voters and are taking 
campaigning as a serious matter. Further, they are differentiating their campaign from 
other campaigns that do not have any money or any resources at all which indicates that 
they don’t have a base or supporters in the street, or even people around the campaign 
who are willing to sponsor it. It also sets the subject or issue agenda for the public 
sphere. 
 
Regarding the high cost of TV advertisements, most campaigns managed to broadcast 
their advertisements for free on television channels in return for the candidate appearing 
on the same channels. Some campaigns, like Aboul Fotouh’s, made a deal to even 
publish a page or half-page advertisement in newspapers before the candidate appeared 
on their channel. Other campaigns, such as Sabahi’s, already had professionals within 
their campaigns who produced their advertisements for free, following which the 
campaign later managed to also broadcast for free in return for the candidate’s 
appearance on the channel.  
 
These advertisements came in short documentary format showing the candidates’ past 
and future plans, and the type of endorsements the candidates received from the public; 
for example, Sabahi’s endorsement by Khaled Said’s mother (the icon of the 
revolution), or Shafiq’s endorsement by the mothers and wives of policemen killed or 
wounded during the revolution. Shafiq also had another advertisement that compared 
him to Lula da Silva, the former president of Brazil. Morsi’s supporters took this 
advertisement and put it on YouTube as if it was for Morsi. Morsi broadcast another 
advertisement of him receiving endorsements from ordinary citizens representing 
different groups and ages, each saying their reason for endorsing him. This included a 
Christian cleric although he did not appear giving his reason for endorsing Morsi, he 
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appeared only in the background of general photos among others who appeared to 
support him. 
 
Despite the importance of advertisements for Moussa’s campaign, they were not 
successful due to problems with the marketing team, as discussed previously. Most of 
these advertisements had longer versions to be played on the internet and in the 
conferences. However, the campaign did not make other advertisements to replace those 
they did not like, apparently due to time and money constraints.  
 
Thus, the use of paid media was almost the same for all the studied candidates, and its 
importance to the campaign managers was almost the same: each campaign used 
advertisements to reflect its candidate’s positioning and send a message through the 
advertisement that addressed a target audience.  The only difference, perhaps, in the 
paid media was the series of vague teaser billboards that was made by Shafiq’s 
campaign, making them more noticeable than opponents’ advertisements. Thus, 
according to the Professionalisation Index which assesses a campaign manager’s 
subjective assessment of the use of paid media, it appears that the degree of 
Professionalisation of the paid media was almost the same in all campaigns.   
 
6.2.5 Debates 
 
Although debates are essential parts of campaigning in western democracy, this was not 
the case with the Egyptian elections. In established democracies, debates are believed to 
give voters a chance to compare candidates’ stances simultaneously. They also allow 
voters to see a candidate’s on-the-spot reactions, unlike other formats where candidates 
would have already prepared answers for questions. Hence, debates attract more 
audiences than other formats, meaning a greater chance to deliver the campaign’s 
message and a greater chance to alert or influence voter behaviour (Benoit 2000: 21). 
Debates are believed to help candidates have equal access to the mass media (Coleman 
2000). The influence of debates does not end after their broadcasting, but extends as 
media analyses who the winner is, which may also affect voter attitudes (Maarek 2011). 
 
Despite this importance, most candidates in the 2012 Egyptian election did not agree to 
participate in debates. As discussed in previous chapters, the debate was supposed to be 
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conducted between the majority of candidates, who refused to appear as they did not see 
that it could help them to win. Only Moussa and Aboul Fotouh agreed to participate as 
they saw it as a chance for a form of campaigning in Egypt unseen before. On the other 
hand, Sabahi wanted to participate with top candidates but was not allowed by the 
media, which did not see him as a frontrunner (Moeness 2016). 
 
The issue of debates highlighted how the three candidates, namely Moussa, Aboul 
Fotouh, and Sabahi, wanted to engage in a practice that they saw as essential to 
democracy and encourage democratic behaviours and practices. This was unlike Morsi 
and Shafiq who would only conduct activities that they believed would help them gain 
more votes. At the same time, however, the conduct of the debate showed a lack of 
effective planning from both sides and perhaps a lack of understanding of the Egyptian 
voters (i.e. would the Egyptian voter be happy seeing future presidents attacking and 
fighting each other or would the Egyptian voter still see the president as a pharaoh or a 
strongman who cannot be attacked publicly?)  
 
Despite some useful information highlighted in the content of the debate, which further 
highlighted the candidates’ opinions and stances, some other factors influenced voter 
reception of the information. Voters only select information they find useful for them 
(Cwalina et al. 2011). This is why they selected the candidates’ performances as 
represented in their fighting and attacking each other, and not the actual information or 
arguments both candidates were trying to convey to them in the debate.  
 
For Moussa, it appeared that one of his main aims was to prove Aboul Fotouh’s Islamist 
affiliations, which was something Aboul Fotouh was trying to hide. At the same time, 
Aboul Fotouh’s aim was to highlight Moussa’s relation to the old regime, something 
Moussa was denying. The result was an increased degree of attack by both sides, 
something Egyptians are not used to. This is why Sabahi’s campaign believed that he 
would not have faced the same fate in the debate. For them, Sabahi’s history is ‘clean, 
and full of political and ethical struggles’ (Moeness 2016). Thus, according to the 
campaign, ‘he would not have faced the same fate’ (Moeness 2016). However, this 
cannot be proved on a practical level, as Sabahi did not participate in the debate; and if 
he had participated, other candidates might have raised other concerns such as his work 
or his future plans for the country, if their plan was to attack him. 
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Ironically, it appeared that the sole beneficiary of this debate was Sabahi, as polls 
conducted after the debate showed a boost in his popularity, unlike Moussa’s and Aboul 
Fotouh’s who lost support. This result concurs with El-Khoreiby’s (2013) conclusion 
that some voters changed their support for their chosen candidates because of the way 
they performed on TV and that they did not depend on media in making their second 
voting choice … in this case, choosing Sabahi. 
 
Aside from the content of the debate, it would also appear that both Moussa and Aboul 
Fotouh’s campaigns did not pay attention to the debate’s technical side, such as the way 
the candidate would stand, the décor, the director shots, and other such details. They did 
not seek the help of an independent director. Instead, they took their instructions from 
the channel’s director. Many details were missing, one of which was toilet breaks, for 
example. Neither of the campaigns, nor the channel itself, considered that the two 
candidates’ advanced years would necessitate a toilet break, meaning that they stood for 
more than 6 or 7 hours without going to the toilet until this was highlighted during the 
advertisement breaks. Their campaigns used the advertisement breaks mainly to prepare 
for the other rounds of the debate. 
 
Although the original Professionalization Index (Tenscher et al, 2012) did not put 
debates as a separate indicator, they played an important role in determining the results 
of the 2012 elections, as it made both candidates who participated lose support from the 
electorate which is believed to have affected the result. Participation also showed the 
candidates were willing to adopt new techniques and methods which they believed were 
part of the professional campaign they were trying to conduct. Moreover, it shows their 
efforts in influencing the media’s agenda and shaping public debate, and highlights their 
use of the free media channels on which the debate was broadcast. All these reasons 
lead to adding debates as a separate criterion while studying the 2012 Egyptian 
campaigns. In terms of the professionalization of the use of debates, Aboul Fotouh’s 
and Moussa’s campaign were the most professionalised, but as explained, it did not help 
them to get more votes. On the contrary, participation in the debate made them lose 
support. This finding suggests the importance of previous experience in elections, as 
candidates and campaigns with previous experience in elections understood that they 
would not get more votes from debates.  
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6.2.6 Internet and Social Media 
 
All campaigns resorted to the internet and social media as a way of campaigning. Their 
use of digital technology was a clear reflection of their adopted strategies, whether the 
campaigns would stick to their brand image as a priority, or would do anything in order 
to win.  
 
Some studies assessed the role of social media in framing the 2012 elections (Khamis 
and Mahmoud 2013) and the candidates’ usage of social media (Elsebahy 2013) by 
conducting a content analysis of their Facebook and Twitter pages. Khamis and 
Mahmoud (2013) argued that online campaigning played an important role in building 
the candidates’ positive image and diminishing the image of opponents. Elsebahy 
(2013) stressed the crucial role it played in the elections by acting as a promotional tool, 
attacking tool, sarcastic tool and rumours spreading tool as well as helping voters to 
interact with the campaigns freely.  
 
However, the importance of the use of social media and the internet did not lay in its 
role as a gateway to information, or in interacting between voters and campaigns, which 
all campaigns did. Its importance was in the use of what is known in Egypt as 
‘electronic committees’, which was the real and crucial difference between the 
campaigns, and which was not discussed by the academic studies analysing candidates’ 
use of social media or the social media role in the elections so far. 
 
The term ‘electronic committees’ is equivalent to what is known as astroturfing.  
Astroturfing is the attempt to hide the real sender of the message to make it appear as if 
it was sent by the public to create artificial support. Its aim is to ‘create an impression of 
widespread grassroots support for a policy, individual, or product, where little such 
support exists’ (Bienkov, 2012). The same can be the case for using negative comments 
to give a misleading impression of strong opposition, seeding rumours or false 
accusations. This can be done via the creation of a large number of fake online identities 
in order to mislead the public or change its opinion by showing that there is a large 
degree of support for, or rejection of, a certain policy or candidate. In an election 
campaign, astroturfing can be used to show public support for a certain candidate and 
public rejection of another candidate. It can further be used to destroy a candidate’s 
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image by attacking him and making it appear as if these attacks are coming from the 
general public. Technology also helped in easing the work of ‘astroturfers’, due to the 
availability of various software that can help in creating fake identities to make it to 
look like an authentic and real profile, and it can also generate different IP addresses for 
them (Monbiot 2011), making it very difficult to uncover.  
  
The only two campaigns that decided to resort to astroturfing were Morsi and Shafiq’s 
campaigns. The other campaigns, such as Moussa’s and Aboul Fotouh’s, did not use it; 
both due to the brand they were trying to maintain, and also due to not having the 
financial resources or manpower.  
 
Regarding Shafiq’s campaign, there was a strong belief among the other campaigns that 
Shafiq’s social media team was managed by the intelligence services: a belief that was 
clearly objected to by the campaign’s social media manager, Mahmoud Ibrahim, who 
felt bad that his efforts were not credited to him, saying: ‘It is not fair to find that all of 
our efforts and professional work are credited to other services in the state which did not 
help us at all.’ (Ibrahim, 2016). 
 
As explained by Mahmoud Ibrahim, Shafiq’s campaign did not have the budget to 
resort to computer programmes to help them in their astroturfing campaigns. Instead, 
they depended on his campaign’s social media team, which consisted of 24 staff, each 
of them managing 20 fake accounts, making a total of 480 fake accounts. As explained 
in previous chapters, these accounts were used to fulfil four main objectives: (1) to 
attack other campaigns, (2) to stop rumours being spread about their candidate, (3) to 
consume the time of opponents’ campaign staff and delay them from performing their 
other tasks, and (4) to support those who support Shafiq online from being attacked by 
opponents.  
 
For Morsi’s campaign, the official campaign and current officials in the Muslim 
Brotherhood deny resorting to any astroturfing or creating social media fake accounts to 
do the astroturfing through, as mentioned by Yehia Hamed (2016), ‘Why would we 
resort to fake accounts. We already have our members who are active on social media’. 
Other ex-Muslim Brotherhood members confirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood had 
resorted to astroturfing in all previous elections, including parliamentary elections and 
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during other incidents when public opinion needed changing or influencing, or to put 
pressure on the government, or impact generally-held beliefs.  
 
This is why it makes logical sense that it was used as well during the presidential 
election which was even more important to them. However, astroturfing by the Muslim 
Brotherhood was not limited to the use of social media. According to Abdel Galil El 
Sharnoby (2016), astroturfing in the Brotherhood was done through: (1) face to face 
communication, as every member of the Muslim Brotherhood is a member of its media 
machine, thus every member promoted what they were requested to through face-to-
face communication or through their own personal social media accounts; (2) creating 
fake accounts on social media; (3) hacking a famous person’s account and using it to 
broadcast what they want as if it is the person’s own opinion; (4) establishing social 
media pages to attack the Muslim Brotherhood. The reason for this was to control the 
type of attack on the Brotherhood and to give credibility to its members, who are not 
known as such to the public,  who are writing and attacking the Muslim Brotherhood so 
as to use them later on to pass on certain opinions; (5) penetrating the opposition by 
making Brotherhood members that are  unknown to the public join the opposition 
group, pretending they are not Brotherhood members, and thus affect the decision 
process there; and, (6) penetrating well-established media organisations by the same 
methods through planting Brotherhood members therein who can provide help when 
needed. 
   
According to El-Sharnoby, the Muslim Brotherhood had its own I.T. department which 
not only bought software to help them achieve their goals, but also produced software 
internally, regardless of the cost. These types of software used to help them in the 
process of securing the process of communication through the internet. For example, it 
helped them to secure emails from governmental monitoring or hacking of other 
political forces. It also helped them to publish stories from abroad to be seen in Egypt, 
even when the government banned the website in Egypt. The active I.T. department 
would suggest it had a role in Morsi’s campaign, mainly in astroturfing. However, it 
was difficult to confirm in this study as current available Muslim Brotherhood 
members, or campaign staff denied the whole idea of astroturfing.  
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From the above discussion, it is clear that astroturfing played an important role in the 
2012 presidential elections, mainly for Morsi’s campaign, then Shafiq’s campaign. It is 
also clear that, at that time, the other campaigns did not have a clear strategy to combat 
it, especially given that the ‘electronic committees’ were not a well-known term at that 
time. It was only explored after the election ended.  
 
On the one hand, the other campaigns stuck to their ‘ethics’ as a brand for their 
campaigns. On the other hand, they did not have a clear vision to deal with it. A 
common complaint from the three other campaigns was how their time was consumed 
by social media, which was one of the main aims of Shafiq’s astroturfing campaign. 
Being penetrated by the Muslim Brotherhood was one of the fears faced by Sabahi’s 
campaign during polling days (although it did not actually occur): again, one of the aims 
of Morsi’s astroturfing campaign.  
 
With the absence of clear ways in Egypt to monitor or differentiate astroturfing from 
real communications during 2012, astroturfing messages were often picked up by 
traditional media and treated as real messages, utilising the political information cycle 
(Chadwick, 2011), creating a state of scepticism and confusion among the electorate. It 
might also affect social media academic research, as research that was done on social 
media at the time did not pay attention to this phenomenon, and did not have ways to 
identify it. Although astroturfing might have been helpful to both Morsi and Shafiq’s 
campaigns in general, it was harmful for the democratisation process in Egypt as it 
hindered the process of constructive debates, mainly on social media, and lowered trust 
in real authentic grassroots movements which might have been useful for the 
democratisation process in Egypt. All this doubt and uncertainty was then transmitted to 
the public sphere as well by various means such as traditional media taking what is on 
social media as a real reflection of the society, or through face-to-face communication. 
 
Although the Professionalisation Index does not add the internet and social media as a 
separate criterion so as not to be biased toward new technologies such as CAMPROF 
(Tenscher and Mykkänen 2014), the internet and social media is added here as a 
separate criterion due to its role in identifying the campaigns’ logic and strategies. Key 
is the potential of digital technologies for influencing the media’s agenda and shaping 
the public sphere, particularly considering the role the internet and social media played 
	 221	
in the eruption of the 25th January Egyptian Revolution (Elshiekh, 2011). In terms of 
professionalisation of the internet and social media, it appears that both Morsi’s and 
Shafiq’s campaigns were more professionalised in terms of their usage of the internet 
and social media: because of their dependence on it they developed tactics to make the 
most use of it. Unlike the rest of the campaigns that did not focus on creating specific 
content for the internet, with the exception of some content specifically made for the 
internet, the majority of the campaigns’ internet content was just either re-broadcasting 
messages broadcast on other outlets, or a reaction to the attacks they were facing from 
Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaigns. 
 
6.2.7 Campaigns’ activities 
 
Apart from the use of media, the five studied campaigns used a wide range of activities 
to reach their target voters. Their activities were almost the same in all campaigns. 
When a campaign pioneered and used unusual methods during the Egyptian elections, 
other campaigns used to repeat the method used. The most common practice used by all 
campaigns was face-to-face communication. This would include governorates visits, or 
knocking on doors, or canvassing, or the electoral conferences which were a famous 
form of campaigning activity. Perhaps the only difference would be the Muslim 
Brotherhood which depended on their female members for face-to-face campaigning 
with other women in areas the Muslim Brotherhood are not popular in, or areas they do 
not have a base in (Shoman and Saleh 2012). This was unlike other campaigns which 
did not strategically make use of women in that way, perhaps deeming it unnecessary 
since women were already part of their campaign either as staff or volunteers. 
 
With regard to the professionalisation of campaign activities, the Professionalization 
Index assesses the degree of media oriented pseudo-events in the campaign (Tenscher et 
al, 2012). Pseudo-events (Boorstin 1961) mainly refer to activities planned ahead and 
organised for the sake of getting media coverage, or in other words, staged events. In 
Egyptians’ minds, the idea of pseudo-events is usually coined with a scene in a 1995 
comic movie called ‘Toyour elzalam’ or ‘birds of darkness’. In this scene, a corrupted 
lawyer who acts as a campaign manager takes the candidate to a poor area, where the 
candidate is approached by a citizen of those living in the area. The candidate felt very 
disgusted by this citizen commenting that he has scabies. But his campaign manager 
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urged the candidate to kiss him, telling him to kiss him on his mouth as cameras were 
approaching. After the cameras took the photo, the candidate pushed the citizen away 
from him. This stereotype of the pseudo-events made campaigns very reluctant to admit 
if their events were pseudo ones.  
 
Having said that, by applying the Professionalisation Index, it appears that all the five 
campaigns were competing to gain the media attention and coverage by creating these 
types of events. These included press conferences, events for the formal inauguration of 
the campaign or for the announcement of the campaigns’ programmes. Some campaigns 
introduced new forms of activities that were repeated by all other campaigns. These 
forms of new activities included long support marches, double decker buses and human 
chains activities.  
 
For example, Aboul Fotouh’s campaign asked his supporters to walk to the place of his 
events; such as when his supporters went to his electoral conference in Cairo Youth 
Centre walking on foot around 3 kilometres through Cairo’s streets (Shoman and Saleh 
2012). The action caught media attention of course. There were also the double decker 
buses used by various campaigns; although they were not able to verify who pioneered 
this as every campaign said that they were the first to use them, it was still new for 
Egyptian campaigns. Long human chains were another theme of the campaigns. It was 
first practiced by Morsi’s campaign, whose chain was described as the longest in the 
world (Shoman and Saleh 2012). This was repeated later by the other campaigns. Some 
campaigns were also concentrating on candidates’ appearances with ordinary people 
such as Moussa sitting on the floor with ordinary citizens and eating with them using 
his hands instead of cutlery, to refute his image as a diplomat who has no relation to 
ordinary citizens. 
 
The logic behind those activities was that wider media coverage would influence the 
voters’ final decision. It would reinforce the decisions of the supporters who see their 
candidate undertaking activities covered by the media which reinforce his image and 
messages, and on the other hand, providing the public sphere with content to discuss 
and debate. They were hoping that it would also affect the sofa party, especially 
knowing that not all the voters would know that these activities were designed primarily 
to gain media coverage. Some citizens think that the media were interested in such 
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events due to the importance of the candidate himself or because of the popularity of the 
candidate. The more the campaigns believe in the importance of media in influencing 
the voters, the more it would depend on such pseudo-events. Thus it appears that these 
events were not for the sole aim of media coverage, but media coverage was used as a 
means to reach the voters. In terms of the professionalisation of campaigns’ pseudo-
events, there was a high degree of competition between all the five campaigns, making 
them with almost the same degree, especially towards the end of the campaigning 
period. 
 
6.2.8 Degree of Personalisation: 
 
Personalisation became a key concept in postmodern campaigns, reflecting changes that 
occurred to election coverage over time mainly due to the rise of TV and the decline of 
party affiliation (Van Aelst et al 2011). Personalised stories attract media attention 
(Strömbäck 2008) and candidates themselves try to appeal to voters on the basis of 
respective similarities (Garzia 2011). However, the assumption that the coverage is 
converted in favour of personalisation (McAllister 2007) is not purely supported by 
other academics (Karvonen 2010; Kriesi 2011). This may be due to differences at the 
time of conducting the studies, or due to differences between the political and 
institutional structure in which the election took place – i.e. presidential or 
parliamentary elections (Garzia 2011), or the absence of a clear definition of what is 
meant by the term personalisation (Van Aelst et al 2011). This is why (Van Aelst et al 
2011) differentiates between two forms of personalisation. The first is known as 
‘individualization’ where the concentration of media coverage is on the individual 
candidate, rather than his institution/ party. The second type is known as ‘privatization’ 
where the concentration of media coverage is on the personal characteristics and the 
personal life of the individual candidate (Rahat and Sheafer 2007). 
 
Despite distinguishing between ‘individualization’ and ‘privatization’, the case was a 
little different in Egypt as all the candidates except Morsi did not belong to any party. 
Thus the term ‘individualization’ is not applicable in comparing between candidates. 
Personalization in the case of the five studied campaigns would mean media coverage 
of the personal characteristics and the personal life of the candidate, i.e. ‘privatization’. 
The importance of privatization lies in the emotional aspect it involves which is 
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believed to influence voters’ behaviour and their reception to the candidates’ messages 
(Abelson et al. 1982; Cwalina et al. 2011; Wattenberg 1987).  This is why candidates 
often participate in three different types of media outlets which give them the chance to 
highlight their personal character: indirect political broadcasts, Infotainment broadcasts, 
or pure entertainment programmes (Maarek 2011).   
 
The perceived effect of the personalisation thesis on voting behaviour has changed over 
time. It was first argued that voting on the basis on personality is irrational (Converse 
1964; Garzia 2011) as voters are deceived and manipulated by professionals and image 
makers working with the candidate. However, recent studies consider it as a rational 
voting strategy that depends on the degree of voters’ sophistication and education 
(Glass 1985; Garzia 2011). Others argued that voting behaviour would depend on 
personality in the presence of some conditions at the time of the elections, such as the 
absence or presence of a dominant culture of opinion, and the presence of a systematic 
crisis (Garzia 2011), which were both available in the 2012 Egyptian election: it 
happened after a revolution, amid trials of corruption and accusations against previous 
regime leaders and amid a high degree of polarization. The importance of 
personalisation in influencing voters’ decisions in Egypt 2012 elections was also proved 
by Farrag (2013) who found that the voters’ evaluations of the candidates was based on 
the candidates’ personal characteristics. El-Khoreiby (2013) also found that candidates’ 
image, which was based on personal traits, is one of the main factors that motivated 
voters to vote for a specific candidate. 
 
The Professionalization Index assesses personalisation depending on the subjective 
assessment of campaign staff of the significance of issue-oriented campaigning, both 
candidate and issue oriented campaign, or only candidate oriented campaign. By 
applying the index both subjectively through the assessment of the interviewees and 
objectively through the assessment of the researcher, it would appear that all the 
campaigns were both candidate and issue oriented, although the degree varied as 
follows:   
 
Candidates who were not well-known to the public had to focus at first on introducing 
themselves to the voters by concentrating on privatization and highlighting their career 
and public work path …etc. Other candidates used personal stories to create a link and 
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appear closer to the voters. In general, all campaigns were both candidate and issue 
oriented. However, Moussa and Aboul Fotouh had an extra feature: they were keen on 
highlighting stories about the campaign staff themselves. Their campaign staff would 
participate in media outlets to talk about the campaign and their roles therein. The aim 
was mainly to create a public perception that their candidates hired professionals to run 
their campaigns and would do the same when they reached the presidential office. 
 
Personalisation appeared through participating in indirect political programmes, or 
features about the candidates or participating in purely non-political entertainment 
programmes. Participating in indirect political programmes was common for all the 
studied candidates, such as participating in talk show programmes. Feature stories about 
the candidates were also common across all candidates. Moussa’s campaign was 
distinct among the campaigns as it was keen on providing the media with topics, ideas, 
and contacts for the features. One of the reasons they were doing this was to give the 
media some substance to work with and, to an extent, control what they would write 
about him. The main difference was the candidate’s or campaign’s willingness to 
participate in purely entertainment-based programmes, which was only done by Sabahi 
and Aboul Fotouh. 
 
The personalization thesis has been studied extensively as highlighted above. However, 
so far, there are not enough studies to assess the impact of personalization methods used 
by the five campaigns on the Egyptian voters in the 2012 elections. Having said that, it 
appeared that using a mixture of news passed to the media and adding a touch of 
personalisation did play an important role in making the candidate closer and more 
well-known to potential voters. Participation in such programmes gave substance for the 
media to work with, instead of leaving the floor for the media to dig alone for stories 
that the candidate might not be happy with. These could be talk show programmes, 
which all candidates participated in, or features about the candidates, which 
distinguished Moussa’s campaign who were keen on giving ideas and contacts for 
features to media outlets. 
 
In terms of the professionalization of the use of personalisation in the campaigns, all the 
five campaigns were nearly similar as all of them were both candidate and issue 
oriented.  
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6.2.9 The professionalization of campaign strategies: 
 
By analysing and comparing the strategies adopted by each campaign, there is a clear 
indication that campaigns which did not have a party or a big organisation supporting 
them were trying to compensate the shortage they had in their structure by concentrating 
more on their strategies. This result agrees with Tenscher’s conclusion that (2013: 249) 
the smaller political parties try their best to compensate for structural disadvantages by 
developing more innovative strategies. This was clear in the way both Moussa’s and 
Aboul Fotouh’s campaigns pioneered with regards to utilising free media and debates. 
They also came in the same category as other campaigns with regards to the 
professionalization of their usage of pseudo-events and personalisation. However, the 
professionalised structure of both Morsi and Shafiq had influenced the degree of the 
professionalization of some of their strategies making them more professional than the 
rest of the campaigns, such as in their targeting and use of the internet and social media. 
Therefore, overall theirs were the two most professionalised campaigns as they had 
more overall professionalised criteria in both the structures and the strategies than the 
rest of the campaigns. However, another important factor has influenced the degree of 
the professionalization of all the campaigns’ strategy which was the logic behind the 
strategy of Morsi and Shafiq from one side, and the rest of the three campaigns from the 
other side. This difference in the logic influencing the campaign strategies will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
6.3 Strategy Analysis 
 
The goal of all five campaigns was to reinforce the decisions of their supporters and to 
gain the support of undecided voters in order to win the election. For both Morsi and 
Shafiq, they already had a solid base of supporters that the rest of campaigns could not 
compete with. Instead, they were competing with the rest of campaigns for the 
undecided voters as well.  
 
The rest of the campaigns, including the three of Moussa, Aboul Fotouh, and Sabahi, 
did not have a solid base of supporters, and thus they were trying to create one by 
influencing the undecided voters, which was referred to here as the ‘sofa party’. On the 
other hand, they were trying to influence the votes of those supporting the revolution. 
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The revolution’s supporters could have acted as a solid base for candidates who were 
saying that they represented the revolution, but since there was more than one candidate 
making this claim, and since the revolution did not have a leader to direct the votes, 
votes of those supporting the revolution were split between the revolutionary candidates 
and cannot be considered as a solid base for any one of the candidates. 
 
This difference influenced the strategy of the campaigns. For Morsi and Shafiq, both 
candidates had already established an image long ago and were building upon it by any 
means that they could to secure as many votes as possible, mainly from the ‘sofa party’. 
 
They were ready to do anything that could help them win, and leave anything that 
would not fulfil that aim regardless of the brand they had already created long ago. 
 
On the other hand, the other candidates were trying to create a consistent brand, and 
were only prepared to make moves that would enhance this brand, and abandoned 
anything that contradicted the brand, even if doing so would help them win.  
 
This difference in secured voters, which led to a clear difference in adopted strategies, 
put both the Egyptian voters and campaigns to the test regarding which approach is 
more effective in the elections: sticking to the brand versus doing anything to win. 
 
(1) Sticking to the brand  
 
There is no academic consensus on whether branding should be applied to politics as a 
communication strategy or not. Those who oppose the idea of applying branding to 
politics, see that it can lead to undesirable effects such as narrowing the political agenda 
and political disengagement (Scammel 1999; Smith and French 2009). Meanwhile, 
those who support it see that it can lead to sociological, rational, psychological, and 
cultural benefits (Smith and French 2009). These benefits could lead to a more 
connected electorate, which is crucial to democracy.  
 
This debate was reflected in the Egyptian campaigns, as campaigns which stuck to their 
brands did not win. Essentially, those who won in the first round of the election were 
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not concentrating on the coherence of their brand. On the contrary, those who did not 
win were paying too much attention to their brand. 
 
Coming from a business and commercial marketing background, both Moussa and 
Aboul Fotouh’s campaigns stuck to branding their image (Moussa with his PR and 
media team, who worked in the business sector before, and Aboul Fotouh’s campaign 
manager was also formerly from the business sector). The same applied to Sabahi’s 
campaign, which built on the revolutionary spirit that prevailed in Egypt at the time of 
starting his campaign. 
 
A brand is defined as: ‘A name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of them 
which is intended to identify the goods or services of one seller or a group of sellers and 
to differentiate them from those of competitors’ (Smith and French 2009:211). 
 
Theoretically, all the candidates satisfied this definition: they had a name that was 
repeated in all media outlets and was written everywhere, whether on street walls, on 
billboards, or advertisements, and each had a symbol that represented him, and in a 
country like Egypt symbols play an important role for illiterate voters who cannot read 
names, but can recognise the symbol. Each candidate tried to present himself as 
different from the others, giving voters a reason why should they vote for him instead of 
his opponents. 
 
According to psychology learning theory, voters remember a brand by linking 
individual pieces of information (Smith and French 2009). This confirms the 
importance of sustaining credibility through the coherence of a campaign’s messages, 
behaviours, and attitudes, and avoiding any conflicting messages, along with integrity 
and competence (Cwalina et al. 2011). 
 
Several statements were made by the three campaigns that indicated that sticking to the 
brand they were trying to create was the main theme of their strategy; such as by 
sticking to positive campaigning, participating in activities they thought would enhance 
democracy, and avoiding astroturfing, and more importantly preserving their moral 
integrity and competence as a core feature of their image (Cwalina et al. 2011).  
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As an example, Aboul Fotouh’s campaign had what they called ‘campaign values’, 
which delayed the process of choosing campaign staff to make sure they had the same 
set of values, and they did not resort to astroturfing or attacking their opponents. They 
participated in the debate as they thought it would enhance democracy. For Moussa’s 
campaign, this was clear as well in their positive campaigning approach, even when 
they had a chance to attack, such as Shafiq’s daughter’s photo that they had, along with 
participating in the debate and not playing upon ‘polarisation behind closed doors’ 
(Khalaf 2016). Sabahi’s method did not differ very much, as his campaign tried to stop 
revolution supporters who were supporting different ‘Revolutionary’ candidates from 
attacking each other, and he wanted to participate in the debate.  
 
The time they started their campaigns played a role in determining their strategy. As 
they were starting their campaigns at the time when Mubarak left power, morals at that 
time were high on the agenda. Candidates built upon this: each portraying himself as a 
supporter of the revolution who can rebuild the country, each with his own philosophy 
and programmes.  
 
However, when the campaign duration grew, many political incidents happened that 
changed the positive morals prevailing after the revolution. These incidents included: 
the debate around whether to have the constitution first or election first, SCAF’s way of 
managing the transitional period, and the increase in the death toll due to clashes that 
took places in the streets in several forms, including but not limited to between 
protesters, or protesters and police. All these incidents led to a polarized society, a 
polarised public sphere, leading to a polarised electorate by the time of election. 
However, the candidates’ brands did not evolve to match these developments. They 
were concentrating on the reconciliation approach for Moussa, the consensual approach 
for Aboul Fotouh, and the revolutionary approach of Sabahi; although not something 
over which he had a monopoly, as other candidates were using the same tactic. Amid 
polarising speeches from other candidates and a polarised society, these three 
candidates did not develop their brand enough to meet the challenges that evolved over 
the course of the campaign. This led to their disconnection from the electorate.   
 
In other words, for Aboul Fotouh and Moussa, the differences between them were not 
clear enough for the polarised voters. As explained in previous chapters, the desire to 
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satisfy all voters made them lose voters as well: making Aboul Fotouh not Islamist 
enough for some Islamist voters, and too Islamist for liberal voters. It further made 
Moussa an old regime figure, but not enough so, for supporters of the old regime, and 
not revolutionary enough for the revolution’s supporters, and so on. 
 
They concentrated on their images more than on the real politics. They concentrated on 
media appearances and marketing their brand more than securing a number of votes 
from the governorates. Their insistence on a coherent brand led to them not playing 
enough politics, and neglecting to do what other campaigns did, as if their brands were 
enough to mobilise the voters; especially the ordinary non-polarised voters to go and 
vote for them on the Election Day.  
 
Although the branding may have had some positive effects for the campaigns or the 
candidates, it did not help them to win. Sticking to the brand alone perhaps made the 
candidates appear to be fanciful, unrealistic, or unaware of the Egyptian electoral 
tradition, and unable to influence Egyptian voters and their voting behaviour. 
 
(2) Everything to win 
 
On the other hand, the other two candidates, Morsi and Shafiq, already had strong, if 
polarising brands. Morsi represented the Muslim Brotherhood even while trying to 
appear in the second round as the revolution’s candidate. Shafiq represented the old 
regime, even while trying not to appear as such and just as an employee of the state, 
whoever ruled it. The reality did not matter to the voters as these ideas were already 
carved into their minds as stereotypes: that Morsi represented the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and Shafiq the old regime. 
 
Instead of working on changing this stereotype or brand, or re-building their image to 
appeal to all voters, they built upon what they already had in order to concentrate on 
having a secure number of votes that would get them past the first round of the election. 
They were not keen on changing their image; on the contrary, they reinforced it, mainly 
during the first round, and they were prepared to do anything in order to win votes. On 
the other hand, they were not ready to conduct campaigning activities that might cause 
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them to drop votes, even if it would cause them to lose the undecided voters. Winning 
votes was priority number one for them. 
 
Despite being culturally limited (Isotalus and Aarnio 2006; Isotalus 2011), the 
functional theory (Benoit et al, 2001) would be best for explaining both Morsi and 
Shafiq’s campaign strategies. According to this theory: (a) voting is a matter of 
comparative judgement; (b) candidates must differentiate themselves from opponents 
through their campaign messages; (c) candidates have three options to increase 
(preferably), namely acclaiming or self-praising, attacks to make opponents lose 
preferability, and defending to restore lost preferability; (d) these three functions, 
namely acclaim, attack, and defence, can be fulfilled by concentrating on policy and 
character; and, (e) candidates don’t need to persuade everyone to vote, but rather a 
secured majority to make him win (Benoit et al, 2001; Isotalus 2011). 
 
Because voting is a matter of comparative judgement, voters will only judge and vote 
for the candidates based on the differences between them. Voters will have no reason to 
prefer a specific candidate if there are no differences at all between them (Isotalus 
2011). For both Morsi and Shafiq, the differences between them were sharp and clear. 
Furthermore, the differences between them and the rest of the candidates were sharp 
and clear enough as well. This apparently gave them an edge over the other candidates, 
who looked nearly the same or, in other words, the differences were not clear enough or 
were not polarising enough to satisfy the already polarised electorate. 
 
These differences were reflected in their messages through a polarised and clear 
discourse at the time of the campaign. This again highlighted the differences between 
them to ordinary voters and reinforced the decisions of the polarised supporters. 
 
Both candidates made full use of the three functions mentioned above: they had a 
history that allowed them to praise themselves. For Morsi, it was his history of opposing 
the old regime and being previously imprisoned. For Shafiq, it was his history as a state 
figure and the ability to manage which highlighted his leadership abilities. This 
acclaiming function was not clear enough among the other candidates, who did not have 
a history of opposition like that of the Muslim Brotherhood, or a history of working in 
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the state and implementing real physical projects such as the airport, or even a history of 
united support to make them appear to be the sole representative of the revolution.  
 
Both candidates also relied upon attacking to minimise the support and appeal of the 
other candidates. This included direct attacks on other candidates or resorting to 
astroturfing, which the rest of candidates did not include in their strategies. 
 
Morsi and Shafiq also used defensive strategies to defend against any general attacks 
against them, and tried to make use of these attacks to guarantee their secured voters. 
 
In their discourses, both candidates focussed on their policies and characteristics. In 
their policies, they concentrated on their past deeds, future plans, and general goals for 
Egypt. For their characteristics, they concentrated on reinforcing the images they had, 
instead of creating new ones. Shafiq, for instance, concentrated on appearing to be the 
strong state candidate who can restore security and safety to Egypt’s streets, something 
that was absent after the revolution. 
 
Both candidates also concentrated on guaranteeing their secured votes and not losing 
any by trying to convince everyone to vote for them, which differed greatly from the 
strategies of other campaigns, especially Moussa and Aboul Fotouh, who tried to please 
everyone with their discourse. 
 
From the above: although the functional theory acts as a method of analysis and not a 
step-by-step guide for campaigns to follow, it appears that candidates who adopted it as 
a strategy in the first round of elections were likely to win, unlike other candidates who 
stuck only to their brand.  
 
6.4 Campaigns’ professionalization and elections results 
 
As elaborated, the two most professionalised campaigns were those of Morsi followed 
by Shafiq as they fulfilled more professional items in both indices, leading to a more 
overall professional campaign.  
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According to the party centred theory (Gibson and Rommele 2001 & 2009; Strömbäck 
2008), there are several factors that would force a political party to resort to 
professionalism in their campaigning. These factors are internal such as: seeking votes 
in order to win, ideology77, size, resources, internal centralization, leadership change; 
and external factors such as electoral shock by loss of incumbency.  
 
In terms of the 2012 elections, some of these factors could explain why Morsi’s 
campaign resorted to professionalism: it was seeking votes as its ultimate goal; as an 
organization it had a high level of resources, with a high level of internal centralization 
represented in its hierarchal structure both in the party and in the group; it had a 
conservative ideology; it had several changes in the both the group and the party, 
including party formation after the revolution and appointing a new leader. However, 
although it did not suffer from loss of incumbency, it suffered from some internal 
problems which led to the dismissal of some of its members.  
 
Although theoretically the theory cannot be applied to Shafiq’s campaign as he was not 
officially representing any party including the dismantled NDP, practically some of the 
factors are still applicable to his campaign such as: it was seeking votes as its ultimate 
goal; the conservative ideology of the dismantled NDP which was still embedded with 
the campaign; the internal centralization of the campaign; leadership change as the NDP 
was already dismantled, and the loss of incumbency after the revolution. 
 
Despite the significant role that professionalism might have played in the first round of 
elections, leading to their winning in the first round, it was not the only decisive factor 
in determining their victory in the second round of elections. There were other factors 
that played a role in the election results along with the campaign’s role, such as, but not 
limited to: (a) absence of electoral alliances in the first round of elections; (b) 
differences between big cities and villages in the governorates in terms of mobilising 
voters and voting behaviour; (c) punitive voting prevailing in the second round of the 
election.  
																																																						
77 According to the theory, ideologically right-wing parties are supposed to be more 
professional. Right wing refers to the conservative or reactionary section of a political party or 
system. In the Egyptian case, conservative and not right wing best describe both the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the dismantled NDP, since they are not reactionary.  
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(a) Absence of electoral alliances 
 
In the 2012 presidential elections, the competition appeared to be between three forces; 
the Muslim Brotherhood, the old regime, and the revolution. Both Morsi, the Muslim 
Brotherhood candidate, and Shafiq, who theoretically represented the old regime, did 
not need to enter into a coalition with other candidates as they already had a solid base 
of voters and they were sure of their capability of winning in comparison to other 
candidates who were also classified as Islamists or from the old regime. Those who 
were in great need of a coalition or alliance were the revolutionary candidates. There 
were some attempts to form a coalition between the main five revolutionary and 
reformists candidates in order to avoid the predicted fragmentation of votes (Al-akhbar 
17/05/2012). These attempts were based on a united election programme and a united 
one candidate that represented all of them. In other words, only one of the five 
candidates would run for presidency and the rest would be vice-presidents or would take 
senior roles when the chosen candidate that represented them all won. However, all 
these attempts failed due to various reasons such as disputes over who would take 
which role i.e. who would withdraw and who would run for presidency and similar 
issues. This led to the nomination of three candidates representing the revolutionary side 
who were Hamdeen Sabahi, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Khalid Aly; and two 
other reformists’ leftists’ candidates who were: Abu Al-Izz Al-Hariri and Hisham El-
Bastawisi.  
 
The result of the first rounds of elections reflected the necessity of a coalition due to the 
fragmentation of votes as each of them took the following numbers of votes: 
 
Candidates  Number of votes78  
Sabahi 4,820,273  
Aboul Fotouh 4,065,239 
Khalid Aly 134,056 
Abu Al-Izz Al-Hariri   40,090 
Hisham El-Bastawisi 29,189 
																																																						
78 Number of votes as appears on EHC website 2012. 
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The two top candidates Number of votes 
Morsi  5,764,952 
Shafiq 5,505,327 
 
The total number of votes gained by the five revolutionist and reformist candidates was 
more than 10 million votes. This exceeded the number of votes collected by either 
Shafiq or Morsi. In other words, if the 5 candidates had entered into a coalition, the 
result of the election might have been finalised in the first round by the winning of the 
revolutionary / reformist camp in opposition to the old regime and the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
 
The same might have been applicable even if the three revolutionary candidates only 
had entered into a coalition or alliance, as the total of votes gained by Sabahi, Aboul 
Fotouh and Khalid Aly exceeded 9 million votes; again, exceeding the number of votes 
gained by either Shafiq or Morsi.  
 
These assumptions are still theoretical as it is not necessarily the case that all supporters 
of a specific revolutionary candidate would vote for the candidate remaining. 
Nonetheless, this assumption still has some validity because if this coalition existed, 
revolutionary supporters would find themselves forced to choose between a Muslim 
Brotherhood candidate who they certainly did not want, an old regime candidate that 
they did not want, and only one revolution candidate who agreed with them even if he 
wasn’t their ideal candidate. In such a case, they would find no choice rather than 
choosing between the three camps and voting for the candidate that best represented the 
revolutionary coalition. However, neither of these scenarios happened in real life.  
 
(b) Voting behaviour differences between various governorates  
 
This chapter stressed the importance of the field co-ordinator role, especially in the 
governorates. The chapter also highlighted some problems that faced campaigns like 
Moussa’s and Aboul Fotouh’s in various governorates in terms of which voters they 
should mobilise and how to mobilise them to go and vote on voting day. The argument 
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was that getting the vote out from villages in the governorates would be different from 
major urban cities such as Cairo and Alexandria for example. This indicates the need to 
mobilise voters with GOTV activities in the governorates and villages perhaps more 
than the capital and other urban educated cities. The chapter argued that both Morsi and 
Shafiq’s campaign were the only campaigns that resorted to professional field co-
ordinators with past experience in mobilising voters in governorates in previous 
Egyptian elections. 
 
Election results supported these arguments as they showed the nature of elections and 
competition which varied between various governorates. In his analysis of voting results 
in the twenty-seven Egyptian governorates, Masoud (2014: 188-194) argued that 
villages identical in many social and economic factors voted differently depending on 
the candidates’ “embeddedness” in local communities. This result supports this 
chapter’s argument on the importance of the field co-ordinator role who was the one 
responsible for creating this ‘embeddedness’ on behalf of the candidate in various 
governorates by contacting and mobilizing ordinary voters, families, community 
leaders, officials and influential people there. 
 
The results of the first round of elections represent a good reflection of the 
governorates’ electoral behaviour due to the availability of all candidates who 
represented different political trends and thoughts. This is unlike the second round, 
which was limited to two candidates only, where Egyptians resorted to punitive voting 
as will be explained in the next section. 
 
The results79 showed two main surprises. The first was that Morsi and Shafiq were the 
two top winners who would compete in the second round; and not Moussa and Aboul 
Fotouh, who were thought to be the front runners according to public opinion polls and 
media estimations at campaigning time. The second surprise was that Sabahi was in 
third place which was unexpected, even after the rise of his support after the debate 
between Moussa and Aboul Fotouh per public opinion polls conducted at that time. 
																																																						
79 For full results in each governorate, see HEC website on: http://pres2012.elections.eg/round1-
results 
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By analysing the voting results of the first round, it appears that there was a clear 
difference in the governorates’ voting behaviours as follows: Urban governorates voted 
for Sabahi. Delta and Northern governorates voted for Shafiq. Upper Egypt and borders 
governorates voted for Morsi. The results also showed a clear drop in the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s electoral support in comparison to the parliamentary elections which 
were held around 6 months80 before the presidential elections. 
 
Sabahi achieved the first rank in well-educated urban governorates such as Cairo, 
Alexandria, Port Said and along the Red Sea with Kafr El-Sheikh, his home 
governorate. He also got the second place in votes in semi-urban governorates such as 
Giza, Garbeyia, Dakahlia, Ismailia, Suez and Damietta. This means that Sabahi gained 
more than 70% of his overall total votes from these urban and semi-urban governorates.  
 
Sabahi getting most his overall number of votes from urban and semi urban 
governorates was another surprise. Due to the nature of his campaign’s speech and his 
Nasserist background, it was assumed that Sabahi would get his votes from poor and 
uneducated areas (Masoud 2014); especially as his campaign slogan was ‘one from 
among us’, reflecting that he was one from the ordinary Egyptian citizens, not the well-
educated upper middle-class citizens. 
 
Masoud (2014: 188-194) also found a negative correlation between Sabahi’s vote share 
and both the crowding rate and percentage of adults working in agriculture. This is 
another way to prove that Sabahi did not get his votes from farmers or poor areas which 
are overcrowded.  
 
Shukr (2012: 299-301) explains this phenomenon by highlighting the fact that voters’ 
behaviour in urban well-educated cities is different from rural ones as those living in 
major urban cities are supposed to be more educated and more immersed in politics 
taking place in the streets around them, which would affect their rational independent 
voting choice. 
																																																						
80 People’s assembly elections were conducted on three stages from 28/11/2011 till 11/01/2012. 
First parliamentary session started on 23/1/2012.  
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The result also showed that Sabahi won his own governorates, which proves the 
important role of the field co-ordinator. In Kafr El Sheikh, all Sabahi’s extended family 
played the role of his field co-ordinator. He was also embedded and well known by 
voters there as he had represented them before in parliamentary elections. However, the 
results also showed that he was not able to mobilise enough voters in Kafr El Sheikh to 
vote on Election Day as the voters’ turn out there was only 42.9 %81.  
 
Being unable to mobilise more voters from his own governorates - taking into 
consideration all the help he had from his family and friends there- highlights the issue 
that he was not able to do the same with the rest of governorates; especially that he did 
not have the same people working for him on the ground. In other words, perhaps if his 
campaign was able to mobilise enough voters to go out and vote on Election Day from 
several governorates, including his own governorate, he might have been able to secure 
the number of votes he needed to outperform Shafiq in the first round: all that he needed 
was less than 700,000 votes, which was the difference in votes between him and Shafiq. 
This again proves the necessity of having a professional field co-ordinator with 
experience, something Sabahi’s campaign lacked. 
 
Quite the contrary to Sabahi’s results, Morsi took the majority of votes in the border 
governorates and Upper Egypt including Giza. These areas – especially the villages - 
are characterized by high levels of illiteracy, a weak economic situation, lack of a 
multicultural environment, and loyalties to bigger families and tribalism (Shukr 2012: 
299-301). 
 
The number of registered voters in these governorates was approximately 9 million, 
which represented 18 % of the number of registered votes in all Egypt. Morsi gained 
around 2.2 million of the valid votes in these governorates, which represented 37% of 
the total votes he achieved in the first round of elections. This could be explained by the 
fact that the governorates’ social, economic and cultural situation plays a role in both 
influencing voter attitudes and in determining voting behaviour. It can also be explained 
by the active role the Muslim Brotherhood played in these areas. In other words, what 
																																																						
81 Average voter turnout in governorates was 47%. In some governorates, such as Port Said, 
voter turnout was 60%. 
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Shukr explains as the role played by the alliance of poverty, ignorance and tribalism in 
backing candidates who use religious slogans in their campaigns (Shukr 2012:300). 
Again, the results showed that a field co-ordinator who understands the nature of his 
voters and their areas would be able to mobilise them using appeals they would 
understand and affect them. 
 
Morsi’s results also showed that the Muslim Brotherhood had lost more than half of its 
voting bloc in comparison to its results in the parliamentary elections (Al-Saadawy 
2012). In the parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood took around 10.5 million 
votes. However, in the first round of elections Morsi only took around 5.7 million votes, 
outperforming Shafiq with a narrow victory of only 882,000 votes (Al-Saadawy 2012). 
This can be explained due to people’s dissatisfaction with the performance of the 
parliament in various cases, one of which is the constitution assembly explained in 
Chapter Three.   
 
Another loss for the Muslim Brotherhood in this election was the significant drop of 
votes it had in its traditional strongholds (Al-Saadawy 2012). Morsi came second or 
third in a number of governorates which were known for their support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood and were even described as Islamist friendly areas such as many 
governorates in Delta and Northern Cairo (Al-Saadawy 2012).  
 
Most of the Delta and Northern Cairo governorates – which were traditionally described 
as Islamist friendly areas - voted for Shafiq.  In five82 out of ten governorates, which 
have more than 29% of the electorate in Egypt, Shafiq got more than 34% of the valid 
votes, leading him to secure more than 2.5 million votes of his overall approximately 
5.5 million votes he got in the first round from these governorates alone. In other words, 
Shafiq secured 45% of the overall votes he got in the first round from these five 
governorates only.  
 
These surprising results could be explained by two main reasons. First is the way 
Shafiq’s campaign was working as it was concentrating its mobilising and campaigning 
efforts more on the governorates with high numbers of registered voters. The second 
																																																						
82 The five governorates are: Dakahlia, Mounifia, Sharqia, Gharbia, Qalyubia. 
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reason, as revealed by Shafiq’s campaign, was that since these areas where known as 
being Muslim Brotherhood friendly since Murbarak’s era, the NDP started 
concentrating on having an electoral base in these areas through various means; one of 
which was training field coordinators to be able to mobilise people in these areas. 
Shafiq’s campaign resorted to these trained field co-ordinators to help him in his 
campaign (Personal interview, Ibrahim 2016). 
 
The above overview proves that voting behaviour varies between governorates. It also 
varies between urban and rural areas.  This is why the role of an experienced field 
coordinator - who understands these differences - is significant in getting out the vote 
from them. The next section explains how Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood managed 
to restore and gain more votes in the second round with the help of the punitive voting. 
 
(c) Punitive voting 
 
This chapter indicates that the professionalization of the campaigns of Morsi, then 
Shafiq was a main contributory factor that led to them winning the first round of 
elections. However, in the second round of elections, the situation was completely 
different. The competition and polarization were fierce between them. It divided the 
electorate into two main binary camps: Islamic state vs secular state and pro change vs 
status quo. In other words, the possibility of the return of the old regime represented by 
Ahmed Shafiq, the last prime minister in Mubarak’s era, vs the possibility of having a 
president from the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
The first round of elections showed the actual support and voting base for both Morsi 
(5.7 million votes) and Shafiq (5.5 million votes). The rest of the electorate did not vote 
for them and did not want them. Thus, many Egyptians found themselves forced to 
choose between two options they did not want or like. This led to several calls to 
boycott the second round of elections or to form a revolutionary coalition until the 
launch of what was known as the ‘squeezing the lime’ campaign. This urged Egyptians 
to squeeze the lime and elect Morsi as a punishment for the old regime and to prevent it 
from coming back. Many figures and revolutionary forces joined the campaign despite 
disagreeing with Morsi ideologically and politically. A lot of claims were made at that 
time such as the blood of the revolution’s martyrs is an obstacle between them and the 
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old regime, and that the Muslim Brotherhood was present with the revolutionary forces 
in Tahrir square at the 25th January Revolution against the old regime. The 
revolutionary forces’ support for Morsi culminated in front of the public after the polls 
closed in the Fairmount meeting where Morsi promised inclusive rule along with other 
guarantees for the democratic rule required by the revolutionary forces.  
 
On the other hand, those who were more afraid of the creation of an Islamic state than 
their fear of the old regime campaigned and voted for Shafiq just to punish Morsi and 
prevent him from ruling them.  
 
This extensive polarization led to the rise of voters’ participation from 46% in the first 
round to 51% in the second round. It also led to the rise of the number of votes for both 
candidates: Morsi got 13,230,131 votes and Shafiq got 12,347,380 votes, giving Morsi a 
narrow victory: only 3.46 % over his opponent Shafiq83.  
 
Thus, although campaign professionalism was the main factor that determined their 
winning in the first round of elections, the decisive factor in the second round of 
elections was the effect of the punitive voting Egyptians resorted to.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Widespread analysis84 attributed Moussa’s and Shafiq success in the first round of 
elections to several factors such as: the Muslim Brotherhood’s organisational ability 
(Al-Saadawy 2012; Trager 2016), patronage and ideology (Al-Ississi and Attah 2014), 
																																																						
83 Number of void votes was 843,257 votes. The number was nearly equal to the difference of 
votes between Morsi and Shafiq which was 882,751 votes. 
 
84 During Mubarak’s era, arguments explaining winning in parliamentary elections were almost 
the same, revolving around: patronage, clientelism, organizational strength and ideology. For a 
detailed review on elections during this era and its implications on the nature of future elections, 
see: Blaydes 2011. For a detailed analysis of all arguments explaining Brotherhood victories in 
the past 30 years, see: Masoud 2014. For a detailed analysis of the role of clientelism during 
Mubarak’s era, see: El Tarouty 2015.  
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deep state85 (Shehata et al 2012; Clevers and Nimeh 2015), the divided and disorganised 
opposition in the case of the other candidates (Ottaway 2013), and the role of business 
men and clientelism (Roll 2013). In contrast to these analyses which did not put enough 
weight on the role of candidates’ campaigns, this chapter infers that the professionalism 
of both Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaigns played a role in the result of the first round of 
elections which made them the two front runners competing again in the second round. 
The chapter concluded this by applying the Professionalization Index (Tenscher et al 
2012) which assesses the campaigns’ professionalism by breaking it into two parts: 
structure (hardware) and strategies (software). Breaking the campaigns into two 
components helped in providing a thorough understanding of the overall strategy and 
tactics and how they were implemented.  
 
While applying the Professionalisation Index, slightly cosmetic amendments were 
implemented which was mainly adding some components that are deduced from the 
same indicators in the index; such as adding debates, the internet and social media in the 
strategy indices to better explain the actual strategies adopted in the case of the 2012 
Egyptian elections as explained previously.  
 
While assessing how the structures and strategies are prioritised is useful and can be a 
determinant for measuring how professional a campaign is, and whether this correlates 
with the outcome, it may not explain everything. As proved in this chapter, 
professionalism appeared to correlate with a functionalist approach with candidates 
being willing to do or say anything in order to win. Thus, according to the way 
professionalism was applied in this election, it perhaps appears that a form of 
																																																						
85The idea of the “deep state” was first used to describe the political structure of Turkey, which 
has a democratic government, but also a powerful military that has the authority to intervene. It 
was used during the Egyptian transitional period to refer to a set of institutions and bodies 
believed to be involved in running the country either in the form of secret manipulation or in 
having control of government policy. These include bureaucratic institutions, intelligence 
service, military, judiciary institution and the media. Due to the long period their existence, they 
develop patterns of behaviour and rules in the administration that cannot be easily changed even 
after revolution (for more see: Abdel Meguid 2014). 
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professionalism that highlights branding more is better for democracy, especially for a 
country in its transitional period trying to build a democracy such as Egypt. 
  
The Index proved that in the first round of elections, Morsi’s campaign was the most 
professionalised followed by Shafiq’s campaign. The index also proved the other three 
campaigns tended to invest more in their strategies; yet it was not always in their favour 
such as the decision by both Moussa and Aboul Fotouh to participate in the debate. 
Another obstacle that faced them in developing their strategies was sticking to the brand 
they created in opposition to Moussa and Shafiq who were ready to do anything to win. 
 
The chapter also explained the tendency of Moussa and Shafiq to resort to 
professionalism by applying the party centered theory criteria as both candidates were 
reacting to internal and external factors, including changing electoral circumstances and 
the situation in Egypt in general. For the first time since its establishment in 1928, the 
Muslim Brotherhood found an opportunity to rule Egypt. And for the NDP, it was the 
first time since its establishment in 1978 to be out of power. This might give a reason 
for the fierce competition. 
 
However, in the second round of elections, professionalism was not the crucial factor. 
There were other influential factors that determined elections’ results in the second 
round such as the punitive voting Egyptians resorted to. 
 
The importance of applying professionalism and the Professionalisation Index is that it 
gives a more comprehensive understanding of how the campaigns were working more 
than other framework or theories that concentrate on only one aspect. For instance, 
those studies concentrating on the importance of patronage or organizational strength 
can still be fitted in the index to be studied with other components. For example, the 
organizational strength can be assessed in the structure indices. The patronage can be 
assessed under audience targeting. Other analyses that only studied the image or the 
mass media can be still fitted into the Professionalization Index in the strategy indices. 
This is why the Professionalisation Index gives a better understanding of the campaigns 
since its components reflect a wider aspect of study and analysis rather than analyzing 
only one component or one criterion.  
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This difference in analysis (i.e. whether it is professionalization or other factors such as 
the deep state and organizational strength) is often ascribed to the way different schools 
study campaigns and elections. As Strömbäck et al (2012: 46) explain, different schools 
give different weight to what matters the most when studying and explaining elections. 
For example, scholars in political campaigning and marketing stress the importance of 
campaigns’ strategies and tactics; whereas scholars in political science concentrate more 
on the importance of political substance, political programme and other political factors 
taking place at the time of elections. Other scholars stress the importance of the 
candidate himself (Strömbäck et al 2012: 46) 
 
Nevertheless, although this research stressed the importance of campaigning in this 
election it did not neglect other factors that different schools study, especially when it 
came to the second round of elections, which adds credibility to the findings. 
 
Despite the effort made to guarantee the credibility of the findings, the research should 
highlight its exploratory nature. It is still the first attempt to study campaigns 
professionalism in Egypt, and thus the 2012 Egyptian election campaigns.  
 
Although the data collected is not limited, future studies assessing other Egyptian 
elections should take into consideration the political environment in which the 2012 
elections were taking place.  
 
Future studies can also offer more in-depth analysis in studying the professionalization 
of the 2012 presidential elections by studying each campaign separately through 
interviewing all the campaigns’ key staff. This should give a more in depth 
understanding and analysis of all that was happening in the campaign, which was not 
possible in this study. 
 
Future studies can also concentrate on studying the effect of each component studied in 
the index on both the overall campaign, and on voting behaviour. This would result in 
better understanding the weight of each of the components, and might lead to amending 
the components of the structure and / or the strategy indices to better reflect the 
indicators they are measuring and assessing in the Egyptian context. 
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Further longitudinal studies on future Egyptian elections - covering the topics above- 
are needed on both theoretical and practical levels. At the theoretical level, these studies 
would help academics to understand and explain the campaigns’ professionalism 
patterns and their effect on the election process and voters’ behaviour.  At the practical 
level, it would help candidates and campaign managers to develop their strategies and 
tactics to maximize the returns. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion: The impact of campaigns’ professionalism on the democratisation 
process in Egypt. 
 
This research indicates the levels of professionalism adopted by the candidates in the 
2012 presidential elections in Egypt may have impacted upon the outcome. Previous 
chapters explained how the readiness of both Morsi and Shafiq to adopt some 
‘professionalised’ techniques was behind their success in the first round of elections, 
with Morsi’s campaign proving to be the most ‘professional’, helping him in securing 
his path towards Egypt’s presidency, to be the first elected president after the 25th 
January Revolution and the first elected president in a very unpredictable first multi-
candidate election in Egyptian history. This chapter aims to conclude the study by 
discussing the implications of the levels of campaign professionalism on the 
democratization process in Egypt. The chapter concludes that professionalism - as 
applied by Morsi’s campaign - had a negative impact on Egypt’s democratic transition 
in general, as it led Egypt to be stuck in its transitional period, rather than moving to a 
functional emerging thin democracy. The chapter argues that this was mainly due to 
Morsi’s performance once elected. The chapter also provides an evaluation of the 
application of the Professionalisation Index in order to understand campaigns in nascent 
democracies.  
 
7.1 Professionalisation and democracy 
 
Literature on professionalisation can be divided into three main sections: (a) studies 
devoted to defining professionalisation, its emergence and how to measure it (Lilleker 
and Negrine 2002 ; Tenscher et al 2012 ;  Gibson and  Römmele 2001 and 2009 ), (b) 
studies discussing the relationship between professionalisation and electoral outcomes ( 
Herrnson 1992 ; Medvic and Lenart 1997; Dulio 2004), (C) and studies discussing the 
positive and negative impact of professionalisation on the quality of democracy (Koch 
2011 ; Norris 2004 ; Hamelink 2007). Studies analyzing the impact of 
professionalization on the democratic process can be divided into two main trends 
(Rayner 2014). The first trend believes that professionalisation enhances democracy by 
allowing better engagement with voters and thus better voter participation. Pippa Norris 
found that there is a positive relationship between voters’ attention to campaigns’ 
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messages and activities and the levels of ‘civic knowledge, political efficacy and voting 
participation’ in the United States, Britain and other countries (Norris 1996; 1997; 
2004). Norris also argues that those who follow more media outlets and campaigns’ 
activities are more ‘knowledgeable, trusting of government and participatory’ (Norris 
2000; Norris 2004). The second trend, which depends on theories of media malaise and 
video malaise, argues that professionalisation depends too much on communication and 
marketing techniques which manipulate voters to win, creating a cynical society, civic 
disengagement and perhaps a polarized society due to polarized messages it used (see: 
Koch 2011, Norris 2004; Johnson 2001; Magleby et al 2000). Hamelink (2007) explains 
the difference between the two trends by arguing that the professionalization 
strengthens thin86 democracies but ‘does little to assist the development of strong, 
participatory, deliberative democracy’ (Hamelink 2007: 185).  
 
While Hamelink’s conclusion might be theoretically logical, it does not help in 
explaining the impact of using professionalism on the democratic process in Egypt as 
there is a difference between applying professionalism in an already functioning 
democracy (whether thin or thick) and in applying it in a country which is still in a 
transitional phase. When professionalization occurs within developed democracies, 
there are usually higher levels of civic education, and a more developed critical media 
and public sphere. The absence of these checks and balances in a state such as Egypt – 
which we cannot call a democracy yet as it is still in its transitional period- can be 
argued to make the effect of professionalisation damaging to the democratic process, 
especially when it is only victory focused, ready to do or say anything for the sake of 
winning.  
 
In 2012, Egypt was neither a thin democracy, nor a strong thick one. It was not a 
democracy at all. On the contrary, Egypt was in a transitional period trying to build the 
basis of a democracy. It was trying to build a thin democracy. In this transitional 
process, Egypt was still trying to build its democratic institutions (new constitution, new 
																																																						
86 Thin democracies can be defined according to the minimalist definition of democracy which 
is ‘free competition for a free vote’ (Schumpeter 1943: 271). This was not the case of Egypt in 
the transitional period, as there was no ‘free competition for a free vote’. In the transitional 
period, there was no elected president, or elected representatives in parliament or even a 
constitution. For more information on different types of democracies and wider definitions see 
Chapter Two. 
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parliament, new president) after which it would start its democratization process. After 
starting the democratization process, a country – Egypt in this case- can be transformed 
into a thin democracy, then to a strong democracy. In each of these stages (removing a 
regime through a revolution, then the transitional stage, then a thin democracy, then a 
consolidated or thick democracy), the process could fail and there could be a reverse. 
(see figure 1) 
 
 
 
When the campaigns were launched in Egypt, Egypt did not have any pre-requisite that 
allows it to be considered a democracy, even a weak democracy. As it did not have any 
of the prerequisite democratic institutions, it did not have an elected president, or 
elected parliament, or a constitution. In 2012, campaigns took place in a transitional 
period characterized by liquidity, polarization, emergence of new political forces not 
known before, floundering in polices and in coalition with different forces.  
 
Thus, Hamelink’s argument on thin democracies cannot be applied to Egypt as Egypt 
had not reached the level of thin democracy at that time. Hamelink’s ideas might be 
applied in a country that had already moved from the transitional period to be a new 
functioning, emerging thin democracy, on the contrary to what this chapter argues. In 
the case of Egypt, in that transitional state, the main two winning campaigns – Morsi 
and Shafiq- adhered closely to a model of professionalisation that compares well to that 
of many established democracies such as the United States or the United Kingdom. 
While adhering to this model of campaigning, they followed a ‘do anything to win’ 
approach. This approach affected the process of democratization negatively and perhaps 
hindered the process of transition to a new emerging democracy. In other words, the use 
of professionalism by the campaigns of Morsi and Shafiq in the 2012 election had a 
negative impact on the democratisation process Egypt was trying to start, leaving it 
stuck in the transitional period. Having said that, the chapter is not arguing that 
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professionalisation in itself has been in tension with democratisation, as the media 
malaise model suggests. Instead, the chapter is arguing that because it helped Morsi 
win, it has facilitated all the anti-democratic moves which this chapter will describe. 
Thus, the chapter supports neither the virtuous circle nor media malaise assessments of 
professionalisation: it shows that what matters is who uses it effectively to win. 
 
The next section will highlight some of the negative consequences of Morsi’s 
application of professionalisation during the transitional period. The reason for choosing 
Morsi’s campaign to highlight these negative implications can be summarised in the 
following reasons: (a) Morsi was the winner and became the new president of Egypt. (b) 
Previous chapters proved how professionalism helped him in winning, thus it is 
important to know whether he would continue using the same professionalised methods 
after winning. (c) His campaign practices, policies and promises were re-discovered 
during his era, especially when he did not fulfil them, creating more polarisation in the 
society. (d) Practices used by his campaign during his campaign time still had influence 
and consequences during his ruling era. (f) Shafiq’s exit from the Egyptian political 
scene is the reason why this chapter concentrates on assessing the impact of using 
professionalism through Morsi’s campaign. This does not deny the role Shafiq’s 
campaign also played in creating polarisation as proven in previous chapters. 
 
7.2 Negative impact of professionalisation during Morsi’s presidency 
 
7.2.1 Manipulating and deceiving voters through fake projects and fake 
promises 
 
The content of Morsi’s campaign was built on his election programme which was called 
the Nahda project or ‘the renaissance project’. It was reflected as well in the campaign’s 
slogans, ‘Renaissance is the will of the people’ and ‘we hold the good for Egypt’. It was 
also reflected in the campaign symbol which was in the shape of a bird, known as the 
‘Renaissance bird’. 
 
Newspapers and different media outlets - including official Muslim Brotherhood media 
outlets- loaded with stories about this project and how it would bring good fortune and 
prosperity for Egyptians. The programme was distributed in various media outlets and 
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published by almost all newspapers (shorouknews 10/5/2012).  It was also uploaded 
onto the campaign official website (Al-Masry 25/6/2012). The project consisted of 
seven axes that cover several aspects of the Renaissance of Egypt, which all gave 
various promises to Egyptians. For example, according to the project, Morsi promised 
to launch 100 national projects to be distributed in each governorate so that each 
governorate could become a leader in a field i.e. agricultural, industrial, tourism …etc. 
(Alarabyia net 21/5/2012). The cost of each project was to exceed one billion dollars 
(Al-Masry 25/6/2012).  
 
Ikhwan web, the Muslim Brotherhood official English website, also stressed the 
importance of the project. A sample of these would appear in the following stories 
which were all published on their English official website87. 
 
• On 27 April, 2012, the website published a story quoting sentences from the 
Kahirat Al-Shater interview. During an interview with the Al-Haqiqa 
programme on the Dream Two TV channel talking about the project and saying 
that “establishing a democratic system and strong political institutions is the 
actual beginning of the launch of the Renaissance Project.” 
 
• On April 29, 2012, the website published a story saying that “Dr. Mohamed 
Morsi revealed that the Nahda Project has 20 billion Egyptian Pounds (US$3.33 
billion) to be spent on the reconstruction of the Sinai during the first 5 years of 
implementing the project.” 
 
• On 7/05/2012 the website published a quotation from Mohamed Gouda, 
prominent economist and member of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) saying 
that the Nahda project was prepared and had ‘a large number of Egyptian 
experts and scientists’. 
 
																																																						
87 Stories on the project in Muslim Brotherhood media outlets were much more plentiful.  
However, it was difficult to find them on their Arabic website now. The author is not sure if it is 
a technical problem or if they were removed deliberately. However, stories about the Nahda 
project are still available on their English outlets. 
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• On 7/5/2012 the website published a story quoting Ayman Al-Zahayri, FJP 
Secretary in South Sinai : “ The renaissance train has already left the station, 
and will bring good fortunes to the Egyptian people. Dr. Morsi has a wealth of 
experience in economy, politics and democracy. He is also a scientist who has 
submitted scientific researches to NASA. We are confident Egypt will be all the 
greater with Dr. Morsi for President. 
  
• On 16/5/2012, the website published a story that FJP’s Nahda project team 
organized a conference about Renaissance experiences around the world and 
that it would be attended by former Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamed to speak 
about the Malaysian Renaissance model. 
 
• On 20/5/2012 the website published a story saying that “Dr. Morsi assures 
businessmen that the scientific committee in charge of his Nahda (Renaissance) 
Project comprises 10 specialized experts, that Egyptian markets will be open to 
foreign investors, and that $20 billion will be invested in tourism”. 
 
The extensive stress on the Nahda project from the Muslim Brotherhood, FJP members, 
campaigns’ members, Morsi and Al-Shater themselves, made Morsi’s name 
synonymous with the word Nahda. When Morsi was elected as president, Egyptians 
were waiting for him to start fulfilling promises in the Al-Nahda project. Some activists 
even launched a website called ‘Morsi Meter’ to measure what he would fulfil from his 
promises mainly in the first 100 days. According to the website, Morsi made 64 
promises during his election campaign and the website wanted to check what he 
fulfilled and what he did not. 
 
However, when Morsi came to power, the surprise that shocked Egyptians was that 
there was nothing called Al-Nahda project. The Muslim Brotherhood leader started 
denying that they had launched a detailed project called Al-Nahda, saying that it was 
only a vision and that Egyptian media got it wrong. Kharait Al-Shatter himself said on 
the 14th August 2012 after his meeting with revolutionary forces that the media dealt 
with the project incorrectly and that the Brotherhood does not have a clear programme 
or final schedule for it to implement and that it was just a ‘preliminary proposal’ 
	 252	
(Alarabyia net, 29/8/2012). In another speech by him broadcast on the Al-Jazeera live 
channel, Al-Shatter said that implementing Al-Nahda project needs qualified and 
enthusiastic citizens (Al-Masry alyoum 12/9/2012). The latter statement provoked anger 
as it made it appear as if the problem was with the Egyptian people – as they did not 
have the degree of awareness needed for the project- but not in the project itself (Gad 
2014: 275) 
 
From the above overview, it appears that Morsi’s campaign was able to convey 
professionalised campaign messages for a main core project of its campaign that did not 
exist. It was able to deceive voters without any ethical rules and without being afraid of 
becoming accountable. The discovery of the non-existence of the project also led to a 
state of distrust and cynicism towards any future Muslim Brotherhood promises. It 
made it very difficult to believe in them again, creating an early perception that what is 
built on falsehood is false in itself. It even created a platform for sarcasm and jokes.   
 
The manipulation was not limited to the electoral programme or the Al-Nahda project 
only. It also appeared in how Morsi’s presented himself as a NASA scientist – which 
was proven to be false as explained in previous chapters- trying to give himself extra 
credit and qualifications, to create a specific leadership image that did not exist, for the 
sake of getting more votes. 
 
7.2.2 Manipulating other Egyptian political forces  
 
The manipulation was not limited to the general voters, but extended to other political 
forces in Egypt including the Muslim Brotherhood’s own allies such as Salafists 
represented in Al Nour Salafists party. 
 
Between the two rounds of elections, exactly on 22 June 2012, Morsi had a meeting 
with some of the revolutionary forces, along with other non-Islamist public figures. The 
result of this meeting was what was known as the Fairmount agreement. According to 
this agreement, Morsi promised inclusive rule. He promised that the next prime minster 
would be an independent national figure, and that the government majority would not 
be from the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Masry 23/6/2012). He also promised not to 
appoint a vice-president from the Muslim Brotherhood, promising to consider 
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appointing four vice-presidents to include a woman, a Copt and a youth figure. He also 
promised to ensure the independence of the judicial and legislative power. (Gad 
2014:17).  
 
However, after Morsi won the election and became the new president, another surprise 
appeared. Morsi did not fulfil his promise of pluralism and inclusive rule. On the 
contrary, he started what was known as the Brotherhoodisation – akhwanat al-dawla- of 
the Egyptian state. The term refers to appointing Brotherhood members or Brotherhoods 
sympathizers to top official jobs in each and all governmental institutions and public 
bodies. The problem with this Brotherhoodisation of the state is that it was not limited 
to the governmental posts or ministerial appointments. but was extended to every public 
institution in the state, giving the Muslim Brotherhood a monopoly of control over all 
areas of Egyptian life (El-Din 2012).  
 
In other words, these appointments meant changing the structure of the Egyptian state 
and the identity of future generations. For example, when they control the Ministry of 
Education from inside, and have the upper hand in forcing and changing education 
curricula, this means changing the identity and culture of future generations. When they 
control the Ministry of Endowment, this would mean that they would have full control 
over what is said in mosques as they would have the upper and only hand in appointing 
Imam to mosques. When they implant their members in the governorates and councils, 
this would mean that all these appointed members would act as their ‘field co-
coordinators’ in future elections. This action increased speculation and raised fears that 
they were not planning to stop ruling the country at any stage88. 
 
These acts of state Brotherhoodisation even excluded other Islamic allies to the Muslim 
Brotherhood such as the Salafists. In a televised on air meeting between Morsi and 
different political forces, the leader of the Nour party complained about Morsi installing 
officials from only one party – referring to the Freedom and Justice party, the political 
																																																						
88 For a list of Muslim Brotherhood appointed officials in various institutions, see Al-Masry Al-
youm investigative report on 14/2/2013. The report shows with names the Muslim Brotherhood 
monopoly over various institutions including 19 Governorates, ministries, unions, various 
councils and public bodies.  http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/286656 
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arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in influential executive positions. He gave a list of 
these appointed Brotherhood members in 13 governorates to president Morsi89.   
 
Again, Morsi’s use of tactics consistent with professionalisation in the campaigning 
period helped him to deceive and manipulate other political forces in the country, 
convincing them of the intention to implement inclusive rule. However, because of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological orientation, it wanted to have monopoly control over 
power, not only excluding opponents or civilian forces, but also excluding their Islamic 
allies. 
 
7.2.3 Changing Egypt’s identity and increasing the polarisation in the public 
sphere  
 
In a narrowcasting campaigning activity targeting the Islamic voters in Al-Mahala in 
June 2012, prominent Islamic figure Safwat Hegazy was filmed talking to those 
attending the event about the Islamic Caliphate State. Hegazy was saying then that it 
would be called the United Arab States and its capital would not be Cairo, Makkah or 
Madina but Jerusalem – Al Quds. He then chanted with the audience the slogan ‘To 
Jerusalem, we are going, martyrs in millions’.  
 
The event was filmed and uploaded on YouTube, and broadcast later by several private 
media outlets90. The controversy of the event can be summarised twofold. The first is 
again deceiving and manipulating voters through the narrowcasting events. For the 
Muslim Brotherhood represented by Morsi, were not going to liberate Jerusalem or 
unite all Arab and Muslim states under the ‘Islamic Caliphate’.  
 
																																																						
89 Part of the broadcast meeting where Al-Nour’s leader mentioned his concerns:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LncLJYV8AyQ  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOfHPdyLVBQ 
 
90 eg. Nas Book programme on Rotana Masryia channel uploaded on you tube on 10 June 2012 
available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tHDCugwhWhg  and Al-Sada Al-
Mohtaramon programme on OnTV channel , uploaded on YouTube on 18 March 2013 available 
from: https://youtu.be/o1Lz7ylfA28 
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The second issue would be that although this event might have secured the vote of 
Islamic voters attending, it raised fears among other non-Islamist forces: Is the Muslim 
Brotherhood aiming to dissolve the Egyptian national identity into an Islamic one? How 
would they liberate Jerusalem? From where would they bring the weapons? Would they 
involve the civilian citizens or the army in a war? 
 
Apparently, the event showed a sort of manipulation and was misleading to the voters as 
Morsi was not going into a war with Israel. On the contrary, he stressed respecting and 
abiding by all Egypt’s international treaties, and agreed for Israel to install cameras on 
the Israeli- Egyptian borders, something Mubarak never agreed on (Gad 2014: 18).  
 
Although the event is proven to be just ‘electoral campaigning’, it helped in increasing 
the trend of polarisation that would take place in Egypt during Morsi’s presidency, 
which all proved part of an attempt to change the identity of Egypt. 
 
Examples of further attempts would be changes taking place in some schools after 
promoting Muslim Brotherhood members in the Ministry of Education, as some schools 
were reported separating Muslim and Christian students, each in a separate class (Gad 
2014: 291). Another example would be an essay question that came in an Arabic 
language exam to the 1st secondary students: The role played by the government, the 
secular liberal parties, the corrupt media and the foreign organisations in conspiring 
against the Egyptian people after the 25th January Revolution (Gad 2014: 291), thus 
applying negative descriptions to other political forces in the country; media is corrupt, 
and non-Islamic parties are secular and all conspiring against Egypt! Changes were also 
clear in appointing a Muslim Brotherhood supporter to the Ministry of Culture, who 
came with a plan to dismiss non-Islamist figures from the ministry (ElNabawi 2013). 
The action re-highlighted the issue of attempts to change Egypt’s culture, especially as 
these actions happened amid calls from the Shura Council to ban ballet dancing as it 
promotes “indecency” in society (Al-Arabyia 21/6/13). 
 
Changes were not limited to the educational and cultural process only, but there was an 
attempt to implement projects that would affect every day Egyptian lives. By the end of 
2011, Egyptians found two pages on Facebook announcing the establishment of what 
was called an Egyptian Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of 
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Vice (BBC Arabic 28/12/2011). The group made it clear that it would not force 
Egyptians to do anything by coercion. However, this was not done practically. During 
Morsi’s presidency, the media reported stories that were attributed to the committee 
such as: In Luxor , a teacher cut the hair of two girls in the preparatory schools as they 
did not wear the Hijab (Al-Watan 21/10/12) . A woman wearing Niqab in the tube cut 
the hair of a 13 years old girl because she was not wearing Hijab (Youm7 8/11/2012). A 
Journalist receiving a threatening message signed by the Committee for the Promotion 
of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, asking her to stop her husband – who is journalist 
as well- from criticizing Islamic rule (Suleiman 2013). In Suez, a young man – a student 
in Engineering – was killed in the street by two men who claimed he was performing an 
obscene act in the street (Omran 2012).  The committee also published an advertisement 
looking for a thousand youth volunteers to work with it, with a weekly reward of 500 
LE, and that they would be provided with 1000 electroshock weapons (Suleiman 2013)  
 
The hate crimes did not stop at this level. It was crowned by a shocking incident toward 
the end of Morsi’s rule in June 2013 - by the lynching of four Shia – including a sheikh- 
by a mob in the village of Abu Musallim in Giza (EIPR 2013). The event was explained 
by the Human Rights watch as due to “months of hate speech” (HRW 2013). 
 
All these incidents raised the fear of non-Islamist Egyptians and increased the 
polarisation of Egyptian society and the anger against Morsi’s rule. As explained by 
Hillal in an interview, Egyptians were not angry towards Morsi because of his failure in 
running the country, but because of their fear of their Egyptian Identity (Al-Wafd 
25/1/2017). 
 
7.2.4 Using technology and mass media outlets to destroy and distort opponents 
 
On 4 June 2012, the presidency invited party leaders and public figures to meet with 
President Morsi to discuss a report about the implications of Ethiopia’s diversion of one 
of the Nile’s tributaries as part of their construction of the Nahda Dam. The meeting 
was converted into a comic movie or a circus. Those who attended the meeting thought 
that it was a confidential secret meeting with the president. No one told them that the 
meeting was being broadcast live on air. Morsi rarely spoke and left the platform to the 
leaders. They started offering strange solutions, unaware that citizens at home – even 
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Ethiopian leaders- were viewing them live. They offered solutions suggesting the 
involvement of the Egyptian intelligence service to destroy any dam Ethiopia built; 
leaking false information to the Ethiopian government; and supporting ethnic liberation 
movements in Ethiopia against the government (Al-Masry 4/6/13). The meeting 
continued like this until one of the attendees asked all in attendance to vow not to leak 
anything of what was mentioned in the meeting outside the room. He was then handed a 
note informing them that they were on air and Morsi finally revealed that the meeting 
was broadcast live (Stack 2013). 
  
The meeting provided fertile material for sarcasm and jokes between Egyptians. It was 
even the main topic in one episode of Bassem Youssef’s satirical show91 giving it the 
title ‘looking for a scandal’. However, for Morsi, the meeting had its role as it 
highlighted the political weaknesses of the political forces that attended the meeting; as 
if Morsi wanted to tell Egyptians, are these the political forces you want me to include 
in the political process.  
 
The above example is not the only instance where Morsi used media outlets to 
undermine his opponents. The role of the electronic committees continued in Morsi’s 
era, but instead of campaigning for him, the new role included opening Facebook pages 
criticising Morsi’s rule to control the amount of disapproval, highlight topics they can 
defend or divert criticism away from certain issues as explained by Abdel Galil El-
sharonoby in a personal interview. It also used to comment on online articles that 
contained any criticism of Morsi or the Muslim Brotherhood by accusing the writer of 
treason, anti-Islamic tendencies or receiving funds from abroad to criticise the regime 
(Gad 2014: 284). The role of the electronic committees was extended to even include 
creating a data base for non-Islamist public figures and sending them threatening SMS 
messages, or calling them all night and threatening them in person (Gad 2014: 284). As 
explained by those who received these calls and messages, when they reported the 
phone number to the police, they discovered that the numbers were not registered in the 
																																																						
91 Bassem Youssef hosted the Al-Bernameg (Show), a satirical news programme, considered to 
be the Egyptian version of the American programme ‘Daily Show’ by Jon Stewart. Part of the 
episode commenting on the meeting discussed can be viewed on: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_yxVREd4nn8  
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communication ministry, thus no one could obtain them (Gad 2014: 285). This suggests 
the argument highlighted in previous chapters about the Muslim Brotherhood’s IT 
department that helps the electronic committees with technical issues.  
 
7.2.5 The ‘do everything to win’ approach  
 
During the campaign, Morsi was able to secure his path towards the presidency by 
doing everything in order to win. After proven to be an effective approach during his 
campaign, he resorted to it again during his presidency. Although Morsi won the 
elections, he mainly won as Egyptians resorted to punitive voting. In other words, the 
majority of Egyptians were against him. This could be the reason why Morsi was trying 
to have full power and full control over all the institutions in the country and the 
Egyptian public sphere as well in order to secure his presidency. This was mainly 
applied through two ways. The first was through the Brotherhoodization process. The 
second was by entering a direct confrontation with the institution he was not able to 
Brotherhoodize, again in order to control it and secure his presidency. These institutions 
that he confronted included the Judiciary, the army, the church, the media and, more 
importantly, the ordinary Egyptian people who were part of each of these 
confrontations.  
 
(a) The Judiciary  
 
Morsi’s tense relationship with the Judiciary and the rule of the law appeared from day 
one. For him the judges were those who dissolved the Islamic dominated parliament and 
the constitution assembly that were formed in the transitional period as elaborated in 
previous chapters. He perceived they could ‘conspire’ against him again and threaten 
his legitimacy as a president. Since the Brotherhoodization of the Judiciary system was 
difficult due to laws organising presidential interference and since any judge need to 
come from the Judiciary cadre, confrontation was the solution.  
 
The confrontation with the Judiciary started on the same day of announcing Morsi as 
the president: his campaign stated that he would not swear the presidential oath in front 
of the SCC in accordance with the SCAF June constitution declaration, but in front of 
the people’s assembly which was already dissolved after it was proven unconstitutional 
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as mentioned in previous chapters. This act created polarisation in the public sphere 
(CNN 25/7/2012). To end the polarisation, Morsi swore the oath in three places: SCC, 
Tahrir square and Cairo University; an indication that the SCC is not the main 
legitimate place and one that can be considered as an early confrontation with SCAF 
and with Egyptian judges in general. 
 
While saying the oath in Tahrir square, another clash with the rule of law took place. 
Some supporters of Omar Abdel Rahman, the Islamic leader in al-Gamaa Islamia, who 
was spending his life term sentence in the USA in relation to the New York attacks in 
1993, were holding his photo and asking President Morsi to release him (Trager 2016). 
Morsi replied that he would do his best. This act raised many critical questions in the 
Egyptian media: Did Morsi just promise to release a terrorist who is spending his 
sentence after trial in USA prisons? (Al-Watan 29/6/12 & Aawsat 30/6/12). 
 
Disrespect for the rule of law and challenging the Judiciary was also apparent in 
Morsi’s surprising controversial decree in July ordering the currently dissolved 
parliament to reconvene92. A decree that forced the SCC to issue a statement halting the 
presidential decree as the parliament was already proven unconstitutional (The 
Guardian 10/7/2012). The issue caused polarization and protests in the street. In the end, 
Morsi suspended his decree.  
 
Another clash with the rule of the law and with the Egyptian Judiciary happened in 
October when Morsi attempted – against Egyptian law93- to remove the current 
Attorney General by making him an Ambassador to the Vatican; a move that caused 
fierce anger from all political forces.  
 
The major clash with the rule of law happened in November and December 2012, when 
Morsi issued a constitutional declaration giving himself ultimate power, and when he 
helped in passing a constitution which non-Islamic forces did not agree on.  
 
																																																						
92 The parliament already reconvened but the session did not exceed 12 minutes. see: Al-Masry 
11/7/2012. 
93 According to Egyptian law, The Attorney General / General prosecutor cannot be removed by 
the president.  
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This constitutional crisis started on 22 November 2012 when Morsi issued his most 
controversial decree which granted him full power94. According to it, all his decisions 
are “final and binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity”. He gave 
himself the right to appoint a new Attorney General for four years in opposition to 
Egyptian law; and immunized the constitution Assembly and Shura Council from 
potential dissolution by court order (Ahram online 22/11/2012). 
 
The declaration was condemned by non-Islamic political forces and sparked violent 
protests in Tahrir square and at the presidential palace in Cairo leading to hundreds of 
injuries and several deaths. In the end, Morsi agreed to limit its scope to “sovereign 
matters” but insisted on keeping his right to protect the constitution assembly from 
dissolution (BBC News 24/12/12).      
 
Morsi's declaration of 22 November gave the constitutional assembly until January to 
complete drafting the constitution. However, members of the constitution assembly met 
overnight to finish the constitution draft, an act that was described by the BBC as “a 
marathon overnight session of voting on a rushed draft” (BBC News 24/12/12); and an 
act that was taken when the SCC announced that it would rule on whether the 
constitution should be dissolved (BBC News 29/11/ 12). The constitution was approved 
by the panel and sent to Morsi who called for a referendum on the 15th December, 
refusing to postpone it as requested by the opposition forces. This was an action that 
caused outrage protests and discontent.  
 
The conflict between Morsi and the judges reached its peak when Morsi’s supporters 
surrounded the court building intimidating the judges in order to prevent them from 
reviewing the constitution assembly. This action was inspired from by his campaign’s 
activities, where his supporters used to show their numerical power by participating in 
protest or by forming long human chains. The action of surrounding the court this time 
led the court to suspend its work indefinitely. In a statement, the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) called it a "dark day" in the history of the judiciary and 
																																																						
94 For more details see the constitutional declaration in Ahram online 22/11/2012. And for more 
explanation on the crisis see: BBC News 24/12/12 
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expressed sadness at the "psychological assassination" of the court (The Guardian 
2/12/2016). 
  
Amid all this outrage, the rule of the law was once again broken when Morsi’s 
supporters entered the area around the presidential palace known as Ittihadiyah Palace, 
where anti-Morsi peaceful protests were taking place, and took control of the area. 
Muslim Brotherhood supporters also captured anti-Morsi protestors and tortured them95. 
Videos of tortures along with videos of severely injured victims speaking of what 
happened were uploaded on social media and private TV channels sparking another 
wave of anger and polarization in the Egyptian public sphere. 
 
(b) The army 
 
The confrontation with the army also started from the time of campaigning and 
continued during Morsi’s presidency. After closing the polls in the second round of 
elections, Morsi’s campaign claimed that he was the winner before any official results 
were announced; an action that was described as an attempt from Morsi to “control the 
narrative” (Trager 2016: 141). His campaign also leaked messages that the army was 
conspiring with Shafiq to change the election results to favour Shafiq. Moreover, the 
Muslim Brotherhood members came from all governorates for a sit-in protest in Tahrir 
Square, threating to use violence if Shafiq was announced as winner. This action caused 
severe tension, fear and polarization in the Egyptian public sphere, and more 
importantly sent a direct message to the army to fear Morsi’s failure in this election96.  
 
The confrontation with the army did not stop after announcing Morsi as the new 
president. Although the details of this confrontation are not available to the public, there 
are some incidents that can clarify the degree of confrontation or how Morsi was trying 
to gain control. The most prominent incident was replacing the military chiefs after less 
than two months into his presidency, an action that was described by the Washington 
Post as a “bid to consolidate power” (Londoño, 2012). 
																																																						
95 For more details about the torturing process, see: Al-Masry Al-youm Newspaper special 
coverage on 7/12/12 which is also available on its English version website ‘Egypt independent 
on 7/12/12). 
96 For a detailed description for these incidents, see: Trager 2016 p: 137-144.  
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However, the confrontation between the presidency and the army was not always that 
clear. It appeared to the public mainly through Morsi’s speeches.  Morsi made several 
statements that were understood to provoke both the army and the Egyptian people as 
well. Morsi’s speeches used to be improvisatory, exceeding the length of two hours and 
sometimes more, making them very difficult to follow or to cut for a news clip, which 
allowed him many opportunities to make controversial, problematic statements. Some 
of these problematic statements were directed or referred to the army.  
 
Four main examples can be recalled regarding this issue. The first example would be 
during the 6th of October anniversary which celebrates Egypt’s victory over Israel in 
1973. The commemoration took place in Cairo Stadium. Egyptians were surprised to 
see Tarek El-Zomor, the leader in Al-Gamaa Al-Islamia, who spent 30 years in prison 
as a punishment for his role in assassinating president Anwar Al-Sadat, who led the 
victory of the event back in 1973. This act was considered offensive by the army, 
Sadat’s family and the Egyptian people (Elaph 8/10/12). 
 
A second famous example would be the incident of kidnapping seven security officers 
in Sinai on 16 May. In this incident, Morsi commented that the efforts made to release 
them should ‘preserve the lives of everyone, whether the kidnapped or the kidnappers’ 
(Al-Masry 17/5/13). His statement raised a state of anger among the Egyptian people 
and hidden anger among the army of course. The Egyptian people, the non-Islamists, 
already feared extremism and terrorist attacks, but now their president was equating a 
terrorist who kidnapped an officer with the kidnapped officer. Although the statement 
raised fear among Egyptians, it also became one of the satirical statements often 
associated with Morsi97. For the army, the degree of anger was understood when they 
issued a statement after releasing the soldiers thanking the Army intelligence and Sinai 
tribes, without thanking the president (Trager 2014).  
 
Nonetheless, the situation between Morsi and the army was not limited to some 
hyperbole or bullshit statement (Belfiore 2009). On 10 June, Morsi spoke about the 
Ethiopian dam project saying that “all options are open” referring to a possibility of 
																																																						
97 There is a list of similar controversial statements and non-understandable statements said by 
Morsi, Egyptians often recall to make jokes of.  
	 263	
military action, involving the army and the Egyptian people in unnecessary 
confrontation and war. The turning point in the relationship between Morsi and the 
army – as described by Reuters- was the ‘Syria support conference’- where Morsi 
blessed Egyptians to go for Jihad to Syria, and moreover hinting at Egypt’s military 
intervention in Syria (Reuters Arabic 2/7/13). This action forced army leaders to break 
their silence and refute Morsi’s statements (Al-Masry 17/6/13). 
 
The above examples show the amount of ‘unprofessionalism’ from Morsi’s side. As a 
president, it would have been assumed that he would act more professionally with the 
army but, apparently, he used to resort to professionalism only for the sake of getting 
votes. After winning, he was not applying the same methods while dealing with the 
various institutions. One would assume that he would hire an expert to help him write 
his speeches, rather than being improvisational every time and creating unnecessary 
tension every time he spoke. However, it appears that these sorts of professional 
methods and techniques were not a priority for him during his presidency. The priorities 
were the methods and techniques he was depending on during and after the campaign; 
such as depending on the everything to win approach and on the organizational weight 
of the Muslim Brotherhood that can mobilize people in the street to surround a court or 
to protest in the streets, just to consolidate power and secure his presidency, without 
paying attention to the division and polarisation his actions caused in the Egyptian 
public sphere.  
  
(c) The church and Christians  
 
Morsi’s relation with the Egyptian Christians was another extension of his campaign. 
Of course, he could not Brotherhoodize the Church or Christians, thus confrontation 
through the ‘everything in order to win’ approach was the solution.  
 
During the start of campaign, Morsi gave Christians many assurances that they would 
be protected in his era. He repeatedly said that their protection was his own personal 
responsibility (Gad 2014:74), but this reassuring speech changed as soon as the result of 
the first round of elections appeared as many incidents took place that would fan the 
flames of sectarian strife. For example, immediately after announcing the results of the 
first round of elections, the Muslim Brotherhood started saying that Shafiq won because 
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of Christians votes98. Tarek El-Zomour, the leader in Al-Gamaa Al-Islamia, asked 
Christians to apologize to the Egyptian people (Gad 2014:103). Moreover, Al-Gamaa 
Al-Islamia issued a press release saying that Shafiq won due to what they called the 
‘Sectarian voting’ that took place in the first round of elections (Gad 2014:103). This 
was a continuance of the deceptive and manipulating techniques for both media and 
ordinary voters to secure the Islamic vote in the second round of elections.  
 
The same approach of confrontation continued during Morsi’s presidency. The 
confrontation reached its peak during the constitutional crisis and the demonstration that 
took place around the Ittihadiyah Palace, as Freedom and Justice leaders,99 along with 
other Islamist figures, claimed that 80% of those protesting at the palace were 
Christians and that the Church was the one mobilising them (Gad 2014:78); again 
creating unnecessary polarisation in the society, but this time between their Islamist 
supporters from one side and Christians and the Church in general from the other side.  
 
(d) Confrontation with the media 
 
Public media was also affected by the Brotherhoodisation.  The Islamist-dominated 
Shura Council appointed a new Supreme Council for the press making sure it was also 
Islamist-dominated. The new council replaced editors in all state-owned publications to 
ensure they are either Islamists or Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers. A new Minister 
of Information - Salah Abdel Maqsud - was also appointed from the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Soon after these appointments, Egyptian editors and writers left their 
columns blank to protest against decisions taken to control the media.  
 
The problems were not only limited to Brotherhoodisation. According to the Arabic 
Network for Human Rights, during the first 200 days of Morsi’s presidency, the 
authorities were investigating 24 cases where journalists were accused of insulting the 
																																																						
98 Gad (2014) disapproved this argument by comparing the number of votes with Christians 
registered in these areas. For more information, see: Gad 2014: 102-109.  
99 Mohammed al-Beltagi, the Secretary General of the Freedom and Justice Party, the political 
arm of the Muslim Brotherhood group, said that 60% of those protesting at Ittihadiyah are 
Christians. Safwat Hegazi, the Salafist Islamic figure said they were 80%. For more info see: 
Gad 2014. 
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president, in comparison to only 14 cases during the past 115 years (Al-Masry 20/1/13). 
There were also 600 complaints filed to the police against some journalists (Al-Arabyia 
net 3/4/13)  
 
The real conflict with the media appeared when Islamist supporters gathered in a sit-in 
protest surrounding the media production zone in Cairo, blocking access to it and 
preventing presenters and those working inside from entering or going out. They were 
protesting against what they called media bias against the ruling Islamist President 
Mohammed Morsi (Al-Arabiya net 25/3/13); repeating the previous situation of 
surrounding the SCC court, and repeating a technique that was proven successful in 
their campaign. The extent of the problem also appeared when the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s general guide blamed the media as the main cause for problems between 
the Muslim Brotherhood group and the Egyptian political forces (Gad 2014: 280). 
 
7.3 The lost hope 
 
It was assumed that having an elected president would eliminate the problems Egypt 
was facing. It was also assumed that the newly elected president would end the state of 
polarisation and increase trust and transparency, in order to build the required dreamed 
of democracy. Conversely, what happened in reality is that the campaigns had already 
increased the polarisation in the society as explained in previous chapters. When Morsi 
was elected as president, he did not try to end this polarisation. On the contrary, he 
continued the ‘everything in order to win’ approach to consolidate power to protect his 
presidency. This approach Morsi resorted to made him re-enforce polarisation in the 
society, reinforce the distrust issue and reinforce the non-abidance of the rule of law. 
More importantly, he created other forms of new problems such as the confrontation 
with the state’s institutions and trying to change Egyptian identity in favour of an 
Islamic – perhaps extremist identity. All these factors had a negative impact on the 
democratisation process of Egypt. It made Egypt go back again to square one and 
remain in the transitional period once more. 
 
 
 
 
	 266	
7.4 Morsi’s ‘democracy’ 
 
Dahl (1998: 37-38) highlights five criteria for a democratic process: 1- Effective 
participation: all members must have equal and effective opportunities for making their 
views known, 2- Voting equality: each member should have equal opportunity to 
express his vote, 3- Inclusion of all adults: all adults must have their full rights of 
citizenship, 4- Enlightened understanding: each member must have equal and effective 
opportunities to learn about relevant policy alternatives and their consequences, and 5- 
Control of the agenda: members must have exclusive opportunities to decide which 
subjects are placed on the agenda.  
 
By applying these criteria to Morsi’s era100, it can be easily concluded from the 
examples mentioned in this chapter that Morsi’s rule did not fulfil them. For the first 
criterion, the effective participation, Egyptians did not have equal and effective 
opportunities for making their views known. There was an attack on every outlet that 
can fulfil this criterion. There was an attack on private media which was playing that 
role. Public media was already Brotherhoodised. There was an attack on opposition 
forces and opposition leaders, and even journalists who criticised the Muslim 
Brotherhood or Morsi. The inclusion of all adults’ criterion was also not fulfilled due to 
the exclusion of any other force rather than the Brotherhood and the phenomenon 
known as the Brotherhoodisation of the state. There was no enlightened understanding: 
Egyptians were manipulated and deceived and were not allowed to have real 
opportunities to learn about the real policies the Muslim Brotherhood was 
implementing, which appeared to be only in favour of the Islamic forces. In addition to 
this, Egyptians did not have any opportunity to decide the subjects placed on the 
agenda; the easiest thing was to spread accusations about all those who tried to express 
a subject or an idea that opposes the Muslim Brotherhood’s plans to the extent that 
some Egyptians were tortured by the Brotherhood members for stating their views as in 
what happened in Ittihadiyah incident. Perhaps the only criterion fulfilled from Dahl’s 
five criteria was voting equality as Egyptians had equal opportunities to express their 
votes. Nonetheless, the process was still faulty as they were not allowed to express or to 
																																																						
100 For chronological order of full events during Morsi’s era, see: Jadaliyya 22/7/13. For detailed 
analysis of these events and their role in ending Morsi’s rule, see: Trager 2016. 
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decide topics placed on the agenda of voting from the beginning. An example of this 
would be the constitution referendum Morsi pushed for, which was passed although the 
voting turnout was only 33 percent; an alarming turn out that showed an indication of 
their distrust in the process and anger at the same time, as all their efforts and protests 
requesting a more representative constitution were not listened to. 
  
The failing path towards democracy was clear by the mid of Morsi’s rule, as he entered 
into clashes, confrontations and conflicts with almost all sectors in Egypt including non-
Islamists Muslims, Christians, judges, media and various state institutions, in order to 
protect his presidency.  Although logically one might assume that he would resort to 
what we described as ‘professionalism’ again during his ruling period, he did not do so. 
As described in previous chapters, Morsi resorted to professional experts to help him 
with his campaign. They helped him with the programme, with the feedback, with the 
media …etc. They were all from the Muslim Brotherhood, but they did the role 
requested from them at that time. When Morsi became president, it seemed that he did 
not resort to professionals to advise. It was assumed that he would resort to experts from 
all political forces to manage the country ‘professionally’ and democratically, but he did 
not. On the contrary, he was concentrating on installing his Brothers into top 
governmental positions and excluding anyone else, even other Islamic forces. He 
appeared to be a president to what he called in his speeches ‘my family and my clan’ 
and not to all Egyptians as he promised to be. When Egyptians started protesting against 
what was happening, and later started asking him to leave, he did not take it seriously. 
On the contrary, he claimed that those who opposed him were either Christians from the 
old regime, or against the revolution. By the end of his rule, he had entered into conflict 
with everyone. In short, Morsi continued all the undemocratic policies he was elected to 
change. It was clear that Egypt’s path toward democratisation was entering a cul de sac, 
making it very difficult to solve these clashes through normal traditional methods.  
 
This is why the Tamarod movement - a grassroots movement meaning "revolt" in 
Arabic- started a petition asking Morsi to step down and to allow early presidential 
elections101. Tamarod said it was able to collect more than 22 million signatures from 
Egyptians with their ID numbers, a much bigger number than those who elected Morsi. 
																																																						
101 For more info, see: BBC News 1/7/13. 
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Egyptians also went onto the streets protesting in many governorates and their numbers 
were estimated to be bigger than the number of those who protested in the 25th of 
January asking Mubarak to step down. 
 
Although a professionalised campaign helped Morsi in securing his way towards the 
presidential palace, it did not help Egyptians in having democratic rule.  It helped Morsi 
to conceal his real ideology and plans. Professionalisation helped him to make cosmetic 
exterior practical changes, but not real ideological ones. The professionalism allowed 
the Muslim Brotherhood represented by Morsi to hide their real ideological thoughts 
and present themselves as a democratic entity that advocated freedom and pluralism, 
which was proven not to be true. 
 
However, professionalism cannot be blamed for this. Professionalism does not ask 
politicians or candidates to manipulate and deceive voters. It depends on who utilises it 
and how it is utilised. It is a double-edged sword. In order for it to strengthen 
democracy, it needs to be coupled with the more cultural and ethical aspects of 
democracy which restrain tendencies towards more partisan and oppressive actions 
which some election winners might have. For example, if a more a progressive and 
democratic politician had run a more professionalised campaign, and won, Egypt’s 
situation might have been different.  
 
In addition to this, professionalisation is a process and method of implementing things 
that requires continuity; a continuous process that is not limited to campaign time only. 
The same methods and techniques applied by a candidate during a campaign could be 
applied by him after his winning. It is an indication that his way of campaigning and 
influencing people was effective and should be continued to secure his rule and power. 
However, a candidate has to develop his methods and techniques during the term of his 
rule. During the campaign, public attention is distributed among all candidates, but after 
the election, public attention is focused on the elected candidate. Thus, if the candidate 
did not develop the methods that helped him in winning, he could be easily uncovered, 
mainly by the media, other competitors and more importantly the public, as happened in 
the case of Morsi when both the ‘electronic committees’ and some of his ‘contradicted’ 
speeches were discovered after being elected. The newly elected candidate should also 
be aware that he is not the most ‘professional’ any more as there are also other entities 
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or politicians who are developing their methods and ways, and who may become more 
professional than him. This is why it is important for the newly elected candidate not 
only to continue with his methods and techniques that helped him in winning, but also 
to develop them to match and follow political and social developments taking place. 
 
In the case of Morsi, his main mistake was that he did not develop the methods and 
techniques used during his campaign period to match the new era. During the campaign 
period, he was in an ‘armed race’ focusing too much on destroying the other candidates, 
mainly Shafiq, in order to win. During this race, both candidates ignored the wider 
implications for them if elected and for the democracy process in general. After Morsi 
won, he continued with the same negative undemocratic practices he used to resort to in 
his campaign. However, during his campaign period, the attention was distributed on all 
candidates. Nobody was aware of or had enough evidence to know for example about 
his campaign resorting to astroturfing or how it works. When he became the president, 
he was under the spotlight and he was the focus of the public sphere’s attention which is 
why it was a big mistake for him not to develop his methods and techniques, and to 
continue with the same practices his campaign was depending on.  
 
For example, he could have developed the use of experts and professionals to include 
those from outside the Brotherhood, or to limit the role of his ‘electronic committees’ to 
positively campaign for him instead of targeting opposition, or even to continue using 
the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated public opinion polls used by his campaign to get a 
sense of Egyptian’s discontent towards his rule and how to fix it. Conversely, what 
Morsi did was completely the opposite: instead of trying to gain the actual support of 
the majority of Egyptians, he participated in increasing the polarisation through trying 
to have consolidated control over all and every institution in the state. This attempt to 
consolidate control and overall power can be understood as an extension of the 
campaigns. In the end, he won and became the president with a marginal victory; a 
victory that came through a majority that voted for him, not because they were 
convinced but only voted for him to preclude Shafiq through punitive voting as 
explained in previous chapters; a marginal victory that gave him an excuse to ‘do 
anything’ to protect his presidency by applying the same ‘anything to win’ approach he 
was applying during his campaigning period. The same result is almost concluded by 
Trager (2016: 181) who argues that Morsi’s electoral victory “gave him the legitimacy 
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to do whatever was needed to advance his agenda and protect his presidency”. 
Moreover, Trager explains this by referring to what he called a “Brotherhood’s 
paranoia”. A paranoia that resulted from its historical experience, making them fear that 
those who put them in prison in the past, could put them again in prison if they got the 
chance (Trager 2016: 182). This again would explain why the Brotherhood was doing 
everything and anything it could to protect its presidency, and why it continued 
focusing on its ‘doing anything to win’ approach rather than developing its approaches, 
methods and strategies to keep pace with the new era. This is why studying and 
analysing the presidential campaigns not only offered insights into how campaigns were 
managed and operated, but also helped in offering an analysis of Morsi’s policies after 
winning the elections, which was an extension of his campaign’s logic. 
 
7.5 Americanisation or Professionalisation  
 
This study showed how adopting an American-esque professionalised campaigns 
strategy, where candidates are ready to do or say anything in order to win was 
inappropriate in the case of Egypt. The study also inferred that the case would be the 
same in other nascent democracies. The reason for this can be rooted in the different 
political and cultural context between the US and other nascent democracies. The US 
has a history of elections and campaigning that has been developing over a long period 
of time. This history provided a learning environment for campaigns, media and more 
importantly, citizens. This history and long experience in campaigning and elections 
also made American citizens and the media more critical and politically literate, making 
them aware of the rules of the game – to an extent more advanced than Egyptians. 
Conversely, Egyptians – and citizens of other nascent democracies – do not have this 
long experience of national elections campaigning enabling the same literacy present in 
the United States or other consolidated democracies, so the tactics of the highly 
professional campaigns are alien to them.  
 
Professionalisation, as discussed here, is catch- all term to describe adapting 
professionalised strategies and professionalised structures to implement professional – 
hopefully successful – campaigns; campaigns that can win elections but are not 
necessarily an asset for democracy. Professionalisation is also used as an umbrella term 
for many other labels such as Americanisation and Westernisation, where campaigns 
	 271	
resort to techniques developed and used mainly in the US or Western developed 
countries.  
 
In general, the “ubiquity” of the term (Tenscher et al 2016) and vagueness of a clear 
solid definition has been acknowledged by many scholars (Tenscher et al 2016; Lilleker 
and Negrine, 2002; Negrine and Lilleker, 2002). The reason for this is that there is a 
wide range of competing explanatory theories that can be summarised as follows: (a) 
Adoption model (Plasser and Plasser 2002), where the US campaigning model is 
exported to and implemented in other countries exactly as it is, leading to the 
transformation of campaigns and standarisation of campaign practices, where country 
specific traditional campaigning practices withdraw gradually and become substituted 
by US practices (Plasser and Plasser 2002: 19). (b) Shopping model (Plasser and Plasser 
2002), or adaptation mode (Lees-Marshment and Lilleker 2012), where certain 
structures and strategies are imported from the US and modified to suit the context in 
the country that will apply them, leading to the professionalisation of political 
campaigns outside the US and the hybridisation of campaign practices (Plasser and 
Plasser 2002: 19). Lees-Marshment and Lilleker (2012) even extend the scope of the 
adaptation model to involve other Western countries, not only the US. 
 
The effect of these two trends –Adoption or Shopping and Adaptation) - on other 
countries has been also studied extensively (Norris 2004; Plasser and Plasser 2002; 
Tenscher et al 2016). They can be summarized as follows: (1) Studies concentrating on 
the importance of the local context and denying a duplicate influence of US campaigns 
stating that “innovations emerge locally and simultaneous to developments in the 
United States” (Tesncher et al 2016:3). (2) Studies arguing that campaigns in other 
countries imitate the US campaigns (Baines and Egan, 2001; Negrine, 2008). (3) 
Studies arguing that many of the US campaign practices are ‘exported’ to a diverse 
range of countries such as Israel, Russia and Mexico (Norris 2004; Swanson and 
Mancini 1996). (4) Studies highlighting that there are culture limitations to the 
application of the Americanisation thesis, which can make it vary from one country to 
another such as the regulatory framework, the party system, the media system and the 
electorate (Norris 2003; Plasser and Plasser 2002). 
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While taking this debate into consideration, along with its different accounts, and 
despite the cultural limitations (Norris 2003; Plasser and Plasser 2002), there is some 
evidence to suggest that American campaigns in particular - and Western campaigns in 
general- can be considered as a role model (Scammell 1998) for many of the Egyptian 
campaigns that were working during the 2012 presidential elections. This can be 
attributed to two main reasons: (1) some key figures in the campaigns saw the US as 
their role model, differences were whether to fully abide by US model of campaigning 
or to adapt it locally. (2) some key figures also studied campaigning in the US, either 
academically by taking or applying for an academic degree, or through practical 
professional campaigning courses studying the US campaigning model. 
 
An example for this would be Yara Khalaf from Moussa’s campaign. Khalaf mentioned 
clearly that they were adapting the Obama campaign model and that their aim was to 
run the Moussa campaign in Egypt as the equivalent of the Obama campaign. At the 
end of the campaign, Khalaf also took her Master’s degree at the ESLESCA business 
school in International Business Administration. Her research project focused on 
studying the position in political campaigns where she compared the Obama campaign 
with Moussa’s campaign applying the Western model of political marketing positioning 
on both of them. The same applies for General Said Zaatar from Moussa’s campaign 
who was also keen on taking courses in US election campaigning between 1990 and 
2002. The case did not differ in the Aboul Fotouh campaign, as El-Shahawy, his 
campaign manager was keen on studying the Western model of marketing techniques as 
well. He gained his Master’s degree in International Business administration in 2008 
from the ESLESCA business school. And at the end of 2011, when he was campaigning 
for Aboul Fatouh, he applied for the DBA doctorate of business administration with the 
Maastricht School of Management. His thesis subject was political marketing in Egypt. 
However, he dropped out after one year as he had to leave Egypt. The case was almost 
the same in Shafiq’s campaign: Mahmoud Ibrahim, his campaign’s social media 
manager presented himself as an expert in US elections. Before the campaign he took 
some courses on US elections in the period between 2005 and 2010 with the 
International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute. After the 
election, he gained an internship with the help of the US embassy in Cairo to go and 
work as an intern in Mitt Romney’s presidential election campaign. He also travels to 
the US whenever there is an election to follow the campaign work there. Ibrahim also 
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stated that some of the field coordinators they resorted to from the dismantled NDP 
were sent during Mubarak’s era to the UK to learn from both the Conservative and 
Labour parties’ campaigning experience.  
 
Although the above may not act as proof that the campaigns are Americanised, or that 
the Egyptian campaigns fully adhere to Americanised techniques, it acts as evidence of 
what the campaign staff wanted their campaigns to look like; they wanted it to look like 
a professional campaign like those in the United States. For the majority of them, 
American campaigns were the ideal. Some of them – such as Mahmoud Ibrahiam from 
Shafiq’s campaign- highlighted that the differences are only cultural ones, such as the 
ways of mobilising voters. As he explained, in the US, they could mobilise voters by 
emails or SMS. Conversely, in Egypt, they have to go and knock on the door. That is 
why Ibrahim explained that in many cases they would take the main idea, theme or 
strategy from the US or Western model, but adapt it locally to be effective in the 
Egyptian local context. Morsi’s campaign also followed an American model, although 
agreeing not to abide by anything that would not allow them to get more votes, or that 
might suggest that they would lose votes such as the debate. This highlights that they 
pick, choose and then adapt locally to suit the Egyptian context (Lees-Marshment and 
Lilleker 2012). 
 
The effect of the US model even appeared before the campaigning period: rumours 
spread that some of the potential candidates at that time were bringing American 
campaign experts and companies to help them with the campaigns - a claim that was 
proven untrue, but showed how the public sphere (not only campaign officials) were 
thinking of US campaigns. For them, campaigns are an American invention and the best 
campaigns are in the US.  
 
From the above, it is clear that the Egyptian campaigns followed an Adaptation (Lees-
Marshment and Lilleker 2012) or Shopping model (Plasser and Plasser 2002), where 
they adapted certain Americanised and Westernized strategies and techniques, modified 
them and applied them according to their cultural and political context in Egypt. As 
Plasser and Plasser (2002:39) explained it: 
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“American campaign techniques represent a giant political supermarket for foreign 
clients offering a variety of items, practices and techniques’  
 
This idea of shopping in a supermarket (Plasser and Plasser 2002) , where you have the 
luxury to pick and choose according to your needs and resources and then adapt what 
you bought according to the local context (Lees-Marshment and Lilleker 2012), taking 
into consideration the cultural, political, media and legal local factors (Norris 2003; 
Plasser and Plasser 2002), is clear in how Morsi’s and Shafiq’s campaigns refused to 
adapt some strategies such as the debate and a preferred a functional approach over a 
branding one. This again is nearly the same as Mahmoud Ibrahim from Shafiq’s 
campaign also mentioned; that they sometimes just get the idea or the main concept 
from the US campaigns but adjusted it while applying it according to what he described 
as ‘the Egyptian style’. A style that reflects the political and cultural context. 
 
This conclusion correlates with Plasser and Plasser’s findings (2002: 38) while studying 
campaigning in 52 electoral democracies. They found that different countries apply the 
shopping model while adapting Americanised campaigns by choosing to adapt specific 
features more than others. For example, Western campaigns’ experts are concentrating 
on the use of electronic mass media. South African experts are keener on the strategic 
use of political research techniques as a way of developing their strategies. While 
Ukrainian experts are more interested on the campaign management process and the use 
of electronic mass media. On the other hand, Latin American campaigns’ experts 
concentrate more on media and PR strategies along with public opinion polls. As the 
largest electoral democracy in the world where eligible voters exceed 600 million 
(Plasser and Plasser 2002), Indian campaigners are interested more in computerised 
campaign techniques and depending on digital software that can help them in the 
counting of votes (Plasser and Plasser 2002: 38). This also correlates with Mancini’s 
conclusion (1999 :243) that “Professionalism seems to develop differently in different 
electorate and political systems and political cultures”. 
 
As in the case of Egypt, the use of professionalisation - as used by Morsi and Shafiq- 
was not helpful to the wider process of democracy in some of these states. An example 
of this would be the Russian Republic and previous states of the Soviet Union due to the 
lack of democratic traditions and party structures (Plasser and Plasser 2002:44). Plasser 
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and Plasser (2002:45) also concluded that adopting professionalised Americanised 
techniques does not always favour some countries, mainly emerging democracies, due 
to practices like political corruption, electoral fraud and votes purchase. As they stated: 
 
“the consequences of the proliferation or imitation of US - American campaign 
techniques in the emerging democracies in Africa and Asia arouse even more 
pessimistic feelings” (Plasser and Plasser: 45). 
 
These ‘pessimistic feelings’ were proven to be true in the Egyptian case, mainly with 
those that chose to adopt a functional negative approach to their campaigns, ready to do 
anything in order to win as highlighted in previous chapters, which had negative 
implication on the process of democracy. This again correlates with Hamelink’s 
conclusion that a Professionalised campaign “does little to assist the development of 
strong, participatory, deliberative democracy” (Hamelink 2007:185). 
 
Despite the history of elections in Egypt, which almost started in 1866102, the 2012 
presidential elections were a totally different case. One can argue that Egypt passed by 
the pre-modern and modern campaigns era in its long history of parliamentary elections 
along with trade union elections; but the case was totally different in terms of the 
presidential elections. One can also argue that both the 2005 and 2012 presidential 
election campaigns jumped directly to the postmodern campaigns era without passing 
through the other two phases, pre-modern and modern campaigns: the presidential 
election campaigns were already born in the postmodern era, and those working on the 
presidential campaign did not witness the other two eras and did not necessarily build 
upon these two phases. Some of those working were even not born in this postmodern 
era. Thanks to the age of globalisation, changes in media environments and electoral 
markets (Plasser and Plasser 2002), along with the social, political and technological 
developments that are coined with the post-industrial era (Tenscher et al 2016). 
 
																																																						
102 Egypt witnessed a sort of elections in miniature amid the French Expedition in 1798. In this 
period, Napoleon Bonaparte tried to play the role of the Saviour who can save Egyptians from 
their bad conditions under the rule of the Ottoman empire. He formed two general assemblies 
whose members could be elected only via indirect elections by another committee formed of 14 
members. In Ismail’s pasha era, mainly in 1866, Egypt witnessed its first parliamentary 
elections, where Egyptians were able to vote through direct elections. However, it limited the 
right to run for elections to the elite only. 
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7.6 Applying the professionalisation index in nascent democracies: 
 
Despite the moral shortage, the professionalisation index still offers a comprehensive 
way of studying campaigns in nascent democracies. It is flexible enough to amend the 
components that reflect the criteria it measures. As explained, in the case of Egypt, there 
was a necessity to add social media and debates as independent criteria. In the Egyptian 
case, they did not aim to be biased toward new technologies. On the contrary, they 
reflected the real logic behind the campaign strategies. This indicates that other 
components can be added or deleted when applying the index to other countries, 
depending on the context the campaigns were working in and the methods they were 
using, which will differ from one country to another. This context could be the 
regulatory framework, the party system, the media system and the electorate (Norris 
2003), or extend to include institutional and cultural limits (Plasser and Plasser 2002). 
 
Future academics studying future campaigns in similar transitional environments should 
take into consideration the possibility of transferring the index into a qualitative method 
while studying single countries, rather than the quantitative method the index was 
already designed for. The qualitative use of the index offers the opportunity to learn all 
aspects of the campaign as well as reflecting on some of the potential impacts. 
 
The reason for this is that while studying completely new election campaigns, the 
quantitative method would be useless in describing the mechanisms and logic of the 
campaign. It will just give numbers and comparisons without real insight into what 
happened, how it happened and why it happened. Having said that, the quantitative 
method would still be useful if doing a comparative study between several countries 
(Tenscher et al 2016), or doing longitudinal analysis on several campaigns over a long 
period of time, where quantitative data is already present.  Academics should always 
assess the benefits and disadvantages of each approach while taking into account what 
is the real aim of their study. Is it longitudinal study of the level of professionalisation 
in various countries; or the level of professionalism in a specific country at a specific 
point where extensive data is not available? 
 
Another element that would help future academics is to add weight to each of the 
components, which was one of the limitations of the index in general and one of the 
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limitations of this study specifically due to time and resource constraints. Adding 
weight to the variables by studying the effect they had on voting behaviour would add 
significantly to the index itself and would help in better analysis of the studied 
campaign, especially in nascent democracies. More importantly, the index will benefit 
more from adding criteria and components that can measure and assess the democratic 
values in order to study and analyse the wider implications of the campaigns, not only 
who won and who lost, or which campaign was more ‘professional’ than the other. 
Adding such criteria would be essential, especially in nascent democracies due to the 
absence or the non-embeddedness of the democratic culture and values in these 
societies.  
 
7.8 An Index for Campaign Practitioners: 
 
As discussed before, the importance of the professionalisation index could extend to 
benefit practitioners. It can still be used as a practical guide mainly in nascent 
democracies. A campaign can resort to it as a step by step guide or as a check list 
especially if they are starting from scratch, with no previous experience in national or 
presidential elections. 
 
There are several questions a new campaign needs to ask itself before starting. The most 
important has to do it with its logic: to what extent they are willing to go negatively or 
positively? If they go positively, do they have a plan to counter attacks? Are they going 
to resort to astroturfing? If they resort to it, will they use it negatively or positively? If 
they will not resort to it, do they have the strategy and resources required to counter 
astroturfing undertaken by other campaigns? And more importantly, if they decide to go 
negatively and perhaps follow the path of doing any and everything in order to win, do 
they have a plan to eliminate the damage of their approach when they get elected to 
office so as not to repeat the Egyptian experience? A campaign needs to ask itself these 
sorts of questions in order to develop a structure and a strategy that could help them to 
establish their campaign mainly in nascent democracies. Below are some of the main 
themes a campaign needs to think about from the first moment their candidate starts 
thinking about running for office, before the actual commencement of their campaign.  
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Some of these themes raise serious concerns about the ethics and morality of the 
campaign. It will be fully up to the campaign to decide whether it will adopt an ethical 
and positive approach, or whether it is ready to commit to non-ethical and immoral 
things and adopt manipulative methods in order to win. In the case of deciding to be 
manipulative and not to abide by ethics and morals, it has to bear in mind the 
consequences of this approach when their candidates get elected to office, by having a 
strategy for solving problems that are most likely to erupt from their campaign’s 
unethical logic and affect their ruling period and the general idea of a democratic 
system, due to their unethical manipulation of voters. That is why it is necessary for the 
campaign to think about all these issues before developing their campaign. 
 
A- Campaign structure 
 
1- Campaign staff 
As discussed in chapter six, there are two major posts a campaign needs to pay extra 
attention to. The first is the campaign manager. Is the campaign manager trustworthy, 
capable of hiring and managing other members of the campaigns including outside 
agencies and volunteers? 
 
The second post is the field coordinator. Does the campaign have an active well-
connected field coordinator(s) who can mobilise voters? How can they reach them, 
especially if the country is new to elections? Perhaps the campaign should think about 
influential reference groups in various constituencies, or field coordinators who used to 
work in other sorts of elections before? The campaign has to be aware of the vital role 
of this post, as it appeared from the Egyptian experience that voters will not go to the 
polling station alone without being mobilised, and the importance of the field 
coordinator post comes in here. 
 
A third post the campaign should also think about is the need for a professional media 
department that can direct the media by feeding stories and adapting to the media logic 
from one side, and on the other side shaping the public sphere debate by positioning the 
candidate as a front runner. 
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2- Management style 
A campaign should adapt a centralised hierarchal structure at the top managerial level in 
order to be able to impose the changes and strategies it needs. Underneath the candidate, 
along with the top posts, a campaign can resort to a horizontal level management as it 
will be more efficient in the daily work. 
 
3- Campaign premises 
Although some candidates may resort to public places such as a mosque to manage the 
campaign from, there is a great need to have separate private premises for the 
campaigns. Chapter Six highlighted the importance of having separate campaign 
premises as a headquarters in the capital and national branches along the country, and 
highlighted examples of locations. 
 
Since this process can be an expensive task, especially with limited resources for an 
independent campaign that does not have a political party to support, the campaign 
should think out of the box and create alternative ways to obtain these offices. This 
could include getting the endorsement of a political party, where this party can give its 
offices to the campaign to use, or building a base of volunteers and supporters who can 
then volunteer places for the campaign to use. Having said this, the campaign should 
have the upper hand in managing these offices and ensure that they abide by the 
campaign logic, strategies and policies. 
 
4. Degree of externalisation  
The degree of externalisation can be considered as an extension to the campaign staff. 
The campaign will not fulfil all its requirements internally. It will need to resort to 
professional experts and companies that will be dedicated to work on the campaign on a 
temporary basis. However, this may be different to an extent in nascent democracies as 
all the campaigns are temporary. In other words, the dedicated external staff will be 
working for the duration of the campaign. The type of expertise needed can differ from 
one country to another. However, in general, the main external experts that a campaign 
will need should include media professionals, marketing professionals, experts to work 
on the candidate’s programme and experts to help developing ways to monitor and get 
feedback.  
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5. Internal campaign communication structures 
A campaign should make sure that members of the campaign are communicating 
effectively and that there are ways to avoid miscommunication between staff. Means of 
communication can vary from one campaign to another and can be a mixture of face to 
face communication, phone calls, messages and emails. Perhaps the most two important 
criteria a campaign should take into its consideration is that members of the campaign, 
along with volunteers, can use the method of communication chosen effectively. For 
example, a campaign should not use text messages with a volunteer who cannot read or 
write, or emails if the receiver does not have good internet coverage, or high 
technological means if the receiver is technology illiterate. The second important item is 
that the campaign needs to secure its internal communication methods to avoid security 
breaches such as, but not limited to, leaking data and hacking. 
 
 
6. Feedback 
Chapter Six highlighted the importance of having a separate department and dedicated 
staff to monitor feedback and communicate it effectively to the campaign manager, 
candidate and other related departments.  
 
Effective feedback can be gathered through public opinion polls and focus groups. 
However, in nascent democracies, it may be difficult to have efficient public opinion 
polls available. Thus, there is the need for the campaign to think again outside the box 
and develop its own ways of getting feedback away from media manipulation. This 
could include: having its own public opinion poll with the help of the business sector, 
conducting focus group sessions in various cities in the country, making use of the field 
coordinators to get them to obtain feedback from various places they are working in. 
The campaign could also get feedback from media outlets including social media but 
they have to take into consideration that it could be manipulative and does not represent 
the actual sentiments of voters. They can only use it as an indication and a way of 
monitoring negative aspects highlighted about their campaign and their candidate. 
 
7. Opposition research 
A campaign should have a dedicated unit and dedicated staff to conduct research on 
other campaigns and other candidates. This could include: background research on all 
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opposing candidates; media monitoring of candidate appearance; content analysis of 
candidate media appearance, use of social media and websites; monitoring candidate’s 
promises and programmes. Although not ethical, a campaign may also extend to involve 
sending unknown staff from the campaign to attend the opposing candidates’ public 
events; or perhaps if the campaign decided to go negative, penetrating other campaigns; 
although this will not be useful if discovered, and if the candidate was elected, as it will 
not be helpful for the wider democratic process since it will be discovered sooner or 
later. 
 
8. Campaign duration 
Campaign duration laws vary from one country to another in nascent democracies or in 
countries where high levels of negativity and attacks are adopted. As explained in 
Chapter Six, long campaign durations do not always favour the candidate, especially 
when candidates do not enter the election race at the same time, or when the interval 
between various candidates entering the election race exceeds a year, such as the 
Egyptian case. In such a case, it may be better that the candidate starts introducing 
themselves without announcing their real intention to be candidate. In other words, as 
soon as the candidate decides that he will enter the race, he should begin finding a place 
for himself in the public sphere. This could happen by engaging in the debates taking 
place in the public sphere or by engaging in some projects that interest the public in his 
country. The main aim of these activities would be to make himself known to and 
trusted by the public, and present himself as an authentic person without making the 
public think that he is doing this in order to enter the election. At this stage, opposing 
candidates and media will not be concentrating on destroying him as he is not a 
potential candidate and all the attention will be focused on real candidates.  After 
successfully creating this image away from elections, he should then find supporters 
who are urging him to put himself forward and represent them, which would be a 
chance for him to announce that he will run for election. 
 
 
9. Campaign budget 
Campaigns budgets and spending differs from country to country based on the laws 
organizing them. In terms of budget, the campaign usually suffers from two things: 
from where to get the money and what if they exceeded the amount the law states? 
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That is why it is always preferable that candidates and campaigns try to influence the 
law through members of the parliament and institutions managing the election process 
to raise the amount of campaign spending by comparing the overall expenditures of 
each candidate’s campaign per eligible voter ... i.e. to have an adequate amount of 
money per eligible voter. 
 
Chapter Six also highlighted other ways the campaign could overcome the limit of 
spending such as depending on in-kind contributions that are not calculated in the 
official documents of the campaign’s spending. In other words, although highly 
unethical, the campaign could always find ways - if it wants - to circumvent the law in 
terms of its spending by asking volunteers or candidates’ friends to pay themselves for 
items needed for the campaign (even if the campaign is the one actually giving them the 
money) and consider it as in-kind donations that will not be calculated in the official 
documents. 
 
 
B- Campaigns strategies 
 
1. Voting targeting  
As explained in Chapter Six, campaigns should be aware that they will not reach or 
appeal to all voters. Thus is the necessity of dividing voters into segments that can 
easily be reached, and developing a secure base of voters.  In order to do this , the 
campaign will need to locate these targets which again could be a difficult process 
especially with the absence of data mainly in nascent democracies.  
 
That is why campaigns should again think outside the box to find other alternatives. 
This could include studying different cities’ voting patterns in previous elections and 
trying to influence law makers to make a voter database available for campaigns. 
Campaigns could also try to build their own voter database by other means – which is 
usually easy in nascent democracies either due to the absence of regulating laws or not 
having the culture of abiding by the law if it existed; or simply by accepting bribes or 
the so-called facilitation fees. These other ways of building data could include having 
membership lists of clubs, trades unions, schools’ students to access parents , university 
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students or even banks’ clients or mobile phones’ customers. A campaign could also 
agree with places that their targeted voters may be going to join a subscription list 
which can be passed to the campaign later. In other words, if the campaign targets 
middle class youth, it could agree with some cafes and restaurants to make these clients 
add their contact details for future promotions and offers, which will be passed later to 
the campaigns … and suchlike methods. 
 
 
2. Narrowcasting activities 
After deciding who the targeted voters are , the campaign should start reaching them 
through narrowcasting activities. These narrowcasting activities can include specific 
tailored messages or secret promises or general explanations about the candidate and his 
promises. A campaign should always take care that what happens in a narrowcasting 
activity could be leaked to the media even if the media was not invited thanks to 
modern technologies, especially smart phones. That is why a campaign should always 
be keen on not providing contradictory messages through these narrowcasting activities. 
A good narrowcasting activity should personalise the campaigns’ messages and the 
importance of the voters’ vote through GOTV (Gerber and Green 2008). A sample of 
narrowcasting activities could include designated SMS messages that are sent to 
specific places. For example, if your targeted audience is of a specific religion, you 
could send SMS messages to mobile phones in the area of their place of worship at the 
time of prayers. Or if you have a specific programme for school education, a campaign 
could send messages or go and meet parents when they are collecting their children 
from schools … and so on. 
 
 
3. Free Media  
Media outlets play an important role in the election period as candidates will mainly 
reach the wider voters through mass media channels. Unknown candidates might have 
problems gaining access to the mass media if they are not considering them as front 
runners and here is the importance of having an active media department that can force 
the candidate onto the media agenda. A successful media strategy would include 
feeding the media with stories in order to stabilise the media agenda setting. Feeding 
journalists indirectly with stories and creating events and stories that media would be 
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interested in covering might reduce the chances of journalists digging for stories about 
the candidate themselves and moving the election debate towards totally new issues the 
candidate might not be good at. At the end of the day, journalists need items to produce 
and stories to publish with media outlets becoming 24 hours a day; they will need 
stories to fill their outputs. That is why campaigns should not take what media presents 
as a real reflection of voters’ behaviour, especially in nascent democracies due to the 
absence of critical media and aware voters. The absence of these checks and balances 
necessitates that the campaign investigates what is mentioned in media without 
neglecting it, but yet again without exaggerating its role regarding voters’ expected 
decisions as it can simply get it wrong. 
 
4. Paid Media 
The Egyptian campaigns study provided some ideas to use paid media without actually 
paying. These ideas could mainly help small campaigns that do not have enough 
resources and money or campaigns that are not supported by parties. From these ideas: 
in terms of production, a campaign could include volunteers from big advertising 
companies, or famous cinema or TV directors and crew who can do advertisements, 
whether TV, radio or online, without getting paid by the campaign. In terms of 
broadcasting, a campaign can strike a deal with TV channels that their candidate 
appears on the channel without being paid, in return for which the channel plays their 
advertisement. Such ideas should limit the cost of paying for paid media. 
 
5. Debates 
Some might argue that the lesson learned from the Egyptian case is not to participate in 
debates. However, this would be not applicable in all contexts and might bring attacks 
on the candidate who refuses, especially if there are other candidates participating. 
Further, it might not be good for the wider implications of the campaign, such as the 
negative media coverage and online backlash against Theresa May after she refused to 
participate in televised debates in which other candidates participated (Coleman 2017). 
 
There are some ideas that a campaign can take into consideration if they decided to go 
for debates. These include: participating in debates only if all candidates are in it, rather 
than choosing only two candidates to participate; agreeing with other candidates on a 
positive approach in the debates putting attacks and negativity aside; choosing a 
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professional impartial presenter who is aware of the wider implications the debate might 
have on the election process; the campaign having its own producer and director who 
work closely with the channel hosting the debate; it may be applicable for the 
campaigns to have the questions beforehand, especially in a nascent democracy where 
media roles are not critical. However, the last option is not advisable as it will transfer 
the debate into a pre-recorded show and will not achieve the aim from it, especially as 
sooner or later the audience will know that the candidates had the questions beforehand. 
 
6. Internet and social media  
A campaign should have a separate team for internet and social media. The team should 
be following what other campaigns and candidates are saying on social media i.e. 
working closely with both feedback and opposition research teams. It should also re-
broadcast the campaign’s and candidate’s messages on the campaign’s internet and 
social media outlets, besides creating specific content for the online, rather than only 
depending on what is broadcasted on other outlets. A campaign should also have 
dedicated persons to reply and engage with social media audiences as some other 
campaigns might be deliberately trying to consume the team’s time. Thus, the need is to 
divide the work without consuming all the team time. The main question, however, is 
the campaign’s need to address whether it is going to resort to astroturfing or not and 
how it will counter astroturfing campaigns that already exist.   
  
7. Campaign activities 
A campaign should be keen on media coverage by creating events mainly aimed at 
media coverage known as Pseudo-events. This could include a variety of events 
depending on the context in each country. Although these activities are mainly designed 
for media, it will help the campaign in reinforcing its image and messages, and will give 
extra credit to the campaign as voters will see the media attracted to cover the candidate 
and campaign’s activities. These activities could range from double decker buses to 
press conferences to launching events for the campaign and the programme. 
 
8. Degree of personalisation  
A campaign should be keen on developing messages that show the personal character of 
their candidate and make him appear to the public as an authentic character. It may be 
wise for the campaign to do this by appearing in various media outlets through indirect 
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political broadcasts, infotainment broadcasts or pure entertainment programmes. This 
will depend on the media environment the campaign is working in. It will also differ 
depending on other issues such as whether the candidate is known to the public or not, 
as candidates who are not known to the public will have to focus first on introducing 
themselves to the voters. The campaign media team may also provide media outlets 
about personal stories and personal trusted contacts who are close to the candidate who 
can help in creating personal stories about the campaign. 
 
7.9 Conclusion: 
 
Some of the ideas presented in this study are that the ‘do anything to win approach’ can 
lead to unethical manipulation of voters which would have a negative impact on 
democracy. That is why the study suggested the importance of developing an index that 
can be converted to a practical guide that can have ethical and democratic components 
and at the same time guarantee winning. For these reasons, some might argue that the 
unethical tactical advice given to campaigns’ practitioners may contradict the study’s 
aspirations. However, in the absence of an index that can stop manipulation and ensure 
winning, and with practitioners still eager to manipulate and doing everything in order 
to win, and not paying attention to the wider implications, the researcher finds it wise to 
highlight the unethical practical advice - alongside the ethical - that can also be learned 
from the Egyptian experience. This leaves it to campaigners to use their own moral 
compass when developing a campaign by deciding which approach they want to adapt 
and implement according to their own local context. Ethics and democratic values 
cannot be imposed on those who do not believe in them, especially with the absence of 
clear legislation, the absence of the rule of law and more importantly the absence of 
citizens and media systems that condemn these unethical practices. In a country where 
even ordinary citizens and media compete in manipulating the laws and manipulating 
each other’s, ethical tactics might not be appealing until citizens themselves believe in 
them before campaigners, which will not happen in one day. 
 
The academic and practical ideas presented in this chapter are purely a result of the 
study of the 2012 Egyptian elections. Future studies of elections in other countries 
should investigate the extent to which these ideas can be applied in other countries’ 
contexts, taking into consideration ethical, institutional, cultural and electoral 
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differences, along with differences in the media and legal system. Future studies about 
other Egyptian elections should also take into consideration changing the political, 
cultural and social environments the campaign will be working in. As explained in this 
study, the 2012 Egyptian election took place in an extraordinary situation as it happened 
directly after a revolution and was almost the first multi-candidate election where the 
winner was not previously known, situations that would not exist in every election.  
 
Professionalisation, as discussed in this study, is just a process and an academic 
framework that is used to understand how campaigns are conducted. Although Egyptian 
candidates along with their campaigns’ managers might not be aware of it, they still 
resort to it by adopting techniques used by other countries. They also resort to it by 
adopting techniques written in books they read or subjects they studied, as some of the 
campaigns’ staff had already studied subjects like marketing and political 
communications. They also follow campaign activities in other countries such as the 
United States. However, as this chapter proved, fully adopting the techniques of a 
professional campaign, in the way they were implemented, was inappropriate to use in a 
country like Egypt due to the negative impact it had on its democratisation process. In 
the case of Egypt, the lack of experience for both candidates and citizens, the way the 
campaigning system was working in terms of doing anything to win, then fully 
consolidating power, and the lack of both critical objective media and educated citizens 
since both were easy to manipulate, all meant that democracy does not automatically 
become embedded in the country as when candidates import the full modes of 
campaigning utilized in more advanced democracies; which is why adopting the full 
techniques of a professional campaign, as conducted in fully consolidated democracies, 
might not be appropriate for a transitional country, nascent or emergent democracies.  
 
Studying the professionalism of the Egyptian campaigns by applying the 
Professionalisation Index offered insight to the campaigns and its implications on the 
democratisation process under the rule of Morsi, the winning president. However, the 
greater emphasis on resources and sophisticated strategies of the Professionalisation 
Index make it an incomplete index to be applied to the Egyptian campaigns; campaigns 
that are taking place in a country that is still in its transitional phase.  This is because the 
index does not include necessary criteria for the democratic process: items like ethics, 
transparency, participation, enlightened understanding and suchlike criteria that are 
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necessary if we need to consider the wider implications of the campaigns, not just who 
won and who lost. This is why there is a great need for a professionalisation framework 
or index that does not depend only on resources, sophistications that might extend to 
involve an ‘anything to win approach’; a framework that can also be converted later into 
a model or a guide to be followed by campaigns, especially for those who have real 
sincere democratic efforts so that they can inform and engage voters, not manipulate 
them, and at the same time guarantee winning. Perhaps future research could be able to 
develop both a professionalization framework and a model for campaigns to follow; a 
framework and a model that can guarantee winning but at the same time guarantee 
enhancing the democratic values, which were missing in the case of Egypt. 
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